lazcatluc

Your examples assume that X and Y are certain people. However, X and Y can be chosen arbitrary. Therefore, your objections are not valid (Ex: X never met Y; obviously there are nontheists who met eachother and who are aware of ANB and who believe that ANB is correct; or your 2nd objection: it would mean that all nontheists hear of such evidence and convert based on it, but then, if this were to happen, ANB would obviously be unsound)

Conclusion: You failed in providing a valid counter-example. All your examples assume X and Y are not chosen arbitrary. But they are.

I claim that, if my "whole business with X and Y" would be correct, then my analogy would also be correct.
I'm sure your right. But does God want almost all people to believe in him? I see no proof of that in Drange's essay. I find proof for the claim that God wants all people to be saved, not almost all.

I see no evidence that John has another overriding desire or that he is not rational (in Drange's sense). If you wish to claim any of these, then the burden of proof is on you.

In the mean time you can try another analogy:

John is very ill. In order to regain his health he would have to spend a lot of money (money he doesn't have). If he doesn't do that he will die. Surely, you must agree that John is willing to regain his health and to save himself from death. But he is not able to do that.
However, John is able to buy himself a brand new car. John doesn't want a new car. He cannot drive it (because he is very ill).

Situation S: (John having saved himself from death) or (John having bought a brand new car)

(A)
(1)John is able to bring about Situation S.
(2)John is willing to bring about Situation S.
(3)There is no overriding desire that precludes Situation S (what could be more important for him then to save his own life?)
(4)John is rational in Drange's sense (I'm sure you can't argue with this)

(B) From A1-A4 => Situation S would have to obtain.

(B) is obviously false. (B) would be true iff Situation S would not be a disjunction. But Situation S is a disjunction (in both my analogy and Drange's ANB) so Drange's ANB is incorrect.

Silent Dave

Strawman. I was not attempting to give a specific counterexample for a specific X or Y, but to show that, for almost any given X or Y, a naturalistically based conversion to theism (which would not rely on ANB's unsoundness) is logically possible. This proposition, which strikes me as self-evident, is sufficient to refute your argument on the logical impossibility of situation S obtaining if ANB is sound.


I could claim that I own the state of Indiana, but I doubt the Hoosiers would be impressed. Your analogy would not be correct, for the reasons already given. In any case, I have already shown the X and Y business to be incorrect.


You therefore find proof for the claim that God wants situation S. Thank you.


Negative. You are the one making the argument from analogy. I have criticized the analogy. You must defend the analogy against my criticism.


This is also disanalogous to Drange's ANB, since A2 states that John is WILLING to bring it about, not that he WANTS to bring it about. There is a difference; I am willing to pay taxes, but I don't want to. And personally, I don't know any Christians who worship a God that is willing to bring about situation S but doesn't want to.

I should add that if change A2 in your analogy above to say that John WANTS to bring about situation S, then if A1-A4 were all correct B would also be correct, for John would bring about situation S by buying the car.


Dave

Jamie_L

Another coment to diana:
It's worth noting that the Problem of Evil is one that also only goes after the Christian god and other similar omnimax concepts, so it's not like ANB is all that specialized compared to the kinds of things we normally argue about around here.

To the rest:
As an evidentiary arguement, some of the force of Drange's arguement lies in the fact that so many people do not believe in the Christian god. Not just atheists, but Budhists, Muslims, Wiccans, Scientologists, and on down the list.

One would expect ALL people to believe in God, but if that weren't true, one would at least expect almost all to believe, which I believe is the source for the inclusion of almost all in situation S.

Jamie

lazcatluc

The proposition may strike you as self evident, but it sure doesn't strike me that way at all. I was not refering to any given X and Y, instead, I was refering to those nontheists who believe ANB is sound (like yourself or Jamie_L).Those nontheists cannot become theists unless they stop beliving that ANB is sound first.

Are we playing with words here? John WANTS to save his life, therefore John WANTS to bring about situation S
Really? Why should he buy a car? He doesn't one and he doesn't need one. Would you buy yourself a brand new car if you wouldn't have money to pay for the medication that keeps you alive? That doesn't sound very rational to me.

lazcatluc

1. Why? There is no evidence that God wants almost all people to be saved.
2. How many do you consider almost all?

lazcatluc

Well, we agree on one thing: ANB is not a logical argument. Is it an evidential argument? I don't think so. It basically says, as Jamie_L puts it:
That doesn't sound like an evidential argument to me. Where is the probability element in this?

