beausoleil

By which I meant that infinte regression of causes is not only not excluded, it doesn't even require an infinite expanse of past time.

Plump-DJ

Bill...

Well i don't think I did -- i thought i mentioned in my post that by universe I meant the M.E.S.T which emerged from the BB ala the space time singularity theroms of Hawking and Penrose. So that's how I define universe and I myself have never used the word in it's more "expansive" mode, as some have.

That's what the theist believes. It's a philosophical position tied into their beliefs about the nature of ultimate or absolute reality. God is ultimate reality or "being itself" as some have put it with the universe being the derived being. Obviously the derived being would need to come from this absolute reality given the truth of this position. As to wether or not we can resolve this question and the truth there in of this philosophical position -- i do not know. I'm not to sure about the nature of ultimate reality myself.

I do think it would be hard (impossible) to prove that God is neccessary for the universe to exist, although one may make a sort of inductive argument to that effect based on the origin of the universe perhaps (or MEST-- which is what people usually mean by universe) along with the so called "fine tuning" or "design" seen in the laws of physics, cosmology, astronomy and biology. Personaly i think that both theist and atheist is still left with the same unanswered question : "What is the nature of absolute reality??" Is it personal, is it impersonal? Is it spiritual or material? I suspect that the answer is unknowable.

Well i guess you and i must part ways at this point in regards to our definitions. To me the universe is all the matter, energy and the space time dimensions associated with that which emerged from the BB, nothing more nothing less. With that definition I can speak of other universes (with their own MESTs) and the "multi-verse" (which the universe may spring from or be a part of) to seperate out my conception of things. So in my view if God exists he is a rung or two down the metaphysical food chain from the universe and not to be limtied by the definition of universe that I employ. (Which would be silly since that's not what people mean by God anyhoos)

Well again, that's based on your definition or conception of things. And to be blunt (if i may ) -- i don't see the point in such redefining of terms, it seems to lead to more confusion in my eyes. We're still left with the question regarding the nature of nature (or the nature of absolute reality?) and if the MEST began (whatever you wish to call it) the many who would have once claimed the MEST *was* absolute reality would be incorrect. (since it began) So we're pushed back another rung on the metaphysical food chain regardless of the terms we wish to employ. And then what are our options? Sometihng like God? Some sort of idealism? An infinite number of universes perhaps? How shall i decide which one to pick since neither is more empirical ?

====================================

.

1) Right. Well i don't think the BB neccesarily entails God (which is what you are arguing against I assume and i would agree, even though i believe in God) but damm it, it might lead one to think twice about what sort of cause could lead to the creation of a universe like this, with this particular order and structure and balance and so on. You're gonna need some gusto i'd imagine and a very interesting cause to get the ball rolling, aren't you?

2) I don't think we will ever "observe" this multi verse. In fact i would consider it physicaly impossible for us to conduct any sort of testable empirical probes (read real science) into the nature of anything beyond the boundaries of this universe.

3) Notice how metaphysical this multiverse really is. It's on the same metaphysical playing field as God imo.

==========

Well i disagree here. The BB could've been created by God, and God is not nothing. In otherwords the potentialy of the universe lies in God himself and not nothing. I would also argue that if God created the universe he created it from that which could not be seen. (ie not matter and energy but something else) So yes, the BB came from something else but this something else does not have to be impersonal matter or energy, does it?

Well imho I think that really misses the point. Firstly, if i were an atheist i would believe in a first cause. Theist or atheist, i feel left with the notion that there is something that has always existed. Now if it's not the universe, it's something else. So eternity is "out there" somewhere. Asking "where did the first cause come from?" is like asking "where did this thing which is eternal in it's existence come from?" It's a meaningless question to ask. Now it's possible the universe itself is this metaphysicaly neccessary something that is eternal in it's exsitence. Of course i think the evidence points away from such a proposition so i'm left with the next question. If there is something which is eternal in it's existence and it's not the universe -- then what is it? What's its nature? Is it something like God?? Can i even know???

