The AntiChris

Koyaanisqatsi

If you recall, earlier in this thread I suggested that you appeared to be using the fact that people disagreed about a moral statement as a demonstration that morality cannot be objective. You flatly denied this and accused me of "paraphrasing or summarizing in your own words what my posts state". Rather than restate precisely what you meant, you side-stepped the issue by asking me to re-read your posts. Bearing in mind you'd posted 30 pages of text, I let the issue drop.

However, having read your last post, I can't help feeling that you really do consider that moral disagreement is a proof that morality cannot be objective.

Take the following statement from your last post:

If you're not using "only to those people who agree" as proof that "there is no such thing and can be no such thing as an objective morality", then what is it you're saying?

You go on to list four "good" (in your subjective assessment ), but differing, death penalty arguments. If you aren't offering these as "proof" of moral disagreement, then I'm at a loss as to why you've included them.

So, if you're not using moral disagreement as a demonstration or proof that morality cannot be objective, what is your argument?

The only thing moral disagreement "proves" is, that if moral truths are objective, then some people are mistaken.

Chris

bd-from-kg

The AntiChris:

Thank you. Unlike Alonzo, I think that traditional moral discourse is quite meaningful and that the proper function of moral philosophy is to discover and explain that meaning. (More on this later.) I really don’t see the point of doing what Alonzo is doing: declaring that moral language, as it is ordinarily used, is essentially meaningless (i.e., inextricably tied to false assumptions about the existence of imaginary entities), but then choosing to use this very language in a radically different way that has no real connection with standard usage. This seems to me to be a decision to use language to confuse and obfuscate rather than to communicate.

In principle, empathy isn’t as essential to the theory as you suppose: the “principle of equality” argument can stand on its own. But I suspect the few people would be persuaded purely by the highly abstract argument presented in that section.

At any rate, it certainly follows rigorously from the definitions used by the theory that “sufficient K&U” will often include a substantial amount of empathy. By definition, a given set of K&U is “sufficient” for a given choice if no additional K&U would result in a different choice. As you note, empathy is a type of K&U which has a high potential of affecting one’s decisions, so it is to be expected that a substantial amount of empathy would often be part of “sufficient” K&U for a given decision.

This brings up an important distinction, which perhaps I did not make clearly enough. I do not think that it is always rational to want to “feel another’s pain”. Pain hurts! My position is that a rational person wants to always do what he would approve of if he had sufficient K&U, not that he necessarily always want to have as much K&U as possible.

Actually there are a number of reasons why one would not want to know something. For example, one does not want to know in advance, in complete detail, the plot of every book one might read or every movie one might see. One might not want to know that the guy next door is a ruthless drug dealer who will kill you in a second if you give any indication of knowing this. And, of course, you might well not want to know, in intimate detail, about the suffering a stranger (or a loved one, for that matter) goes through as he or she dies slowly from cancer.

All that I claim is that it is rational to prefer to make the decisions that you would make if you knew these things. You would prefer to choose the book or movie that you will enjoy the most, even though you can’t be sure of choosing it precisely because of your lack of knowledge. You would prefer not to abet you neighbor unknowingly in killing an undercover agent, even though you don’t want to know what he’s up to. You would prefer to alleviate the cancer victim’s suffering, or at least not make it worse, without actually experiencing it.

In some cases there is no way to guess what decision you would approve of if you had sufficient K&U, but in many cases it is possible to be reasonably certain. In many other cases, such as committing adultery, there are “moral rules” whose real purpose (according to my theory) is to provide guidance as to which decision you would make if you had intimate K&U of the consequences of each choice.

The decision to “do the right thing” cannot be contingent on one’s actually having the requisite K&U to foresee fully all of the relevant consequences. One rarely has, or could possibly have, such godlike knowledge and understanding. My theory says that, when you tell someone that he “should” do something, you are informing him (or very often just reminding him) that this is the choice he would make if he really understood fully the consequences of the possible choices.

In fact, I think that this is what people really mean when they speak of appealing to one’s “better nature”. After all, in what sense is taking into account the effects of one’s actions on others displaying one’s “better” nature? The answer is that it is more rational; it is in accordance with one’s nature as a rational being, rather than simply doing whatever pleases one at the moment, as (we imagine) the “lower” animals do. I believe that any being who is even partially rational (like us humans) recognizes that it is “better” or “preferable” to be more rational. Once again, this is not something that can be “proved”, or that is logically entailed by any set of facts about the “real world”. It is an absolutely fundamental “value judgment”. If someone asked me to justify it, I would be at a complete loss, just as I would be at a loss to explain why I am committed to accepting conclusions of rigorous logical arguments.

It doesn’t really matter that much to me. some people, like Koyaanisqatsi. appear to use the term “objective morality” to mean something that is logically impossible, like a square circle. That’s their prerogative, but I don’t see the point of depriving the term of any conceivable meaning.

