bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

I recently had the privilege of interviewing the noted philosopher F.A., who appears to share many of your views on morality. (He insisted that I use only his initials.) I was especially interested in what he had to say about objectivity morality. Perhaps you would like to comment on his ideas. Do you disagree with him on any point, or do you share his views in their entirety?

I. The bold statement

bd: Is there an objective morality?

F.A.: Certainly. The moral system that I defend is what I call “all-things-considered” morality. Under it, one should choose the action that satisfies more desires (weighted according to strength) than any alternative. (Actually this is just a first approximation; the actual criterion is too complicated and subtle for you ordinary folks to begin to understand.) Of course, the desires in question are all of the desires that exist, regardless of who has them; that’s what’s meant by “all things considered”.

bd: So there are objectively valid moral truths?

F.A.: No question about it.

bd: Could you give us an example?

F.A.: Sure. It was objectively wrong for the Nazis to exterminate millions of Jews.

bd: How do you test the soundness of your theory?

F.A.: The same way that one tests the soundness of any theory. I look for evidence that any of the propositions within the theory are false or inconsistent.

bd: How is your all-things-considered morality superior to others?

F.A.: Rationalist, subjectivist, and other internalist moral theories equivocate between moral-ought and practical-ought. This is the primary reason why I reject them.

bd: Any other reasons?

F.A.: Yes. Some-things-considered moralities are moralities of selfishness, cruelty, exploitation and harm. They are evil.

bd: OK, OK, calm down.

II. The slide into irrelevance

bd: I like everything you’ve said so far, but I’m still not clear about why you consider your morality “objectively correct”.

F.A.: I never said that it was. The question of whether a morality is objectively correct is meaningless. A “morality” is just a definition of “should” in the moral sense. There is no such thing as an “objectively correct” or “incorrect” definition.

bd: But in that case how can there be an objective morality?

F.A.: Actually there are lots of objective moralities. A morality is just a definition of “should”. There are a number of definitions of “should” such that it is possible to determine objectively whether or not an agent “should” perform the act in question according to that definition. Any such definition constitutes an “objective morality”.

bd: I still don’t get it. If there is no objectively correct morality, how can there be objective moral truths?

F.A.: When I say that something is an objective moral truth, I mean that it’s true in some objective moral system – i.e., under some unambiguous definition of “should”. For example, say that Jones is considering killing Smith for his money at a certain time and place. It is an objective moral truth that Jones should not kill Smith. It is also an objective moral truth that Jones should kill Smith. The reason both of these can be objectively valid is that they’re based on different definitions of “should”. The first, for example, is probably based on an “all-things-considered” definition of “should”, and the second on a “self-only-considered” definition.

bd: But didn’t you say that the all-things-considered definition is the correct one?

F.A.: No. I said that it is the best one.

bd: Then in what sense is it “best”?

F.A.: Why, in the only possible sense in which one definition can be said to be better than another: it facilitates communication more efficiently than other definitions.

bd: Let me get this straight. When you say that Jones should not kill Smith, you mean only that Jones’s killing of Smith is inconsistent with a definition of “should” that you consider to facilitate communication more efficiently than other definitions?

F.A.: Exactly.

bd: But wait a minute. When most people tell someone that they should not kill another person, or that it would be “morally wrong” to do it, they understand themselves (and are generally understood) to be saying something relevant to the decision whether to do it. That is, they understand themselves to be saying something that might reasonably be expected to influence this decision. This is often expressed by saying that in telling Jones that he should not kill Smith, or that it would be morally wrong, one is giving him a reason not to do it, or telling him not to do it, or recommending that he not do it. But merely observing that killing Smith would be inconsistent with a particular definition of
”should” (even if it’s the one that facilitates communication most efficiently) cannot reasonably be expected to influence Jones’s decision. There is no reason to suppose that it will give him a reason for not doing it. And it can hardly be regarded as a recommendation, especially if it is coupled with the observation that it is consistent with many other definitions of “should” which may not (in your opinion) facilitate communication quite as efficiently, but are just as valid.

F.A.: The idea that moral statements might reasonably be expected to influence an agent’s actions – that they have some bearing on the question “what shall I do?” - is indeed presumed by common usage of moral language. But common usage is based on a fundamental error: it presumes the existence of desire-independent values. It supposes that some actions have a mysterious intrinsic property of ‘ought-to-be-doneness’ and that others have the property of ‘ought-not-to-be-doneness’, and that these properties have some sort of mystical power to affect people who became aware of them, to cause properly-functioning people to avoid doing that which has a property of ought-not-to-be-doneness and to guide them to do that which has 'ought-to-be-doneness.’ My theory avoids this error by refusing to posit any link of any kind between moral judgments and action.

Of course, knowing that one “should” do something according to a certain definition might influence the agent’s decision about whether to do it, just as knowing that a certain automobile is green might influence his decision about whether to buy it. the point is that there’s no reason to expect that it will. Whether it does or not depends on whether the factual information conveyed by the statement that he “should” is relevant to his desires, and that’s the end of the matter.

Thus in my moral theory, moral statements are purely descriptive. They are statements about whether certain actions satisfy certain definitions, whether they are correctly described in a certain way, whether they are accurately classified in a certain way. The definitions, descriptions, or categories involved are basically arbitrary, although some may be more useful than others, because people on the whole may be more interested in the question of whether an action satisfies one definition rather than another, or may be accustomed to using moral terms to classify actions in certain ways.

bd: So when you said that the all-things-considered morality is the one you “defend”, you meant...

F.A.: That I defend the claim that this is the definition of “should” that facilitates communication most efficiently.

bd: And when you said that the false assumption built into common moral usage often leads to “moral mistakes”, you meant...

F.A.: That it often leads to actions that are inconsistent with the definition of “should” that facilitates communication most efficiently.

bd: And when you said that the Holocaust was wrong, you meant...

F.A.: That it was inconsistent with the definition of “should” that facilitates communication most efficiently.

bd: And when you said that some-things-considered moral theories are “evil”, you meant...

F.A.: That the definitions of “should” that they use do not facilitate communication as efficiently as an all-things-considered definition.

bd: And finally, when you said that you test the “soundness” of your theory by looking for “evidence that any of the propositions within it are false”, you meant...

F.A.: Ah, that was a red herring to throw you off the track.

bd: So your “moral philosophy” is really a linguistic preference, which has no relevance to the question “what shall I do?”

F.A.: Very good. You understand me perfectly.

Koyaanisqatsi

As do I. The pointless redefinition of the word "objective" so that it means "subjective."

As always, what's the point?

Alonzo Fyfe

bd:

I recently had the privilege of interviewing the noted philosopher F.A., who appears to share many of your views on morality.

You know, you actually frightened me for a moment that somebody else had my ideas.

Perhaps the best way for me to comment on this hypothetical interview is to answer the questions the way that I think they should be answered. Fortunately, I, unlike your guest, has some advanced warning about potential ambiguities and misinterpretations, so I have a capacity to ward off those problems that your original guest did not have.

I will be relying on examples using the word "atom". "Atom" originally meant "without parts." When using this example, think back to a time when people first began to suspect that particles they had long been calling 'atoms' actually had parts.


bd: Is there an objective morality?