Hans

Thanks to everyone who has contributed. Keith & beausoleil, thanks for the info on Xeno's paradox. I'm still going through the links that you and Bill provided.

It helps when you know where to look.

tronvillain

Plump-DJ:
Since Hume is not here, I think I'll ask you instead: Exactly how is creation from nothing an absurd proposition? There is nothing illogical about things spontaneously popping into existence without cause - we simply have never observed an instance of it occurrring, which lends support to the hypothesis that it seldom or never occurs.

There would be nothing irrational about such a hypothesis, but it is a poor one in light of the evidence that things do not simply spring into existence. It could very well be true, but the available evidence does not support the hypothesis.

Actually, that is the other way of getting around the Kalam argument - if there is no before the Big Bang, then the universe did not come into existence from nothing at T=0 any more than a ruler comes into existence from nothing at one end.

Horia Plugaru

This is my reply to Bill in response to what he wrote me at the feedback section.

Bill:

You say "that the idea of an infinite regress of causes is relied upon both theist and atheist debaters [...] so why not just admit that both theists and atheists rely upon the concept of eternal (infinite) existence and get on with the debate on a more productine front?". Because if Sadowsky is correct when he says that "the string of causes CANNOT be infinitely long" (I'll note this propositionwith P), it follows that both theists and atheists are WRONG. They are relying on a necessary false statement. In this case, their preoccupation should not be simply to continue their debate on another front but rather to try to resolve this difficulty by showing that P is not true or by basing their positions on another--and this time coherent--principle. Obviously, in case they are not able to do neither of these, they should abandon their beliefs - not get on with the debate ignoring the problem.

You also say that "ever since some combination of Leibnitz and Newton gave us the mathmatics of Calculus it has been far easier for humans to deal with concepts that include infinities".
One question needs to be asked here: is an endless regress of causes (one in which there is not even a single uncaused cause or, as Sadowsky puts it, in which "nothing (including causes) can exist without a cause") one such concept? Sadowsky does not think so and he offers an argument in support of his position. If you, on the other hand, can easily deal with this particular infinity, then you should be able to show why Sadowsky's defence (the one presented in my feedback) of P is problematic. I'm afraid that in your response you do not show this.

Best regards,
Horia Plugaru

Horia Plugaru

This is my reply to Professor Richard Carrier's response to the topic "Can there be an endless regress of causes?" posted at the feddback section.

I would like to thank you, Professor Carrier, for taking the time to respond to my feedback. Unfortunately, I am not satisfied with your response and in what follows I will try to show why.

You say that I "note that Schick argues against infinite regress". Not true at all. On the contrary, I clearly say that Schick believes the proposition "the string of causes cannot be infinitely long " (for simplicity, let us call this proposition P) to be false: "In his paper... Professor Schick argues for the FALSITY of the following proposition..." Since P states that an endless regress of causes is impossible and, as I say in my feedback, Schick disagrees with P, it follows that Schick argues FOR the possibility of infinite regress, not against it.
You also say that I "show Sadowsky arguing for infinite regress". Incorrect. Since Sadowsky defends P (as I also show in my feedback) which in turn states that an infinite regress of causes is impossible, it follows that he argues AGAINST this regress, not for it.
Note again that P states that an infinite regress of causes is IMPOSSIBLE: "the string of causes CANNOT be infinetly long". Note also that we have to choose only between the two following options: we either say that 1. A exists due to an endless regress of causes or that 2. A exists due to an uncaused cause. As far as I know, there is no third option here. Now, if Sadowsky is correct to say that 1 is impossible, we are left out of logical necessity only with 2. In this case, we can say that logic indeed demands an uncaused cause. This clearly contradicts Dr. Schick.

