ex-xian

Do you realize what an ass you're sounding like? :banghead:
Anyway...

First, I use first person pronouns in an agnostic sense. You speak of a soul, something matterless by definition, as a substance. No one bothers to call you on this b/c your usage is obvious. Please show others the courtesy.

Your next statements illustrate my point very clearly. Your concept of a person is merely a collection of perceptions, nothing more.

Your first premise is unwarranted. Proof that something has experiences.

These two statements taken together are incredible. As a philosophy student, one assumes that you are familiar with the fallacy of dismissal. That is what you have done here time and time again. Whenever do not have a good refutation, you simply say that the post made empty assertions.

The identity is preserved because of the flow of experiences. That was the whole point of my post. Next time, respond and don't ignore.

mnkbdky

I am sorry you misunderstand. My concept of a person is not merely a collection of perceptions, nothing more. Rather it is that a person is an immutable (at least in regards to its essential properties) simple (i.e., no parts) immaterial substance that is capable of having experiences.

Why exactly is my first premise unwarranted? Can you give me an instance when nothing has experienced something?

.

I certainly did not mean to dismiss. I just do not know what to refute. Are you a bundle theorist, a consituitionalist, a type or token theorist, an emergentist? What is it that passes on this conscious stream? How is this stream passed on? These are things I can refute.

If you are a bundle theorist then refutation is easy. If bundle A at time T1 can cause bundle B at time T2, then, why can't it also cause bundle C at time T2. But if bundle A can cause two things then neither B nor C can be identical to A. Thus neither B nor C continues the existence of A. In fact, the mere existence of B and C cause A to be annihilated and nothing that causes the annihilation of something can be said to continue the existence of the thing it annihilated. With this theory it does not matter if the bundles are physical, mental or both.

What about constitutionalism? This idea says that I am not identical to my body but rather constituted by it. But, this is like saying that the statue is not identical to the stone it is made of but rather to the form it has taken. This is ridiculous. And if true, then every store should be advertizing that they are havin a two for one sale. The fact is, if X is composed of Y then X is identical to Y. That is, X=Y. It is the basic metaphysical law of identity, or Leibniz's Law. Strictly speaking, though, this is not a theory about mental causation.

These next two are the most common appeals to mental causation.

Type identity (TP) is the theory that mental events, states and processes (M) are identical with physical events, states and processes (P). That is, types of mental states are identical to types of physical states. Hilary Putman’s multiple realization (MR) argument is adecisive objection against TP. MR states that TP claims that for every type of M there is a type of P such that any life form may be in M iff it is in P. Plain and simple, M=P and P=M. Putman believes, though, it is an empirically verifiable hypothesis that it is possible life could evolve somewhere where M may occur apart from P or vice versa. Therefore, it is possible that TP is false. Hasker adds to this that there is a possible Cartesian world in which there is only M with no corresponding P. He concludes that given these objections it is highly unlikely that TP is true.
I might add another thing: it is possible to be in physical pain and not be mentally aware of it. This appears to be possible in two ways: either I could be ignorant of my pain or I could divert my attention away from the pain. It is a common experience, I take it, that people sometimes come to experience pain only once they are mentally aware of their injury. For example, say you are backpacking through the backcountry of the Wasatch and after wiping the sweat off your forehead you look at your hand and see blood. After seeing the blood you focus your attention on your head and realize it hurts. You then remember scrapping your head against a tree branch a few moments ago. In this situation the same physical injury is now there that was there a few moments ago and yet before you did not feel pain and now you do. The only difference is that you are now mentally aware of your physical injury. Now it seems entirely plausible that this could be done intentionally as well, by diverting our mental attention away from our physical state. If I can be in one mental state while at the same being in a different physical state, then it appears that M=P.

Token identity (TK) is a substantially weaker claim than type identity. It maintains that M=P but P does necessarily equal M. According to this view it is possible that P have several different Ms. To explain how this is possible some appeal to the theory of supervenience. The conversation on this topic is long and involved; in the end, though, I believe that TK combined with a strong supervenience may be able to account for a physicalist view of mentality. It is for other reasons that I believe we must not accept a materialistic view of mentality, namely that all physical causation and physical explanation must be mechanistic and hence are fundamentally non-teleological. Now, if mechanism is true, then there are no such things as intentions. That is, no one does any action because they intend to do it; nor do they believe anything because they have reasons to believe it. It is for this reason that I believe we should reject TK. It is obvious that we have intentions behind many of our actions. So, if TK is true then there is a physical cause for every mental event—even though the same physical event may cause different mental events—but if there is a physical cause for every mental event and physical events are non-teleological then so is every mental event non-teleological. If any materialist account of mind-body interaction is to be taken seriously it must account for intentions.

It is my opinion that superviences also succumbs to the objections for type and token and ultimately ends up being an epiphenomenalistic theory.