It depends on what you mean by "objective" and "morality". There is a pair of definitions whereby the a proposition of the form "A is immoral" is an objectively true statement for some A.

If you were to ask me, "Do atoms have parts?" I would give a similar answer. It depends on what you mean by 'atom' and 'parts'. There is a definition of these terms where "Atoms have parts" is an objectively true statement.


bd: So there are objectively valid moral truths?

I must be a little picky. Validity and invalidity are properties of arguments; truth and falsity are properties of propositions. We are talking about whether moral propositions can be objectively true.

My answer is the same. There is a definition of "objective" and "morality" whereby there are objectively true moral propositions, just as there is an interpretation of "atom" and "parts" where "atoms have parts" is an objectively true statement.


bd: How is your all-things-considered morality superior to others?

What question are you asking here?

Are you asking me to prove, given the way that I define "atom" and "parts", my thesis that atoms have parts? Or are you asking me why the definitions that I use for the words "atoms" and "parts" is better than any other definition?

I think you are asking the second question, so that is the one I will answer.

My answer has to do with the fact that many of the things chemists have written about atoms will remain true, even if it turns out that atoms have parts. Much of the way that they talk (though not all) can continue unchanged. This is because most of what people have said about atoms was about the smallest bits of an element and did not imply or require the presumption that they have no parts, even though people took the word 'atom' as meaning 'thing without parts'.


bd: I like everything you've said so far, but I'm still not clear about why you consider your morality "objectively correct".

Hold it.

I am once again unsure which question you are asking. Now, it seems that you are saying, "I'm still not clear about why you consider your definition of the word 'atom' to be 'objectively correct.'

But that's a bogus question. Nobody in any field can ever argue that their definitions are objectively correct. I said that, given a particular definition of atom, 'atoms have parts' is an objectively true statement.
Do you have evidence that 'atoms have parts' is false? Do you have evidence that 'atoms have parts' is just a matter of opinion? Or do you just have evidence that some people use the word 'atom' to mean 'thing without parts'?

It sounds to me like you want to argue that because some people take the word 'atom' to mean 'thing without parts' and, yet, call these smallest bits of an element atoms, that the thesis that the smallest bits of an element has parts is false. Such an argument would not support the conclusion that the smallest bits of an element does not have parts, or for supporting the conclusion that whether the smallest bits of an element has parts is a matter of personal preference.


bd: But in that case how can there be an objective morality?

How can there be an objectively correct answer to the question "do atoms have parts?"

There can be no objective definition of the word 'morality', just as there can be no objective definition of the word 'atom'. This does not prevent a statement of the form "X is immoral" to be objectively true just as "atoms have parts" is objectively true.


bd: I still don't get it. If there is no objectively correct morality, how can there be objective moral truths?

Does the fact that there is no objectively correct definition of the word 'atom' cause you to ask how there can be an objective truth to the question of whether atoms have parts?

There is a definition of the word 'atom' which refers to these smallest bits of lead, gold, etc., whereby 'atoms have parts' is an objectively true statement.


But didn't you say that the all-things-considered definition is the correct one?

No, and a chemist cannot say that this smallest-bit-of-an-element definition of atom is the correct one. It is the best one.


bd: Then in what sense is it "best"?

You quote FA as answering, Why, in the only possible sense in which one definition can be said to be better than another: it facilitates communication more efficiently than other definitions.

This is an acceptable answer.


bd: Let me get this straight. When you say that Jones should not kill Smith, you mean only that Jones's killing of Smith is inconsistent with a definition of "should" that you consider to facilitate communication more efficiently than other definitions?

No more than when I say that "atoms have parts" that I mean only that "atoms without parts" is inconsistent with a definition of 'atom' that facilitates communication more efficiently than other definitions.

You are committing a fallacy of confusing the reasons (R1, R2, ..., Rn) that a person gives for assigning meaning M to term T with the meaning M assigned to term T. M <> (R1, R2, ..., Rn).

When I say that 'atoms have parts' I mean that these smallest bits of gold, lead, etc., can be broken up into still smaller parts.

When I say that Jones moral-should not kill Smith I am saying that Jones' killing Smith is not the best thing to do all things considered.

(More precisely, I mean that Jones killing Smith is not what a person with good desires would do, where a person with good desires is a person with those desires that can exist in harmony with the desires of others. A close alternative interpretation is that all of us considered have reason to condemn and seek to thwart actions like that of Jones killing Smith.)


bd: But wait a minute. When most people tell someone that they should not kill another person, or that it would be "morally wrong" to do it, they understand themselves (and are generally understood) to be saying something relevant to the decision whether to do it.

When most people talk about atoms they have understood themselves as talking about something that is without parts. They also have used it to refer to the smallest pieces of gold, iron, lead, etc.

Only, there is nothing in the world that is both the smallest pieces of gold, etc., and that is without parts.

Do we reject the thesis that the smallest pieces of an element has parts because people have a habit of calling these things 'atoms' and the literal definition of the word 'atom' is 'thing without parts?'

This is a rather foolish way to do chemistry.


That is, they understand themselves to be saying something that might reasonably be expected to influence this decision.

Unfortunately, there is nothing we can say in some instances to influence this decision. Given Jones desires and beliefs, killing Smith is something that he will do, and no increase in Jones' knowledge and understanding will necessarily change that.

So, now we must decide what we are going to do given this fact. Are we going to allow actions like that of Jones murdering Smith? Or are we going to take action to prevent actions like Jones murdering Smith?

The best option all things considered is for us to take steps to prevent actions such as Jones murdering Smith, and the best way to do that is to call Jones' action immoral as a way of flagging it as one of those types of actions that we have a reason to try to prevent.

In doing so, it is no longer concerned with what Jones has a reason to do or not to do, just as calling the smallest bits of an element 'atoms' implies that we will no longer take ourselves as meaning 'thing without parts'. Now, it is concerned with what we have a reason to prevent or to allow. It is no longer meant to guide Jones' actions, but our own.

The alternative, of course, given that there is no rational that would be effective to dissuade Jones, is to say that Jones' murdering of Smith is not immoral. This option is freely open to us, just as we are free to say that the smallest bits of an element are not atoms. Though we would have to get used to the fact that Jones killing Smith being moral implies nothing about whether it is the type of action that we have a reason to prevent.

Whichever way we decide to go with respect to the linguistic decision, it remains objectively true of Jones killing Smith that it is the type of act that we have reason to work to prevent.

Tracing this back to the analogy of the word 'atom', given that there is nothing in the universe that is a smallest bit of gold, lead, etc., that also has no parts, we can say either that the smallest bits of these elements are atoms with parts, or that they are not atoms. Either way we go, the smallest bits of these elements has parts.


bd: So when you said that the all-things-considered morality is the one you "defend", you meant...

This is a question about language, so it should be taken in the same way that "When you said that the smallest piece of an element definition of 'atom' is the definition you defend, you meant...."

The answer to this question has no relevance to the question of whether the smallest pieces of an element has parts.


bd: And when you said that the false assumption built into common moral usage often leads to "moral mistakes", you meant...

Something analogous to mistake made by thinking that atoms means 'without parts' -- the mistake of assuming that the smallest bits of an element does not have parts.