My theory is “objective” in at least three important senses:

(1) If it is ever true for anyone, at any one time, that a specific act is “right”, it is true for everyone, at all times, that it is “right”.

(2) There is a good, objective reason for preferring this definition of “right” over any other – namely, that any fully rational person will find it compelling. That is, any such person who understands what it means to say that an action is “right”, and who understands that a specific choice is “right”, will do it. Thus it gives a reasonable account of the connection between morality and action which Alonzo insists cannot exist, but without which morality is essentially meaningless.

(3) It interprets ordinary moral discourse in a meaningful way which is as close as is logically possible to what is intended by the people using it.

Here’s a good illustration of what I mean. When people talked about things like sunrise and sunset in 5000 B.C., few of them would have agreed that they were talking about the way the sun appears to move above and below the horizon as the earth revolves. But in almost all cases, if they had come to understand what’s really going on, they would have agreed that this is what they “really” meant, even though it’s not what they understood themselves to mean.

In the same way, while few people would agree that my interpretation captures just what they have in mind when they use moral language, I think that most people would agree that this is what they were “really” getting at if they had sufficient K&U. Of course, sufficient K&U in this context would include understanding that religions are expressions of certain deep human realities, but are not literally true, that there is no intrinsic property of “ought-to-be-doneness”, etc.

But if someone insists that he means something else by “objective morality”, and that my theory is not “objective” in his sense, so be it. Why should I care whether my theory satisfies someone else’s criterion of “objectiveness”?

Koyaanisqatsi

And I countered by stating that the reason people disagree about what is or is not considered "moral" is because morality is necessarily subjective.

It's been so long, you may be right, so rather than get into an "I said/you said," I'll just grant this and point to the above clarification.

As will I.

Not as a proof that morality cannot be objective. Morality cannot be objective; that is an absolute because it is dependent upon agreement as a neccessary defining quality.

You have the syllogism backwards.

Again, as before, it is impossible for an action to be intrinsically either "bad" or "good," precisely because "bad" and "good" are judgment calls.

Judgment is subjective by definition, unless you can argue that it is the "universe" that somehow makes such an objective judgment?

Once again, we are not talking about facts that exist independently of human interpretation as has been granted a thousand times by all involved. Look at bd's entire posts regarding what are his standards; his justifications.

BY DEFINITION ALONE THEY ARE SUBJECTIVE AND DEPENDENT UPON OUR GROUP CONSENSUS FOR ACCEPTANCE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION!

Fine. You're correct and I apologize. There can be no such thing as an "objective morality" because morality must be agreed upon by group consensus.

Judgment is subjectivity defined and without group consensus, it is impossible to ever state anything is absolutely morally "good" or absolutely morally "bad," all right?

In fact, even with group consensus, it is impossible to ever state anything is absolutely morally "good" or absolutely morally "bad," which therefore means that nothing can ever be "absolutely morally good" or "absolutely morally bad."

In other words, it does in fact mean that because there are no objective moral truths, there can be no objective moral truths, due to the defining qualities of the concept of morality.

You are correct. They are examples that prove it is impossible to state that the death penalty, for example, is an absolutely immoral sentence. Morality will always necessarily be a matter of personal and/or group opinion.

Again, fully granted. Morality cannot be objective because it is necessarily an individual judgment call open to disagreement.

In other words, it is impossible for anyone to state that an action is universally, objectively, absolutely "immoral" for all humans.

Impossible. The second you say, "No it isn't," is the second you prove my point.

No matter what you claim to be immoral for all humans I can then counter that claim and that's the end of it, for there is absolutely no possible means for you to prove that you are correct. None.

And yes, that does mean that no objective morality exists precisely because morality is a judgment call and not a tangible fact that exists independently of human perception, as, again, has been granted by everyone here ten billion times.

The action to kill cannot be demonstrated to be "objectively bad" ever as a necessary condition of the action; circumstances and judgment (elements of subjectivity) will always be required to determine the "goodness" or "badness" of the action.

As I've argued previously, the only way the action to kill could ever be considered "objectively bad," for example, would be if that "badness" were intrinsic to the act itself, independent of human interpretation.

The second--the millisecond--you state that morality only applies to human perception is the second you ipso facto declare its conditional subjectivity.

False, because the disagreement is morality! After (what, 8 pages) I now fully affirm the fact that morality and disagreement are synonymous and apologize for my earlier defensive posture.

Thus you present an invalid premise in: If moral truths are objective, then some people are mistaken.

Moral truths cannot be objective due to the defining qualities of morality.

What you consider to be moral will always be a personal decision unless you can provide a mechanism for objectivity that is independent of human interpretation, which is why theists so strenuously argue for God.

