Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Actually, I'm not so sure it is. Well, let's remember that an argumentum ad numerum is not the same as an argumentum ad populum; let's assume you meant the ad numerum fallacy.

What Alix is noting is that you seem to be very sure of yourself. I've noticed that in the past, too. The way you speak makes it seem as if you've discovered a fatal flaw in the evidential argument from evil, and it's only a matter of time before the philosophy of religion community realizes it.

Suppose Alix were claiming that because no one on this thread accepts your argument, or even understands why you are so confident about it, your argument is probably unsound. That would be an instance of the argumentum ad numerum fallacy.

I think what Alix is claiming is something different, however. Alix is claiming that because no one on this thread accepts your argument, or even understands why you are so confident about it, your confidence is misplaced. Your argument is not so clearly sound or strong, and you're not doing such a good job of presenting it. And I think this claim is validly supported by a survey of the philosophers in this thread, because if it were so undeniable, fewer people would be denying it. So I don't think it's an argumentum ad numerum after all.

rainbow walking

alix: It also occured to me that you may not be aware of the fact that your last post is not even formally correct, from a logic point of view. Allow me to clarify:

A logical contradiction is of the form P & ~P, yes? Let us look at the formal structure of your 'contradictions.'

rw: Has it also occurred to you that no matter what form my arguments take the contradictions will not magically vanish?



alix: The premises here are:

P1: a group of people (omnifolk) freely choose the right under all circumstances.

P2: omnifolk do not need to demonstrate their virtue.

You will note that P2 != ~P1 and P1 != ~P2; therefore this is not a logical contradiction.

rw: And you will also note that these are just quotations of your postulates leading up to the contradictions, that the additional postulates are required to define the contradictions, so your claims here are premature. And we should also note that P2 has omitted part of the equation.

P2 Correctly stated: never needing to demonstrate virtue under adverse circumstances such as situations of immorality, willful evil and other unpleasantries

Additional Postulates:

P3: In a world where all people freely choose the right under all circumstances there would be no adverse circumstances of immorality or willful evil.

therefore

P4: In a world devoid of immorality and willful evil there is no basis for recognizing or assigning any normative value to any choice and all choices become non-value assigned choices.

Contradiction: It is logically impossible for the same choice to be both right and non-right in any logically possible world.

C1: (If P3 ~ P2) if P3 therefore P4 ~ P1) ~P1, ~ P2

As I’ve already conceded, I have no formal training in the language of logic, so I don’t know the formal symbols for if, then and therefore, but I do know ~ means “not”.





Alix: The premises here are:

P1: omnifolk are virtuous.
P2: omnifolk never need to demonstrate their virtue.

You will note that P2 != ~P1 and P1 != ~P2; therefore this is not a logical contradiction.

rw: Same as above; premature and ill-formed. The rest of the premises exposing the contradiction are:


P3: In a world where no immorality or willful evil exist there would be no occasion for the concept of virtue to arise as a normative assignment for a person based on their actions.

therefore

P4: In such a world no person can possibly be virtuous.

C2: It is logically impossible for any or all persons to be both virtuous and non-virtuous in any logically possible world.

C2: (If P3 ~ P2) if P3 therefore P4 ~ P1) ~P1, ~ P2


alix: The premises here are:

P1: it is not possible to assign 'virtue' to any omnifolk action.

P2: therefore omnifolk are not virtuous.

You will note that P2 != ~P1 and P1 != ~P2; therefore this is not a logical contradiction.

In fact, it is of the form: If A then B.

But if it is not possible to assign a 'virtue' value to any omnifok action, then one also cannot say that omnifolk are not virtuous; their actions are undefined (in your scheme), therefore your premise If A then B is a non-sequitur

rw: I didn’t say “not” virtuous. I said non-virtuous. Their actions are value un-assignable…not undefined. They are contradictory, which is a definition. It is contradictory to say that an action with no assignable value is virtuous. Thus, an action cannot be both virtuous and non-virtuous.






alix: The premises here are:

P1: Omnimax could create a group of people who freely choose the right under all circumstances.

There is no P2, therefore this is not a logical contradiction.

rw: Really? No P2? Then what is this…?


P2: Whether or not they recognize their choices as 'right' is irrelevant:

In such a world where value assignment is forced upon a choice against the choosers ability to recognize the value assigned, said choice cannot be described as a right choice freely chosen as though the chooser is a moral person.

