Taffy Lewis

Thomas Metcalf,

You infer (I') from (G) and (H). And you justify (G) by propositions (A)-(F). But (C) reads:

How is a "morally justifying reason" relevant to "Probably, earth is 4.6 billion years old"?

This is an attempt to move from "how things appear" to "how things really are". Earlier you were attempting to move from "how things appear to not be" to "things really aren't that way". Your prior use of the inference was based on a negative existential claim. You are saying that there is no reason based upon "there appears to be no reason". But the parent-child analogy you are using now is different. It is based upon a positive appearance.

Your latest claim is that it appears that a loving parent would reveal its purposes to a suffering child in order to comfort it. And since God is supposed to be like a loving parent he would behave the same way. So unless I can construct a counter analogy your use of the parent-child analogy will give us good reason to believe God would reveal his purposes if there were any.

The most obvious counter analogy is that parents often refrain from revealing many aspects of the world to their children until they believe the child is mature enough to understand and appreciate them. For example, a parent might prevent their child from watching television programs which are violent or sexual in nature. The child might wonder why the parent doesn't allow them to watch those channels or read particular books and yet the parent has a good reason. You are right that a loving parent has good reason to reveal their purposes. But similarly a parent has good reason to refrain from revealing many things. So using the parent-child analogy we have considerations on both sides.

You may object and say that these particular purposes do not involve suffering in the case of the child. But it is easy to find such cases. A young child may wonder why a parent forces them to study mathematics. The child may not be capable of understanding the many uses of mathematics and why it is in the child's interest to learn as much about it as they can. They may think mathematics is boring and tedious and difficult. And following your logic they may reason "I can't think of any reason why I should learn mathematics therefore there is no reason".

You may say that the suffering involved in being forced to study isn't nearly as great a case of suffering as spinal cancer or some other extreme case of suffering. But that is beside the point. They are similar in the respect relevant to the analogy--that we cannot think of a reason for a loving God to permit spinal cancer just as a child cannot think of a reason why they must spend long tedious hours studying mathematics.

But you might object again. Maybe you'll say that parents only refrain from revealing their purposes in these examples because they are not powerful enough to bring it about that the child understands. But supposedly God's power isn't limited. He could bring it about that we have the ability to understand his purposes (maybe by giving us a "brain boost" as Theodore Drange suggests). But this objection brings us back to the original problem. We are limited by our very finite physical abilities. God is limited by logic. Maybe God has good reason to allow us to develop our moral and intellectual capacities on our own. If that is so then it is logically impossible for God to bring it about that we have the ability to understand his purposes. If he does it for us then we do not do it on our own. So which of these two goods has the greater value?

• God makes us aware of every reason of which he permits every case of suffering.
• God allows us to develop our moral and intellectual abilities on our own.

But in order to defeat an argument from gratuitous suffering I am not required to argue that God has a reason for every case of apparently gratuitous suffering. I merely need undermine any grounds which you put forward for believing that there is no reason. So the argument from God's failure to reveal his reasons for gratuitous suffering is just another case of apparent gratuitous suffering.

Lastly, you suggest that skeptical theism leads to a general scepticism by using Bruce Russell's example of a 100 year old earth.

But the case of radioisotopes and the age of the earth are positive existential claims. You are claiming that there is a very old earth based upon how things appear to you. There is nothing wrong with such an inference. But in the case of apparently gratuitous suffering, you are claiming that something does not exist simply on the basis that things do not appear to you a certain way.

Negative existential claims can be misleading because there is an ambiguity between:

It appears to me that there is no X.

And:

It doesn't appear to me that there is an X.

In order to move from "It appears to me that there is no X" to "There is no X.", I must have the additional information that if there were an X present it is likely that it would appear to me. But no such additional information is necessary for positive existential claims. Examples bear this out.

Suppose I say "It appears to me that there is no bottle of water in my refrigerator." We can infer that there is no bottle of water in my refrigerator because we know that if one were present we'd likely see it. Now suppose I say "It appears to me from my window that there is no ant in my backyard." I would not be justified in believing there is no ant in my backyard because we know that even if there were an ant in my backyard it would not appear to me that there is. People just can't see that well.

