Jamie_L

bd-from-kg and tronvillain:

In some ways, some aspects of you arguements see quite similar:

bd-from-kg argues that people do things because they prefer one state of affairs over another.

tronvillain argues that people do things for some "payoff" - which essentially means the person prefers one state of affairs over another.

What does it mean to prefer one state of affairs over another? It means that internally, we are more pleased by the thought of one state of affairs than we are of the thought of another state of affairs. Which is basically what tronvillain is arguing. Isn't it?

Or maybe I'm off-base.

Jamie

bd-from-kg

tronvillain:

1. A significant difference?

Suppose I were to say:

“You: The dawn arrives because the sun rises.

Me: The sun rises because dawn arrives.

I am not sure that there is actually a significant difference between these two positions.”

I think you might start wondering about my mental stability. Of course there’s a significant difference between these positions.

2. Strawmen ?

A strawman is a simple-minded caricature of an opponent’s position, not an accurate description of another, commonly defended position. The positions I’ve criticized have all been widely held at one time or another, and most are still widely held today; they are not “strawmen”.

Do they all represent your position? No; that isn’t logically possible. In my long Dec. 7 post and the one I promised (which I plan to finally post later today) I try to cover all of the logically possible versions of the idea that no one ever does anything from any motive (ultimately) but a desire to experience some mental state(s). Naturally many of these positions are incompatible. I’ve commented that you seem to have taken logically incompatible positions yourself at different times. Maybe I’m just not understanding you. But in any case the result is that I don’t know which of these positions is the one you actually hold. Still, you must hold one of them, since (as far as can figure out) I’m covering all possible ones.

3. Did I misrepresent your position?

Actually I didn’t say that this is your position. I said that it’s one of two incompatible positions that you seem to have taken in response to different scenarios that I presented. And I laid out my grounds for saying that you have taken this position. But since you deny taking it, here they are in more detail.

In response to my scenario where Bob is given the option of saving lives without knowing about it vs. receiving $100, you said:

Now of course one cannot get pleasure and satisfaction from knowing something unless one knows it, and a person won’t know that he will be saving lives in the future until he has chosen the option of saving lives. Thus the only reasonable interpretation of your statement is that, for people who choose the first option, the motive is the desire for the pleasure and satisfaction that they expect to derive from choosing that option. And this only makes sense as a special case of the general principle that the “real” reason for choosing to do anything is the pleasure one expects to derive from making that choice.

This is quite different from saying that the reason for doing anything is the pleasure one expects to derive from doing it. I pointed this out in my very next post:

You seemed to be a little confused about this point because your reply was:

I have no idea how you could think that these claims are the same; the difference seems crystal clear to me, and it seems to me that I explained it about as well as possible. In fact, the scenario under consideration is designed to bring out this distinction. It is plausible to say that Bob expects to derive pleasure from choosing to accept the first option, but the whole point of the scenario is that it is impossible for him to derive pleasure from the actual act of agreeing to it, since the moment he does this his memory will be erased and he will never know anything about the consequences, or even that he made this choice.

Anyway, I elaborated on this point further in the same post:

You replied:

So let’s review. You’re agreeing here that your position is that the “real” motive for choosing to do anything is always that it makes some difference to the agent’s mental state at some time(s) in the future. And you’re agreeing further your position is that this difference always occurs before or at the time the choice is made (i.e., before actually doing the thing one has chosen to do). But this is precisely what is meant by saying that the motive for choosing to do anything is always the pleasure (i.e., some desired mental state) that one expects to derive from making the choice as opposed to any pleasure derived from doing the thing in question.

Thus regardless of the merits of this position, it certainly seems that you were taking it at this point. Which is exactly what I said. I’m well aware that other things that you said are incompatible with this position, and I said that too.

So I was certainly not creating any strawmen or deliberately misrepresenting your position. I did my very best to state it as best I could understand it.

Sorry this got to be so long, but I put a high priority on issues of intellectual integrity.

tronvillain

Actually, I am not sure there is a significant difference between those two positions:

Me: The time at which the sun rises arrives because the sun rises.

You: The sun rises because the time at which the sun rises arrives.

Where is this "significant difference"?

tronvillain

bd-from-kg:
Well, perhaps it seemed to you that I have taken that position, but I have not actually taken it.

No, that is not the only reasonable interpretation of my statement. Try this scenario:

1) A person identifies two options.
2) Thinking about the first option makes them feel good.
3) Thinking about taking the second option makes them feel bad.
4) They take the first option.

The person does not think "Choosing the first option will make me feel good!", they simply choose it because it does make them feel good. When you touch something hot you do not think "Taking my hand away will make the pain stop!", you simply take your hand away because it hurts.

Anyway, the experience one expects to derive from something is usually strongly related to the experience one has when deciding to do it.

I agreed to no such thing. What I actually agreed to was that "any relevant differences in mental state must occur before or at the time the choice is made." Perhaps you think that is the same as "the 'real' motive for choosing to do anything is always that it makes some difference to the agent’s mental state at some time(s) in the future.", but I do not.