C3: A person cannot be both moral and non-moral from the same choices in any logically possible world.



alix: Oh, my. Where to start....

rw: May I suggest…over.

alix: P1: omnifolk are constrained in their choices
P2: therefore their choices are not free
P3: non-free choices are not 'right'

C3: a single choice cannot confer morality and immorality on the same person.

Regrettably, NOTHING in that follows the form P & ~P, and your contradiction does not follow from your premises.

rw: Really? Probably because none of that is suppose to follow from your mistated P1,2 & 3. You’ve conflated the argument to obfuscate the obvious.

P1 is: Omnimax could create a group of people who freely chose the right under all circumstances.

P2: In such a world where value assignment is forced upon a choice against the choosers ability to recognize the value assigned, said choice cannot be described as a right choice freely chosen as though the chooser is a moral person.

C3: A person cannot be both moral and non-moral from the same choices in any logically possible world.

Once we insert these postulates, Alix’s “oh my” becomes an “Uh Oh”, and we expose his misstated P1,2 & 3 as attempts to obfuscate the contradictory nature of his original claim in P1.


.

alix: Here is a strawman: nothing in my proposal requires the omnifolk to be without conscience - that is something you are ADDING to my proposal.

rw: Really? When you say:

1. a virtuous man can be unconscious of his virtue and


2. the dictionary says virtue is moral excellence and

3. that the moral arises from the conscience as a sense of right and wrong

4. Then how else am I to interpret this claim? The conscious and the conscience operate out of the same brain. Conscience requires conscious awareness of something for the conscience to consider.

alix: In addition, this argument is of the form:

P1: If A then B.
P2: ~A
C1: ~B

You will note that P2 != ~P1 and P1 != ~P2; therefore this is not a logical contradiction. It is not even in the form of a logical contradiction. In addition, your argument is fomally wrong. The formally correct version would be

P1: If A then B
P2: ~B
C1: ~A

rw: I see…so when I say

The dictionary defines virtue as moral perfection and

Further defines moral as rising up out of ones conscience

And conscience requires conscious awareness of relevant factors like virtue

Then” unconscious virtue” is not a logical contradiction in any logically possible world?

And what world would that be?

alix: Are you quite sure you understand what is meant by logically impossible? Are you sure you understand what a logical contradiction is?

rw: Oh, I’m quite sure Alix, are you quite sure that you can hide behind a convoluted logical formalism to escape the contradictory nature of your example? I don’t think so. I’m going to stay on your brain like an Alabama tick in a blood bank.

rainbow walking

rw: No, I specifically meant ad populum. The reason being the PoE is a popular argument here so, naturally, any challenge to it is going to generate more cons than pros. I'm not surprised that I stand alone in this position nor does Alix's reminder constitute a refutation of my position.

Thomas: What Alix is noting is that you seem to be very sure of yourself. I've noticed that in the past, too. The way you speak makes it seem as if you've discovered a fatal flaw in the evidential argument from evil, and it's only a matter of time before the philosophy of religion community realizes it.

Suppose Alix were claiming that because no one on this thread accepts your argument, or even understands why you are so confident about it, your argument is probably unsound. That would be an instance of the argumentum ad numerum fallacy.

I think what Alix is claiming is something different, however. Alix is claiming that because no one on this thread accepts your argument, or even understands why you are so confident about it, your confidence is misplaced. Your argument is not so clearly sound or strong, and you're not doing such a good job of presenting it. And I think this claim is validly supported by a survey of the philosophers in this thread, because if it were so undeniable, fewer people would be denying it. So I don't think it's an argumentum ad numerum after all. [/B][/QUOTE]

rw: I didn't pick up on that Thomas, but you could be right. The point is, am I to argue forcefully from a position of uncertainty? If I don't robustly pursue my defense none of us would be having all this fun...

Alix Nenuphar

Thomas Metcalf:

Thank you; that was the point I was trying to make.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

I'm still not sure you know the difference between the argumenta ad numerum and ad populum. If Alix had said something like this --

"Don't you see how much trouble you're causing? All these people have to waste their time responding to your posts, and you just keep going without regard for their mental fatigue. Everyone has to deal with your insensitivity and obtuseness, and everyone is getting tired of it."