In the case of morality, the mistake is that there actions like that of Jones murdering Smith is not the type of action that we have reason to try to prevent, based on its being the case that Jones would still murder Smith even under maximum knowledge and understanding.


bd: And when you said that the Holocaust was wrong, you meant...

That actions like that holocaust are a type that we, all things considered, have a reason to try to prevent.


bd: And when you said that some-things-considered moral theories are "evil", you meant...

That some things considered morality labels as permissible instances of those types of actions that benefit an agent at the expense of others -- actions that are harmful, exploitive, abusive, violent, etc -- actions that we, all things considered, have reason to try to prevent.


bd: And finally, when you said that you test the "soundness" of your theory by looking for "evidence that any of the propositions within it are false", you meant...

Exactly what I said -- just as the person who tests his theory 'atoms have parts' would test his theory.

He would not test it by noting, "Well, people call these smallest bits of elements 'atoms', and people take the word 'atom' to mean 'thing without parts,' therefore the smallest bits of an element can not possibly have any parts."

This is not how one does chemistry, but you seem to be requiring that this is the way we should be doing ethics.

"Well, people call actions like Jones murdering Smith 'immoral' and they take the word 'immoral' to mean that it has some property whereby Jones would not do the action if he knew and understood that property, therefore Jones murdering Smith has some property whereby Jones would not do the action if he knew and understood that property."

Jones murdering Smith has no such property. There is, in some cases, nothing we can say to Jones (or nothing that Jones can learn about his murdering Smith) that would prevent him from doing so. And, so, now we must ask what we are going to say about Jones murdering Smith under these circumstances. Are we going to call it 'moral?" As in 'morally permissible'? As in 'The type of action that we should allow Jones to do?'


bd: So your "moral philosophy" is really a linguistic preference, which has no relevance to the question "what shall I do?"

In exactly the same what that atomic theory is really just a linguistic preference that has no relevance to partless items. Atomic theory is a substantive claim about the smallest bits of an element, accompanied by a proposed change in the language that reflects this fact. How are we going to say "the smallest bits of elements are made up of parts"?

The moral equivalent is that, in some instances, there is nothing we can say to reason Jones out of murdering Smith -- the only way to stop the murder is by force. This fact requires a change in the language that reflects this fact, since the language assumes that such a property exists. How are we going to say, "Jones murdering of Smith is the type of action that we, all things considered, have reason to prevent?"

[ June 07, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

BD:

A crucial element in this debate is whether to include the desires that an agent would have as a result of improved rationality or knowledge and understanding (K&U) in determining what an agent morally ought to do.

The short answer is that there are no such desires to include (or, at least, none of the right type).

To explain what I mean by "right type", I need to distinguish between those desires caused by such an increase (contingent), as opposed to those entailed by such an increase.

The main difference is that causal changes can be just about anything. Press a button, and you can cause all of the lights in a room to go off.

Rewire the house just a bit, press the same button, and dump data from a table into a database. Change the wiring again, and there are countless things that can be made to be caused by pressing the button. But there are very few things that are entailed by pressing the button.

The acquisition of knowledge and understanding effects the structure of the brain. New neural connections are formed, unused connections (presumably those associated with previous false beliefs) atrophy.

Desires also depend on brain structure.

Therefore, it is quite possible that the acquisition of knowledge and understanding could generate a change in brain structure that also alters a person's desires.

But those alterations are causally contingent and, like the pressing of a button, can lead to just about anything.

While learning about the mating habits of a sea slug, certain new connections form and then . . . poof . . . a dendrite and an axion come into contact and, as a result, the person now has a significant craving for peanut butter and live spider sandwiches. Another person, reading a book on the history of postage stamps, has a connection atrophy which removes the aversion to stabbing himself 1000 times with a toothpick.

It certainly does not follow that the first agent should be eating live-spider sandwiches or the second agent should be stabbing himself with toothpicks.

That is to say, if such a person were to ask, "why should I be eating live spider sandwiches?" how would we answer? "Because a neural connection would be formed causing you to want live-spider sandwiches if you learned about sea slugs." When he looks at us questioningly and asks, "So?" Then what?

Yet, it still makes sense to say that the first agent should do whatever is entailed by having a complete knowledge of the life of sea slugs. If these facts suggest that live spider sandwiches are more nutritious, then he should be eating live spider sandwiches, even if he has no intention of every learning about sea slugs (provided he has an interest in nutrition).

Also, we face the problem that, given the complexity of human mental wiring and how little we know about it, we really can't say much about what would be caused by an actual increase in K&U. These causal relationships are likely different for different people, and likely to be effected by the order in which things are learned.

Also, given the finite capabilities of the brain and the huge set of propositions P that are true of the universe, and we add to this all of the counterfactual truths (If A, then B), then it is reasonable to expect that no brain can hold all of the knowledge and understanding. We must all be selective. In which case, the desires that one may be caused to have would be dependent on which pieces of knowledge one decides to acquire.

Whereby, it makes no sense to talk about the desires that would be caused by acquisition of all that K&U -- since nothing would be caused by it -- since the acquisition of all that K&U will never happen, and can never happen, in order to cause anything in fact.

None of these problems exist with entailment.

But, another problem exists.

No set of facts entails a value. A value must be included among the antecedents if the consequent is to be a value.

No set of beliefs entails a desire. A belief must be included among the antecedents if the consequent is to be a desire.

No amount of knowledge and understanding entails a reason for action. A reason for action must be included among K&U if the consequent is to be a reason for action.

So, in the case of S = "Jones murdering Smith for his money", if we assume that for all propositions P true of S, Jones has no desire that not-P, and some desire that P (i.e., has no aversion to murder but a desire to have Smith's money) then all of the facts in the world entails no change in Jones' values.

He can believe everything there is to believe about S (for all P true of S, Jones believes that P), but this entails no change in Jones' own desires.

The only thing entailed by an increase in Knowledge and Understanding is an awareness of the most efficient method (means) possible of murdering Smith for his money so as to make sure that he does not bring about a situation R within which a proposition P is true where Jones does desire that not-P (i.e., the best way to cover his tracks).

Which means that, if morality is concerned with what Jones would do given sufficient knowledge and understanding, that the only moral advice we have available for Jones is to murder Smith as efficiently as possible.

Or we could take the 'caused desires' option, in which case the 'caused desire' may well be a desire to torture Smith before killing him. In which case, our moral recommendation to Jones would be to torture Smith before killing him even if, right now, he has no desire to do so.

If this is what is required by paying attention to "the purpose and function of morality," then morality, perhaps, is something that we would be better off without -- all things considered.

[ June 07, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

It would have been much more enlightening if you had done as I requested and indicated where your views differ from those of my guest. As it is I am having trouble figuring out where you are just saying the same thing in different words and where you actually disagree with him.

You could easily have avoided these ambiguities and misinterpretations from the start, but chose not to, as I illustrate below.

[By the way, speaking of ambiguities, I sometimes speak of a moral theory as a definition of “should” and sometimes as a definition of “morally right”. But (unlike Pompous Bastard, for example) I use these terms interchangeably: to say that an act is “morally right” is to say that the agent “should” do it. So to define either term is to define the other. Ditto for “morally wrong” and “should not”.]

