Alonzo Fyfe

Actually, this is false, which I will show shortly.

The only thing a person needs in order to desire something is for certain neurons to be connected to other neurons in the brain in a particular way -- and there is a lot of different ways this may come about -- including stroke, a blow to the head, and medication.

I have drafted a more detailed response, but unfortunately I have been heavily involved in defending the 9th Circuit Court ruling on the Pledge these last couple of weeks and have not had time to turn the draft into a final document.

Please be patient. It is on its way.

bd-from-kg

dk:

The difference being?

This is just a lot of meaningless verbiage. Cheating is immoral (in general) because it does harm. Usually it directly harms some other identifiable person or persons; almost always it harms society in general. On the rare occasions when it actually does more good than harm, it is not immoral.

More meaningless verbiage. If you’re suggesting that cheating is always against the self-interest of the cheater, you’re living in the same fantasy world as 99percent. And the “essence” you refer to appears to be a Platonic essence. There are no such things.

Again, the “reality” you seem to be referring to is in the realm of ideals, which “exists” only in the imaginations of neo-Platonists.

No. I’m recognizing that a different relationship entails different responsibilities and possibilities.

So how does this show that what you can and should do for your son is no different from what you can and should do for another man’s son? Looks to me as though you’re confirming my point.

Of course. Your point being?

True enough, especially if it is limited to just one person or a few.

Not so. For example, kids who dream of being “like Mike” aren’t even interested in what being Michael Jordan is like. They’re fantasizing about being famous NBA stars, like Michael Jordan. There’s a huge difference.

Disgust, yes. Envy, doubtful. If one has a sufficiently strong empathy with somone, one will experience his joys vicariously, and this experience will be just as real and strong as his direct experience of them. so there would be no reason to be envious.

But besides this, any such envy would have no practical effect on a sufficiently rational person with enough K&U. If Smith, say, has really gotten it clear in his mind that tomorrow’s Smith is not him any more than tomorrow’s Jones is, there is no reason why any envy that he might feel toward Jones would translate into actions that would benefit tomorrow’s Smith at the expense of tomorrow’s Jones.

That doesn’t sound like empathy to me. Or at best it’s empathy for the playmate as he is at the moment coupled with a complete lack of empathy for the same playmate as he will be a minute or two from now. Not to mention a lack of empathy for the kid’s family and friends. More likely there was no empathy of any kind involved.

John Page

Alonzo:

Hey, the pledge is more important.

Yes, but it is the person that has the desire, not the neurons.

I concede that it is possible to have motivation toward something given certain brain wiring etc., however, I don't believe this qualifies as "desire" as such a property becomes an anthropomorphism (an apparent desire). "Real" desires stem from (conscious or unconscious)knowledge of something and deciding you want it.

I guess we could argue semantics (does a spring desire to uncurl?, maybe yes but not in the same way as humans...). Perhaps the thing to do is focus on how human desire comes about.

Cheers, John

Koyaanisqatsi

Again, you've got it phrased incorrectly. Morality is nothing more than a personal negotiation one has with one's own social indoctrination and is therefore, inescapably, inherently and necessarily based upon nothing but agreement; the culmination of assessment of circumstance, reflection of group consensus and personal decision to either ascent or descent and nothing else.

Absent an intrinsic "rightness" or "wrongness" contained in the act itself, it is literally impossible to state morality is objective. That is the equivalent of stating you are riding a black white horse.

Correct, because labeling something "objective" means that it is independent of consensus, for the ten billionth time!

There is "universal consensus" among christians, for example, that Jesus is God, but that doesn't mean that Jesus is God or even that a God exists, yes?

In other words, universal consensus doesn't mean shit. What is or is not considered to be moral is ultimately and completely up to the individual and their selective, subjective assent or dissent.

You say something is morally good; I say that same thing is morally bad. We are both right because both of those statements require the addendum "for me" for them to be complete sentences.

In other words, you say something is "morally good for you" and I say that something is "morally bad for me."

It is impossible to just say something is "morally bad." That is an incomplete sentence based upon the defining qualities of what it means to assess the morality of an action.

Yes, because there are no such things as "objective moral truths." The claim itself is an oxymoron; it contradicts itself.