-- that would have been ad populum. Alix would have been appealing to a large number of people (the gallery, as it were) with some appeal to emotion. But if Alix had said something like this --

"Everyone here disagrees with you. Not one person thinks your argument could even get off the ground. So it's really dubious to me that it could be even a step in the right direction."

-- that would have been ad numerum.

And my point (and Alix's) is that we could do without proclamations of your superiority. Whether or not your argument is sound will be evident from the discussion of it, so you don't need to reinforce it verbally.

Alix Nenuphar

rw:

I note the following:
Actually, no. You are the one who keeps insisting these people are unconscious. Why, I don't exactly know....

(This is known as a straw-man. You have, in this thread, frequently generated straw-men from other's posts, and then claimed victory on the basis of dispatching them. This is a poor debating style, because it shows your audience that you either don't understand their posts, or don't care about their posts.)

All I have done is propose a world where the omnifolk freely choose the right. I have not specified how they do this. They might have excellent moral consciousness; they might just be lucky. My point is that it doesn't matter: they freely choose the right moral choice in all circumstances where such choices are available.

The point is that omnifolk virtue is not relevant to the conditions of the problem - you are advancing a red herring.

The fact is that you have not shown that the PoE is invalid. You propose that there is no unecessary evil or suffering, i.e. that this is best possible world that God could create. Your argument can be countered by proposing a logically possible world that contains less evil and suffering. I have done so. You have claimed that this world is not logically possible. I have pointed out that you need to demonstrate a logical contradiction inherent in the definition of this world in order to claim logical impossiblity. You have not done so, and in fact, you commented:

I have explained to you several times exactly what a logical contradiction is and the form in which is must be phrased in order to satisfy the conditions of a logical argument.

By your statement, you are admitting that you cannot create such a logical contradiction - hence, you cannot demonstrate that my world-proposal is logically impossible.

This is very basic logic. I presumed that given your extraordinary intellect - self-proclaimed - creating a logical contradiction according to the rules of logic would be simple. Clearly I was mistaken, but perhaps the problem remains your lack of education in this field. I suggest the following web-sites as a beginning:

http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/log/terms1.htm

http://www.risc.uni-linz.ac.at/courses/ss2001/formalpar/tla1/index

http://www.mtnmath.com/whatth/node20.html

But ultimately, you will have to go to the literature:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0412808307/qid

Have fun. I look forward to actual serious arguments in the future.

rainbow walking

rw: I’ll accept your clarification. They are closely related fallacies. One question: What is the relative difference between this:

Alix: Consider the fact that after six pages of argument, no other person accepts any of your contentions.

And this:

Thomas defending Alix:"Everyone here disagrees with you. Not one person thinks your argument could even get off the ground. So it's really dubious to me that it could be even a step in the right direction."

…that would have been ad numerum.

rw: I see no difference.

And earlier you offered this example:

Thomas earlier: Suppose Alix were claiming that because no one on this thread accepts your argument, or even understands why you are so confident about it, your argument is probably unsound. That would be an instance of the argumentum ad numerum fallacy.

rw: When this was also attached to his above statement: "why are you unable to produce a convincing argument?"

The implication is that because a number of people disagree with me I am unable to produce a convincing argument.

This does not negate the validity of my argument or my defense of it.

The remainder of your explanation, along with Alix’s agreement, based on my tone and personal opinion of the argument is duly noted…but the ad numerum fallacy remains.

With all of that having been said, and this entire “aside” behind us, I’ll get busy on a response to your last post, Thomas.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

That's true by definition. If everyone disagrees with you, your argument isn't convincing. By virtue of the meaning of "convincing."

Right, that's the distinction we've been trying to explain. Alix wasn't asserting that your argument is unsound, but rather, that it's not convincing or compellingly presented.

rainbow walking

Wow Alix, don’t hold back…tell me how you really feel.

Now that you’ve gotten all that off your chest, feel any better about yourself?

Have you sufficiently patched up your ego to allow you to press on?

There’s still a heap of cogent questions and challenges awaiting a direct repeal. They haven’t gone away and unless you’ve got some special pull with the moderators of this board I don’t foresee them being deleted. They’re right there in plain view for all the world to see, waving like bright red flags on a clear summer day.

Thusfar all you’ve offered by way of responses are:

False accusations

Intentional misunderstanding

Obfuscation

A multitude of fallacies

Whining about form (in spite of knowing before you entered this discussion that it was written in clear common English by a person with no formal education in logic).

