Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

As I, and virtually every other atheologian who propounds EAE, have been for decades. It's generally assumed these days. Apparently, that assumption isn't always warranted.

This is the crux of your objection to EAE. You think these are more important for humans to have than the prevention of some intense suffering. And that's why God isn't morally obligated to prevent suffering, even though we are. Your argument is that these three pursuits are more important than the prevention of any suffering at all. (Correct me if I've misread you.)

If something is logically impossible, to claim it has obtained is to utter a contradiction. That means the speaker has said something like (1) "Jane, the spinster, has a neglectful husband," or (2) "Drumheller Fountain is round and has such nice corners." I can restate these sentences in predicate logic, in which the contradiction is obvious. Observe:

For (1), where "a" is the individual Jane, "S" is the predicate "[] is a spinster," "(Ex)" is the existential quantifier, "H" is the relation "[] is the wife of []", and "N" is the predicate "[] is neglectful":

(1a) Sa & (Ey)(Hay & Ny) [assumption]
(1b) -(Ex)((Ey)(Hxy) & Sx) [assumption: definition of "H" and "S"]
(1c) (x)-((Ey)(Hxy) & Sx) [from (1b)]
(1d) -((Ey)(Hay) & Sa) [from (1c)]
(1e) Sa [from (1a)]
(1f) -(Ey)(Hay) [from (1d) and (1e)]
(1g) (Ey)(Hay) [from (1a)]
(1h) Q & -Q [from (1f) and (1g)]

For (2), where "b" is the individual "Drumheller Fountain," "(Ex)" is the existential quantifier," "R" is the predicate "[] is round," and "C" is the predicate "[] has nice corners":

(2a) Rb & Cb [assumption]
(2b) -(Ex)(Rx & Cx) [assumption: definition of "R" and "C"]
(2c) (x)-(Rx & Cx) [from (2b)]
(2d) -(Rb & Cb) [from (2c)]
(2e) Q & -Q [from (2c) and (2d)]

As you can see, both (1) and (2) lead to an explicit contradiction. Let me know if you want me to explain any of the steps in the reasoning further.

So now you can show me the contradiction in these three utterances. You could either do that by deriving a contradiction in predicate logic, as I have performed above, or you can simply point it out directly. Go for it:

(3) Humans possess a robust and useful body of scientific knowledge, and God has intervened to prevent one baby from being scalded.
(4) Humans have a rich and important history, and God has intervened to prevent one baby from being scalded.
(5) Humans have an extensive and highly functional body of experiential knowledge, and God has intervened to prevent one baby from being scalded.

Let me anticipate an objection right off the bat: You're likely to say that if God doesn't intervene completely, he's failed a moral obligation. But that's obviously false, because even if some intervention is permissible or obligatory, it doesn't follow that all intervention is permissible or obligatory. So it might be the case that some intervention is permissible or obligatory but not all intervention is.

Fill in the blank. The phenomenon Tom is trying to explain (i.e. provide a reason for why it obtained) is:

rainbow walking

Thomas: As I, and virtually every other atheologian who propounds EAE, have been for decades. It's generally assumed these days. Apparently, that assumption isn't always warranted.

rw: No, it isn’t always warranted but that’s neither here nor there.



Thomas: This is the crux of your objection to EAE. You think these are more important for humans to have than the prevention of some intense suffering. And that's why God isn't morally obligated to prevent suffering, even though we are. Your argument is that these three pursuits are more important than the prevention of any suffering at all. (Correct me if I've misread you.)

rw: It’s partially correct but not complete, or in the proper order. I also argue that the concept of “moral” , the same concept you argue should motivate a god to intervene in some small way, carries specific obligations that negate the attempt to elicit partial intervention in a situation where full intervention would be warranted after the initial intervention was deemed warrantable. In other words…we’re still dealing with “all or nothing” and then we move to the results of “all” as listed above.
The a theologian must first justify partial intervention, (which is what CP is about anyway). If he can justify partial intervention without necessitating full intervention, (a formidable accomplishment to be sure), then PoE obtains. The problem resides in the impact of moral perfection which is considerably more demanding than human moral benevolence. As you’ve argued in your thread on incoherence, to elicit partial intervention, when full intervention is possible and available, is not logically consistent. A greater being can be imagined and incoherence obtains. Remember, I have conceded that full intervention is possible, but that man’s GG would not obtain. I can’t negate omnipotence to say it isn’t possible…only that it incurs a contradiction iff man’s greatest good, attainable only by man's willful participation, is a viable motive for non-intervention.


