Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Davo · 12-10-2002, 08:09 PM

Devilnaut,

Quote:

Possible in a world where time can flow both backwards and forwards, sure.

It doesn't need to flow both backwards and forwards, because your conclusion doesn't follow logically from your premise. Let's look at how you came to your assumption:

Quote:

I am arguing with the assumption that for us, time flows forward. This means that causes always temporally precede their effects.

How does "causes always temporally precede their effects" follow logically from "time flows forward"? Unless you can show the logical connection, it remains acceptable to argue that foreknowledge and free will are compatible.

Liquidrage · 12-10-2002, 08:16 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Davo:
Devilnaut,

But why? It's often asserted that foreknowledge conflicts with free will, but it's never really demonstrated why it does.

My contention is that God's foreknowledge is caused by our future freely made choices. How does something in the future cause something in the past? Well, I'm a four-dimensionalist, meaning that I view all times, past, present and future, as real. The past still exists, as does the present, and the future is not indeterminate. As such, temporal order is largely irrelevant to causal order. Even though past events generally cause future events, there is no reason for holding the presupposition that future events cannot cause past events.

So, considering that all times are as real as one another, it is possible for our future decisions to cause God's foreknowledge of what these decisions will be.

Just because someone knows what your future decision will be doesn't mean you're not free. Please demonstrate why there's a logical contradiction between foreknowledge and free will using either a formal proof or at least an argument in standard form with premises and a conclusion. I think once you set out your argument clearly you'll find it easier to see the hidden assumptions you're making.

Quote:

Originally posted by Davo:


So, you're admitting that foreknowledge only conflicts with free will if you hold your presupposition? In other words, it's certainly possible for foreknowledge to be consistent with free will?

I don't buy your out of time argument as anything but an attempt to use bunk in a manner that doesn't conflict with your presupposed concept of free will.

Regardless of any arrow of time, if the results are the same in each instance of time then there are obviously no other possible outcomes.

If god is zipping around time and sees me write this all 239,232,453 (or any number of god's choosing) times that god views this instance, then it was predetermined no matter the direction of cause an effect.

If the results are not the same in each instance then we have multiple instances of everything and are in a Many Worlds universe. In which case we have either all possible outcomes or a limited set of outcomes (from a larger infinite set) controlled by that which is moving through time.

god as a time traveler does not in any way remove the logical contradiction that for a being to be truly omniscient free will cannot exist. Nor does an arrow of time or the removal of an arrow all together.

By free will I am referring to choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances.
Of course this version of free will has not been shown to exist, where as there is evidence that human choices are constrained by external circumstances.

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Liquidrage ]

Davo · 12-10-2002, 08:47 PM

Liquidrage,

Quote:

I don't buy your out of time argument as anything but an attempt to use bunk in a manner that doesn't conflict with your presupposed concept of free will.

That's nice.

Quote:

Regardless of any arrow of time, if the results are the same in each instance of time then there are obviously no other possible outcomes.

Possible, yes. Actual, no. If you choose to eat toast for breakfast tomorrow morning, I argue that you were always going to choose to have toast. It was true in 1880 that you were going to have toast on the morning of December 12th 2002. I don't think this conflicts with free will, however, because I don't think free decisions are indeterminate. Given external factors, and given your internal volition, you never choose anything other than what you were always going to choose, but that doesn't mean it's not your free will that makes these choices.

Quote:

By free will I am referring to choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances.

As long as you allow room for some external influence on one's choices, then I'd agree with you.

Liquidrage · 12-10-2002, 08:53 PM

Davo,

Then your arguing a meaningless side of free will that no one cares to debate.
Computers make choices. So do people.
The difference?
A currently unknown layer of abstractions and complexity shield us from understanding the entire process of making choices within humans.
Where as computers are fully understood.

You just label this deterministic process "free will".

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Liquidrage ]

Davo · 12-10-2002, 09:00 PM

Liquidrage,

Quote:

Then your arguing a meaningless side of free will that no one cares to debate.

No one cares to debate compatibilism? That's precisely my position, that determinism doesn't conflict with free will. And it's held by a great number of philosophers, so I don't think no one cares to debate it.

Devilnaut · 12-10-2002, 09:01 PM

Davo, I would consider you a free will compatibilist, in the sense that as long as all of the forces acting upon any particular decision of yours are internal to you, you would consider that decision free. The fact that our choices are determined doesn't matter as long as "we" can still be said to be in control of them.

This kind of thinking does avoid the argument against free will / omniscience, in the sense that it uses a different definition of free will than the one which the argument attacks. Moreover, I don't think the reason your position avoids the argument has anything to do with temporal VS causal precession.

The reason no one cares to debate compatibilist free will is because most consider the position pretty much unassailable, myself and probably liquidrage included.

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]

Devilnaut · 12-10-2002, 09:04 PM

Eva, I am not sure if you're being purposely evasive, or what, but you seem to be ignoring the crux of my posts, and writing them off as "simply assertions" without giving any substantial objections.

I'm going to drop our current thread of discussion and begin anew, because it's degenerated into a fruitless semantical debate, and that's not what I want.

You've even gone so far as to say that there is no contradiction between God knowing that you will choose A, and you choosing B!

