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03-25-2002, 12:08 AM | #101 | |||||||
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03-25-2002, 02:03 AM | #102 | |
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03-25-2002, 11:37 AM | #103 | |
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[ March 25, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p> |
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03-25-2002, 11:40 AM | #104 | |||||||
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The provlem is that there is simply no inconsistency involved in a God who is already considered the direct cause of everything (including acts that violate His moral laws, assuming that this is possible) sending people to hell. Quote:
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But if He is not "omnimax" then there is no way to know for sure what His actions are. In neither case above do we have a basis for assuming that morality is defined by God's actions. But again, since (on your assumptions) morality must have come from this "omnimax" God somehow, morality must have some other aspect of God than His actions as a basis. So, the question is how do we come to know God's position on morality if not by "observing" His actions? Quote:
And why would a world that will never have anything in it but morally naive creatures, who never have any possibility of acquiring knowledge about good and evil, be a more "perfect" world than our own? |
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03-25-2002, 01:55 PM | #105 | ||||||||
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[ March 25, 2002: Message edited by: Samhain ]</p> |
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03-25-2002, 11:42 PM | #106 | |||||||||
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A "God" that is considered to be the direct and immediate cause of everything (thereby eliminating any possibility of moral responsibility for any act) is, by nature, amoral; not omnibenevolent. So, "His" existence was irrelevant to any argument related to "the problem of evil" from the outset. Your analysis has shown that it was pointless to have posited such a "God" in the first place. This "God" saves us all a lot of effort by using Occam's Razor on Himself. Quote:
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[ March 26, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p> |
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03-26-2002, 02:10 AM | #107 | |
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03-26-2002, 09:00 AM | #108 | |
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03-26-2002, 10:22 AM | #109 |
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jpbrooks:
I know much has not been clarified as of yet, but I hope that I can now explain to you my position with the problem of an omnimax creator. I think now that we have discussed many of these things which are relevant to the argument we can now draw several conclusions based upon what situations can and cannot be possible. Conclusion 1: God is an omnibenevolent creator, but he cannot extend further than this with his "omnimaxity." He cannot be omnipotent in this sense, since his omnibenevolence would dictate to change all of the evil in the world to good, since God would not be able to put up with evil in the world because it goes against his ultimate and undying "goodness." So we can therefore assume in this conclusion that since God does not change all evil to good, that he is, in a sense, powerless to change all of the world to good, so this questions his omnipotence and/or omniscience. I will hold that God in this situation has the power to change some things in the world, but his power cannot extend in the "universal" sense, but he changes what he can, when he can. In this case we would have Free will. Conclusion 2: God is, basically, the same as nature. God holds to the characteristics of omnipotence and omniscience, but instead of omnibenevolence, holds to omniindifference, since we we have concluded that it is impossible for omnibenevolence to exist along with omnipotence. God is nothing more than a hard deterministic viewpoint in this sense, and can be eliminated by applying Occam's razor. This God, as a entity, makes little, if any, sense at all. It would be pointless to worship a God of this type, one might as well worship nature. In this case God would eliminate free will, just like a deterministic universe would. I still hold that we cannot have free will with God as an omniscient and omnipotent being. Conclusion 3: I hesitate to list this as a conclusion at all, since it is completely absurd and, I believe, impossible, but I've decided to list it anyway since I figured this would be more of the theistic viewpoint. God keeps his omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence (even though, if we regard the Bible as accurate at all, we know this to be quite absurd, especially with omnibenevolence). We still have free will, and our actions are completely free of God's intervention (in a basic sense)(even though this conflicts with his omniscience and omnipotence). God allows evil into the world for some sense which we cannot understand (even though this conflicts with his omnibenevolence). Therefore it would be just for God to punish us accordingly depending on our actions, since we are not one of God's "tools" in this sense. The reason why God can have all of his "omnimaxity" is because, while we can define the terms, the attributes themselves "transcend logic." So basically God has everyone of these attributes, but cannot be bound by them in any sense? Absurd. In this case it is impossible to understand any attribute of God at all, and therefore impossible to understand God. This is another example of the cryptic nonsense which (in my experience) theists seem to fall back upon time after time, when they refuse to see logic and reason. I cannot even count this type of god as supernatural, but just irrational and impossible. This definition of God makes the least amount of sense at all in my opinion, but it is the only one which can explain all of the contradictions of God by basically shifting the burden of proof. Now which of these three is worth worship? (1) A god who can be just as incompetant as any human since he does not have enough knowledge or power to be infallible, (2) A god who is basically nature and determinism defined or (3) A fairy tale. Something nice to hear and ok to believe if you are four years old, but when faced with harsh reality, it is sensed that this is completely devoid of all logic and reason. And therefore it can be logically concluded that there is no purpose in worshipping a god which one cannot even begin to comprehend let alone define. I think this pretty much will answer any of the questions you posed before, but if you still have some, or have any more comments, feel free to ask/comment. [ March 26, 2002: Message edited by: Samhain ]</p> |
03-27-2002, 06:45 AM | #110 | |
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All three "Gods" above are problematic. (Actually, the "God" that comes closest to that of Theism is the "God" of Conclusion 1 rather than the one in Conclusion 3.) The "God" in Conclusion 1 cannot be omnibenevolent either. This "God" is either or both not omnipotent or/and not omniscient. If "He" is omniscient, then "He" failed to avoid performing acts that "He" knew would eventually lead to the occurrence of evil. This, on your assumptions, makes "Him" an evil being. On the other hand, if "He" is not omniscient, then "He" chose to perform acts without knowing whether those acts would lead to good or evil. Which, again assuming your principles, makes "Him" amoral. In neither case can "He" be omnibenevolent. The God of Conclusions 2, as you have already pointed out, is superfluous. And the God in Conclusion 3 is, as you have suggested, mislabelled as an "Omnimax" being. If there is no reason to assume that a being exists, there is no point in asking why that being allows things like evil. Again, the underlying problem in this discussion is that the distinction between direct (or immediate) causation and indirect causation is being rejected. Unless we can both agree to accept this distinction, we can never be referring to the same being when we use the term "God", you will never be able to make any sense out of the relationship between God and morality, and no "God" that you propose will be relevant in arguments related to the "problem of evil" for Theism. So, I wil let that final observation answer any future comments that you may desire to make. [ March 27, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p> |
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