Redundancy

Evasion

Lying

Insult

Sound familiar? They should because you’ve accused me of many of them. I’ve gone overboard to address your accusations…can I expect you to do the same?

Alas, lest you leave us with the unjustified impression that all your troubles are a direct result of my intractable refusal to accept your imagined world as logically possible, let’s see exactly what is required to fulfill the obligations of logic in creatively imagining such a world.

Just to set the record strait, my position is not that it isn’t possible to imagine any number of such alternate worlds. In fact, I encourage it. My objection revolves entirely around the claim that such world’s, as are imagined, meet the criteria of being logically possible.

One additional concern that should be addressed before we begin is that of what “form” our endeavor should take. Since we’re using the tool of logic to explore the possibilities there exists a specially developed language of logic that we could use, but what if we don’t speak this specialized form of logic? Is there no recourse? There are those who think so, but I’m not one of them. There is also available the logic inherent in everyday common English. It has its deficiencies, to be sure, but it also has terms with specific definitions and is logically structured to facilitate both our imagination and the communication of its contents, so it is sufficiently structured to allow us to examine each postulate of an imagined world for inconsistencies. To be able to reconstruct such a world in the special language of logic is not a necessity, so anyone who agrees to participate in a discussion based on the simple form of the English language, with those who use this form because they do not speak the language of logic, should not expect to introduce a charge against their adversary on the basis of form. To do so is unethical and not good form. If a participant, in a discussion that is based on the English language, also speaks Greek or Latin, and finds an advantage in Greek or Latin, it is quite permissible to use that advantage by careful interpretation so those who only speak English can see the advantage. What is not acceptable is to demand the English-speaking participant also and only frame his objections in Greek or Latin, and if he cannot, then the Greek/Latin speaker has proven his claim. Of course, the ability to speak Greek/Latin does not assure us that the arguments presented by those proficient in such languages are valid. All it really proves is that one of the participants does not speak Greek/Latin. A trivial gain to be sure. However, what it also demonstrates about those who resort to such a tactic is not that their reasoning capabilities are superior, or that their argument is superior, but that their intellectual integrity is inferior. Now consider if such a person resorts to such tactics to portray the appearance of a valid argument, and they are defending an imagined “better” world sans evil…the first result, if such a world were literally obtained, would be their demise, since they have resorted to a tactic that compromises their intellectual integrity, and such behavior should not belong in any imagined better world.

Unfortunately just such a situation has arisen, and the intellectual integrity of a participant stands in question. This participant has expended a great deal of bandwidth complaining that I have not demonstrated the contradictions, in his imagined example of a better world, in a language I am unfamiliar with. I do not speak formal logic. Neither was my OP submitted using such terms nor have I ever represented myself as being fluent in the use of this language.

This individual submitted a brief description of an imagined better world that I am convinced, (and still am), incorporated a number of inconsistencies. My initial response was to ask a series of pointed questions aimed at exposing these inconsistencies so that this individual could modify his example or better describe it to alleviate the inherent contradictions. His response was to modify the example with further contradictory postulates that only exacerbated the inherent problems of logical possibility.

From this came the complaint that I had not demonstrated any logical contradiction between the postulates used to describe his imagined better world and I had not done so in a language that I am unaccustomed to thinking or communicating in. To demonstrate the errancy of my ways he proceeded to detail how my rebuttal failed to expose any contradiction between the postulates of his description. His demonstration was made in the language of logic. To his credit, (or maybe not), he incorporated just enough common English for me to comprehend his tactic in defending his description. According to his logic my rebuttal failed because it didn’t show any “stand-alone” contradictions between his postulates.

For instance, if we asked the question: “Why do you like candy?”

And someone responded with a set of postulates like this: “ I don’t like the color red. All candy is red. I like candy.”

Of course, the contradictions in such a response require no further information to expose. They stand in stark contrast to one another and need only be isolated to show their contradictory position to one another. These are stand-alone contradictions.

But what if a set of postulates are submitted that contain no stand alone contradictions? Does that make the premises, and any conclusions drawn from them, sound, valid, or logically possible? Of course not. The stand-alone contradiction is not the only form of error that exists. There is also the inherent contradiction that requires additional information to expose.

For instance, if we asked the question: “Can you use the omni-max attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and omni-benevolence to imaginatively create a logically possible world better than this one?”