It doesn't offer "proof" in the sense you seem to be here suggesting--in the formal logic sense--I guess, but that is irrelevant and nothing more than pointless semantics games.

The sentence, "Our sun is a star," is a complete sentence that establishes a fact. Our sun is in fact a star. Why? Because we defined those terms in that manner (syntax) in order to establish that fact for the purposes of communication, yes?

So if I were to abuse the rules of syntax, for example, and just state, "The sun," you would be forced to go, "Yes? 'The sun' what?"

In other words, you would be forced to await proper qualification of that initial, bizarre utterance, yes?

That's what I'm getting at with morality.

Thus, the phrase, "Masturbation is morally bad," looks like it's a complete sentence, but it is not, because it is missing a crucial qualifier, the addendum "for me," see what I mean?

Thus the question "do you consider disagreement to be a proof that there is no objective morality?" is fallacious, because the phrase "objective morality" is a contradiction in terms; the fallacy of the complex question.

There is no and can be no such thing as an objective morality. Period. It contradicts itself. It is impossible to state "the act of killing is morally bad" and have that statement be anything other than an incomplete sentence; it demands a qualifier, such as the one I presented.

So, here's what bd, for example is doing and why it is also fallacious; he is qualifying the incomplete sentence with: "the act of killing is morally bad, because it harms others."

Got it? Now it is a complete sentence fully qualified, but it is still not "objective" because it cannot be objective. What it has become with the qualifier is a judgment call that is left up to the individual who reads it to either assent to bd's criterion for morallity (it harms others) or dissent from that criterion (i.e., in time of war, harming others is necessary).

Clearer now? You are asking me a fallacious question.

I hope I've bisected that circle, yes?

Koyaanisqatsi

Simple. The statement "X should do Y" is fallacious, since it assumes an objectivity that does not exist.

The correct statement is "I think X should do Y."

It is never possible to simply state, "X should do Y." The qualifier "I think" is inherently addended, even if the speaker has simply forgotten to so qualify it.

What is or is not "moral" is ultimately up to the individual to decide for him or herself.

Morality is nothing more than a code of living, yes? "These are our moral guidelines on how to behave and act in society," correct?

Thus you have your group consensus.

Even with that consensus, however, it is still ultimately up to the individual to determine for his or herself which of those actions they will personally assent to or dissent from (aka, agree with or disagree with) and then they, in turn, will act (or not) accordingly.

GROUP: This group declares that killing in all circumstances is "morally bad."

INDIVIDUAL: I disagree that killing somebody in self defense is "morally bad" and will act accordingly if threatened.

GROUP: Then you will be punished for disagreeing with the consensus.

INDIVIDUAL: I do not recognize your authority to punish me for my disagreement.

Ad infinitum....

See? It is nothing more and can be nothing more than a negotiation between individuals and the groups those individuals form, absent an intrinsic "rightness" or "wrongness" inherent within the action itself.

Since we've all agreed a thousand and one times that there is no intrinsic "rightness" or "wrongness" in the action itself and that such a concept is absurd, then we are right back at the defining qualities of morality; the subjective, personal opinions of the individual in relation to the group.

Again, even if every single person but one agreed to an action being "morally bad," all that can be said is that every single person but one agrees that the action is "morally bad."

This in no way establishes anything "objectively" bad about that action, however, due to the defining characteristics of morality.

If the action cannot be said to be intrinsically "bad" or "good" then it is not possible to establish anything remotely "objective" concerning it; thus the word "objective" is not applicable.

Not in the slightest. The existence of the consensus would only attest to the existence of a consensus and nothing more.

You continue to leave off the required qualifier of that statement.

The statement must be if "I think capital punishment is wrong" or "The group thinks that capital punishment is wrong."

It is impossible to declare in an objective voice, "Capital punishment is wrong," so you've committed a fallacy right out of the gate.

Aka, a group of people who think that capital punishment is "wrong..."

Non sequitur. The only thing that follows would be a tautology. A group of people who think that capital punishment is wrong means that a group of people think that capital punishment is wrong.

It means nothing else regarding whether or not capital punishment can be said to be "objectively" wrong, because that is an impossibility; a contradiction in terms.

