Toby Beau

I just got done listening to a debate between atheist Steve Scianni and presuppositionalist apologist Pastor Gene Cook, Jr on the question of "Is the Atheistic Worldview Superior to Christianity?"

It was done in a church and was obviously heavily slanted to theism.

It's a very tough thing to listen to, because the presuppositionalist disregard any argument you say by attacking your grounds to make an argument. Gene Cook didn't answer anything, he simply rambled off how on Triune God is a precondition for any intelligiibility. He also says that atheists must be physicalists and naturalists, then he says that naturalists cannot believe in anything that's not physics including abstract concepts.

He never has to justify his position, he simply says that Christianity is necessary for all things to exist and that all other world views can't. The way he regects Islam, Mormons or Buhddists is by begging the question, saying that the only tenable world-view is one where we are made in God's image, have 10 commandments and where the second person of the trinity comes down and dies for our sins. So, basically... all other religions are wrong because they're not Christianity.

He's trying to make Christianity a tautology by defining Christianity as being necessary. It's even worse than the old ontological argument for the existence of God. "God, by definition exists, therefore God exists."

I really like Steve Scianni and his arguments were good, but I think he underestimated the wiles of a presuppasitionalist like Gene Cook. He proceeded to get his ass chewed in terms rhetoric, style, eloquence (a.k.a. all the things that really don't matter to the truth of the speakers claim). His cross-fire was really weak... he started asking questions like "Gene, do you think it's strange that so many meteors are always hitting the moon?" I mean, I know where he was getting at but it wasn't a good argument especially with an audience of Christians.

I wish Steve would have demanded Gene to account for reason, logic, math..etc. Because Gene kept claiming that math, for instance, couldn't exist without a "triune God". These claims were really just left out in the open and I'm sure his whole congregation buys that, but I would have been great to hear him squirm when he actually has to find MATH in the bible (pi is exactly 3!).

Steve also said that logic simply exists within human minds... which, I suppose he's right in the sense that what we call logic is something we made up... but Gene fired back with "Ok then, before humans there was no logic? A star could be also not a star at the same time?" Then Steve was sorta stumped.

It was painful. I really despise Gene Cook, he's so incredibly cocky. He's got this really annoying mixture of eloquent, articulate speech veiled in pseudo-logical double talk and either extreme intellectual dishonesty or he's just crazier than a shit-house rat.

http://tnma.blogspot.com/2007/08/deb...-superior.html

Dante Alighieri

When (most) presuppositionalists speak, [1] I get the feeling that they have never taken a single course in analytic philosophy. I have difficulty figuring what they mean if only that it is difficult to figure out what the argument is. In any case though, presuppositionalist arguments rest on a severe general fallacy, which (if I have time) I shall try to explicate.

[1] There are some presuppositionalists that are very comfortable with analytic philosophy (of religion, generally). I've no real problem with them. I have just no clue why they would bother with presuppositionalism at all.

Jade

Here is the beating heart of Presuppositionalism: "I cannot understand," says the Presuppositionalist to himself, "how rational argument can even be possible --much less justifiable-- if my God did not exist: (since my understanding is infallible) it is thus true that if my God did not exist then rational argument would be impossible and unjustifiable. Since rational argument is possible and justified, then by Modus tollens my God exists. Q.E.D. As further proof, whenever I ask non-Christians to justify their use of rational arguments from within their own worldviews, I can invariably find some flaw or inconsistency or something or other about their worldview that does not make sense to me...and (since my understanding is infallible) if something does not make sense to me then it does not make sense at all."

Toby Beau

Beautifully said. :notworthy:

punkforchrist

Hello gentlemen,

When I first encountered Presuppositionalism, I thought, "it's impossible to rationally argue that way". There are many things about it at face value that don't seem to follow. I'm willing to attempt to answer any questions you might have about it.

As Jade hinted at, TAG makes use of Aristotle's reductio ad absurdum. If I were going to sit down with a skeptical friend over a cup of coffee, here's how I would approach the conversation. I would ask: is it your desire to be rational?