Yes, you use this example so extensively that it almost seems as though you regard it as a life raft to keep your argument afloat. But the analogy is seriously flawed and ultimately extremely misleading. The best way to illustrate this is to take your next-to-last answer first. (The original questions are in bold throughout).

But this makes no sense - there is no way to interpret it so that it makes sense. To show this, let’s look at this “atom” example more closely.

A scientist proposing to continue use the word “atom” to refer to the smallest units of elements even though they are not indivisible would have argued more or less as follows:

Part 1: A number of experiments have produced results that seem to be inconsistent with the current hypothesis that atoms are indivisible. These experiments are as follows ... It appears that the only way to explain these results in a reasonable way is via the hypothesis that what we call “atoms” are not indivisible – that they have an internal structure.

Part 2: The term “atom” comes from the Greek atomus, which means “indivisible”. So we now have to decide whether to continue to refer to these entities that we thought were indivisible as “atoms”, contrary to the etymology of the word, or choose a different name for them. I propose to keep the old name, because...

Now Part 1 is a discussion of evidence from various experiments, and it is reasonable to speak of “testing” the claims involved by conducting further experiments. But Part 2 consists entirely of a discussion of a linguistic question: “What shall we call these things now that we know they are not indivisible?”

The problem with your analogy is that, in the case of a “moral theory” (as you define the term), there is nothing corresponding to Part 1. The experiments described there make it clear that any reasonable description of “how the world works” is going to require a word for these “smallest bits of an element”. The only question is what word we are going to use. In the case of moral theories there is nothing of this sort. The only question is what property of an act we find it convenient to use the term “morally right” to refer to.

Now you point out correctly that it would be fallacious to reason:
Exactly so. One cannot deduce facts about the real world from facts about the way a word is used.

But then you go on to say:
But that just isn’t so. And in any case it’s irrelevant to the question of how you supposedly test the "soundness" of your theory by looking for "evidence that any of the propositions within it are false".

You continue:

Now it is true that many people believe that acts have such an intrinsic property (what you call a property of “ought-to-be-doneness”). And if this were true, that would obviously be the appropriate property for the term “morally right” to refer to. Finally, I agree with you (as I have said many times) that there is no such property, so there is no question of using the term “morally right” to refer to it. But this still leaves a very wide range of non-intrinsic properties that it could be used to refer to. And there would seem (on the surface at least) to be no objective way to choose between them; no criterion for declaring one such property to be a “better” choice than another.

So I am still mystified as to what you mean by “testing” the “soundness” of your proposal to use the (supposedly unique) “all-thing-considered” property to define “morally right”, or what would constitute “evidence” that propositions within it are “false”.

Now let’s go through the rest of your self-interview.

That’s clear enough, but what you said earlier on the subject was – well, let’s just say that it was open to misinterpretation. For example, in the <a href="http://iidb.org/ubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000138&p=2" target="_blank"> Fyfe and Acting with Impunity</a> thread you said:

(As usual, you clarified this later in the thread.)

On this thread, we find:

Calling your all-things-considered theory “objective” and some-things-considered theories “subjective” certainly gave the impression that the former is objective in a sense in which the latter are not. But eventually (much later) we learned that both types of theory and be equally “objective” in the sense of giving equally unambiguous answers to the question of whether a given act is “morally right”. And so far, at least, you have given no indication of any other meaning of “objective” that you might have had in mind.

Again, the next day:

Here we find no qualification about it depending on what one means by “objective”, etc.’ Instead we were told that calling your theory objective “has the advantage of being true”.

The same pattern is evident in your comments about the next question.

But that isn’t quite what you were saying earlier.

In you very first post on this thread you said:

This might have been a good time to clarify your position . But instead you continued along these lines for some time. For example:

Thus, earlier in the thread (as on some other threads) you didn’t seem to be at all concerned to avoid “potential ambiguities and misinterpretations”.

This Q/A was designed to bring out the fact that, according to this type of moral theory, the original question is “bogus” because it amounts to asking why a definition is “objectively correct”. It seems to me that F.A.’s answer here was exactly the same as yours.

Hey, you’re the one who considers a “moral theory” to be essentially a matter of giving an arbitrary definition of “should” (or “morally right”) yet still refers to his moral theory as an “objective morality”. The only sense that I can make of this is the explanation that F.A. gave: a moral theory is objective if it is unambiguous enough to allow an objective determination of whether a given moral statement is “true”. Do you disagree with this? If so, I’m still at a loss.

Are you disagreeing with F.A.’s answer, or just saying the same thing in different words?

Are you disagreeing with F.A.’s answer, or just saying the same thing in different words?

How does this differ from what I said?

In other words, “good” desires are those that tend to lead a person to do what he “should” do in the sense that facilitates communication more efficiently than other definitions. This is a natural way to extend your theory to include definitions of other moral terms, but I don’t see how it sheds any further light on my question. It still looks to me as though, when you say that Jones should not kill Smith, you’re saying that this would be inconsistent with a definition of “should” that you consider to facilitate communication more efficiently than other definitions – nothing more, nothing less.

No, this is not an alternative interpretation of the statement that Jones should not kill Smith. It is the (more or less) correct interpretation, under your theory, of the statement that the rest of us “should” condemn and seek to thwart actions like that of Jones killing Smith. The two statements are not at all the same. For example, Peter Singer has argued forcefully (and some would say persuasively) that from an all-things-considered perspective you “should” give 30% of your income to charity. But even if this is true, it may well not be true that, from an all-things-considered perspective, the rest of us “should” condemn and seek to thwart your failure to do so. Regardless of whether you agree with Singer (and I, for one, don’t) this example makes it clear that the statement “X should do Y” is very different from the statement “The rest of us should condemn X’s doing Y and seek to thwart such actions in the future”.

There’s another problem with interpreting “It would be morally wrong for X to do Y” as meaning something like “The rest of us have reason to try to prevent acts like Y”: the latter statement is often true when the former is false. For example, we may have reason to try to prevent a man afflicted with rabies from biting a child, but that doesn’t mean that we would consider his biting of the child to be morally wrong, or to say that he “shouldn’t” do it. Or again, we might have reason to try to prevent a regiment of convicts from capturing a key communications post, but (given that each one of them would be shot immediately if he tried to disobey his commanding officer) we wouldn’t say that it was “morally wrong” for them to attack it. Or again, if a policeman is about to shoot a man because of a justified (but false) belief that the man is a criminal about to shoot him, we would have reason to try to stop him, but we wouldn’t say that what he was about to do was “morally wrong”. Of course, in each case no one would say that we should “condemn” the act in question, but that’s because “condemn” is itself a moral term, and it is self-contradictory to say that one “condemns” an act that one does not consider morally wrong. So the word “condemn” has no place in any attempt to define the meaning of “morally wrong”; any such definition is circular. And if one substitutes a morally neutral expression like “express disapproval of” or “warn against” for “condemn”, the objection to this kind of interpretation of “morally wrong” stands.

Are you disagreeing with F.A.’s answer, or just saying the same thing in different words?

Are you disagreeing with F.A.’s answer, or just saying the same thing in different words?

Are you disagreeing with F.A.’s answer, or just saying the same thing in different words?