Which he cannot actually state, since inherent in Smith stating such a thing is the qualifier "I think X should do Y..."



Only regarding the "truth" that Smith personally considers something to be either morally right or morally wrong, I suppose.

Indeed.

Whether or not Smith personally feels that X should do Y, of course, and upon what subjective criteria Smith bases such a judgment call.

It's not rocket science.

Incorrect. It is, in fact, exceedingly easy to do just that very thing.

Look, here it is in a nutshell.

Smith says, "I think X should do Y."

Jones says, "And I think X should do Z."

So Smith asks, "Why do you think Z and not Y?"

And Jones gives his criteria and Smith either accepts the criteria or does not and they do the hokey pokey and they turn themselves around, and that's what it's all about.

At the end of all of it, however, both Smith and Jones will return to their homes and in the privacy of their own thoughts, they will most like say, "I know the other is wrong."

Aka, ultimately, it comes down to a personal decision and therefore it is inherently subjective.

Not that there "can" exist a situation wherein...blah, blah, blah.

It is therefore subjective.

Q.E.D.

Thereby further demonstrating precisely what I'm talking about, for if there were an intrinsically "moral badness" or "goodness" to any action, there would be no interpretation and no debate.

It would be as objectively "true" as the age of the Earth.

It means that you have fallaciously left off the qualifier.

Correct the statement to read, "Z thinks X should do Y" and you have the correct, valid statement.

That would mean that a person actually made a "moral statement" and nothing else.

Clear now?

Non sequitur.

I hope I have done so here by correctly pointing out to you the fallacy of your "X should do Y" statement.

Apparently so.

"I think that killing animals is morally wrong."

That does not mean that killing animals is objectively morally wrong, correct?

The qualifier "I think" is what has been missing from every single one of your statements, yet is must be there when arguing a "should" scenario and is intrinsically there whenever you do, thus the fallacy you are committing is to beg your own question by assuming that a statement such as "X should do Y" is objective, simply because you've phrased it objectively.

I hope this, then, has clarified it for you.

The AntiChris

Koyaanisqatsi

Thanks for a very full response, although I think you may be mistaking my objection to your "lack of moral consensus" argument for disagreement with your position on the subjectivity of morality.

Using your definition of "objective", I agree with you completely. Clearly, some philosophers take a different view of "objective" when applied to morality (although apparently they don't all agree) but I'm in no position to defend them.

So, I shall not be responding to each of your points - not because I'm avoiding the issue, but because I essentially agree with you.

However, I do take issue with your use of examples of moral disagreement as "proof", "a demonstration of", "evidence in support of" or whatever you want to call it (you're proving very difficult to pin down on this ).

By your own admission "universal consensus doesn't mean shit", so how does lack of universal consensus have any bearing on your argument? Citing examples of moral disagreement isn't a poor argument, it's an irrelevant argument for two main reasons:

1) It doesn't support your case (it isn't "proof", "a demonstration of" or "evidence in support of").

2) It isn't persuasive in debate (I'm not aware of any objectivists who use "universal moral consensus" as evidence to support their case).

I hope this clarifies things.

Chris

[ July 18, 2002: Message edited by: The AntiChris ]</p>

bd-from-kg

John Page:

Theism asserts that God objectively exists – that is, that He exists for everyone, regardless of what anyone believes or how anyone feels about it. That makes it an objective theory.

Being an objective theory has nothing to do with being objectively true, or having objectively valid reasons for believing it.

This question doesn’t make sense. What it means to call something “objectively true” is that it is true, period. Not true “relative to” anything else.

As to judging the truth of a moral statement such as “X should do Y”, this is certainly not trivial. But I have offered an interpretation of such statements which is plainly meaningful, even according to the strict criteria of logical positivism. As I pointed out in my recent post to The Antichrist, my primary interest here is in metaethics, not practical ethics.

I have no idea what you mean by “morally” in this context. Whether a person or action is rational or irrational is not a moral question. And I have no idea how you can believe that there’s no important objective difference. The distinction between sane people and madmen is not arbitrary or subjective. If you don’t agree, please review my criteria of rationality ( see my June 21 post) and tell me which ones you consider arbitrary or subjective.

I have no idea what you’re trying to say here. What’s the relevance of the fact that our actions are based in part on what we think other people believe?