The answer of course is invariably, "yes", since otherwise the conversation would end right there. I would then ask if he or she agreed with the following two statements.

1. One cannot be rational while rejecting rational inquiry.
2. One cannot be rational while undermining the necessary preconditions of rational inquiry.

As in the case before, if (1) is rejected, then the conversation might as well end there, since surely both believer and unbeliever wish to engage in rational inquiry. After all, that's what we're doing right now. (2) should likewise be self-evident, or else we have no basis for claiming rationality.

Once that is established, I would ask: what are some of these necessary preconditions? The conversation often turns towards issues like the nature of evidence (an internal critique of logical positivism, for example), conflicting worldviews, and how to resolve the conflict of worldviews by appeal to transcendental evidence through further internal critiques. Here is what the Presuppositionalist argues:

Prove A: God exists.
Assume ~A: God does not exist.
~A --> B: If God does not exist, then laws of reason and laws of morality are not objective.
~B: Laws of reason and laws of morality are objective.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: God exists.
Q.E.D.

At this point, the internal critique becomes the key factor in any Presuppositionalist argument. We might, for instance, critique Relativism.

1. If Relativism is true, then there are no objective truths.
2. There are objective truths.
3. Therefore, Relativism is false.

This is a rather simple example, and I believe that TAG must undergo a much more elaborate defense in order to interally critique views like metaphysical Naturalism, but hopefully this will give everyone an idea about what TAG is all about.

Dante Alighieri

Thank you Jade and punkforchrist. I hope I was not misleading people; I do understand the structure of argument that presuppositionalists give. My point, I suppose, is somewhat unrelated insofar as to the lack of engagement that most presuppositionalists have with analytic philosophy, and vice versa. (It is quite telling that [can someone find any article?] there are no Christian analytic philosophers who advocated, much less discuss presuppositionalism.) In any case though, that is independent of the merits of the actual argument.

Presuppositionalists cite a number of epistemic, axiological, and metaphysical things of the world. In terms of the epistemic, the presuppositionalist cites the problem of induction alone it seems. In terms of the axiological, the presuppositionalists cites moral realism. In terms of the metaphysical, the presuppositionalist adduces "the laws of logic." In order to account for the former, the presuppositionalist that there is no reason to believe in induction unless God made nature uniform. The second is that moral realism cannot be true in a world without God. Lastly, the "laws of logic" somehow have no place in a world without God. And somehow, this conclusion does not lead to theism proper, but specifically Christianity.

Is this an accurate statement of the argument?

punkforchrist

Dante, I think you've got a handle on what most Presuppositionalists attempt to do. Unfortunately, there just aren't that many Greg Bahnsens out there. Even though I generally take a Presuppositional approach, I've found that too often the debate centers around demonstrating the incoherence of strict Materialism, as opposed to other non-Christian systems, such as your own Neo-Platonism. With that said, if we dig deeper, we'll find that Presuppositonalists have attempted an internal critique of other worldviews.

Not right away, at least. What the Presuppositionalist must argue is that alternative theistic systems to Christianity fail the test of coherence. In Islam, for example, Allah is capricious; the God of Islam is thought to be above reason and can change whatsoever He wills. The Christian at this juncture will point out that this view ultimately undermines reason. God's nature in Christianity is such that He is a rational being.

Although this seems to take apologetics on the offensive, the Presuppositionalist also aims at defending the coherence of Christian theism (hence, I'm having my second formal exchange on the problem of evil at infidels). Van Til sums it up this way in The Defense of the Faith, pg. 100, "The Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent, assuming the correctness of his method merely for argument's sake, in order to show him that on such a position the 'facts' are not facts and the 'laws' are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place himself upon the Christian position for argument's sake in order that he may be shown that only upon such a basis do 'facts' and 'laws' appear intelligible."

Bahnsen has left us many resources in which he critiqued alternative worldviews. You can find many of them here: http://www.cmfnow.com/index.asp?Page...S&Category=207

I realize not everyone will want to invest in some of these lectures, but if I were going to recommend just one thing, it would be Bahnsen's book, Always Ready.