Thomas: If something is logically impossible, to claim it has obtained is to utter a contradiction. That means the speaker has said something like (1) "Jane, the spinster, has a neglectful husband," or (2) "Drumheller Fountain is round and has such nice corners." I can restate these sentences in predicate logic, in which the contradiction is obvious. Observe:

For (1), where "a" is the individual Jane, "S" is the predicate "[] is a spinster," "(Ex)" is the existential quantifier, "H" is the relation "[] is the wife of []", and "N" is the predicate "[] is neglectful":

(1a) Sa & (Ey)(Hay & Ny) [assumption]
(1b) -(Ex)((Ey)(Hxy) & Sx) [assumption: definition of "H" and "S"]
(1c) (x)-((Ey)(Hxy) & Sx) [from (1b)]
(1d) -((Ey)(Hay) & Sa) [from (1c)]
(1e) Sa [from (1a)]
(1f) -(Ey)(Hay) [from (1d) and (1e)]
(1g) (Ey)(Hay) [from (1a)]
(1h) Q & -Q [from (1f) and (1g)]

For (2), where "b" is the individual "Drumheller Fountain," "(Ex)" is the existential quantifier," "R" is the predicate "[] is round," and "C" is the predicate "[] has nice corners":

(2a) Rb & Cb [assumption]
(2b) -(Ex)(Rx & Cx) [assumption: definition of "R" and "C"]
(2c) (x)-(Rx & Cx) [from (2b)]
(2d) -(Rb & Cb) [from (2c)]
(2e) Q & -Q [from (2c) and (2d)]

As you can see, both (1) and (2) lead to an explicit contradiction. Let me know if you want me to explain any of the steps in the reasoning further.

So now you can show me the contradiction in these three utterances. You could either do that by deriving a contradiction in predicate logic, as I have performed above, or you can simply point it out directly. Go for it:

(3) Humans possess a robust and useful body of scientific knowledge, and God has intervened to prevent one baby from being scalded.
(4) Humans have a rich and important history, and God has intervened to prevent one baby from being scalded.
(5) Humans have an extensive and highly functional body of experiential knowledge, and God has intervened to prevent one baby from being scalded.

Let me anticipate an objection right off the bat: You're likely to say that if God doesn't intervene completely, he's failed a moral obligation. But that's obviously false, because even if some intervention is permissible or obligatory, it doesn't follow that all intervention is permissible or obligatory. So it might be the case that some intervention is permissible or obligatory but not all intervention is.

rw: That’s the best argument you’ve compiled yet Thomas, however the contradiction doesn’t obtain for one very good reason. PoE is positing a god who created the initial state of affairs that ultimately leads to GG. So this god shares in the credit of man’s accomplished GG by virtue of having created the initial conditions that led to that accomplishment and by having remained non-interfering during the process. So he actually can bring about man’s GG without actually doing so by DF and thus, no contradiction is incurred.



Thomas: Fill in the blank. The phenomenon Tom is trying to explain (i.e. provide a reason for why it obtained) is:

rw: Children being mysteriously prevented from scalding accidents by invisible elves.

rainbow walking

rw: Another problem I see in this case Thomas is very simple…how would we know if he did so in one single case through-out man’s history? Even if he appeared and rescued the child personally in front of ten or twenty witnesses…would you believe them? This is another reason why the partial intervention becomes problematic to justify. If you weren’t there, or even if you were the baby he rescued, or it’s father, none of this would change the world in any meaningful way nor convince other a theologians not to argue PoE. He’d still be liable to the same charge. Seems we'd need some method of verification else PoE continues to be argued.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

But we both think that would be a dubious inference. "Partial intervention is warranted" does not entail "full intervention is warranted." We both seem to agree to that. So there is no problem of not intervening all the time. If some intervention is justifiable, and I've argued that it is because it is in the case with humans and there's no relevant difference with God (under discussion below), we can say there's some level of intervention less than full -- call it L -- that's justifiable.

You seem to be conceding my argument, then, ultimately. God should have created a different initial state, because there's too much suffering on earth now. Humans would have an obligation to choose a state of affairs that will lead to a minimum of suffering. What's different about God?

Wait a minute. Explanations are only offered for observed phenomena. Who observed invisible elves preventing kids from being scalded?