It seems to me that you’re confusing the statements “S is objectively true”, “S can be known to be true”, and “S is known to be true”. These mean quite different things. I do not claim that it is always possible to know whether a statement like “X should do Y” is true or false, much less that I (or anyone else actually do know[/i] whether it is. My theory says only that such statements express propositions, and it explains what sort of propositions they express. Of course this does require that it must be possible (at least in principle) to produce evidence bearing on whether such propositions are true, and that it must be possible (in principle) for conditions to exist in which one would be rationally justified in believing such a proposition to be true or false.

No. The paragraphs you are commenting on explain what I label moral theories and what I do not label moral theories. They have nothing to do with the distinction between objective and subjective theories.

Before one can even talk meaningfully about how morality “works” one has to get clear what morality is. My theory is a theory about what morality is - i.e., what statements like “X should do Y” mean.

But perhaps you mean that there are no universally valid moral rules. This might well be so, but my theory neither assumes nor implies that there are. When I speak of a specific act, I mean a specific act, like John Green’s robbing the 7-11 store on the corner of Fifth and Main in Oronco, Idaho, at 7:01 PM on August 11, 2001. Now suppose that you say that this act was wrong. The first criterion above says only that if your statement is true, it will be true if anyone says the same thing at any time. This is elementary. A statement that fails to meet this criterion does not state a proposition. Thus the many moral theories that entail that it is possible that your statement is true, and that my statement that the very same act was right is also true, are not objective theories.

The question was how this question was relevant. But for the record: no, I do not believe that humans are “intrinsically good”.

But as I pointed out before, for you this would seem to be a meaningless question, since you do not believe that the term “intrinsically good” means anything.

I don’t know what you mean, nor do I understand just how this is supposed to relate to the discussion.

Of course the seeking of objective truth is subjective in the sense that it is a mental process. And it’s subjective in the sense that in some cases two rational people can come to opposite conclusions. I suspect that you mean more than this, but I don’t know what.

Once again I have no idea what you’re trying to say. What kind of theory would base anything on what someone says he believes? And I don’t know what could be meant by “analyzing from the truth of a person’s belief”.

Could you explain the relevance of this?

Once again I don’t understand what you’re trying to say, nor any possible relevance.

Huh? Call me simple-minded, but it seems to me that if I say that the brick house which appears to be on the adjacent lot objectively exists, this claim is not “limited by the scope of the data and assumptions used.” It is either true or false, period.

If I say that a statement is objectively true, what does it mean to ask what it is objectively true with respect to? In fact, as I said earlier, it seems to me that to say that something is objectively true only “with respect to” something is to say that it is not objectively true. Or to put it anther way, to assert that something is objectively true is to assert that that qualifiers like “with respect to” are not applicable.

[ July 18, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

dk

Is it [im]possible for morality to be objective?
dk: - Whether or not moral behavior is caused internally or externally depends on the sense of the inquiry. Take for example the immune system. An antigen, within the body, elicits a response form the immune system sending antibodies to eliminate the bad proteins (antigens). When the immune system mistakes a benign-vital protein for an antigen an allergic reaction causes inflammation, pain and destruction of healthy tissue. An immune system that attacks the body is diseased, as in rheumatoid arthritis. People are similarly afflicted in the real world by morality. Parents that abdicate their responsibilities are immoral because there behavior causes injustice, suffering and even death to the abandoned child, whether the perpetrators and their victims recognize the mistake or not.
Just as the immune system must judge and respond appropriately to protect vital tissue from antigens at a microscopic level, the active intellect must judge and respond to vice to protect the virtue of family, friends, institutions and society. How? A person’s conscience informs the active intellect about guilt and blame rationally derived from the context of the act. If I tell a lie, I should feel guilty. If my neighbor molests a child I should blame my neighbor (not the child). Since everyone suffers from guilt and blame its rational to categorize morality as objective. An immoral person manifests a warped (malformed) sense of morality, and a whole community of absentee immoral parents puts all the children in that community in harms way.

[ July 18, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

The AntiChris

bd-from-kg

I'm aware of the different types of moral theory, although I don't claim to fully understand the distinction between them. This was the reason I asked earlier in this thread what the purpose of your theory was.