The point of all this is that you are making a fairly ambitious negative existential claim. You must argue that "a reason for apparently gratuitous suffering DOES NOT EXIST". But in the case of an ancient earth we have positive appearances and claims. And there is no ambiguity in positive existential claims as there is in negative existential claims.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Taffy Lewis:

"How is a 'morally justifying reason' relevant to 'Probably, earth is 4.6 billion years old'?"

Because it would apparently be beneficial to humanity to know whether Q obtained in this case. I'd say humanity would be worse off if we were wrong about a lot of things, such as the age of earth.

Am I correct that you deny the Principle of Divine Explanation? If so, how would you argue for any empirical inference of the existence of phenomenon P?

"But the case of radioisotopes and the age of the earth are positive existential claims. You are claiming that there is a very old earth based upon how things appear to you. There is nothing wrong with such an inference. But in the case of apparently gratuitous suffering, you are claiming that something does not exist simply on the basis that things do not appear to you a certain way." (Emphasis original.)

I think other non-controversial negative existential claims fare similarly. Consider "There is no elephant in my backyard." We are familiar with pleny of instances in which we conclude that there is an elephant somewhere, just as we are familiar with many instances in which we conclude that there is justification for some suffering. But according to you, I think, we can't conclude that if there were a good reason for an elephant to be in my backyard but for me to be unaware of that fact, we would know about it. That is if you use the second-order UPD as a defense against the charge that God has good reasons not to hide reasons from us. So we must suspend judgment about whether there is an elephant in my backyard. The reasons for God to hide such an elephant are just as mysterious as the reasons for God to hide the justification for suffering.

You seem, however, to be avoiding the second-order UPD. You have offered a positive reason for God not to inform us of these things. By your position, we could not fully develop our moral and intellectual abilities if one fewer instance of situation e happened:
e: a orphan is buried in a landslide and dies slowly. No one ever finds out about her death.
This is simply a dubious position. This event does not appear to produce any moral or intellectual development in humans that would not be equally valuable if God gave us a "brain booster." Again, you seem committed to an elaborate moral theory in which certain qualities, which are qualitatively identical with other qualities except that they were produced by suffering instead of by God, are better than the others. This is not uncontroversial.

I would be interested to know your own analysis of knowledge. As I see it, you must argue that "We don't know that we're in a position to know of a reason for suffering if it exists" is a defeater for the inference from "Apparently gratuitous suffering" to "actually gratuitous suffering." But I think we have reason to believe we are in such a position; simply, we know of other instances of justified suffering. Obviously, we learn of them sometimes -- quite often in fact -- but there are a few cases in which there is no evident justifying reason.

Why is it not the case that "We don't know that we're in a position to know of a reason for a Great Deceiver to make there appear to be no disproof of God when in fact there is, and maybe a Great Deceiver exists" is a defeater for the inference from "Apparently, no obvious disproof of God" to "Actually, no obvious disproof of God"? My point is, the mere possibility of God is not enough to make it seem plausible that every particular instance of intense suffering is justified. Yes, maybe God exists and is only allowing the justified suffering to exist, but this possibility is not enough to make it seem likely that only the justified suffering exists.

I would say the existence of a Great Deceiver is more plausible than the existence of most versions of the God of the apologists.

Also, it seems that if you claim suffering is not evidence against God, you must hold the position that a world with God in it would contain just as much suffering as a world without God in it. Do you wish to make this claim?

Jack the Bodiless

Taffy Lewis:

What, exactly, is "benevolence"?

Surely a benevolent being is required to act in a manner which maximizes human happiness and minimizes suffering? And an OMNIbenevolent being must act in perfect accordance with this goal at all times?
No, an omnimax parent would NOT force a child to study mathematics. If the child does not want to study mathematics, the parent would fix things so that knowledge of mathematics will never be required. Alternatively, knowledge of mathematics will be pre-programmed into the child's brain.

If an omnimax parent or God wishes to prevent any human unhappiness or suffering, then the existence of ANY human unhappiness or suffering is clear, visible, unambiguous evidence that the omnimax protector has failed. There cannot be any possible justification for allowing humans to suffer, just as there can be no justification for killing a cancer patient to save his life: any antidote to suffering that itself causes suffering is a failure.

An omnimax being can end ALL suffering at a stroke. Even we mere humans have the technology to insert an electrode into the brain's pleasure center. An omnimax being could transform all human beings into immortal, invulnerable, sentient rocks which are permanently happy. If there are reasons why God does not do this, those reasons are not motivated by God's alleged benevolence: they cannot be, because the result is that we suffer and are not as happy as the "happy rocks" would be. God has failed in his duty to minimize suffering and maximize happiness.