Now this question is considerably more complex than why you like candy. A respondent will likely agree that any number of imaginative worlds can be created. One such world might be described like this:

Omni-max could create a group of people who freely choose the right under all circumstances. In such a world, all men (and women) would be virtuous, even though they would never need to demonstrate that virtue under adverse circumstances (such as situations of immorality, willfull evil, or other unpleasantries).

As we can see there are no stand-alone contradictions in this description. All the postulates resonate with plausibility and one might be tempted to accept this description at face value. If, however, one is interested in testing this description for validity, to determine if such a world is indeed logically possible, one must carefully examine each postulate in this description against a backdrop of additional knowledge about the relevant factors these postulates are being combined to convey as logically possible. In this way, if there are any contradictions inherent in this description the comparison between the postulates and additional known conditions should draw them out.

This description is comprised of two postulates:

P1: Omni-max could create a group of people who freely choose the right under all circumstances.

P2: In such a world, all men (and women) would be virtuous, even though they would never need to demonstrate that virtue under adverse circumstances (such as situations of immorality, willfull evil, or other unpleasantries).

Although the two postulates do not appear to be contradictory to one another there does exist a number of inherent discrepancies that, when compared with what we know about some of the factors these postulates are based on, will lead us to a number of contradictions. For instance:

D1: Would there ever be an occasion for adverse circumstances, immorality, willful evil or other un-pleasantries in a world where people always choose the right under any circumstance?

The obvious answer is a resounding no. So we are led to question P2 and its reference to virtue. How would such people know they are virtuous? The answer received was:

P3: Knowledge of their virtue isn’t relevant. They are unconscious of their virtue.

So, taking these three postulates together we can then begin to consider what we know about the concepts they incorporate in their terms, specifically the concepts of right and virtue in a world where no evil or adverse circumstances could arise.

Let’s consider the concepts of “right”, “virtue”, and “moral”. All three terms are “value” assigning terms. This means they allow us to attach a relative significance to some thought, word, deed, or event. They are terms that connote a “measurement” in terms of “quality”.

Now consider that the concept of “measurement” requires some sort of sliding scale from the least to the greatest. For instance, we often refer to a woman’s beauty on a scale of 1 to 10, with one being equivalent to ugly and 10 equivalent to Ooh, la, la. The scale of beauty in relation to woman slides from beautiful to pretty to cute to okay to homely to ugly and any other term that might be associated with the concept of a woman’s over-all appearance. But what if we lived in a world where all women looked identical? Could we say any single woman was beautiful, or ugly? No, we could not. Why? Because the concept of beautiful would not exist in relation to women. You could no longer look into a set of hypnotic green eyes and tell the love of your life how beautiful she is.

Now consider that all value-assigning concepts are derived from two basic concepts: good and bad. From the concept of good comes virtuous, moral, right, ethical, beautiful, excellent, intelligent, accurate, happy, ecstatic, joyful, functional, and too many more to list. From the concept of bad comes evil, wrong, wicked, ugly, immoral, unethical, sorrowful, hateful, spiteful, broken, lazy, stupid, terrible, slothful and a host of other qualitative terms too numerous to list.

As you can see, our language has been built around value-assignment. So what happens to people in a world where they always choose the “right” in any situation? No wrong, evil, bad or any negative quality ever arises. In such a world the sliding scale has been chopped off at the hip. Just like the case of all women looking like identical twins, where beautiful ceases to be a meaningful term to associate to their appearance, in such a world where all thoughts, words, and actions are always “right” all value assignment ceases to be a meaningful way to measure the quality of anything.

Immediately we begin to see a contradiction arises out of a description of such a world that defines the choices of such people as “right”. Such choices cannot be so defined unless there is something other than right with which to compare. “Right” ceases to be a meaningful concept and all you can say about such people is that they always choose…and that’s it.

But then, why would they choose anything in such a world where no qualitative value can be assigned to their choices? Consider the reason we assign qualitative value to our thoughts, words and deeds. It allows us to functionally know the difference between good and bad in relation to our very existence. If we had no such measuring instrument why would we decide to drink apple juice in lieu of snake venom? There would be no qualitative difference. In a world where we always choose the right, where no evil could ever exist, we’d have to be immortal and indestructible…else we couldn’t survive. No value assignable language or conceptual assistance would exist to guide our choices.