Could you cite an example of someone who has made this mistake as a result of believing the false assumption you refer to? Someone, that is, who believes on the basis of this assumption that if we learned that Jones would murder Smith even with maximum K&U, we would have no reason to try to prevent him from doing so?

Once again, wrong. According to your theory, the statement “Trying to prevent such actions is consistent with the definition of ‘should’ that facilitates communication most efficiently” is a correct interpretation of “We should try to prevent such action”, but it is not a correct interpretation of “Such actions are wrong”.

Aside from the fact that you are again making the mistake that I just pointed out above, this appears to be essentially the same answer that F.A. gave. That is, some-things-considered definitions of “should” are “evil” in the sense that they are inconsistent with the definition of “should” that facilitates communication most efficiently. And it doesn’t seem to me to be a big improvement to say that they are “evil” in the sense that trying to punish or prevent things that are consistent with their definition of “should” is consistent with the definition of “should” that facilitates communication most efficiently.

As you probably noticed, I skipped over one question and have not yet commented on the last one. These last two Q/A’s from your self-interview will be dealt with in the next post.

[ June 07, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]

[ June 07, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

Now for the remaining two answers from your self-interview.

[Note: I don’t consider this question to be all that important; after all, it’s just a question of what definition facilitates communication most efficiently. But it seems to be important to you, since by now you’ve given at least three different answers to it in this thread alone, and at least a couple of others on other threads. In any case, it provides an opportunity to explore your attitude toward common moral language and the logic of moral discourse.]

The answer you gave to this in the self-interview was:

To be sure, this is one of the answers you gave (on May 29, long after the reasons that F.A. cited, which appeared in posts dated May 21 and earlier). Do you now disavow these earlier reasons, or do you agree with F.A. here and merely wish to add to his answer?

Anyway, I’m not clear about why you regard this as a good argument. On the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000138" target="_blank">Fyfe and Acting with Impunity</a> thread, your response to my criticism of Pompous Bastard’s moral theory on the grounds that it “reduces virtually all actual moral arguments to nonsense”, you replied,

When I said “I think it's quite obvious that most moral arguments are not meaningless or nonsensical, you replied:

When I said, “the task of the moral philosopher is to analyze in what sense [ordinary moral discourse] is valid, and what constitutes validity in moral reasoning, not to toss it all in the rubbish heap”, you replied:

And later, commenting on the same statement:

When I presented a few examples of what I considered to be obviously meaningful moral reasoning to illustrate what I was talking about, your response was:

So it’s pretty clear that you have total contempt for traditional usage, find only confusion in everyday moral reasoning, and believe that the logic of moral discourse is based on falsehoods. So why would you regard it as an argument in favor of your theory (i.e., of your terminology) that many of the things that have been have written about moral questions will “remain true”? Obviously you do not think that they will remain true, since you don’t think they were true in the first place. What you’re really saying is that, if we take many moral statements that have been made over the centuries and impose your radically new meaning on them, they will become true. In some cases this is so; in others not, but in any case why would it be a virtue of your theory that true statements using these definitions are sometimes formally identical to statements that have been made (and believed) by those whose understanding of morality is more traditional or standard, but actually mean something fundamentally different? Isn’t this a sure path to confusion – a guaranteed way to befuddle and mislead people?

In your “atom” analogy it made sense to preserve the old terminology because a great deal of what had been said using it was true; it was only the understanding of the nature of the things called “atoms” that was wrong. But in the case of morality, in your view virtually none of the “traditional” moral beliefs is true, and the reasons and arguments given for them are essentially nonsense (i.e., based on false beliefs, like the belief in a volcano god or the belief that animal entrails can predict the future), so there is nothing to preserve. Your view is that traditional moral beliefs and arguments are inextricably tied to a false assumption that there is an intrinsic property of “ought-to-be-doneness” and that humans have an organ or faculty capable of discerning this property; and that this belief has led to terrible “moral mistakes”. Why wouldn’t it be more productive to chuck the whole thing; to stop using moral language altogether except for the purpose of explaining how and why it is based on a fundamental error? How can it facilitate communication to use traditional language in novel ways that are designed to yield statements that appear to mean the same thing as statements made by followers of the traditional morality but actually mean something radically different?

As far as I’m concerned, this is the key question. It seems to me that you’re trying to have it both ways. On the one hand, when your theory is attacked, you say that the criticism is unwarranted or misdirected because, after all, we’re just talking about what definition of “should” to use, and that there is no “correct” or “incorrect” answer to this kind of question. But when discussing other moral theories you consistently criticize them on grounds that are based on your theory, just as if your theory had some special, privileged status. One almost gets the impression that you consider your theory to be more valid in some sense than competing ones.

So how do you answer the question of whether your “theory” is really just a linguistic preference? Well, you say:

Granting for the sake of argument that this is true, it only narrows the field of moral philosophies to those that do not involve the false assumption that you refer to. Beyond that, it seems to me that your “moral philosophy” is still just a linguistic preference with no relevance to the question “what shall I do”?

To judge from your earlier answers I would guess that you would reply that the fact that an act is “wrong” according to your definition might not be a reason for the agent not to do it, but that it nevertheless would be a reason for the rest of us to condemn him or try to stop him. But this doesn’t work either. For example, Denton and Edwards, who take a “self-only-considered” view of things, would each have a reason for trying to prevent such actions. Denton’s would be to save his neck; Gould’s to save his. Neither would regard the fact that the action is “wrong” according to an all-things-considered perspective to be a reason for doing it. In fact, the only people for whom it would be a reason are those who take an all-things-considered point of view.

In the final analysis, what you’re describing here is just subjective morality cleverly disguised as “objective morality”. (This is one point that Koyaanisqatsi and I are in complete agreement on.) As I explained in my last post on the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000165" target="_blank">Morality is evil</a> thread (freely adapted here):

Let’s say that Jones kills Smith to get the money in his wallet. You arrest him and prepare to hang him. He asks why. What can you say in reply? If you tell him that you’re doing it because what he did was “wrong”, you’re saying that you’re going to hang him because you use certain words in a certain way! This will hardly do. Jones is asking for a moral justification for hanging him, and your reply is that a particular definition of “should” facilitates communication more efficiently than others. Jones might be excused for finding this an inadequate justification.

To bring out the point more clearly, suppose that Jones informs you that he also uses words like “right”, “wrong”, “justice”, and “deserve” in a purely descriptive way, and that according to his definitions you’re the one who deserves to be hanged. It seems to me that at this point you either have to say that you’re using moral language in something more than a purely descriptive way, or else you have to say that you’re hanging him simply because that’s what you want to do. Notions like “guilt” and “justice” don’t really enter into it: you’re just as “guilty” under his definitions as he is under yours, and since both sets of definitions are stipulative it is meaningless even to ask which is “correct” or more “valid”.

But this is exactly what most people understand by the statement that morality is subjective, or that there is no objective morality.