Since no such creatures exist (and even if they did, as I argued previously, that still would only mean the subjectivity is shifted to God) and it is illogical to claim that the universe as an entity acts as the mechanism for objectivity, then it cannot be stated that moral truths exist objectively.

Morals are nothing more than rules of conduct formed by and conditioned upon group consensus. To say the universe forms morality or that nature forms morality as a mechanism for objectivity is an absurdity and therefore invalid.

To say that objectivity in regard to morality means "applicable to all humans" is to claim facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations, an impossibility considering the necessary qualities (elements) of morality.

<ol type="1">[*] It involves human judgment based upon circumstance; a necessarily subjective qualification unless and until it can be established that there somehow exists an absolutely impartial judge, human or otherwise.[*] There exists no possible absolutely impartial judge, human or otherwise.[*] It is abstract, thus there are no "facts" or "conditions" of the concept of "morality," per se as there are merely facts and conditions surrounding the institution of morality (as in the verb, to institute).[*] Feelings, prejudice and interpretation are defining qualities of the concept of "morality" and cannot, therefore, be separated from the concept of "morality," absent an absolutely impartial judge, human or otherwise.[*] The defining of standards as an absolutely impartial judge (aka, "otherwise") is nothing more than group consensus.[/list=a]

It is, therefore, invalid to argue that absence of an objective moral truth does not mean there can be no objective moral truth.

The valid argument is: There exists no objective moral truth as a necessary, defining condition of the concept of "morality."

(edited for formatting - Koy)

[ July 12, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

John Page

bd:

It seems to me that you want to define morality as objective, rather than considering how you arrive at moral judgements. Consider:

This is not objective. Assuming that the "right" you define is a moral decision then its "rightness" can only be evaluated in terms of achieving a desired outcome. The desire is subjective, even if many people share it. Right and wrong, as Koy observes, are products of our fickle minds.
This is not an objective reason. In any event, how do you define rational? This will bring us back to desire, social pressures etc. Of course there is a connection between moral judgements and action but this does not automatically make the judgements "right" in any objective way.

Think of it this way, two rational people of integrity placed in the same circumstances will choose different courses of action according to their morality. Both are "right" and both must have made subjective choices (for if there were an objective morality their choices would have been the same).
Subjective discourse is also meaningful, is it not? Nothwithstanding this, it is the human mind that is doing the interpreting here, not your objective morality.

Perhaps this argument is a testament to the negative moral connotations people place on subjectivity. I think you can put this down to both science and religion ramming it down peoples throats that they need to be "objective" and "moral" respectively.

Can you provide me one single example of an objective moral truth that meets all three of of your own criteria?

Cheers, John

The AntiChris

bd-from-kg

I'm having difficulty imagining at what point "no additional K&U would result in a different choice". Your second statement indicates that that there is a line to be drawn. At what point does one "rationally" draw that line?

As a complete layman, it appears to me that some moral theories (or opinions) depend on very dubious moral "truths" and as such it's not only legitimate, but essential that their objectivity is challenged. However, your theory doesn't seem to me to be in this category. Bearing in mind that to some subjectivists the mere mention of "objective" and "morality" in the same sentence is tantamount to intellectual bankruptcy, might it be politic to drop the "objective" tag? It just might facilitate a more interesting discussion about your theory.

Chris

The AntiChris

Koyaanisqatsi

So, I think we've established that you consider that the existence of moral disagreement is a proof of the subjectivity of morality.

However, you go on to say:

This appears to suggest that even if there were universal moral consensus, there could still be no such thing as an objective moral truth. In other words, moral consensus has no bearing at all on the existence or otherwise of objective moral truths?

If this is true, how does moral disagreement constitute any kind of proof?

Unless of course the fact that there is moral disagreement is somehow part of your "defining condition", but then we'd be going round in circles wouldn't we.

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

A summary of my position, just for the record.

There are no categorical imperatives.

There are no intrinsic values.

There is no rationality of ends.

There is no way to derive new desires from an increase in knowledge and understanding.

One way or another, all arguments that fall into any of these descriptions ultimately makes the same mistake -- they attempt to derive 'ought' from 'is.'

bd-from-kg's argument begins by describing the role that knowledge and understanding plays in a rationality of means. In this, his claims are correct. One should do that act which they would do with sufficient K&U, because the act that they would do with sufficient K&U is that act that would best fulfill their existing desires.

But bd-from-kg goes on to assert some additional powers for K&U -- that it can somehow yield new desires. And he asserts that there is an axiom of rationality that states that one 'should' do that action which fulfills not only existing desires, but also implied new desires.

Neither of these are justified.

There is no way to derive or infer or imply any new desires from an increse in K&U -- there is no rationality of ends. This is the 'is/ought' problem at work.