Here's a good one: http://www.proginosko.com/docs/IfKnowledgeThenGod.pdf

Dante Alighieri

Well, I doubt whether most presuppositionalists represent strict materialism (which is simply physicalist monism) accurately. This is most telling in which presuppositionalists argue that the "laws of logic" (which I suppose is a placeholder for "Platonic abstracta") are incompatible with a material universe. Physicalist monism is committed to the thesis that all actual concrete particulars are physical. It says nothing about the relations that hold between the things (the "laws of logic") or the existence of universals. The general critique that presuppositionalists offer against physicalism is simply based on a strawman version of physicalism. So, it is fully possible to be a physicalist monist and be a realist about universals.

In any case, I don't think a positive case even need be made to show that the presuppositionalist argument fails. For instance, no one, I think, need defend moral noncognitivism to refute the axiological premise of presuppositionalism or so on.

I don't understand this mode of the argument; the argument (at least how Van Til, Bahnsen, Clark, and others said it was supposed to be) is deductive (presumably); what exactly is the point of pointing out the alleged incoherence of other religions if one has a deductive argument that shows it to be logically necessary that Christianity is true? Such maneuvers make sense if we construe the argument as abductive (and even that portion of the argument is highly dubious), but it makes no sense if the argument is deductive. If Clark, Van Til, and Bahnsen agree that the presuppositionalist argument is deductive, then where precisely is the logical contradiction upon the falsity of Christianity?

In any case, it seems clear to me that I see no way of (even if we accept theism) showing the Christianity of it all. First of all, it is difficult to figure which conception of Christianity applies in the first place, since various metaphysical issues have significant effects on Christianity proper, so, which conception is even being referred to in the first place?

Secondly, the only beliefs that are (presumably) deductively arrived at are a subset of Christian belief. The argument I have described proves the existence of a God who is the ground of morality, wherein logic reflects His nature, and who creates order. Where, for instance, does the Trinity even become involved in this for instance? There are going to be logically possible non-Christian beliefs that satisfy this requirement; so, that manuever makes no sense if we construe the argument as deductive. And, there are, needless to say, very good reasons to reject every step of the presuppositionalist argument to begin with.

Okay, I can understand this. I just disagree with it. (I look forward, by the way, to your discussion with ~M~, and our future exchange on the KCA)

I have read Always Ready. However, it seems that my position on presuppositionalism did not change after reading Always Ready; in fact, after Bahnsen explicated his views, my own views strengthened. For I find severe epistemological, axiological, and metaphysical objections to the entire presuppositionalist argument (including its entire method) which I do not think it can overcome. I hope to be able to find the time to explicate it.

Thank you. I've actually read that article before. However, needless to say, I'm far more familiar with Plantinga than I am with Van Til.

Jade

Indeed. Many presuppositionalists appear to believe that (a) they are actually conducting meaningful internal critiques, and (b) that these internal critiques are a way of establishing the truth of that premiss above. I do not think either belief is correct.

Generally the procedure is as follows:
Step 1: Take the opponent's worldview and attempt to find the ontological, epistemological and/or axiological axioms --the basic principles and starting points-- of that worldview (usually by asking the opponent to describe his/her worldview, or simply assuming that the opponent has a particular worldview). There is a tendency here to create straw men. Presuppositionalists are usually all too eager to find flaws in their opponents worldviews, and so the principle of charity can get lost in the shuffle. Take Dante's example of materialism; one common tactic is to overstate the ontological axiom of materialism to make it incompatible with realist conceptions of things like propositions, relations, universals, etc. So "the only concrete particulars are matter, things reducible to matter, and things supervenient upon matter" becomes "the only things that exist are matter" (which is much easier to knock over).