[ June 07, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

dk

dk: - The advantage of an act follows from the consequences reaped by the agency the actor represents.
[quote]Koyaanisqatsi: ME: - The term is implicitly comparative--regardless of what advertisers have bastardized over the years--that demands qualification.
dk: YOU: - No I meant an honest person tells the truth out of habit, even if a lie suits his interests. A dishonest person tells a lie out of habit, even if the truth suits his interests.
Then, as before, your "dilemma" is not a moral dilemma at all. The honest person tells the truth out of habit. It has nothing to do with morality; it's simply a personal choice.
dk: - Morality regulates conduct with reason. An honest person is compelled by reason to fulfill their contracts because to renege requires an implicit and/or explicit lie. A dishonest person can lie or cheat to gain the greatest possible advantage from the contract, except when forced by authority (injunction). An honest person learns to fulfill their contracts, and acquires good habits consonant with virtue. A dishonest person learns to break contracts to everyone’s detriment. In a litigious society everyone suffers from the costs accrued by huge bludgeoning bureaucracies, while in an informal (moral) society people do business with a handshake. The price of a handshake is honesty; the price of bureaucracy is incalculable but can become so burdensome it breaks the back of productive people.
dk: - I address the issue of judgment latter on.
dk: - - If you’re accusing me of making a reasonable judgment, I plead guilty. I also judged the earth to be round, just a subjective thought.
dk: - If that’s what you said we are in agreement. The age of the earth is experimentally determined by the available evidence and objective by the Principle of Causation.
dk: A proposition has an end in view and acts to that end. It is the nature of every act to communicate itself as far as possible. Ontologically speaking being as agent is finalized.
dk: – No, I said discursive thinking terminated by self evident assumptions. For example gravity is irrational verses rational, an elemental force that exerts a force, and warps space as a function of mass. Gravity is objective because it has been rendered self evident (elemental). Self evident assumptions can’t be proven ontologically (exist) or epistemologically (validity), but to deny renders knowledge unintelligible, which is of course absurd.
dk: - - No. The proposition of string theory explains elements of gravity. P1: Gravity is objective P2: String theory explains gravity: Conclusion: String theory is objective
dk: - You don’t know what everyone “reasons” about morality, the premise is absurd.
dk: - No, the objectivity of non-theistic morality follows from human nature, which according to the principle of identity is a union of like things called people. People are by nature intelligent creatures. Non-theistic morality inherits its objectivity from human nature, like string theory inherits its objectivity from gravity.
dk: - What do you mean by discursive thinking is not “active in any manner”?
dk: - : To assume a person has no destiny is absurd. But because a person has a destiny doesn’t preclude them from participation in that destiny.
dk: - Personal ad hominem attacks are a poor rejoinder.
dk: - I agree, in the sense that the intellect of an ignorant person is uninformed but predisposed to know. Morality informs a persons intellect, or creates intellect from ignorance.
dk: - I’m not alluding to anything, people unable to control themselves are degenerates unsuited to freedom, but well suited to a mob mentality and tyranny. They are literally degenerates.
dk: - People make honest mistakes, and quit often learn from them, but renewal, rehabilitation, forgiveness and restoration of a person requires virtue and morality. The topic is non-theistic morality.
dk: - Its self evident that a person ruled by passion is deprived of reason, to deny the premise produces an absurdity. One is only free to follow their passions within reasonable limits.
dk: Clearly moral principles apply to all aspects of procreation. For example, Is it immoral for a trustees like teachers, friends, mothers or fathers to masturbate before a 5, 10, 15 or 25 year old daughter or son; or visa versa? Does masturbation teach a teenager self mastery and self worth? What pathologies does masturbation advance? These are reasonable question that require moral judgments suitable to human nature.
dk: - Is there a child in the world unsuited to a safe home under the cover of loving parents? NO!!! Is there a household anywhere unsuited to clean drinking water, balanced diet, safe productive work or a living wage? NO!!! The proposition of non-theistic morality communicates both internal and external aims to perfect the rational nature of self with respect to ideas (a plan), materials (substance), efficiency (tools) and finality (for the sake of what).
1. All rational behavior benefits from fundamental moral precepts that inform a person of self in relationship to family, friends, neighbors, school, community, work, society, progeny etc… People are rational intelligent creatures that benefits from objective morality, derived from human nature. How much and what a person eats is a rational behavior that benefits from moral precepts applied by ethics to their personal situation and circumstance. .
2. The premise “… objectively moral … is … independent of human perceptions/existence” (forgive the summation) poses an absurdity. It is absurd to propose human nature exists independent of objective knowledge, or visa versa. All human knowledge (subjective and objective) reflects upon the nature of people, and visa versa. When a person elects to mime the sexual behavior of a dog they are immoral, because dogs and people have different natures.
3. This premise follows from an absurdity (bullet 2), so it is also poses an absurdity.
4. This premise follows from an absurdity, (bullet 2 and 3), so it is also poses an absurdity.
dk: - Follow me here. When I ask a question, I expect an explanation so that I might understand your point of view. Likewise, when you ask a question, I don’t respond with an argument but an explanation. That’s how a discussion proceeds. Hint, don’t ask questions to make an argument.
dk: - Thanks for the technical definition, you should credit the technical source. However you just made my point. How? By pontificating at length about the technical nuances that demonstrate a non-sequitur is anything but self-evident. Hint: in the future please explain the specifics of technical terms, give credit to your sources, and don’t be so quick to jump at the bait.
dk: Back on point
--------------
Koyaanisqatsi: Aka: Given p and ~p, the PEM asserts that at least one is true.
deductively to the specific case
And exactly how do I do this? Deduction is an inference in which the conclusion about particulars follows necessarily from general or universal premises.
You're telling me to apply a principle of logic that asserts either p or ~p is true in a specific given deductively to the "specific case" (which I'll assume to be "masturbation is moral and masturbation is not moral").
PEM asserts at least one of these givens is true (and both can be true), but that does not mean that either of these givens is ultimately true, i.e., valid when plugged into a syllogism.
It is an assertion for the sake of syllogism, not an immutable law of nature, as you are misconstruing, nor does it:
--------------

• For starters you errantly mistake a conclusion for a premise. For example; It is wrong (a moral judgment) to wear golf shoes to play league baseball because the sharp spikes put players at unreasonable risk (unreasonable consequences materialize).
  Are:
  P1: To wear Golf shoes is immoral or ~P1 To wear Golf shoes are moral. The is an obvious error of course. Properly stated…
• If the “uncreated truth” of masturbation (or golf shoes) is ~reasonable then masturbation (or golf shoes) is bad.
• What is this uncreated truth?
  The uncreated truth references intellect. Intellect communicates intelligibles. The intellect is predisposed to know, but not from sensible things. The active intellect authors ideas, structures, utility and concepts to turn sensible things into intelligible things by making a judgement from experience (not only from memory). A thing that is nonsense becomes intelligible through a judgments of the active intellect. Some art work is designed to confound a person’s active intellect with multifaceted perspectives. For example when an illusive portrait of a women, turns into a bearded man, it confounds the active intellect. Is this an optical illusion, or a rendered judgment?

dk: - Whhhooooo… A moral necessity!!! If morality is a necessity then are people free to descent? What’s the difference between a moral necessity and non-theistic morality?
dk: - I didn’t evade the question, I answered the question by sidestepping the logical fallacies your question imposed. .
dk: - Through the course of this discussion I’ve come to realize argument hinges on intellect not reason. Reason distinguishes between sensible things. Intellect communicates intelligibles like ideas, utility, structure, and concepts to give perspective to sensible things, or to render them intelligible. I submit active intelligence is predisposed to know, and perfects itself by judgments that finds the truth from uncreated truth by judgments. In a practical sense good judgment is reliable, and bad judgment is faulty according to the reliability of the consequences. Intellect gives perspective to our sensibilities by correctly judging (deducing) the essence from the appearance. The lynchpin of the issue is…
Are
judgments drawn from normative processes … (subjective)
- more or less reliable than
judgments drawn from 1st principles of the active intellect (objective)

I submit a person denied judgement has no intellect at all. A human being without intellect is a sophisticated automaton or zombie. Obviously a person of intellect must judge, and since judgment begins with self evident principles of the active intellect morality must be objective. Immediate empiricism gives a reliable snapshot of what appears to exist, but only intellect can deduce the essence of a thing from the appearance. Subjective morality renders judgment on appearances of a thing. Objective morality renders judgments on the essence (impersonal) of a thing. A reliable (good) judgment is more intelligible (perfected) by taking into account personal and impersonal accounts. In this light the science of ethics gives the appearance of morality, and morality gives the essence of ethics.