Even if there were, the role that K&U plays in a rationality of means (because it identifies the act that would best fulfill the agent's existing desires precludes it from playing the same role in a rationality of ends. An agent is rationally free to rationally claim that he has no use for any K&U that would change his existing desires.

[ July 13, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

Please allow me to explain how the 'argument from disagreement of moral principles' works against the claim that there are objective values.

First, the use of 'objective' in the statement above is ambiguous. It means one of two things:

(1) There there are intrinsic value properties.

(2) There (or can be) objectively true moral statements.

The argument from disagreement applies against type-1 objectivity, not against type-2 objectivity.

To illustrate how the argument works, let us use gravity as an example. (I employ gravity in this example because 'intrinsic values', if they were real, would work like some type of force.)

Gravity causes a downword acceleration on a body of about 10 meter per second, no matter which culture one belongs to, or what one believes.

The claim about intrinsic values is that we are pulled towards that which has intrinsic merit by the intrinsic merit itself, as opposed to being pushed towards ends by our own desires.

If this pull was real, then we should be able to find its effect on all people in all cultures. It would be like gravity -- no matter what the people believed or what explanations or superstitions they might have adopted, the influence of this force on those people would still exist.

The fact that it does not exist demonstrates that people are not pulled towards certain ends by their intrinsic merit. The theory that they are pushed toward certain ends by their desires wins out.

I stated that this theory argues against type-1 objectivity but not type-2 objectivity. The fact that people are pushed towards certain ends by their desires is an objective fact. Also, the desires that they have is an objective fact. Therefore, even though type-1 objectivity does not exist, type-2 objectively (objectively true value claims) still does exist.

Alonzo Fyfe

Both of my previous posts are consistent with one other proposition.

The only type of value that exist -- that is real -- that is relevant when we are talking about real-world actions, real-world laws, real-world customs -- describes a relationship between states of affairs and desires.

Anything beyond this is a fiction, a fantasy. It has no real-world relevance and no role to play in discussing real-world actions, laws, customs, or policies.

But, these relationships between states of affairs and desires are real. They can be objectively discovered, tested, and verified.

They are independent of belief. One can not bring such a relationship into existence by declaring it so. What the value of something is in fact, and what a person declares it to be, may well bee two different things. Indeed, it is possible (and in some cases very likely) that nobody on the planet knows what the real value of something is.

And whereas each individual agent has only a small percentage of the total desires, each individual agent accounts for only a small percentage of the total value of a state of affairs.

Finally, you cannot discover the total value of something by looking inward or measuring one's own reactions. One can only determine this total value by looking outword, at the world, and at the other people in it. And one must be prepared to discover that they do not like what they discover.

bd-from-kg

Koyaanisqatsi:

You say:

Perhaps if you would explain just what you think the statement “X should do Y” means, it will be clear why you say that morality cannot be objective.

You say:

This is unclear, to put it mildly. Why must morality be agreed upon by group consensus, unless it is defined by such a consensus? But if it is defined by a consensus, would not the objective existence of such a consensus be an objective moral truth? For example, if “Capital punishment is wrong” means that there is a consensus against capital punishment, then if there really is such a consensus, it is objectively true that capital punishment is wrong.

Later you say:

Again this is unclear. If when Smith says “X should do Y” he means that he disapproves of X’s doing Y, then if he really does disapprove of X’s doing Y, is it not his statement objectively true? On the other hand if he means that he judges that X should do Y, we are left with the question of what it is that he is judging. He is only making a judgment call if he is expressing a judgment as to whether something is true. And it only makes sense to make such a judgment if the “something” is capable of being true or false; in other words, it must be a proposition. But what proposition?

The point is that it is not a simple matter to interpret moral statements in a way that is remotely consistent with common usage. In fact, the question of how moral statements should be interpreted is a subject of heated contention even among subjectivists.

So I ask again: what do you think a statement such as “X should do Y” means?

It would also be helpful to explain what you think it means to say that a moral statement is “objectively true”. This would greatly clarify what you mean when you say that moral statements cannot be “objectively true”. If your position is that it doesn’t mean anything to say that a moral statement is objectively true, then it must also be your positition that it doesn’t mean anything to say that moral statements cannot be objectively true: if X is meaningless, so is not-X.

If you would take the trouble to answer these questions clearly instead of just asserting repeatedly that morality cannot be objective “by definition” or “by its very nature,” it is very possible that most of us will agree with you that under your definitions there can be no such thing as objective morality. Of course, some of us may mean something quite different by saying that a moral statement is “objectively true” than you do. And some of us may not agree that your understanding of moral statements has much to do with what most people have in mind when they utter them.

In the absense of such definitions or explanations, I suspect that you’re wasting dozens of pages arguing about what are really linguistic questions as if they were substantive ones.