rainbow walking

thomas: God should do it more often. There's still too much scalding, in my view. So even if we thought God did it once, he'd still be failing to meet an obligation.

rw: Exactly...which just highlights my major point of all or nothing. Once a god began to intervene, man would never be satisfied until this god was regulating every trivial affair of man's life. He could and should always do more, they'd reason. But it wouldn't stop with just prevention. Soon enough man would be clamoring for invention...instantiation of man's desires for him.



thomas: The question before us is whether it violates Ockham's Razor to say God could have used invisible elves. It does not, because there is no observed phenomenon that I am explaining with invisible elves. Even if I were, that wouldn't mean God couldn't use those elves.

rw: Your example is the prevention of a child being scalded. Obviously the event of being scalded must arise to be prevented. How does this prevention occur? Invisible elves. What form does this prevention take? Not defined. How do these elves cause something not to happen in such a way that everyone knows a potential scalding has been averted? The example must provide us some evidential clue that a god has done this, else nothing conclusive has been established in relation to the evidential CP. If you are going to appeal to an unverifiable incident as an example and say, "here is one case where the scalding has not been prevented." Then I can point to any number of similar unverifiable incidents and say, "here are twenty cases where it has been prevented by invisible elves, so your argument of "too much suffering" fails." These appeals to non-verifiable examples bring us no closer to a conclusion than when we started. Your example is a loaded die and I am not obligated to play in this game.

Further, should a case arise where a scalding has been mysteriously averted and the invisible elves hypothesis arises, it is then susceptible to the Razor and parsimony. The question is not whether a god could do this but whether we can verify he has or hasn't. Positing an unverifiable example leaves you exposed to a counter-claim that negates your own. For every dozen cases of scalding you point out, I can point to a thousand un-scalded toddlers and say he has. Invisible elves and all having been introduced into your example doesn't help your case Thomas. If it comes down to sheer numbers, I venture a guess there are many more unscalded toddlers in the world than scaulded ones, so how would you support a claim of too much?



thomas: Seriously, no one is explaining anything with the invisible elves. There is no observed phenomenon right now that I'm using elves to explain.


rw: Yet you introduced this as a possible way god could intervene without affecting man's responsibility for his children. I only pointed out that such unverifiable means leaves you open to parsimony and the Razor as well as failing to meet your own exacting standards of "evidence".

thomas: I'm an atheist. And I'm a materialist. And I don't believe in invisible elves. But none of those facts entails that God shouldn't use them.

rw: How do you know he hasn't? Your personal beliefs won't allow you to accept that as a possibility even if I point out a million unscalded toddlers. It's unfruitful to argue over unverifiable examples and postulate unverifiable methods of intervention.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

It doesn't follow that no intervention is okay, or that partial intevention is okay. Humans might be unsatisfied, but it wouldn't follow that good wasn't maximized.

That part doesn't matter; it doesn't matter whether we know a scalding has been averted. What matters is that the scalding has been averted.

And that would obviously be a non sequitur. Even if God has prevented some, he hasn't prevented enough. That's been my position throughout this whole exchange.

Only in that we shouldn't explain it with elves.

Huh? I would guess that most children in the U.S. aren't starving. Therefore, it is not the case that too many are?

Look, you're totally wrong here. Really. I'm not explaining anything with the elves. And there is no reason to say God couldn't use them. Only if I claimed to explain some prevention with the elves would I be vulnerable to the Razor. But I'm not.

rainbow walking

Thomas: It doesn't follow that no intervention is okay, or that partial intevention is okay. Humans might be unsatisfied, but it wouldn't follow that good wasn't maximized.

rw: I wouldn’t know how maximum good could obtain in a world of unsatisfied humans.



Thomas: That part doesn't matter; it doesn't matter whether we know a scalding has been averted. What matters is that the scalding has been averted.

rw: It would matter if you offered scalding as an evidential example in PoE. The example would have to be such as to facilitate verification where a god to actually intervene.



thomas: And that would obviously be a non sequitur. Even if God has prevented some, he hasn't prevented enough. That's been my position throughout this whole exchange.

rw: Yes, I’m aware you’ve held the “not enough” position. The problem arises from postulating examples that are unverifiable in terms of whether more such occurrences might actually have entailed had a god not intervened, such that your claim of “not enough” would be specious in comparison. Neither of us can verify that there might have actually been a 300% increase in scalding had a god not invisibly intervened in past cases. And if a god were to actually intervene in future such cases the same problem arises. You’re using current known cases (whatever that might be) as evidence of “too much” without taking into consideration if that value assignment accurately reflects the probability that it is exactly the right number.



Thomas: Only in that we shouldn't explain it with elves.

rw: Which is the only point I was initially making anyway.



Thomas: Huh? I would guess that most children in the U.S. aren't starving. Therefore, it is not the case that too many are?

rw: Yes, but someone else might not agree. They are just as likely to believe that even one starving child is one too many. The whole shebang is so subjective and problematic.



thomas: Look, you're totally wrong here. Really. I'm not explaining anything with the elves. And there is no reason to say God couldn't use them. Only if I claimed to explain some prevention with the elves would I be vulnerable to the Razor. But I'm not.

rw: I understand that Thomas but you did suggest elves as a means of intervention…which is where all this began. Then you took issue with my mention of the fact that “should” you persist and posit invisible elves, you would be subject to the above. That’s how this entire non sequitur has played out. We’ve been bandying back and forth over a hypothetical that you now, apparently, have abandoned as a suggestion. So we can close this case…yes?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Why couldn't it? What if satisfying them meant precluding a greater good?