In order to defend Schick, you should show somehow
that Sadowsky's reasoning is mistaken. (As I see it, the most promising way to do this is to somehow show that the proposition "nothing (including causes) can exist without a cause" is not problematic.) However, in the second paragraph of your response you simply assert that both 1 and 2 are logically possible. This is hardly adequate. And since you do not show that, contrary to Sadowsky's attack, 1 is indeed possible, your response from the second half of this paragraph fails: you cannot empirically observe an impossible fact, one that cannot exist in reality.

In the third paragraph of your response, you seem to reason along these lines: "I cannot show using a priori reasons that Sadowsky's a priori argument for P is problematic. (It is true that you never say this explicitly. But since you give no a priori reasons against Sadowsky, I think this indeed is the case: you do not have such reasons.) However, I can show P's falsity by using empirical facts".
This strategy could work only if you have EXTREMELY good, convincing empirical facts in support of your position. (Why? Because if the facts in question provide only SOME advantage to your position, the overall situation will look something like this: Sadowsky- an a priori reason vs Carrier- no apriori arguments, no a priori criticism of Sadowsky's argument, only a relatively credible empirical confirmation. Since an a priori argument is very powerful, I think Sadowsky would be the clear winner here.)
In the present case, you should show that there are very serious scientific theories which were tested and which clearly confirm that an endless regress of causes is (at least) possible. Is this the case? Quite the contrary, you just say that we cannot ascertain whether there was any time before the Max Planck-time. In other words, science does not tell us whether the universe is eternal in time or not, At this point, Sadowsky might respond as follows: "No wonder science cannot prove that the universe is eternal in time since this would imply that an endless regress of causes is possible and, as I show, such a regress is a logical impossibility. Therefore, unless science will clearly prove that I am wrong, I am within my epistemic rights to believe that an endless regress of causes is impossible. In this case, contrary to Professor Carrier, the N-Theory (if it implies the universe's infinity in time) is not only undemonstrated, but also implausible".

In the fourth paragraph, you write: "whether anything requires a cause is a hypothesis which can only be proved empirically". To repeat: if Sadowsky's defence of P is correct, you are wrong: an impossible fact cannot exist in reality, so it cannot be observed empirically. If, on the other hand, here you just want to say that an UNCAUSED cause can exist in reality, then I ask: even if you are right, how is this supposed to show that, contrary to Sadowsky's argumentation, an endless regress of causes in which "nothing (including causes) can exist without a cause" is (at least) possible?

Again, thank you for your response and if you choose to respond to me again, I look forward to it.

Respectfully yours,
Horia Plugaru

Bill

OK, lets look at the argument you presented in your feedback: All that James A. Sadowsky has done is to state, in a slightly different form, the classical Kalam argument (which does not originate with William Lane Craig, its best-known current proponant, but rather with an ancient school of Muslim philosophers, roughly a thousand years ago). The <a href="http://www.self-realization.com/prooffor.htm#KalamTime" target="_blank">Kalam argument</a> goes something like this: As the above quote notes, "The key here is the concept of infinity." Perhaps in the 10th century, when the Kalam school of philosophers flourished, the idea of an "actual infinity" was somewhat daunting. But the problem dissolves with an understanding of Calculus, as I indicated above.

In order for me to traverse in time from one second (or minute or hour or day...) to the next, I must traverse an infinite number of intervening moments. But it can just as easily be argued that it is impossible for any finite individual, such as myself, to traverse an infinite number of moments. (This is the premise upon which the Kalam argument rests.) However, it is plainly obvious to me that I have absolutely no difficulty at all in traversing in time from one second (or minute or hour or day...) to the next. I know that it is a trivial matter for me to traverse through an infinite number of moments. And that infinite series of moments can easily extend back as far in time as is necessary, even to an infinite past time, and I can still easily conceive of traversing all that infinity of time to arrive at the present moment.

Lets approach this problem from the other direction. Lets ask this: if the universe had existed for an infinite amount of past time (P1), then why would that create a problem for us in our lives here at the present moment in time?

