Feather

That's pretty much the whole argument Vogel. It goes something like this:

1) Reality can be known only through reason.
2) I have reasoned out what reality is.
3) Obey me and those I appoint as similarly rationally gifted. We are your Philosopher Kings, and you are filth beneath our feet.

Aethari

Harumi-

I'm discussing the exact same thing in my philosophy class now- we just got into his theory of forms on Thursday. As I pointed out in class, Plato's theory of forms takes some serious damage from Plato's own 'Proposition K', that is Plato's insistance that no-one really knows anything unless they cannot be wrong about their knowledge. That is 'knowledge of P -> necessarily P'. If his proposition K is not true, the theory of forms becomes almost superfluous to knowledge. If K IS true, then one has to ask the question as to how we can ever be *sure* we percieve beauty or any other Form. As I pointed out, since two people will disagree on any given Form (ie. 'Is that beautiful?', 'Does this have more chair-ness than that?'), no-one can fulfill the requirements of principle K to know of ANY form. Simply enough, it seems that on the theory of Forms and K, while forms *might* exist (???), no-one could ever know of any of them. My professor agreed that it was a very valid objection, and said that Plato doesn't offer much more than special pleading that we can't rigidly hold principle K to the Forms themselves.

I hope that helps, if you need something more involved than that, I could try to write a less off-the-cuff critique.

-Aethari

[ October 20, 2002: Message edited by: Aethari ]</p>

Aethari

Actually, since I have nothing better to do until my g/f gets off work, here is a somewhat more detailed list of problems with what Plato says in his theory of Forms.

First, so much of what Plato says is entirely ad hoc, and is there to justify the far-out mysticism that you'll see at the very end of the Republic. While Plato does make some valid commentary that needs to be argued *against*, much of what he says is either non sequitur or ad hoc. If it isn't eminently clear how Plato reaches a conclusion, it is perfectly valid to question this.

Second, Plato is necessarily committed to the position that all possible Forms have existed eternally. This is fairly obvious, as Plato wouldn't be saying a new Form is created in the universe every time man makes a new object. (Man invents a Tooth Brush, 'Tooth-Brush-ness' pops into existence.) Many problems stem from this, because Plato is never particularly clear as to what objects/ideas get their 'own' Form. If *every* concievable object has it's own form (that is, my Wingman Pro mouse corresponds to a universal ideal of 'Wing-Pro-mouse-ness', and my Bic pencil has a 'Bic-pencil-ness' which is wholly different from a 'Pro-Write-pencil-ness'), then the obvious question is to ask about the utility of an infinite number of overlapping Forms. What is the point of forms if the Form of my pencil changes once I sharpen it? Most likely, Plato wouldn't buy this, and would insist that a finite set of Forms exist, that correspond to a finite set of physical/mental objects. Then the question becomes "How is that ordering of forms any more valid than the ordering of forms expressed above?" You have to question why Plato's own personal set of Forms is in any way superior to any other set of Forms. That is, why should we believe Plato's conception over my conception that the only Forms that exist are 'Kinky-ness' and 'Fragtastic-ness'? There is no reason why Plato's ordering is preferential over any other.

Third, as I expressed in my previous post, Plato's principle K undermines the believability of ANY set of forms. And if we deny principle K (which most people do, and rightly so), then the power of the Forms is severely minimized. Despite Plato's special pleading, if we apply principle K strictly to everything, we are reduced to solipsism.

Fourth, it is wholly possible to simply object to Plato's definitions of 'knowledge', 'belief', 'reality', and 'apperance'. While his definitions are not inherently contradictory, and hence not logically flawed, they represent a serious divergence from the normal meanings of those words. There is nothing wrong with asking why his definitions are as they are. Plato's definition of knowledge in the form of principle K seems wholly unsatisfactory, and if his definitions turn out to be without value, his entire epistemic worldview starts to crumble.

-Aethari

boneyard bill

I feel compelled to point out that Plato claimed that truth is known through logos, (reason or word). He did not claim that it is known through logic. Logic was invented by his student, Aristotle. So when Plato speaks of reason, he is talking about something other than precise logical processes since he didn't know them. His allegory of the cave suggests that he is using "logos" in a rather mystical sense. And, in fact, the term seems to have been used mostly in that sense in the ancient world including Christianity where Christ is claimed to be the logos. "In the beginning was the Word."