Why do we need to know that God has intervened for his intervention to be good?

Suppose there are 10,000 possible levels of intervention. The background probability that the current level is the best is 0.0001. So you're going to have to provide some evidence that it actually is the best level, because prima facie, it probably isn't.

That's only a fact about humans being unsatisfied. Do you or do you not believe there are too many starving children in the United States?

And such a suggestion has absolutely nothing to do with the Razor. Only if I had claimed to explain some phenomenon I've already observed with invisible elves would the Razor come into play. So your introduction of the Razor into this thread has been illegitimate from the beginning.

rainbow walking

Thomas: Why couldn't it? What if satisfying them meant precluding a greater good?

rw: Then PoE fails to obtain against my argument.



Thomas: Why do we need to know that God has intervened for his intervention to be good?

rw: Because you are arguing an “evidential” PoE and the rules of evidence must apply both ways.



Thomas: Suppose there are 10,000 possible levels of intervention. The background probability that the current level is the best is 0.0001. So you're going to have to provide some evidence that it actually is the best level, because prima facie, it probably isn't.

rw: And how did we arrive at this background level? I must have missed that step.



Thomas: That's only a fact about humans being unsatisfied. Do you or do you not believe there are too many starving children in the United States?

rw: What I think is irrelevant because it’s subjective. If you want to take this path that’s fine by me but it’s not going to bode well for your position. I would say that probably anyone you put this question to will agree that one starving child is one too many. Now, consider that there actually are starving children in America. Taking the incongruity of these two factors one must ask:

If everyone agrees that one starving child is one too many, why is there still one starving child?

In as much as humans have shown an amazing ability to get things done once they decide to do them we can only conclude several possible reasons can exist for why there are still hungry children in America.

A. Either everyone is lying

B. Or everyone is waiting on everyone else to take action

C. Or everyone is waiting on God to do something

D. Or everyone really don’t think that one starving child is one too many, which may be a form of pandering to public opinion.

The ramifications here are that you have a difficult time establishing an evidential baseline of too much when making this determination from a subjective position. Obviously, if everyone agrees and no one acts…something is amiss. Or if everyone agrees and only a few act, but not enough to make a difference…something is amiss.

Now how do you determine an evidential “too much” from this subjective reasoning, in the face of reality? Since you’re appealing to subjective opinion and the facts aren’t lining up with the opinions given…on what do you base your evidence? Did you take a poll? Do you have special knowledge that the rest of us aren’t privy to? Or do you simply have nothing that would qualify as “evidence”?

And, of course, this just leads right back to why God is obligated to do for man what man can do for himself...especially when man concludes it aught to be done?



Thomas: And such a suggestion has absolutely nothing to do with the Razor. Only if I had claimed to explain some phenomenon I've already observed with invisible elves would the Razor come into play. So your introduction of the Razor into this thread has been illegitimate from the beginning.

rw: How so? You suggested the elves thing. So why is my suggesting the Razor in response illegitimate? Sounds like you want to redefine the rules of engagement here.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

You mean your objection fails to militate against the argument from evil? Your position seems to require that all humans must be satisfied for God to have fulfilled his obligation. I have questioned that requirement.

I don't think you understood the question. I say God can intervene, and that can be good, whether or not we realize he has intervened.

Well, given our epistemic situation, we just have to weight everything equally. If there are 10,000 possible levels, then the chance of any particular level being the correct level, all else equal, is one in 10,000.

Everyone to whom I put this question will agree that humans are in a position to decide, sometimes, when there are too many starving children in America. My point is that we seem to believe we're often in a good position to estimate these sorts of things. If my opponent merely claims we can't tell there's too much suffering, then chances are, she's being inconsistent.

Because it's not happening. Because sometimes it's morally obligatory to intervene.

Because. I'm. Not. Trying. To. Explain. Anything. With. The. Elves.

phlebas

I know I haven't paid attention in awhile. RW, when did you revert back to believing in God? Or is this an extremely long brain exercise?

The PoE is a weak argument for God's non-existence, anyway, because "evil" is a subjective term. If we identify the greatest evil on earth, and God does away with it, #2 becomes the greatest evil on earth and how could God let us suffer like that? And on and on until acne is the greatest evil on earth, and our scarred and greasy adolescents cry out to the heavens at the injustice of it all.

In this particular thread (and I admit I might have missed part of it, so feel free to ignore me) you seem to be saying that God allows suffering so we can cope better with this harsh world he's given us. The response from the opposition is that he didn't have to give us such a harsh world to begin with.

In fact, depending on which flavor God you like, giving us a world at all wasn't necessary. In standard Christian views, evil and suffering are absent in heaven, and the residents there (or at least God himself) are not worse off because of it.

It all eventually spirals back to the insoluble "why would an omni-god want to create this imperfect place anyhow" argument.

Anyhow. Not sure where you're coming from here. If you've backslid in my absence, I'm sorry to have let you down

rainbow walking

Hi phlebus,
No, I haven't slid back into theism...I'm just being my usual get-on-everybody's-nerves-piss-people-off-self. Some things never change no matter which side of the road you walk on...eh?

phlebas

Glad to hear it! I'll just get out of your way so you can get on with it, then

Jobar

Rainbow, your multi-volume posts are hell to moderate, so you are quite successful as far as I'm concerned.

But really, I have no problem with you playing Christian's advocate. It may be that your delving in to what seems to be mined-out philosophical territory will produce new and useful concepts; it's happened plenty of times before!