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Join Date: Mar 2002
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Quote:
Originally posted by Xeluan:
<strong>
I was thinking this morning that Arm may be someone like Dembski, Wells (not saying the one of them is Arm) posting on the board. I could be wrong.
Xeluan (Zed over at Arn).</strong>
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Actually, I've been reading up on Philip E. Johnson lately, and I have to say that my bet is on him -- from his interest in the moral implications of naturalism, to the similarities in (the rather verbose and condescending) writing style, to his sudden appearance on ARN about a week after his stroke in 07/2001. Anybody else see the resemblance?
Anyway, this particular piece from Arm is a good starting point, because he recycled the same post from <a href="http://www.arn.org/cgi-bin/ubb/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=1;t=000820;p=2" target="_blank">here</a> to <a href="http://www.arn.org/cgi-bin/ubb/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=13;t=000242;p=3" target="_blank">here</a>:
Quote:
***EPISTEMOLOGY***
This post is meant especially to Myrmecos & Lizard (and others who hold epistemological positions similar to their views). The suggestion below is a cordial, educational gesture and not meant to offend in any manner. I hope that you will follow the suggestion in order to improve the tone & intellectual quality of the conversation for this discussion topic specifically & within this discussion forum in general.
There is a branch of philosophy named "epistemology." It is the branch which theorizes about KNOWLEDGE and asks & tries to answer crucial questions such as: How is it exactly that we get to know the truth? When are we properly justified in believing something is true? When are we properly warranted in believing something is true? These are very important questions which are foundational to ALL branches of knowledge (including biology).
The posts by Myrmecos & Lizard in the last several days seem to be taken straight out of either the "evidentialist" school of epistemology or (its first cousin) the "positivist" school of epistemology. I have the distinct impression that they have never directly & carefully studied epistemology, but somewhere along the line they have picked up & internalized the assumptions & beliefs within the evidentialist/positivist ("strong foundationalist") school of epistemology and they currently believe that evidentialism/positivism is OBVIOUS, UNQUESTIONABLE, ABSOLUTE TRUTH. The problem is that these positions, which were indeed dominant and popular within the halls of philosophy departments until perhaps the 1960's, have since then fallen into much disfavor, because so many irreconcilable errors within them have been exposed by epistemologists of all stripes -- from postmodernists to reformed epistemologists. By UNENDINGLY PARROTING evidentialist/positivist assertions & positions, Myrmecos & Lizard are making this discussion forum look & sound (& smell?) like a relic from the 1960's.
I invite Myrmecos & Lizard (and those of you who agree with them) to RE-EXAMINE some of these foundational epistemological issues (or perhaps examine them carefully for the very first time) by reading an accessible, thorough, contemporary introductory volume of epistemology. This will not only improve the intellectual quality of the discussion herein, but will pay many dividends to you personally as thinking individuals. I recommend volumes such as Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge by Dr. Robert Audi (1998) and Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous by Dr. W. Jay Wood (1998). Dr. Wood, for example, explains, points out strengths, and then critiques different schools of epistemology such as strong foundationalism (eg. evidentialism; positivism), coherentism, reliabilism, & reformed epistemology, and develops his own modest foundationalist view of virtue epistemology.
Here are some quotes from Dr. Wood's helpful book:
"You will recall that all nonbasic beliefs are justified insofar as they are appropriately supported by one's epistemically basic beliefs. Strong foundationalists claim the only appropriate support is logical: nonbasic beliefs must be inferable either deductively or inductively from our basic beliefs. Weak [Modest] foundationalists are more generous in recognizing other kinds of basing relations. In either case, accepting just any old belief willy-nilly, with no thought to its being suitably anchored by supporting beliefs, is unacceptable. Herein lie the rudiments of a theory of epistemic justification known as evidentialism, a theory that at one time exercised considerable hold on the philosophical imagination and that continues to hold sway in much popular thinking." (p.106) Professor Wood then exposes several fatal problems within evidentialism which are pretty much universally recognized by top epistemologists today, including infinite regress (p.107), self-referential incoherence -- a.k.a. self-contradiction (p.107-8), slippery-slope fallacy (p.108), and extreme vagueness (p.108-9).