Fine. It simply seems to be happening a lot.

bd-from-kg

Jamie_L:

At this point I have no idea what he's arguing. You'd better ask him.

bd-from-kg

tronvillain:

You say that I misinterpreted the statements of yours that I quoted, claiming:

But actually it is the only reasonable interpretation based on what you’ve said.

As I explained some time ago:

Let’s call this the preference-desire-belief-action model.

At the time you said:

But in your last post you give an account of a decision-making process which, taken on its face, is inconsistent with the standard account:

All references to preferences, desires, and beliefs are notably absent here. So far as this account is concerned, thinking about doing X might make you “feel good” for any reason at all. For example, it might remind you of Uncle Fred, who always makes you laugh. This is just silly. Thinking of doing X might make you “feel good” for some such reason, but there is no way that this would induce you to do X. Any reasonable account of the reason for doing X has to be along the lines of the standard account: you prefer the state of affairs A that you expect to result from choosing to do X to the state of affairs B that you expect to result from not choosing to do it, and you therefore have a desire to bring about A by choosing to do X.

But of course you may not have meant exactly what you said. Perhaps you were skipping some steps and speaking a bit loosely as people so often do when talking about such things since everyone presumes that everyone else is familiar with the preference-desire-belief-action model and is capable of “translating” less precise accounts into it. So, what happens when we construe your account in a way that is consistent with the standard model? Why, we get the following:

(1) A person identifies two options.
(2) Thinking about the first option causes him to expect that choosing it will bring about state of affairs A, which he prefers to not-A, and therefore desires A.
(3) Thinking about the second option causes him to expect that choosing it will bring about state of affairs B; but he prefers not-B to B, and therefore does not desire B.
(4) Since he desires the results of choosing the first option and does not desire the results of choosing the second, he chooses the first.

Now we have an intelligible account of a decision-making process.

Now let’s look once again at your statement:

So:

When you say that people choose one option over another because of such-and-such, you are saying that such-and-such is the reason for their doing it. A reason for doing something is called a “motive”. And according to the preference-desire-belief-action model, a motive is always a desire for something, combined with a belief that doing the thing in question will achieve it.

But emotions such as pleasure and satisfaction are not themselves desires; they are the objects of desires.

Thus the only reasonable way to construe your statement consistent with the standard model is that the motive for choosing option one over option two is the desire on the part of the agent for the pleasure and satisfaction that they believe they will obtain right now by choosing option one. And any pleasure and satisfaction that the agent gets right now from choosing to agree to option one must derive directly from choosing to agree to this option rather than from agreeing to it.

So unless you’re rejecting the standard preference-desire-belief-action model, this really does seem to be the only reasonable way to interpret your statements.

[ December 11, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

99Percent

bd-from-kg: Re: your post of December 04, 2002 04:00 PM

Your theory of morality rests heavily on the fact that empathy exists and that people act morally due to their feelings of empathy. I don't deny that people seem to make moral choices because of their empathetic feelings for others. You claim its really k+u of what others feel and what they would like to feel, so they act accordingly but is it really? How can a feeling for others be k+u of what they want? Many times you might think your wife wants you to cook dinner for her because supposedly you have enough k+u of what she wants but this is not certain, its merely a feeling of what she might want, a feeling that is entirely perceived by yourself only. In reality it could be that your wife wanted to go out to the new restaurant a friend just raved about.

Frankly this is not acting morally at all because to me a true moral action involves reason, thinking, a detachment of any kind of immediate feeling, either pleasurable or painful. The correct attitude to make regarding the dinner for your wife example would be acknowledge that you derive pleasure for yourself regarding the loving attitude you get from her so you then ask her accordingly to see what she wants, and not base yourself on the current feeling of empathy you might be having this moment desguised as k+u of which you don't really have. The gain of future pleasure is then truthful and rightful because you are actually taking into consideration the objective wants and desires of others that will then in turn reflect in a more rewarding result for yourself. They are objective because there has been a communication between the self-motivating participants.

Acting altruistically is irrational because the all acts comes from an individual that is propelled by his own wants, desires and self-satisfactions that lead to his driving force which is happiness. The existence of this living individual is being self-fulfilled by its own actions. Altruistic acts are those that make a sacrifice of this individual's own happiness and existence to satisfy and fulfill the existence or supposed happinessof other individuals. Since this is negating an existence, in other words making not A=A so then it becomes irrational. This does not mean that an individual will never act for the benefit others, it simply means that when he or she is really acts for his or her own benefit and happiness even if at first glance the act benefits others. A true altruistic act is one where the individual negates his own happiness for the perceived happiness of others, sacrificing his own existence. This is what I would say is completely irrational.

What I am saying is that rewards based entirely on immediate feelings cannot be rational. There must be an objective, real physical feedback that allows the rational mind to see that these feelings are legitimate and sustaining. For example pure feelings of "love" cannot lead to permament real happiness. Sure you might feel elated and in love with a person but if that person doesn't actually correspond with you physically those feelings of love translated into happiness cannot last long, in fact you end up feeling miserably in love. In the hypothetical case of the guy who thinks he was helping people stranded on the island but never seeing them, I can guess that yes, at first he was feeling accomplished of his actions and maybe immediately happy, but in the long run I think he will soon feel listless and purposeless since he wasn't getting any physical feedback of his actions. He wasn't seeing with his own eyes the rewards of his actions, he wasn't being rewarded materially for example. Material rewards work when dealing with strangers (because no empathy exists) and these people were certainly strangers since he wasn't being in touch with them directly. If these people were his family for example he would get the reward by listening to their own voices, not just the confirmation by the person perpetuating the hoax.