He cannot or he doesn't want to hide the nonbelief. And why should he hide it? What you wrote falsely assumes that God wants to hide the nonbelief.
Watch out for circularity: the assumption that nonbelief should be hidden is based on the ideea that nonbelief causes further nonbelief. That means that ANB is true, but that is exactly what you are trying to prove, so you can't assume it.

Silent Dave

This contradicts what you said earlier, that X and Y are chosen arbitrarily. But if you want to narrow the playing field to only those nontheists who believe that ANB is sound, I am happy to grant that restriction -- it only makes the proposition stronger, since it makes it less open to counterexample. If you dispute my proposition, then show the logical contradiction in a nontheist coming to believe that God exists in a completely naturalistic way.


That has nothing to do with the specific paragraph you responded to, so I take it you concede the point raised in that paragraph. The rest of this is therefore purely academic, since we are no longer talking about Drange's ANB. Nevertheless, I address your point below.

*sigh* I guess I have to spell it out for you.

Let me put it this way: the statement "John wants situation S to obtain" could mean one of two things, either

(1) John wants the situation of (either his life saved or his having a new car) to obtain

or

(2) Either (John wants the situation of his life saved to obtain), or (John wants the situation of his having a new car to obtain).

These are not the same thing; (1) expresses a single desire on John's part, while (2) expresses that John has either of two different desires, neither of which is the desire expressed in (1).

Now, if what you mean to say is (1), then your entire argument against ANB is faulty;

(0) John wants the situation of his life saved to obtain

does not entail

(1) John wants the situation of (either his life saved or his having a new car) to obtain,

any more than

(0') Dave wants the situation of his having a million dollars to obtain

entails

(1') Dave wants the situation of (either his having a million dollars or his being castrated) to obtain.

I can tell you that (0') is definitely true; if (1') followed from it, then by castrating me you would be acting in accordance with my wishes, not against them. A criminal could use this defense to get out of a murder rap: "Since the victim wanted to live, it logically follows that she wanted to either live or die. So by killing her, I was just doing what she wanted." This is obviously absurd.

On the other hand, if by "John wants situation S" you mean to say

(2) Either (John wants the situation of his life saved to obtain), or (John wants the situation of his having a new car to obtain)

then this would be much more reasonable, and your criticism of your own premise B makes sense. But we would then no longer be talking about ANB. ANB's premise A2 expresses a single desire on God's part, a desire for one situation to obtain, a situation which would come about by any of a set of seperate (but closely related) conditions being fulfilled. By contrast, your premise A2 expresses two different desires (of which John has at least one) for two different situations to obtain, each situation which would come about by one particular and unique condition being fulfilled. So it goes with each of your other A-premises (except A4).

So, assuming you're not trying to be irrational, you're actually arguing against, not Drange's ANB, but of a completely different argument of your own devising. It's not Catalin vs. Drange, or any other ANB-supporter, but Catalin vs. Catalin. Let us know who wins.


Dave

Silent Dave

1. There is evidence that God would want all or almost all people to be saved. This is not the same thing as God wanting almost all people to be saved, nor is it derived from it. Also, ANB states not that God would want all or almost all people to be saved (although that proposition strengthens the argument), but that God would want almost all people to believe that certain propositions are true (what Drange calls the gospel message). Again, you're arguing against yourself.

2. Drange probably didn't have a specific figure in mind, and it's not really necessary to have a working numerical figure, since it is clear to any rational person that less than one-third of something does not constitute almost all of something.


Dave

Silent Dave

It is an evidential argument. Although it is phrased as a logical argument, the argument establishes the conclusion with a degree of confidence correlating to the degree of confidence with which the premises are established.


Even if you were correct that ANB-supporters could not believe so long as they believe that ANB was sound (and I've already addressed that), God could indeed hide the nonbelief. He's all-powerful. And if the arguments in support of premises A2 and A3 of ANB are sound, then he would want to hide it if it were necessary for situation S to obtain.


It is not necessary to assume ANB in order to assume that nonbelief causes further nonbelief. It can be derived from simple observation. Moreover, it is not necessary to argue that nonbelief should be hidden -- only that, if for some reason nonbelief does preclude situation S, then it [i]must[/b] be hidden in order for S to obtain. Again, this is all moot, since nonbelief does not preclude the logical possibility of S.


Dave

K

lazcatluc:

There are a couple of bad assumptions you made in your refutation of ANB.

First, you assumed that believers must start as non-believers and be converted. An omnipotent God could certainly make belief the default.

Second, you assumed a starting point where non-believers existed along with believers. Even if belief were not the default, God would only have to convert the first person to belief in order to circumvent your refutation. If that were the case, every new person would come into a world of believers. With no non-believers, there would be no ANB to convince the new person not to believe.