Step 2: Use the various arguments that (secular) philosophy has devised to critique stances in the past few centuries and millenia to reveal problems with the opponent's axioms. For instance, take the opponent's epistemological axioms (e.g. 'we only ever acquire knowledge via the senses') and attempt to show that if they are true then one cannot know that they are true. Or adopt (temporarily) the stance of hyperbolic skepticism to dispute the idea that the opponent's foundations for knowledge (e.g. sense experience) can support everyday beliefs (such as that the sun will rise) and justify the practices based upon them. Other tricks include: taking the opponent's ontological axioms and claiming that they do not solve the problem of the one and the many, or the problem of universals, or that they provide insufficient grounds for moral realism, or the uniformity of nature, or the various 'Laws' that are supposed to infest the universe and make reason, science, and moral judgment possible and justifiable. The straw men of Stage 1 come in very handy here.

A principal failing of presuppositionalists at this stage is that they assume that, because one can make various complaints about (for example) moral anti-realism from a realist perspective, as a consequence of those complaints anti-realism (and hence the opponent) must be wrong, and cannot make the practice of moral judgment intelligible (i.e. not intelligible to a realist). A related failure is that presuppositionalists generally carry their own assumptions and understandings with them when they (attempt to) internally critique other worldviews (e.g. their own assumptions about the nature of 'Laws'); and this generally vitiates and invalidates their attempted critiques (because they are not actually conducting an internal critique at all). To use an analogy, it is like an incompatibilist-determinist carrying his incompatibilist understandings and assumptions about the nature of free will with him whenever he critiques and 'disproves' a compatibilist claim that people make free choices.

Step 3: Assuming that the opponent has been 'proven wrong' by the first two steps, this is where the presuppositionalist assumes or asserts that Christianity can make reason, science, and morality intelligible. This stage may include the presuppositionalist sternly (and hypocritically) lecturing the opponent on the necessity of conducting an internal critique of Christianity. In other words, telling the opponent that (s)he must adopt all the understandings and perspectives from which Christianity seems to makes perfect sense (and indeed seems to be the only worldview that can possibly make sense), otherwise none of the complaints and critiques that the opponent can offer will carry any weight.

There are a variety of defensive moves that presuppositionalists can use at this point; though they rarely let their opponents use equivalent defensive tactics from within their own worldviews in step 2. Many of these defensive moves revolve around that Ultimate Carpet called 'God', under which virtually any problem, paradox or inconsistency can be swept with nary an ungainly lump or bulge to show for it. For instance, Van Til 'solved' the problem of the one and the many by collapsing that particular mystery into the even deeper mystery of the Trinity -- solving a riddle by wrapping it in an enigma, as it were.

Step 4: Assert that steps 1, 2 and 3 have proven the premiss (~A --> B). Assume here that by 'disproving' one non-Christian worldview you have 'disproved' them all.

punkforchrist

This is true for some materialists, but most materialists I've heard representing their position in debate have almost universally held that all things, not just concrete particulars, are reducible to physical matter. Both of Bahnsen's opponents held to this (Stein and Tabbash), as well as Dan Barker in his debates with Michael Butler and Paul Manata.

So it's really not a straw man; there are simply (at least) two subsets of materialism.

I'm actually quite glad you've raised this question, since it is a point of disagreement I have with many Presuppositionalists. What Brian Bosse has argued, and I agree with him, is that TAG ought to be an inductive rather than a deductive argument. There is no way to deductively prove that all non-Christian thought entails human autonomy, for instance. What the Presuppositionalist must do is examine each alternative worldview one at a time.

One way to sort it all out is by continuing an internal critique. Some Christians interpret Scripture inconsistently.

Right, and this is why some Presuppositionalists, including myself, would appeal to evidences in addition to the internal critique. I'm not sure how the Resurrection of Jesus could be proven deductively by the moral version of TAG, for example.

Well, non-Christian worldviews have had some difficulty with the problem of the one and the many. Van Til attempts to solve this issue by stating that unity are plurality are co-ultimate and reflect the nature of a "one and many" being. Now, this doesn't deductively prove the Trinity, but if the argument works as it should, then it does inductively demonstrate the impossibility of alternative worldviews solving this problem.

I look forward to it, as well.