Why does that matter? That is, what does it matter that we know whether it was God who intervened? Maybe I wouldn't be satisfied if God didn't intervene more, but that's just a fact about my psychology, not a fact about whether God has met his obligation. I'm not concerned with having observed God intervening; I'm just concerned with all the apparently pointless suffering in the world. If there weren't as much of it, I wouldn't be as disturbed.

rainbow walking

Thomas: But we both think that would be a dubious inference. "Partial intervention is warranted" does not entail "full intervention is warranted." We both seem to agree to that.

rw: We both agree that full intervention is unwarranted due to the negative effects on man. Where we seem to be talking past each other is in the obligation of moral perfection. My argument holds that to sustain this attribute, partial intervention would be unwarranted and insufficient to sustain moral perfection, that nothing less than full intervention would sustain moral perfection. The reason this isn’t contradictory is the postulate you offer, to which I concede, that an omnipotent god can do anything…but logically intervene. He can illogically intervene, such that man’s UGG (ultimate greatest good) would not obtain. This would hold true whether his intervention was partial or full. But if he were to elect to intervene, nothing shy of full intervention would sustain moral perfection.

Thomas: So there is no problem of not intervening all the time. If some intervention is justifiable, and I've argued that it is because it is in the case with humans and there's no relevant difference with God (under discussion below), we can say there's some level of intervention less than full -- call it L -- that's justifiable.

rw: I don’t know what you mean by “under discussion below”? I see nothing below supporting your claim to justifying some intervention.



Thomas: You seem to be conceding my argument, then, ultimately. God should have created a different initial state, because there's too much suffering on earth now. Humans would have an obligation to choose a state of affairs that will lead to a minimum of suffering. What's different about God?

rw: My argument has always been that no other state of affairs would allow man’s UGG to obtain. Human’s don’t have a choice in states of affairs, at least not that I know of. PoE doesn’t argue that human’s should have chosen another state of affairs, but proceeds on the assumption that God is the controlling factor of these states, so basically I see no relevant value in your argument here…at least, not in relation to PoE.

The point I was getting at above is that no contradiction incurs in saying man acquires his own UGG and a God cannot because, ultimately, if man reaches this goal, it is because a god created a meta-path by which the goal obtains, and thereby shares in the credit…so man isn’t doing something that god hasn’t had a hand in. Since I’ve never argued that man can acquire his UGG by some sort of fiat of his own, saying that God cannot acquire it by DF is also not a contradiction.



Thomas: Wait a minute. Explanations are only offered for observed phenomena. Who observed invisible elves preventing kids from being scalded?

rw: Observed phenomenon? I don’t think so. People offer explanations of gods all the time in cosmological arguments that fall under the test of Ockam and these are definitely not explanations based on an observed god.



Thomas: Why does that matter? That is, what does it matter that we know whether it was God who intervened? Maybe I wouldn't be satisfied if God didn't intervene more, but that's just a fact about my psychology, not a fact about whether God has met his obligation. I'm not concerned with having observed God intervening; I'm just concerned with all the apparently pointless suffering in the world. If there weren't as much of it, I wouldn't be as disturbed.

rw: I knew I didn’t explain this anywhere nearly clear enough so your misunderstanding is my fault. Sorry. What I’m saying here is that you are arguing an evidential PoE. So any postulated example of interference a god should have brought about, based on reasonable standards of evidence, aught to be verifiable by those same standards. You can’t deny your opponent the same courtesy he extends to you in allowing your evidence. It isn’t logical to say a god should have done X, when X isn’t sufficient to establish that god did it, or that it represents a substantial reduction in evil or suffering, should he have elected to do so. This is why partial intervention gets trickier than full intervention. You can argue that god should have done X but if there’s no way to verify, by the same standards as we verify why he should have, then we are no closer to a resolution to PoE than when we started. Thus, when you say god should do X, it should be reasonably obvious to everyone that a reduction in evil and or suffering has obtained. If this isn’t the case then I could just as reasonably argue that he has done X but you just weren’t around and won’t take my word for it. The argument devolves rather quickly after that.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

But this is obviously false because there is a point at which some intervention is too much, morally. There is a point at which it is morally wrong to intervene.

Um, we actualize states of affairs all the time. I'm bringing about "the letter 't' is typed" several times during this post. So both humans and God bring about states of affairs, often ones in which we try to prevent some evil. Why is it objectively good when we do it but objectively bad when God does it?

They are attempting to explain why the universe exists. The observed phenomenon is "the universe exists."

But the atheist thinks there's too much evil right now. So by definition, there has been no reduction of suffering from the "too much" state.

rainbow walking

Thomas: But this is obviously false because there is a point at which some intervention is too much, morally. There is a point at which it is morally wrong to intervene.

rw: Hmmm…I hadn’t thought about it that way. I’ve been proceeding on the postulate that too much would engender a contradiction between DF and MUGG (man’s acquired ultimate greater good)…but I suppose you’re right. If DF prevented man from acquiring his UGG this could be construed as less than moral behavior for a god. So, I will defend by arguing that all intervention is less than moral behavior for a god if man’s UGG is to obtain by man’s willful participation, and such attainment is the highest value attainable, which is what I’ve been arguing all along anyway.