Only someone outside our world, existing in a state where value assignment is a valid test of quality, would be able to assign the term “good” to our choices. Inside such a world that assignment is incomprehensible to those trapped there.

Now consider all our choices are motivated by value assignment relative to their value to us, to our desires, needs and aspirations. In a world where no value assignment exists all our desires, needs and aspirations, indeed our very existence becomes meaningless. We have no way to say that our lives are good or miserable, joyful or sorrowful, loving or hateful. The net effect is we have no motivation to make any choice whatsoever.

So anyone who describes such a world and includes the terms “freely chooses” has committed a serious miscalculation. In such a world people would not choose anything, and if they did, it couldn’t possibly be “freely” made. People in such a world would be nothing but robots awaiting a program to direct their behavior.

Now, in light of all this additional known and comprehensive information, the inherent contradictions in a description of such a world are drawn out into full view and no one can justly declare such a world to be logically possible or even better than our own.

Such a world imagined as a better world than this one defies reason. One cannot claim such a world reduces instances of pain, suffering and evil because it reduces all life to the mechanics of machinery. If this is someone’s idea of a better world they are welcome to it. I would prefer the one I’ve got now.

But are these the only discrepancies and inconsistencies a person describing such an imagined world has to account for? There’s another, more serious problem that arises up out of using omni-max attributes to create such a world. Consider it is the attribute of omni-benevolence that is being called upon as the “value related reason” for creating such a world. But such a world has no valid claim to any value related reasons whatsoever. The immediate effect of a god creating such a world is the negation of his value added attribute of omni-benevolence. Negate an attribute and such a god ceases to exist. Well… that is the final conclusion a proponent of PoE is trying to obtain, to be sure, but at what price?

Remember, in this imaginary world the occupants require someone other than themselves to direct their value based choices. That someone, of course, is the god who’s attributes were used to create their world. Now if this god ceases to exist upon creation of their world, who will program their actions as “right” rather than “wrong”? Because no wrong exists in such a world, no right can be comprehended and thus, no action of choosing occurs. The occupants of such a world will not last more than a few days before they all die of inaction. This world becomes another lifeless planet, like Mercury, floating around a useless star.

Finally, the person who described this imaginary world gave us an example of always choosing the “right” and how it would be reflected under a specific circumstance. The example was based on finding a lost wallet containing money and returning it, along with the money, to its rightful owner. In such a world, he claims, no suffering or evil obtains.

But I wonder how this can hold true when “accidents” are still allowed in his world? Surely he didn’t mean to imply that the losing of a wallet came about deliberately? So it had to be an accident. Now, I don’t know about anyone else, but I’ve experienced the anxiety and agony of losing a wallet. It isn’t a pleasant experience. Now we have the makings of another contradiction. How can a world, such as this, boast of no suffering, or other un-pleasantries, when accidents are still a viable phenomenon?

In conclusion, a specialized language of logic has not been needed to expose the inherent contradictions in a description of such an imaginary world as this. It is, and remains, a logically impossible state of affairs to sustain. And it’s proponent must either modify his description or concede.

rainbow walking

thomas: Right, that's the distinction we've been trying to explain. Alix wasn't asserting that your argument is unsound, but rather, that it's not convincing or compellingly presented. [/B][/QUOTE]

rw: I have already anticipated that response anyway. Is it not convincing or compelling due to an error or some inherent contradiction or fallacy? Or is there another reason I'm un-aware of?


I have submitted an argument comprised of specific postulates that basically boil down to this state of affairs being described as a meta-path that could lead to the best of all possible worlds where man attains his greatest good.

I have used that description to justify this state of affairs along with the possible existence of an omni-max being based on the additional postulate that such a being, if omniscient, would know that a greatest good for man could only be attained by allowing man to willfully participate in its attainment. That any other divinely acquired means would not lead to man's acquisition of his own greatest good and that an omniscient being would know the difference between a greatest good self attained and a greatest good attained by divine fiat and adjudge the self obtained greatest good to be a greater value than the other. Thus a non-interfering omni-max being could exist along side a world of evil, suffering and pain and PoE fails to obtain.

This is not a complicated argument nor that difficult to imagine and is logically possible and accounts for the evidence of evil and suffering.

If I knew how to convey the argument in formal logic I would. Perhaps you could help me?