Therefore he cannot possibly be both omnipotent and omnibenevolent.

Taffy Lewis

Thomas Metcalf,

Are you saying that it's likely that God would reveal to us every bit of knowledge that would be beneficial to us? This is a new argument.

(1) If God exists, then we will hold any knowledge which is beneficial to us.
(2) Knowledge of the most efficient way to build an electric car would be beneficial to us.
(3) We are not aware of the most efficient way to build an electric car.

(4) Therefore, there is no God.

I pointed out this fact with my "bottle of water" example. One often can move from "It appears that there is no X" to "There is no X". But this is only the case when one has the additional information that "if X were present I'd likely be aware of it". Obviously in the case of a bottle of water in one's refrigerator and the case of an elephant in one's backyard, if these things were present one would likely be aware of them.

Now you want us to believe that :

• We are just as likely to be aware of the purposes of an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being as we are that an elephant is in our backyard.

This doesn't seem very plausible to me.

This is false. In the case of the elephant I have the additional information that "if an elephant were in my backyard then I'd likely be aware of it". In the case of God, I do not have the additional information that "if God exists and has a purpose for every instance of evil then I'd likely be aware of all God's purposes". Again, I don't see that being aware of elephants is on a par with being aware of all the reasons for acting of an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being.

You have misunderstood my position. I did propose that God permits evil in order to bring about the good of moral and intellectual development. I was following your parent-child analogy. You used this analogy to suggest that God would reveal his purposes to us just as a loving parent would. I counter with the well-known fact that parents often do not reveal their purposes to their children because the child has not matured enough. So if we are to take your parent-child analogy seriously we shouldn't expect to know all of God's reasons for permitting suffering. Given the parent-child analogy, we have, at least, as much reason to believe that we would not be aware of God's purposes as to believe that we would. So you need to present another reason why we should believe that if God exists and has a reason for permitting every instance of suffering it's likely we would be aware of every reason for every instance of suffering.

You think we can move from "I am aware of some reasons for a God to permit suffering" to "it's reasonable to believe that I would be aware of all of God's reasons". This is like saying "I am aware of many solutions to mathematical problems therefore it's likely I'd be aware of solutions to every mathematical problem". (But maybe you think God's reasons for acting would be more accessible to us than mathematical proofs.)

That depends on which world we are talking about. If it is a world where only God exists then there won't be any concrete instances of evil. But the question is whether or not our world is likely to contain apparently gratuitous evil. Since you are arguing that it wouldn't, the burden of proof is on you. And I don't need to argue that the world would likely contain apparently gratuitous evil if a God exists in order to undermine your argument. Again, in order to defeat an argument it is not necessary to show its premises to be false. One only needs to undermine any reason the proponent of the argument has given for believing the premises are true. If I have no reason to believe the premises are true then I have no reason to accept the argument.

Jack the Bodiless

That seems reasonable, yes. If an omnibenevolent God exists, he should give us this information.

Why not?

K

Taffy:

That is an excellent proof of the non-existence of an omnipotent-omnibenevolent-omniscient god. The second premise is a bit tenuous, but you could replace it with any other piece of knowledge that would clearly be benificial to humanity.

[ October 04, 2002: Message edited by: K ]</p>

Jack the Bodiless

Let's try something slightly more crucial to human wellbeing and happiness, such as fusion power or cheap, hyper-efficient solar cells.

If a human scientist developed this technology, but then refused to reveal it to those who might benefit from it, even if this would greatly improve the quality of life for millions in Third World countries: would you describe such a person as "benevolent", or even "omnibenevolent"? I think not.

Yet, supposedly, God DOES have this knowledge.

Would we assume that the scientist has an unknown purpose for not divulging the secret of better solar power?

And a similar case must be made for EVERY technology that God might reveal. There might be a UPD defense for fusion power (better H-bombs), but: curing cancer? Curing MS? Do you require us to believe that EVERY technology God might reveal has a harmful downside that will cause problems which even an omnipotent being cannot sort out?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Taffy Lewis:

"Are you saying that it's likely that God would reveal to us every bit of knowledge that would be beneficial to us? This is a new argument."