But Plato had also studied Pythagoras so his idea of forms probably had a mathematical character to them. In that respect he lives today in modern science where the laws of physics are assumed to be the eternal forms. We assume that the laws of physics do not change over time. If they do, our cosmology is all nonsense. Such forms are not necessary for Aristotlian science. It was Galileo, Descartes, and Newton who resurrected Plato and put him to practical use.

As Whitehead said, "All of Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato." We should not disparage him too greatly since we are all his progeny in one way or another.

But aside from his historical importance, we also need to look at the problem he was struggling with. As I read it (and my reading is probably idiosycratic since I haven't been instructed in Plato), he was stuggling with the question of abstractions. Why is it that the mind is able to form abstractions? We see round things and from this we form the idea (form) of a circle. But we never encounter pure circles in nature. Still, we can form the idea of a perfect circle. Plato concluded that this ability is a divine gift, therefore these abstractions (the forms) represented the true nature of reality and our perceptions were just approximations of that true and perfect divine realm. (Since the Planets were thought to be part of the divine realm, they must travel in perfect circles. Neither Copernicus nor Galileo could shake off this idea, and it was painful even for Kepler to give up on the idea of perfect circles in favor of ellipses).

At any rate, Plato concluded that the forms were implanted in the soul prior to birth and that's why we can form abstractions. All true knowledge is remembering, a remembering of the divine realm from which the soul originated and to which it would return at death.

Of course, this is not demonstrable through logic alone. But, as I have pointed out, Plato didn't know logic and wasn't speaking of reason in that strict a sense. Nevertheless, it is the rejection of Plato's forms on logical grounds that characterizes the modern world and that particular philosophical problem actually began as far back as the Middle Ages.

Still the question of abstractions remains. How, from the presence of round things, can we form the idea of a perfect circle? How, from the presence of good deeds, can we form the idea of "the good?"

It is my contention that abstractions are a form of knowledge that inform us of the holistic nature of our environment and of existence generally. And it is this holism that is generally ignored by modern science and philosophy as well. The only discipline I know of that pays it very much attention is Gestalt psychology, and even there, their approach is very limited. But if you take away the language of the divine that Plato uses and substitute wholeness, he makes a lot of sense.

godlessmath

I have no qualms with the Theory of Forms. In fact, I find them to be quite useful in my atheistic worldview. When someone tries to prove the existence of God to me by saying "first, it is obvious that we all have a sense of right and wrong" I immediately say "therefore the Forms exist, so why does God exist?"

Kharakov

Gods a form.

Amos

Except that the sense of right and wrong are not Forms because they are not abstractions from reality. That is, an apple cannot be good or bad or right or wrong because an apple can only be the way it is.

boneyard bill

Posted by Kharakov:

Exactly. God is an abstraction that expresses the holistic nature of all of existence. God is the perfection of existence and the universe is an approximation of that perfection. This is rather like the Anselmian argument for God. Plato didn't make that argument as far as I know, but it is easy to see how Anselm would come up with from a knowledge of Plato. For Anselm, to conceive of something in the mind is a real form of knowledge and if I can conceive of something that is greater than everything else, it must exist in reality because it is greater to exist in reality than to exist in the mind. Of course, this argument doesn't necessarily convince anyone who doesn't believe in Plato's theory of forms. But if you accept the forms, God would seem to be a logical development of that philosophy.

godlessmath

Aye, you caught me in a lie. However, I've been in situations where people have asked me how can I account for such notions as "Justice," "Good," and "Beauty," and such which seem universal, if I don't believe in god. I can offer Plato's Theory of Forms as an alternative hypothesis.

boneyard bill

Amos writes:

There are good apples, bad apples, and sour apples. I don't suppose we can accuse apples of bad conduct but we can accuse them of bad taste. The term "the good" certainly is an abstraction from reality. We find specific behaviors or relationships and label them "good." Others we label "bad." The whole point of the Republic is to decide how a society should be organized in order to promote "the good." But, of course, the Republic is a rather stylized work since the point of the Republic is to show, by analogy, how the individual soul (psyche) should function. Plato's other political writings on politics are more practical.