Emergentist like William Hasker are a strange bunch. They assert that the soul--a simple substance--is generated by the mind--a complex substance. I really don't know what to say to this other than it is impossible for a complex substance (i.e, somethat that is made of parts) to generate a simple substance (i.e., something that does not have parts).

So, as you can see preservation of identity because of the flow of experiences or consciousness is complex and inextricalbly related to how one says it is passed on. I hope this helped.

mnkbdky

See my post to ex-xian.

Bill Snedden

Although I think that Clutch has rather neatly shown that your initial "assumption" is invalid (in that not all rational people consider themselves immutable; actually, I should think that any person who considers themselves immutable is quite possibly irrational), I do have a couple of observations:

You may want to consider that your argument, if correct, yields the unfortunate consequence of completely severing our memories, character, & personality from whatever it is you postulate that our "soul" might be. These things, certainly, are not immutable and therefore cannot be part of this "soul" you've postulated. Therefore, whatever the soul might be, it's not what we would, in ordinary language, consider "ourselves" to be.

In your OP, you made reference to the "soul" as an entity that that "survives death", but you've not made any argument in an attempt to support that. Even were one to grant that only affirmation of strict diachronic identity is rational and that a "soul" is necessary in order to support this, there is nothing to stand in the way of postulating a "soul" that arises at birth and ceases to exist at death.

Finally, perhaps you could clarify the following, especially in relation to the objection Clutch raised and my first comment, above:

Q1: what are these "essential properties"?

Q2: how can an "immutable substance" have experiences?

Regards,

Bill Snedden

mnkbdky

You are definitely correct. According to this theory I am not identical to my memories, character or personality. These are merely accidental properties that begin to accumulate the moment my soul exists. They are, however, particular to me and thus can only belong to me. That is, I am the only soul that can have the property of sitting in the chair I am sitting in at the time I am sitting in it, which is now as I am typing this. I am not sure, though, why you think it is an unfortunate consequence. This distinction allows me to lose all of my memories (i.e., Alzeimers [not sure on the spelling here]) and still remain the same person. That is, if my Grandma lost all of her memory, I could still justify going to see her since she is still my grandma and did not lose that status merely because she cannot remember that she is my grandma.

I think I recall that I qualified the immutable aspect with what I called essential properties. Of course my soul, if it exists, is not absolutely immutable. Nothing is immutable (unless you think timelessness in a coherent idea, which I do not). Everything gains added properties by merely getting older. However, these are not essential properties--properties that cannot fail to be, they are accidental properties--properties that can fail to be.

I realized this at the end of my argument when I said, "Once your body dies your soul will continue (presumably, that would take another argument)" I just forgot to change it in th OP. But you are correct that is another argument.


You will recall above I made the distinction b/t essential or necessary properties and accidental or non-necessary properties. By essential or necessary properties I mean this: Necessarily, for any substance X and property Y, if substance X cannot obtain or exist without property Y, then, Y is essential to X. By accidental I mean: Necessarily, for any substance X and property Y, if X can obtain or exist without Y, then, Y is accidental or non-essential to X.

A couple of examples could clear this up. As I said above it is not possible for something to exist and not be identical to itself. That is the statement, "X=Y where X is numerical different than Y", is necessarly false. Where as the statement, "Necessarily, if X is numerically distinct from Y, then there is no possible world in which X=Y", is true. The state of affairs where I am numerically different than myself could not occur. It is a metaphysical impossiblity. Therefore, I am numerically identical to myself at all times necessarily. That is, X=Y if and only if X is numerically identical to Y. This is an essential quality. It could not fail to be and if it did then I would not exist.

As to the second question I am not sure why this is a problem. I guess I could ask, how can a mutable substance have experiences? It seems to me that the question suffers parity. The only answer I could give is that it can. I can offer no argument for how it happens. Perhaps, someone might think this is a cop out. But it certainly is not, because I don't think the opposite question can be answered either. It is like asking why a C-fiber causes pain and not pleasure. It seems perfectly plausible that it could have. This is what is known as a brute fact, it just does. Sorry I cannot be more helpful here.

Hope that answers your questions.

simul iustis et peccator

mnkbdky

Earlier when talking about type indentity in my response to ex-xian I said this:

I forgot that the not symbol does not show up so the sentence should read:

If I can be in one mental state while at the same time be in a different physical state, then it appears that M does not equal P.

Looks, like I screwed up somewhere else too. O well, it happens.

p.s., if there is ever any confusion because of what you might think is a typo, please tell me and I will look at it.

Marcel

If one were not able to separate deep metaphysical and biological insights and debates from common sense, I'd say yes. But fortunately even the most absent-minded, deeply sunk philosopher can distinguish natural facts from the conventions of behaviour and ideas that people have reached with each other, eg. morals, laws, sincerity, language, integrity, honour, etcetera.

After having read numerous works on ethics (like Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil') we could know that there is no intrinsical good or evil. But that does not mean that we revaluate all values and start raping women to have more offspring and kill people who are - to our views - weak.