I think the degree of benefit to humanity is important here. If it were true that earth were about to be hit by a gigantic asteroid, but it were possible to avoid it somehow, I think we could expect a morally perfect God to inform us of how to escape destruction. To know the reasons why "A child is tortured and killed" obtained at instance i would help humanity by removing some of our intense grief, helping to bring us closer to God, helping us to understand how the universe works, etc. Now, you can answer in the face of this that maybe these benefits are outweighed by some greater evil, but a "maybe" is not enough to suggest persuasively that it would not be better for humanity to know of such reasons. Just as a "maybe God exists" is not enough to confirm that it's likely that some intense suffering has a morally sufficient reason, only that it possibly does.

The claim that earth is 4.6 billion years old entails a similar negative existential claim to the claim that there is some gratuitous suffering. To claim that earth is 4.6 billion years old, you must claim that there are not magical elves who alter the distribution and ages of the uranium in our rocks, just because they are malicious little things. I do not think it is likely that if these elves existed, we would know about them. Must we therefore abandon our knowledge of earth's age?

Why is it not the case that "Maybe a Great Deceiver exists" is a cognitively accessible defeater for any epistemic justification inference?

I find both the "magical uranium-rearranging elves" and the "Great Deceiver" hypotheses to be more likely than most versions of the God of the apologists, especially given the complete lack of positive support for this God.

"Given the parent-child analogy, we have, at least, as much reason to believe that we would not be aware of God's purposes as to believe that we would."

I don't see how this could be. Remember, our parents are not in a position to give us a "brain booster." Further, if we take any specific instance of suffering, it seems likely that God would not be losing anything to inform us of the reasons for it, although the reasons for Suffering in General might remain hidden.

"You think we can move from 'I am aware of some reasons for a God to permit suffering' to 'it's reasonable to believe that I would be aware of all of God's reasons'." (Emphasis original.)

What I mean to demonstrate is that we are often aware of the justifying reason for an instance of suffering; this knowledge does not seem to harm humanity, and we are fully able to understand such a reason. This is considerable support for the proposition, "If there were a morally justifying reason for instance of suffering e, we would be able to know of it without harm to humanity." Because we are aware of the solutions to many mathematical problems, and this does not seem to produce any harm to humanity, it does not seem controversial that given any unsolved mathematical problem, we would be able to understand the solution without detriment to humanity.

Taffy Lewis

Jack the Bodiless,

I think it is safe to say that peer review among scientists would allow us a good idea as to whether or not the scientist has a good reason for withholding some bit of technology. In general, we are rational in accepting the testimony of the scientific community. If the scientific community says that it is a bad thing to make the technology accessible and we have no access to the facts then we are rational in believing that they have a good reason. Without the testimony of the scientific community we will have to withhold judgement on the issue. We can't say either way.

So if the scientist has a reason then it is likely we would know about it through the scientific community. And if the scientific community cannot make a pronouncement then we can't say either way.

The crucial difference between the mysterious scientist and God is that a scientist is a human among other humans. We know that it is likely that if one scientist understands something then at least the scientific community can evaluate their work. But God is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. He isn't our peer and we can't refer to some community to evaluate what he does.

Your assumption here is that God would likely do everything for us. You don't seem to think very highly of self-reliance. But following the parent-child analogy again, we know that parents don't do everything for their children all of their lives. Surely there is some value in accomplishing things for ourselves. So we have just as much reason to believe God will withhold his purposes as we do to believe that he wouldn't.

Dr. Retard

I think this claimed difference is illusory. I think both inferences need to reject certain unsupported positive claims (which, depending on your idiom, is the same thing as embracing negative claims). Take the age of the earth: We have observations that, so long as God isn't deceiving us, confirm an old earth. For that confirmation to go trough, for that inference to be a good one, it must be that God is not deceiving us. This negative claim is a prerequisite for the inference. Similarly, for evil, our failure to see how God could justifiably allow all this evil, so long as God doesn't have good reasons beyond our ken, confirms God's nonexistence. For this inference to be a good one, it must be that God doesn't have good reasons beyond our ken. The moral of the story, it seems to me, is that if the only thing holding an inference back is a conceivable, but unsupported, defeater story, it's reasonable to go ahead with the inference for the time being. Of course, if we come across good support for the defeater story, then we should abandon the inference.

I think there are other good reasons against indefinitely suspending inferences like this, but this Russell analogy works, I think.