mnkbdky

I am not sure if dogs are the same overtime. I had a cocker spaniel and a brown lab and they definitely seemed to be the same dog over time. If they have a soul, then, yes they are the same. If they do not have a soul, then, no they are not the same. It seems entirely cogent to me to say that a dog has the ability to be self aware, which is a fundamental character of having a soul. But, can I say if the dog re-cognizes itself as the same dog through out time? No, I can't. But because I love dogs so much (my dogs names' were Lady and Mango--well actually Mango was my girlfriend's dog and she dumped me . . . o woe is me), anyway, if I were pressed, I would say, yes, dogs have souls. However, my reasoning may be tainted by my emotional attachment.

And what do you mean by "it remains the one continuous living system?" Are you arguing for a closest continuer theory or perhaps a causal bundle theory--neither of which work. The latter suffers from the problem of fission (A might cause B and C and B and C cannot both be identical to A), while the former cannot be true either. If I was sitting talking with my friend and the only thought I was thinking was that Homer was the funniest character on the Simpson and then conviced her of that just as a piano was dropped on my head, so that she is now my closest continuer, would she now be me? No. Indentity must be numerical.

yguy

Those things are important for functionality, but I don't see how they relate to identity. My example was meant to demonstrate that an aspect of personality may be temporarily nullified without a change in identity.

The assumption here seems to be that we are the sum of our experiences. I would suggest that memories have nothing to do with who we are. How can they, when they are only illusions of something that no longer exists?

Knowing that one exists is really the only one that comes to mind at the moment. However, I think that apparently normal people can get to the point where they forget who they are, having become nothing more than the sum total of the experiences they have reacted to. I think this may explain extremely perverted people such as unrepentant child molesters. The vast majority weren't born that way - something alien infused itself into their consciousness.

Marcel

Such a good example of delightful theological 'you-see!'-reasoning.

When I started reading your post I immediately noticed the rashness of your introduction; you say that I maintain, like all people, that I will be the same person all the time. Liking biology and other topics related to nature, I immediately reasoned: "In seven years I will not be the same person." So that point was irrelevant. It is common knowledge that in a timespan of seven years every person's cells have been replaced. The average cell lives seven years (now don't say: 'you see!' just because number 7 is mentioned). It is perfectly normal for materialists with some knowledge of biology to know that we are not the same persons after seven years.

Unfortunately your assumptions therefore never challenged me, because your whole argument seems to revolve around this statement. You seem to think that it is absurd to think that a person is not the same person, in an unknown amount of time. Who says it is absurd? It is true. Only enamel (of the teeth) is solid and constant.

The fact that our personalities and our memories ('soul' to irrationally thinking persons) remain more or less the same throughout many years, is just as 'remarkable' as the fact that, throughout many decades, the tips of our fingers continue to produce the same fingerprint. Cells are simply being replaced by other cells, which are virtually identical to their 'ancestral' cells, due to copying of genetic material. Hence, cells are also being copied, just like their DNA is. One cell's identity is being passed on to the next generation of cells.
Since the brain consists of cells too, why would the brain be such an exception? Because of the 'soul'? But the soul does not need to exist, despite your argument.

You also seem to confuse 7 years with one hour. You say that, in the light of this cell replacement, someone is not the same person as he was, say, an hour earlier. Maybe several million cells have been replaced in the mean time, but by and large this has very little consequences, even if this constituted a large number for a body (which is not so). For the sake of your argument; maybe only an earlobe has changed from hour to hour. Big deal.

Biology has many more astounding things for you in store if you are really inquisitive.

I would finally want to point out that, even if your statement about irrationality were true, it would still not be an argument for the existance of the soul, because a personality is a combination of cerebral functions. 'Soul' is an irrational, theological term for what we know as 'personal character'. It implies a spiritual gift, which is irrelevant for the materialist.
You also have a character; you don't need a soul to be the person you are and the person you will be in seven years.

Clutch

Honestly, I thought I had. But I'll try again: You motivate Premise 1 by assuming that any changes would be very big and fast changes. This is an elementary error. It would be like attacking continental drift by arguing, "If continents move, then why don't we see them moving really fast?"Of course you can individuate things as you like, and name them accordingly. But that's not how we apply personal names in natural language. At least, not normally, though of course (as you refuse to notice) it does happen. ("Simon, as of this moment you are Peter"). Normally, though, changing names would be pretty confusing. Besides, the changes in persons are continuous, or if discrete are at least much more fine-grained than could be captured by renaming in any socially useful manner. Flaming dogdish, what have I been arguing?"Convention" is your word; depending on what you want to build into it, I'd probably not agree. What persons are diachronically is related -- by similarity, by constitution, by memory -- in many diverse respects. Our social practices of naming track this complex of relations.If you are explaining why there is no need to postulate souls or strict identity over time, then yes, we are agreeing. But that seems rather the opposite of your initial claim. Did you have an actual argument to replace the debunked first premise?

yguy

It would appear then, sir, that it is unjust that murder carries no statute of limitations, seeing how the person who committed the crime does not exist seven years after its commission.