"Strong foundationalists severely restrict what can count as a basic belief, what kind of support it lends to the other beliefs we hold, and the manner in which this support is communicated to nonbasic beliefs. They claim that the foundations of human knowledge must be unshakably certain and that the only way this certainty is transferred to nonbasic beliefs is by ordinary logical relations of deduction and induction. As we shall see, weak foundationalists (also called "soft," "modest," "minimal" and "mitigated" foundationalists) have good reasons for relaxing the standards of proper basicality and expanding the way in which basic beliefs lend support to nonbasic beliefs." (p.85)
Dr. Wood then lists and explains the 3 criteria/beliefs named by strong foundationalists as EXCLUSIVELY being "properly basic beliefs"; namely, "self-evidently true" beliefs such as the axioms of logic e.g. the law of identity & the law of non-contradiction (p.85-6); "incorrigible" beliefs e.g. "I exist"; "I am in pain" (p.86); and beliefs "evident to the senses" (p.86). Positivists limit the last criteria / basic belief because "ordinary claims about external objects can't be certain" (p.86-7). Dr. Wood also adds 4 other aspects of "strong foundationalism"; namely, "very high access requirements" (p.87); a strong element of "individualism" (p.87-8); its claim of being "universal" (p.88); and its "isomorphism" between beliefs and a mind-independent reality (p.88).
Dr. Wood also lists & explains several fatal problems within strong foundationalism that have been pointed out by numerous epistemologists (p.88-98). I don't have the time to list all of them, but here are some examples: self-referential inconsistency (p.89); and an infinite regress problem as long as strong foundationalists maintain high access requirements (p.89-92,96).
MOST IMPORTANTLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS DISCUSSION FORUM, Dr. Wood lists and explains basing relations other than deduction and induction through which nonbasic beliefs can be legitimately inferred from basic beliefs. Many Darwinist persons like MYRMECOS & LIZARD who are wedded to flawed evidentialist/positivist/strong-foundationalist epistemological positions adamantly & inflexibly believe these other basing relations are illegitimate -- especially when these other basing relations are effectively applied by Intelligent Design theorists. Myrmecos & Lizard also don't seem to understand that these other basing relations are used everyday in other scientific disciplines involving the possible detection of patterns of intelligence (human or non-human), such as Forensic Science, Cryptography, Archaeology, Paleoanthropology, and SETI ("Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence"); if these other basing relations are legitimate for these scientific disciplines, then it is shameless SPECIAL PLEADING to deny their use as legitimate "scientific methodology" when ID theorists use them to prove their non-naturalistic theories (by "non-naturalistic" theories, I mean theories involving patterns that are not random cause-and-effect results of non-sentient/intelligence-deprived nature, but which involve specified-complex patterns of intelligence that are non-human because the origin of these patterns preceded the presence of humans). These legitimate basing relations (other than deduction and induction) are (#1) "RETRODUCTION" a.k.a. "Reasoning From the Best Explanation" or "Inference From the Best Explanation" -- a "back-to-front" type of basing relation (p.92-3). In addition to Dr. Wood's explanation of retroduction (called "abductive" inferential support by philosopher C.S. Pierce), please explore the following articles: "The Best Explanation Criteria for Theory Choice" by Paul Thagard, Journal of Philosophy vol. 75 (1978):76-92; and "Structural Explanation" by Ernan McMullin, American Philosophical Quarterly no. 2 (April 1978):145-146. (#2) "Congruence" -- a "lateral" type of basing relation (p.93). (#3) "Cognitively Spontaneous", immediate and noninferential, beliefs -- these are not basing "relations" because they are noninferential (p.94); they are "properly basic beliefs" beyond the usual 3 cited by strong foundationalists; egs. the commitment to the reliability of memory; the assumption of a unified center of consciousness that endures through time; perceptual consciousness; rational intuition; acceptance of testimony (see eg. pgs. 90,110,160-2).
Pages 98-104 then explain how "modest foundationalism" contains the strengths of "strong foundationalism" (discussed eg. pgs. 77-84) while avoiding its fatal weaknesses.
After having cleared up some epistemological cob-webs, you will be open & ready to tackle rigorous & sophisticated volumes such as Intelligent Design and The Design Inference by William Dembski (Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy of Science). For another well-written defense of ID with a different perspective, see Nature, Design, and Science: The Status of Design in Natural Science (2001) (Suny Series in Philosophy and Biology) by Del Ratzsch (Note: Ratzsch includes an appendix criticizing Dembski's The Design Inference). I hope that Myrmecos, Lizard, & others will take some time & effort to RE-EXAMINE their epistemological assumptions because, if they don't, they will be stuck with evidentialist/positivist/strong-foundationalist assumptions that are hopelessly flawed and seen as relics from an unenlightened past by today's top epistemologists. Good luck.
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[ August 25, 2002: Message edited by: Scientiae ]</p>
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