However I wasn't looking for practical advice. I was asking the charity donation question in the context of my previous query about "sufficient" K&U.

The question "what percentage of my salary should I donate to charity?" seems a prime example of a choice that would be dependent, in part, on empathic K&U. In other words, the more empathy one felt for fellow humans in distress, the greater the percentage of one's salary one would donate to charity. However, in practice there seems to be a "rational" limit to what people actually donate and what percentage we would approve of as "reasonable".

This seems, to me at least, to run counter to your 6th "principle of rational action":

It could be argued that the remoteness of much of humanity's suffering somehow insulates us from the levels of empathic K&U that would motivate us to do more. However, the graphic depictions of human disasters in the media and the fact that poverty and deprivation on our own doorstep fail to motivate us to anywhere near approaching the level we would expect if humans really were trying to "do what you would approve of if you had sufficient knowledge and understanding" doesn't seem to support the "remoteness" argument.

What appears to be happening here is that we treat empathic K&U in a different way to other K&U. While it's indisputable that any rational person will seek sufficient K&U in order to make the "right" or "best" decision, this will depend on what K&U he considers relevant to the question at hand.

Just as the determined murderer will probably see empathy for his victim as irrelevant, the potential charity donor will view any empathic K&U beyond a certain level as irrelevant (even though more might result in his preferring a different choice).

I think this calls into question your conclusion:

This presupposes that it is rational to take into consideration empathic K&U and other K&U equally (or at least to such an extent that it will change one's behaviour). Whilst I tend to agree that that it is likely that in many cases people will act altruistically, I'm not sure I agree that people will always act altruistically or, more precisely, that it is rational for people to always act altruistically).

I'm not sure to what extent, if any, this has a bearing on the validity of your theory but it's an aspect of your theory that somehow doesn't feel quite right to me.

Chris

bd-from-kg

Koyaanisqatsi :

Since your latest post says nothing that you haven’t said a dozen times before, there’s no point in replying to it in detail. Besides, I was just trying to get you to (finally) explain what you think sentences like “X should do Y” mean. Once again you failed completely. For example:

You’re saying that morality cannot be objective because “X should do Y” fallaciously assumes that morality is objective. This is a tad bit circular. It also fails to give the slightest hint as to what you think the statement “X should do Y” means.

This is nonsense. “I think (or believe) that S” can never be a correct definition, or analysis, of S. And it can only be meaningful if S itself is meaningful. You can only believe S if S expresses a proposition. You cannot believe “The grunwinkle is perdate”, or “Who’s going to win the game tonight?” or “Close the door”, or “Wow!” Thus to say that any statement means “I think (or believe) that X should do Y” is to say that “X should do Y” expresses a proposition.

You also failed to give a remotely coherent account of what you mean by “objective” in the context of moral philosophy:

This is nonsense. To say that a statement is true, objectively or otherwise, never means that someone made it.

The rest of your post displays a breathtaking ignorance or disregard of elementary logic. Thus:

The question was rhetorical. Of course it would. As usual, you ignore the conditional (the “if” part). The fact that you don’t agree with a premise doesn’t mean that the conclusion doesn’t follow from it.

“Non sequitur” means that the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premise. Here it clearly does. Once again you’re confusing the question of whether a premise is true with the question of whether the conclusion follows. Or to put it another way, you seem to consistently confuse the question “Does A imply B?” with the question “Is B true?” It often happens that “A implies B” is true but B is false, or vice versa.

Nonsense. If you don’t understand how to use the term “non sequitur” appropriately it would be wise to avoid using it altogether.

Clear as mud.

Now let’s try it again.

To avoid the “I think that” cul-de-sac, let me rephrase the question. What do you think it means to say “I believe that X should do Y”? Does this statement express a belief? If so, what is it that the person who utters it is claiming to believe?

Are you beginning to see that saying that “X should do Y” means “I think that X should do Y” gets you precisely nowhere?

The question of what it means to say that X should do Y is not a trick question; it is not a side issue, and it does not implicitly assume that morality is objective. It is the central, fundamental question of moral philosophy. Until you are prepared to deal with it seriously, you are not going to have anything interesting to say about morality.