Right?

Neilium

It wouldn't be the first time the Buddhists wre right about things. "I" is a fiction of convenience, the narrative center of gravity.

I'm not the same person who was born 37 years ago. However, I used to be that person.

-neil

mnkbdky

Ok, here is my first premise.

1) Anything that is made out of parts and is merely the sum of its parts must retain its original parts in order to remain the same thing that it started as.

How am I assuming big changes. The fact is, this premise states that any change, whether big or small, is fatal to identity. So, perhaps then to be more clear it could look like this:

1') In order for an object that is consititued of parts and is merely the sum of its parts to retain numerical identity it can neither lose any of its original/essential parts, at any rate of speed or amount, nor gain any new essential parts, at any rate of speed or amount.

Though I can't see how this is any different than the first, except for the addition of not being able to gain new parts. This is all to say that in order for something to retain numerical identity it must stay the same throughout time. It must endure.

The first premise is far from debunked.

As far as the continent thing is concerned it just isn't a good comparison. I am not saying that bodies don't change because we cannot see them change. I am saying they do change and we do see them change, even ever so slightly--like loosing a hair. Perhaps, the analogy would be this, if a continent changes then it is not the same continent as before, which is true. Or if a continent moves then it is not in the same place as it was before, which again is true. Either I am a frickin' moron, or the analogy just does not work.

The question here is whether or not Jesus, by giving Simon the new name of Peter, was identifying a new object. That is, does Simon and Peter refer to the same person or different people?Obviously the answer is the same person. If we go with your theory, though, they are two different people.


If there is no soul, then, I agree, keeping the same name to refer to different entities that look similar and appear to be the continuation of something is best, pragmatically.

I can accept social practice as a definition for convention. How though can similarity be a criterion for identity? If I were to step into a duplicator machine that allowed for memory tranfer as well, my duplicate and I would be similar to each other but not the same person. I would still be me and my duplicate would be himself. Identity is reflexive and transitive. This is to say that, if substance X exists at time T1 and continues to exist at the next moment T2, then the X that exists at T2 is identical to the X that existed at T1.

You seem to be saying, if substance X exists at time T1 and goes out of existence and is replace by a similar substance Y by some type of relation at time T2 then the Y that exists at T2 is identical to the X that existed at T1. But it absurd to use the word identical in this situation. Identical means, "the same thing." Clearly, though, it is not the same thing. So, this is why I say identity to materialist is an illusion, it is a matter of social practice, it is pragmatic.

We are agreeing, then. My original claim was that in order for the materialist to remain rational they would have to say that they are a different person from moment to moment. That is, they are as different to themselves from moment to moment as they are different to me.

mnkbdky

Marcel, rather than respond to you, see my reponse to Clutch. And I was not ignorant to the 7 year new body. It merely doesn't matter. This is an argument about numerical identity. I believe I am the same person I was yesterday, numerically identical to myself throughout the whole time. A materialist, is irrational if they say that. If they say they are a numerically different person then they are rational. But that really seems to have some odd consequences.

mnkbdky

I agree. If all this is true, the "I' is a "narritive center of gravity." But clearly I am the same person numerically who began to respond to this post as the one who finished it. The only way that can be is if there is a soul. I am the same person numerically that was born 29 years ago as I am today. It is all "my" history.

Clutch

My mistake: you distinguished your premises from your assumptions. What I have comprehensively debunked is what you actually call your first assumption.The denial of this view is indeed rationally tenable; hence your assumption is false. And your argument for it does indeed falsely dichotomize between strict identity and radical immediate change -- analogous to arguing that because you can't water-ski behind a continent, therefore they don't move.

Now, I argue in detail that the diachronic relation between selves is not identity. You reply that, on my view, the diachronic relation between selves is not identity!

Who could have foreseen such an incisive reply?

Too bad your painful reconstruction of what I'd already said simply and repeatedly had to culminate with the same foolish fallacy:This is a perverse straw man -- the same non-sequitur that Assumption One made in the first place. Why on earth would you think that the latter follows from the former? What makes talk of identity naively tempting in the first place is the similarity and psychological continuity of selves over time.