I am merely explaining why pure feelings cannot lead to real happiness, there must be a rational basis for happiness to because, because reason itself is is what defines us as human beings.

Because it negates your existence. See above.

The real reason you are taking your friend to the airport is not because if he gets the job it will benefit him but that if he gets the job he will be thankful to you, for making time to take him to the airport. He might then invite you to dinner to celebrate or simply transmit a joy of happiness you will receive yourself just by watching him. In short you are the beneficiary of this action, not only him. And if he doesn't get the job, you still get a reward because your friend knows that it wasn't necessarily your fault that he didn't get the job and still feels appreciated by you, so he in turn rewards you with feelings of appreciation for you. This can all be seen and confirmed.

bd-from-kg

99Percent:

You’re saying so many things on so many different subjects here that it’s hard to sort them all out. But here’s my best try.

I. You seem to be claiming either that people rarely act altruistically or that they never do; I’m not sure which. But in any case, I’ve expended thousands of words arguing against both of these ideas and you haven’t bothered to address a single one of my arguments, so there seems to be no point in covering this ground again.

II. You argue that acting altruistically is irrational.

Let’s try to parse this.

(i) An agent is motivated by his own preferences and desires.
(ii) The only ultimate desire (i.e., the only thing desired for its own sake) is for the agent’s happiness.
(iii) The existence of an agent is self-fulfilled by his actions.
(iv) Altruistic acts sacrifice the agent’s happiness to that of others.
(v) But (iv) contradicts (ii), so altruistic acts are irrational.

Now the first thing to note about this argument is that premise (iii) is superfluous (which is just as well since I have no idea what it means). The second is that the correct conclusion is not that altruistic acts are irrational, but that they are impossible. If it were really the case that the only thing anyone desires for its own sake is his own happiness, it would be impossible to intentionally sacrifice one’s own happiness to that of others. But (as I have argued at some length) people often do sacrifice their own interests to that of others, because they do desire things other than their own happiness as ultimate ends.

However, I suspect that something is missing here. What premise (iii) really seems to be getting at is that it is irrational to desire anything but one’s own happiness as an ultimate end. And of course this is the crux of the matter. I think that any reasonable person will agree that altruism is irrational if desiring anything but one’s own happiness as an ultimate end is irrational. But I can’t make out what your argument is that desiring anything but one’s own happiness is irrational. It seems to be that only one’s own happiness fulfills one’s own existence. But I can’t make head nor tail of this. What does it mean to “fulfill one’s own existence”? Why do you think that only your own happiness can do this (whatever it is)?

In any case, I can’t really make any sense of the concept of an irrational ultimate desire. It seems to me that if you desire something for its own sake, why then you desire it for its own sake, and there’s nothing more to be said. What criterion distinguishes “irrational” ultimate desires from “rational” ones?

As to the rest, I’ll treat them very quickly.

(1) I clearly distinguished between empathy in the sense of knowledge and understanding of another person and empathy in the sense of a sympathetic identification with his desires and needs. Didn’t you read any of this?

(2) I really have no interest in your theories about what produces “real” happiness; there are matters of psychology, not philosophy. And your comments about whether I should ask my wife whether she’d rather I’d cook dinner or take her to a restaurant are both remarkably naïve and completely off-subject.

(3) You say:

Again, I have no idea what to make of this. Perhaps you can help by explaining what you mean by a “true moral action”. Then it may be a little less murky why you think that it requires a “detachment of any kind of immediate feeling”.

Anyway, this is not (as you seem to imagine) a criticism of my moral theory, which is based on reason and does not depend in any way on what one’s “immediate feelings” are; on the contrary, it often requires one to ignore one’s feelings.

[ December 14, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

99Percent

bd-from-kg, as always, you ask insightful and difficult questions. Unfortunately my english writing is very lacking and therefore not very lucid. Anyway, I will try to respond shortly.

Biff

I have just finished reading this LOOOOOONG topic, and I have to say that bd is almost completely wrong in most of what he says, and for just a few simple reasons.

The first of which is that he is making many philosophical arguments which rest on logical necessity, when the central issue here is one of human PSYCHOLOGY. Without acknowledging the fact that humans are influenced by unconscious processes, are often unaware of their own motives, and frequently do not act completely rationally, you totally miss the true answer to this question.

bd has continually argued that emotional payoff cannot be the root cause of altruistic acts, by mistakenly equating what other debaters have CLEARLY and REPEATEDLY labelled as unconscious processes as items that an agent would be fully aware of in the course of decision making.

I have had a very hard time not laughing out loud reading bd's posts as he tilts at windmills. I think it is probably best for others to let him think he has won, as this dull ass will not mend his pace with beating.

Biff