student738

Following is a thought that came to me this evening. I don't have a great deal of time to commit to a thread, but I thought I would see whether there is anything of interest in the idea, and if so, hopefully respond to comments as appropriate (and as I am able...).

First, it seems true it is not the case that "I know that x" implies "I know that I know that x," i.e., I can know a thing to be true without knowing that I know a thing to be true.

And so, suppose it is true, "I know that A." Now, what I wonder is whether it is possible that I manipulate or otherwise operate upon the brain of some person, Jones, without his being aware of my intrusion, where at the onset of the operation it is false, "Jones knows that A," and yet at the conclusion of this operation, "solely as a result of my having performed this very operation", it is true, "Jones knows that A.

By, "solely as a result of my having performed this very operation," I mean to disclude the possibility that, for example, some other agent or even some internal act of Jones causes Jones to come to know that A. That may not be quite strict, but I hope it is clear enough what I am after.

Now, substituting for myself, Smith, some other person, suppose it is true, "Smith knows that Smith has only three fingers." Suppose that Smith performs an operation on Jones, without Jones' being aware of it taking place. The intent of this operation is that all within Smith's brain on which Smith's knowing (and therefore believing) that Smith has only three fingers, depends, is duplicated in Jones' brain. Suppose that the operation is successful by this intent.

I suggest that it is possible (i.e. it may be in at least some circumstances) that "solely as a result of Smith having performed this very operation", Jones knows that Smith has only three fingers.

Jones believes that Smith has only three fingers. There is an unbroken causal chain between its being directly perceived that Smith has only three fingers, and the corresponding thoughts being formed in Jones' brain. It is true that Smith has only three fingers.

If you do not believe it to be true, "There is an unbroken casual chain between its being directly perceived that Smith has only three fingers, and the corresponding thoughts being formed in Jone's brain," while I believe I disagree, I suppose I may most easily convince you by in response adding to the scenario that it is true, "Smith is the sort of person who, when he has the opportunity to perform such an operation upon a person like Jones, will do so without fail."

student738

I am inclined to believe that the above scenario may in some cases result in a direct transfer of knowledge.

The theist, it would seem, has an interest in the direct transfer of knowledge being possible.

If knowledge can be transfered without the recipient's being aware that it has taken place, or of from where the transfer originated, then it is possible (in the world in which a God of a certain sort exists) to have knowledge of God, not at least directly dependent upon one's perception, or the testimony of others.

However, concerning knowledge directly transferred from a God or perhaps from some "divine messenger", there seem to be many complications. These complications may be seen even in the scenario of Jones and Smith, outlined previously.

In the event that Jones has a prexisting belief that Smith has but two fingers, it seems there will be some effect upon the possibility of knowledge being transfered to Jones that Smith has three fingers. We might additionally consider the case in which Jones's prexisting belief that Smith has but two fingers is justifiably held, perhaps as the result of the false testimony of a witness which Jones correctly takes to be generally reliable in these matters.

Upon the completion of the operation, Jones will find himself to hold two incompatible beliefs, both the belief that Smith has but two fingers, and the belief that Smith has three fingers.

There are several questions which arise:
a) Does knowing that x require both believing that x and not holding any belief inconsistent with the belief that x?
b) Does knowing that x require both the belief that x be justifiably held and not being justified (where being justified does not entail believing) in holding any belief inconsistent with the belief that x?