It is a fact that we, materially, are not the same persons in seven years. Still there is a notion of continuation of identity. The memories and the character of a person, the feelings of guilt, pride and so forth, are being transmitted from cellular generation to the other. Of course, we are not aware of this biological shift, but we surely would like to think that we are the same person all our lives through. I think that this is not a shocking fact because we don't realise it continuously; the brain will allow us to realise that. To lose your sense of identity as well as your memories, will weaken the individual. Continuity and the accumulation of experiences is as important to an organism as it is to a society. In evolution the guarantee for continuation is embedded in the necessity of continuation.

worldling

I bought my first computer eight years ago. I am now on my fourth. Each one was completely different from the one before it. But the one I have now still has bits of software which I copied and documents which I created on my first computer. My desktop is arranged in much the same way, my address book has the same entries plus quite a few more. In other words, although my computer has changed completely four times over these eight years, it still contains characteristics that make it very much my computer - characteristics which first appeared when I started using and personalizing that very first one.

This may be completely off the mark, but doesn't the poster of the OP fail to make the hardware/software disctinction?

Marcel

mnkbdky,

I just wrote a lot of text, but somehow I managed to delete it all and now I am stranded here with your quotes that I started writing to.
I will repeat what I wanted to say, albeit in a very concise way. I firstly want to tell you that I like your arguments! I will certainly remember them, because it is quite funny if you realise how limited language is when you try to see through the verbal veil that you put over the facts. It then requires language again to unveil the facts.

Firstly, I fully acknowledge that a person is not the same in whatever time span. This is something I have always known, from the time that I was a child. Cell replacements change a person, and it physically replaces a person, by using up his atoms to gradually rebuild the existing structures. these structures are also present in the brain, which makes up the mind ('soul', to many religious people). People are given the feeling that they are the same, identical person they were a couple of years ago. This is necessary because the accumulation of thoughts, experiences and memories is good for survival; inherited or collected experiences are as important to an organism as they are to a society. So here is the necessity of continuity and of having the notion that you are the same.

No, they ARE a continuation.

You seem to want to assert that because someone changes through time, that the former state of a person is so stable, as to be fully an definately identifying for the individual.
I am not good at the philosophy of time, but what I think is that time is nothing more than a way of people to view the sequence of events. Our attitude towards existence is conditioned by our view of time. According to our ordinary conception of things, based on every experience, time flows in the sense that events are for ever receding into the past. Past events, however, do not reflect a different world. There are not two persons, because they make up the same person; the person is not being torn up into two parts just because he is changing.

I hope this makes sense, but I think that your argument lacks clarity on the level of time and (possible?) worlds. There are no possible worlds, in my view. There is only one universe. The universe is all there is, and it is the way it is now.

I hope to read more on this time & language-ploy.

Best regards, Marcel.

Bill Snedden

Yes, but who you think your grandma to be is irrelevant. You continue to classify her as "grandma" due to the abstract construct of "grandma" that exists in your mind. The question is: Who does grandma think she is?

Clearly, without her memories, grandma no longer considers herself to be "grandma". Who are you to dispute?

My point is that memory is an inseparable characteristic of our identity. Without them we most certainly are not the same persons. You may postulate a soul that accumulates memories, but without them there is no real identity.

By that line of reasoning, "memories" become properties essential to identity. "Immutability", therefore cannot be an essential property.

None of which necessitates strict diachronic identity.

Perhaps you misunderstand the question.

Immutable substances cannot change and yet change is the essence of experience. Something that cannot change cannot have experiences.

Change is a response to stimuli. One thing acts upon another and in response the second thing bears some record of that action. A mark, a memory, a change in behavior, etc.

For example, I used to be a staunch supporter of the death penalty. I am now a staunch opponent. In the past 20 years I have gone from a conservative worldview to a relatively liberal one. I have almost completely changed my outlook on life and yet "I" remain myself.

This almost complete change in my personality and character are an indelible, inseparable part of my identity. I would not be who I am without having been who I was, but "I" am a totally different person than I was 20 years ago. Therefore, identity is mutable.

Contrast this with....well, I'll have to use a hypothetical because in reality, nothing is immutable...let's say a completely immutable rock. I hit it with a hammer, it looks the same. I dip it in strong acid, it has no effect. I direct a 500 MW laser at it, no damage. There is no record of any action upon it. It has not changed.

An immutable soul would have no ability to accumulate experiences. If indeed such a substance were to survive my death, it would continue in the pristine state in which it had existed prior to birth; no part of "me" would remain.

Your entire thesis seems predicated on the belief that strict diachronic identity is required for "persons" to persist. But it is clear that "persons" consider themselves to be comprised of memories and experiences that accumulate over time, for without them we must acknowledge that we would not be "who" we are. Therefore, "we" are comprised of, at least, memories and experiences that have changed over time and the idea that strict diachronic identity is necessary for person persistence is right out.

Regards,

Bill Snedden