Thomas: Um, we actualize states of affairs all the time. I'm bringing about "the letter 't' is typed" several times during this post. So both humans and God bring about states of affairs, often ones in which we try to prevent some evil. Why is it objectively good when we do it but objectively bad when God does it?

rw: Well, I meant this strictly in regard to PoE and the alternate state of affairs PoE claims a god should have instantiated, as I took that to be what you were referring to, so obviously I misunderstood.. But I see what you’re driving at now. The difference between man’s good in doing so is in relation to his acquisition of his UGG. God doing so violates man’s prospect of acquiring his own GG, thus it would be bad for man and reduce a god’s maximal power status and moral perfection.



Thomas: They are attempting to explain why the universe exists. The observed phenomenon is "the universe exists."

rw: Yes, and if you postulated invisible elves as the reason children were not scalded, children miraculously being spared a scalding would be the observed phenomenon. In fact, any miraculous intervention you submit a god should do would be subject to this claim.



Thomas: But the atheist thinks there's too much evil right now. So by definition, there has been no reduction of suffering from the "too much" state.

rw: This is true Thomas, but doesn’t respond to my argument which ascribes a reason for a god’s non-interference. My reply above was in reference to any example you might offer that a god could do to reduce the suffering. At any rate I appreciate your criticisms. They have helped me to better see some of the finer nuances in both PoE and any attempt to defend against it, and without your participation this just wouldn’t have occurred, so I owe you a debt of gratitude.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Okay, so now we'll see why God intervening is bad but humans intervening is good. Tell me where the explicit or implicit contradiction is in the following sentence:

"God intervenes to prevent one child from being scalded, and humans have a rich and well-developed history, culture, science, and moral position."

But we have not observed children being miraculously saved from being scalded, so it is not an "observed" phenomenon. It would be if what I'm advocating were to come about, but then the question would be whether we humans should explain this intervention by elves. Maybe we shouldn't, but that doesn't mean it would be morally wrong to employ them.

rainbow walking

thomas:Okay, so now we'll see why God intervening is bad but humans intervening is good. Tell me where the explicit or implicit contradiction is in the following sentence:

"God intervenes to prevent one child from being scalded, and humans have a rich and well-developed history, culture, science, and moral position."

rw: There is no contradiction in this statement between its postulates. The contradiction is implied between this statement and one of the postulates of the evidential CP.

The contradiction being: How would we know God did so? What would keep me from arguing that this incident was the result of natural causes? You can't invoke evidence to support your argument and then submit an unverifiable example, were a god to actually comply. Evidence must be verifiable for both parties in the argument. It's a loaded argument from start to finish.

It is likely that there have been numerous cases where children have narrowly missed being scalded with no immediate explanation for the near miss. What's to prevent someone from attributing these cases to a god and thwarting your conclusion?

And if a person did claim a godunnit, what would be your first initial reaction? Can you verify that please? This is one of the inherent problems with an evidential CP. This is also why nothing short of full intervention with a complete eradication of atheism as a consequence, would satisfy the requirements of an evidential PoE.



thomas: But we have not observed children being miraculously saved from being scalded, so it is not an "observed" phenomenon.


rw: So if you did observe one such miracle why would you argue that it had to be a god? Being an atheist (assuming you are, of course), you would naturally seek an alternative explanation and continue to argue PoE. Certainly you aren't going to argue that some child somewhere hasn't already narowly missed being scalded by some undetermined means, are you?

Thomas: It would be if what I'm advocating were to come about, but then the question would be whether we humans should explain this intervention by elves. Maybe we shouldn't, but that doesn't mean it would be morally wrong to employ them.


rw: No, the real question would be if you were even willing to allow this a supernatural explanation at all. I seriously doubt you'd be advancing such an explanation and would still be arguing PoE. I see no advantage in allowing you to submit a frivilous unverifiable example, that a god should do, knowing that it would never be sufficient for you to concede a godunnit in the final analysis anyway.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

God should do it more often. There's still too much scalding, in my view. So even if we thought God did it once, he'd still be failing to meet an obligation.

The question before us is whether it violates Ockham's Razor to say God could have used invisible elves. It does not, because there is no observed phenomenon that I am explaining with invisible elves. Even if I were, that wouldn't mean God couldn't use those elves.

Seriously, no one is explaining anything with the invisible elves. There is no observed phenomenon right now that I'm using elves to explain. I'm an atheist. And I'm a materialist. And I don't believe in invisible elves. But none of those facts entails that God shouldn't use them.