[ June 07, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

For the sake of brevity, I will paraphrase your argument.

I have offered an analogy between the use of the word "moral"; with the use of the word "atom" My aim has to use the technique of "disproof by counterexample" to demonstrate that certain forms of argument made against my use of the word "moral"; are invalid, by using "atom" as my counterexample.

You have raised the following objection to my claim that "atom" provides a useful counterexample.

(1) An argument showing that atoms have parts would, itself, have two parts.
(2) Part 1 = experiments and observations inconsistent with the hypothesis that atoms have no parts.
(3) Part 2 = a proposal to change the meaning of the term "atom" to reflect these facts.
(4) Part 1 is missing with respect to the term "moral".
(5) Therefore, a proposed change in the meaning of the word "moral" in step (3), to reflect facts nonexistent observations required at step (2), is at best meaningless.

My counter-claim is: (4) is false of the term "moral" as I have defined it. And, for any definition of "moral" for which (4) is true, it has no relevance in the real world. Morals talk would only be legitimate in a land of fantasy..

Morality, as I have argued, must concern phenomena capable of moving muscles and causing human action. That is to say, moral propositions must be consistent with a set of propositions that make up the best theory of human action.

Theories of human action are tested and defended or attacked based on their capacity to provide the simplest and most accurate way of predicting and explaining human behavior. As such, it is susceptible to experiment and observation to verify or falsify the various theories. And this process of the study of human action makes up the "part 1" of morality.

The most widely accepted theory of human action holds that the best explanation for observed human behavior postulates only the existence of motivating desires and non-motivating beliefs. Whether or not Jones will murder Smith depends entirely upon whether or not the murder of Smith will best fulfill his desires given his beliefs.

If we assume that all of Jones' beliefs are true, and that he knows all of the relevant facts, then whether Jones will actually murder Smith depends on whether, for all propositions P true of S (where S is the state of affairs of Jones murdering Smith) and any consequent of S, the sum of the strengths of Jones desires that P(1), P(2), P(3), ...., P(N) is greater than the sum of his desires for any competing state.

Morals talk presumes that there is a proposition (or some set of propositions) P true of S, whereby if Jones knew and understood P, then Jones would not perform the action leading to X, independent of his actual desires. It does not state clearly how this is done -- perhaps awareness of P motivates the agent directly, perhaps awareness of P creates an aversion to P that is sufficiently strong to motivate the agent not to perform the action.

What morals talk does not do is say that: If it is true that, for Jones, if Jones the sum of the strengths of Jones desires that P(1), P(2), P(3), ...., P(N) is greater than the sum of his desires for any competing state, he morally-should murder Smith for his money.

So, if it is true both that the sum of the strengths of Jones desires that P(1), P(2), P(3), ...., P(N) true of S is greater than the sum of his desires for any competing state, and that in saying to Jones that there is something about S whereby he ought not to bring about S, then there must be some other proposition P true of S, that Jones cares nothing about, that nonetheless has the capacity to motivate him not to bring about S.

(Either that, or when we say that Jones ought not to murder Smith we are saying nothing at all about what Jones would do if all if he had all of the possible relevant true beliefs about murdering Smith.)

Within BDI theory (or script theory, which I continue to hold is superior to BDI theory because of its superior ability to explain and predict human behavior) holds that it has no need of a proposition P true of S that entails an action independent of the agent's desires or entailing a desire on the part of the agent.

This set facts about BDI theory plays the role of "part 1" in my argument.

Which leads us to Part 2: the need to modify our language to reflect the fact that no such entity exists.


To judge from your earlier answers I would guess that you would reply that the fact that an act is "wrong" according to your definition might not be a reason for the agent not to do it, but that it nevertheless would be a reason for the rest of us to condemn him or try to stop him. But this doesn't work either. For example, Denton and Edwards...

If I say that the total weight of eggs in a basket is greater than 10 pounds, you are not free to interpret that as meaning that each of the eggs in the basket weighs more than 10 pounds, remove 2 sample eggs from the basket, demonstrate that neither weighs more than 10 pounds, and thus assert, "Hah! Thus I refute you."

But I think there might also be some confusion about the phrase, "the fact that an act is "wrong" according to your definition might not be a reason for the agent not to do it."

It may be more accurate to say that the fact that an act is something that an agent does not have a reason to not to do it does not determine whether it is wrong.

If something is wrong, then reasons not to do the action exist. Those reasons are tied to the desires that other people have, but may not be tied to the desires that Jones has.


Let's say that Jones kills Smith to get the money in his wallet. You arrest him and prepare to hang him. He asks why. What can you say in reply? If you tell him that you're doing it because what he did was "wrong", you're saying that you're going to hang him because you use certain words in a certain way!

This would be a valid argument if somewhere I made the claim that I have discovered the one true and proper only correct way to use the word "wrong", and by means of that discovery I am justified in hanging Jones.

But I have repeatedly denied that such a claim can be true, let alone that it is true of the way I use the word "moral."

If Jones wants to know why I am hanging him, and we have a few moments to discuss the subject, then I would first ask him, "What do you mean by "Why?" Are you asking for an explanation, or are you asking for a justification?

If he is asking for an explanation, and because it is my action that I am explaining, then that explanation will inevitably be explained in terms of my beliefs and my desires. We may assume that it includes a statement of the form that I moral-ought to hang Jones.

Jones may challenge me, "How do you justify your statement that you ought to hang me is true?"

Me: Well, when I say that I ought to hang you, I mean that it is what a person with good desires would do under these types of circumstances. Now, when I say that something (S) is good, what I mean is that for the propositions true of S, and the consequences of S, the sum of the desires that P is greater than it is for any alternative to S. So, a person with good desires is a person for whom, of all propositions P true of having that desire and its consequent, there is more and stronger desire that P than desire that not-P.

Jones: I think you ought to be hanged. And when I say that this I mean that it is something that a person who wants to kill red-headed Negroes would do. And, clearly, a person who hates red-headed Negroes would want to kill you.