I really don't know what more I can say, but I will attempt it once more.

Here I'll try to simplify my argument:

Two definitions worth mentioning just to make it clear that I'm not referring to any compatibilist versions of free will:

Free Will- the human initiation of one event over another, free of all physical forces or any forms of coercion whatsoever.

Divine Foreknowledge- knowledge of the outcome of an event, that precedes the event in time.

Now, I am trying to show that these two concepts are mutually exclusive. This means that I have the option of showing that if the first is true, the second is false, or that if the second is true, the first is false. I'll thank you in advance not to tell me what I should or shouldn't be arguing, and to simply deal with my argument as it stands.

And here is the entire argument in all its simplified glory:

1. Free will requires the existence of more than one option at the time of the choice.
2. If God knows that (at some point in the future) you will choose A over B, then you will choose A over B.
3.a) God has divine foreknowledge.
3.b) God knows that you will choose A over B.
4. You cannot choose B.
~5. You do not have free will.

Where would your objection fall?

Edit to clarify and fix formatting.

Editted again to add a premise

I do realize that I'm basically reiterating the points from the first page of this thread, so this probably won't go anywhere new.

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]

Liquidrage · 12-11-2002, 04:35 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Davo:
Liquidrage,

No one cares to debate compatibilism? That's precisely my position, that determinism doesn't conflict with free will. And it's held by a great number of philosophers, so I don't think no one cares to debate it.

Not here anyway. This is about free will.
Besides, Compatibilistic free will isn't "hard" free will, or "true" free will. The philosophy itself might be worth an discussion. But not their version of free will. Though I do have a slight problem with this being called "free will". It conflicts with the commonly used meaning of "free will" which is as I defined a few posts back.

Kharakov · 12-11-2002, 08:15 AM

I believe the 'free will' that we are discussing is the non logical type where a choice is made without any cause.

Keith Russell · 12-12-2002, 07:28 AM

Greetings:

Is anyone here really arguing in favour of a will that makes decisions that have no cause?

Or are we just confused about semantics?

Keith.

12-10-2002, 08:53 PM	#54
Liquidrage Veteran Member Join Date: Dec 2001 Location: Tallahassee Posts: 1,301	Davo, Then your arguing a meaningless side of free will that no one cares to debate. Computers make choices. So do people. The difference? A currently unknown layer of abstractions and complexity shield us from understanding the entire process of making choices within humans. Where as computers are fully understood. You just label this deterministic process "free will". [ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Liquidrage ]</p>

12-10-2002, 09:01 PM	#56
Devilnaut Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Location: Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada Posts: 374	Davo, I would consider you a free will compatibilist, in the sense that as long as all of the forces acting upon any particular decision of yours are internal to you, you would consider that decision free. The fact that our choices are determined doesn't matter as long as "we" can still be said to be in control of them. This kind of thinking does avoid the argument against free will / omniscience, in the sense that it uses a different definition of free will than the one which the argument attacks. Moreover, I don't think the reason your position avoids the argument has anything to do with temporal VS causal precession. The reason no one cares to debate compatibilist free will is because most consider the position pretty much unassailable, myself and probably liquidrage included. [ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

12-10-2002, 09:04 PM	#57
Devilnaut Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Location: Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada Posts: 374	Eva, I am not sure if you're being purposely evasive, or what, but you seem to be ignoring the crux of my posts, and writing them off as "simply assertions" without giving any substantial objections. I'm going to drop our current thread of discussion and begin anew, because it's degenerated into a fruitless semantical debate, and that's not what I want. You've even gone so far as to say that there is no contradiction between God knowing that you will choose A, and you choosing B! I really don't know what more I can say, but I will attempt it once more. Here I'll try to simplify my argument: Two definitions worth mentioning just to make it clear that I'm not referring to any compatibilist versions of free will: *Free Will-* the human initiation of one event over another, free of all physical forces or any forms of coercion whatsoever. Divine Foreknowledge- knowledge of the outcome of an event, that precedes the event in time. Now, I am trying to show that these two concepts are mutually exclusive. This means that I have the option of showing that if the first is true, the second is false, or that if the second is true, the first is false. I'll thank you in advance not to tell me what I should or shouldn't be arguing, and to simply deal with my argument as it stands. And here is the entire argument in all its simplified glory: 1. Free will requires the existence of more than one option at the time of the choice. 2. If God knows that (at some point in the future) you will choose A over B, then you will choose A over B. 3.a) God has divine foreknowledge. 3.b) God knows that you will choose A over B. 4. You cannot choose B. ~5. You do not have free will. Where would your objection fall? Edit to clarify and fix formatting. Editted again to add a premise I do realize that I'm basically reiterating the points from the first page of this thread, so this probably won't go anywhere new. [ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

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12-11-2002, 08:15 AM	#59
Kharakov Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Fidel Posts: 3,383	I believe the 'free will' that we are discussing is the non logical type where a choice is made without any cause.

12-12-2002, 07:28 AM	#60
Keith Russell Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Overland Park, Kansas Posts: 1,336	Greetings: Is anyone here really arguing in favour of a will that makes decisions that have no cause? Or are we just confused about semantics? Keith.

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