Me: Well, if I take your stipulated statement at face value, that when you say that I ought to be hanged you mean nothing more than that a person who wants to hang red-headed Negroes would hang me, then I guess it must be true that I ought to be hanged. Because it is true that a person who wants to hang red-headed Negroes would hang me. But you cannot infer anything from the statement "I ought to be hanged" that cannot also be inferred from " a person who wants to kill red-headed Negroes would try to kill me." I will do the same thing. I will infer nothing from the fact that the person with the best reasons for action would hang you that is not true of the fact that the person with the best reasons for action would hang you. So, prepare to be hanged.

Jones: The only reason you are hanging me is because you decided to use the word "ought" to mean "that which a person with good desires would do," rather than "that which a person who wants to kill red-headed Negroes would do."

Me: No, I am hanging you because that is what a person with the best reasons for action would do, not because I selected any particular meaning for the word "ought". I will let you reserve the word "ought" exclusively to mean "that which a person who wants to kill red-headed Negroes would do";, as long as you infer nothing from this "ought" that is not true of "that which a person who wants to kill red-headed Negroes would do", and that you accept all of the implications for your 'ought' that are also true of "that which a person who wants to kill red-headed Negroes would do." And I will draw no inference from the fact that hanging you is that which a person with good desires -- with the best reasons for action -- would do. Prepare to be hanged.

Jones: "Wait! You've just transferred your problem back to the use of the word "best".; What if I say that the best desire is the desire to kill red-headed Negroes?

Me: Best in what sense? The only way that something can be good or bad is insofar as the propositions true of it or its consequences are desired. The only way that a desire can be good or bad is insofar as the propositions true of it or its consequences are desired. You can make the argument if you want that the desire to kill red-headed Negroes and the consequences of that desire fulfill more desires than any other option, but I do not think that you can make the claim stick.

Jones: That's question-begging. You used your assumption that best is what fulfills all desires, rather than what fulfills the desire to kill red-haired Negroes, as a basic assumption in your argument against me.

Me: Look, I took all of the reasons that exist for hanging you, and all of the reasons that exist for not hanging you, and concluded that the reasons that exist for hanging you outweigh the reasons that exist for not hanging you. If you want to argue that I need more than all of the reasons that exist to justify my action, then I will admit that I cannot provide it. But I think that demanding that I consider more than all of the reasons that exist is a bit facetious. And if you want me to consider less than all of the reasons that exist -- to consider only the reasons that exist for people who want to kill red-headed Negroes -- then I challenge you to ask me when the concept of "justification"; has ever meant using a subset of all reasons.


It would have been much more enlightening if you had done as I requested and indicated where your views differ from those of my guest.

False dichotomy.

Whether I agreed or disagreed with the views expressed by your "guest" depended on the interpretation given to ambiguous questions with multiple meanings. Places where I saw the context as giving question Meaning(1), I answered the question as if it had that meaning, only to have the interpretation of the question shift to Meaning (2).

I then find answers I have given under an assumption of Meaning(1) show up next to answers given under an assumption of Meaning(2) as if they both answered the same question and, thus, contradicted each other.

So, the correct answer was to neither "agree" or "disagree" with your fictitious guest, but to answer that I did -- that the answer depends on which of two possible meanings was assigned to an ambiguous question.


Why wouldn't it be more productive to chuck the whole thing; to stop using moral language altogether except for the purpose of explaining how and why it is based on a fundamental error?

Perhaps it is. I am willing to entertain arguments to this effect.


On the one hand, when your theory is attacked, you say that the criticism is unwarranted or misdirected because, after all, we're just talking about what definition of "should" to use, and that there is no "correct" or "incorrect" answer to this kind of question. But when discussing other moral theories you consistently criticize them on grounds that are based on your theory, just as if your theory had some special, privileged status.

There are different types of arguments relevant to different types of criticism.

To the person who has said that they want to use the "moral" in a particular way (typically in a way I think is indistinguishable from practical ought), I have said that they are perfectly free to do so. However, they must be willing to accept the implications of that particular definition. This would include such things as calling Jones' murder of Smith moral. Again, for those people who want to assert a sense of "moral ought" that is indistinguishable from "practical ought", this means calling moral any selfish, abusive, and harmful act where:

value of success * probability of success &gt; value of failure * (1- probability of success)

If a person is seeking to assert a particular definition, and not willing to accept the implications of using that definition, I have a problem with that and raise an objection.

Should there be a case where they use their definition and accept the implications of that definition, and I use my definition and accept its implications, then there should be no conflict between us. If both theories are true and accurate, then one should be able to accept both theories without a contradiction or dispute between them.

We would simply need to find some way to reduce the confusion caused by using the same terms in two different ways. It would be much easier if used different and consistent terms.

Toward that end I have said to others that if they want to assign some terms for me to use, I will use them. Nothing depends on the specific choice of words.

I do not care what you want to call the state of affairs that I refer to with moral terms. It remains that state of affairs that is recommended by looking at all of the 'reasons for action' that exist in the real world.

[ June 10, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

BD:

Just as a point of reference, I do not see our two theories as positing any significant differences in fact.

You hold that what an agent morally ought to do is what he would do with sufficient knowledge and understanding.

I hold that what an agent morally ought to do is what he would do with sufficient knowledge and understanding and good desires -- where good desires are those desires that are compatible with the fulfillment of other existing desires, regardless of who has them.

Even here we are not that far off, since you hold that good desires are consequent in some way on sufficient knowledge and understanding. Thus, you hold to the same conclusion that an agent morally ought to do that which he would do with sufficient knowledge and understanding and good desires. Only you, unlike me, hold that the good desires are in some way consequent upon having sufficient knowledge and understanding.

Against this, I make my "no value implies a fact; no set of beliefs imply a desire" claim -- that the ends that Jones desires will be no different after "sufficient knowledge and understanding" than they were before. Consequently, sufficient knowledge and understanding only shows Jones the most efficient way to murder Smith.

Either way -- whether one beliefs that K&U somehow entails good desires, or believes that good desires must be an explicit additional criterion, we both seem to share the "sufficient K&U + good desires" formula for moral ought.

Alonzo Fyfe

BD:

In your comments, you stated that the "key question" is how a moral philosophy answers the question "what shall I do?" Since this is so important, after a good night's sleep I thought I would single out special treatment.

I think the question is ambiguous -- that there are two questions here:

What practical-shall I do?
What moral-shall I do?

The answer to the first question is: That action which I would perform if I had sufficient knowledge and understanding. Unfortunately, in the famous Smith murder case, this would be to murder Smith in the most efficient way possible -- the way he would be murdered by somebody with Jones's desires and a full knowledge of all of the relevant facts.

The answer to the second question is: That action which I would perform if I had sufficient knowledge and understanding and good desires -- where good desires are those desires most compatible with the fulfillment of all desires.

The "problem" with making this distinction is that even if Jones is perfectly aware of what he morally-shall do, if he does not in fact have good desires then Jones, even if he fully knows and understands that he morally ought not to murder Smith, is still going to murder Smith. All of the knowledge and understanding in the world is not going to change his desires, and his desires will determine his action.

The "problem" with refusing to make this distinction -- with collapsing moral-ought into practical-ought, is that, not only does Smith get murdered, but in murdering Smith, Jones does nothing immoral.

It would be nice to find some property of Jones murdering Smith whereby all we have to do is make Jones aware of that property and he will not murder Smith. But no such property exists. Because of that, we are going to have to put up with one of the two "problems" of moral-ought.