The logic problem presented by the Kalam argument is really an entirely artifical argument that depends upon a deliberate confusion of linguistic terms for its hold on humanity. The entire problem is dissolved by applying a Wittgensteinian analysis to it, as Jim Still perfectly demonstrates in his essay <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/james_still/w_why.html" target="_blank">The Mental Discomfort of “Why?”</a> The confusion of linguistic terms is illustrated by the Wittgenstein quote that Jim uses to begin his essay: Once you understand that all of these arguments are nothing more than expressions by a "believer" in some particular mythos that there had to be some beginning point in order for the present to make sense, these arguments are then easily viewed as nothing more than a "believer's" expression of belief.

As the above-statement of the classical Kalam argument makes clear, there are really only three options for us to consider: <ol type="1">[*]There is an infinite amount of past time, with an infinite chain of causality, stretching all of the way back in time;[*]There is a "first moment" at which time the "first cause" acted to set in motion the chain of causality which has existed from that "first moment" up through the present, and that "first cause" is itself totally un-caused (or it has "no cause" or "its cause is nothing"); or[*]There is a "first moment" at which time the "first cause" acted to set in motion the chain of causality which has existed from that "first moment" up through the present, and that "first cause" is X (where X is "God" or anything else you might care to postulate, such as a quantum fluctuation within a quantum vacuum).[/list=a]]Classically, the Kalam philosophers, and now your James A. Sadowsky, argue against the first two propositions, above, by arguing that an infinite past is impossible (which is, in fact, an entirely unsupported and unsupportable assertion, in modern times, anyway), and so we are left with only the third proposition, so all we really need to do is to define what "X" is in that third proposition.

What Wittgenstein did (as demonstrated by <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/james_still/w_why.html" target="_blank">Jim Still's essay</a>) was to clearly demonstrate that the third option was as ludicrous as the second. No person could logically assert that everything that exists within our universe today was the product of an absolute and total nothingness! Such an assertion is ludicrous, as so many theists claim when they mis-characterize so many atheist arguments as claiming that the "Big Bang" came from "nothing." But the third argument is ludicrous, too, for exactly the reason that Wittgenstein pointed out: it only works because "believers" have agreed amongst themselves that the moment that the chain of causation reaches their God, then all questioning of causes must immediately cease. Well, that is just a ludicrous way of avoiding the obvious: if "God" is "X" in the third assertion, above, then why is the third assertion any different from the first? Does not God exist for an infinite amount of past time? And if not, then what caused God to begin to exist?

Accordingly, the "believer's" preferred argument, the third, collapses right back into the first argument, since both actually involve an infinite regress of time and causation. Our choice must then be made between only the first and second options, above, and the second option of "all that exists" emerging from "complete nothingness" is still ludicrous, so in reality, only the first option of an infinite regress of time remains.

In short, if we were looking at some candidate for "first moment in time" and we were going to decide whether or not it qualified as the true "first moment in time," we should not fail to ask "what caused this candidate for 'first moment in time' to be here, anyway?" And, if we ask that question, and reject the second option of "it appeared out of complete, total, and absolute nothingness," then we must realize that this candidate for "first moment in time" must have had a predecessor moment. In case one, the chain of moments goes infinitely far back in time, as I've explained earlier (and, as I've explained earlier, Calculus helps us deal with those sorts of infinities). In case three, if "X" is the cause of "the first moment in time," then the only legitimate option is to ask "well, didn't this 'X' have some prior existence in time?" If we ask that question and select a "no" answer, then we have equated "X" with "complete, total, and absolute nothingness," which we rejected when we considered the second option. And if we select a "yes" answer for that question, then we have just declared that there was a prior moment before "the first moment in time" and that this prior moment was in some way associated with X. The chain of causation then continues on backwards in time with no real distinction from the first option, which declares the chain to be infinite from the beginning.

==========

I'm sorry if you did not understand all of these issues, Horia Plugaru, but if you check back earlier in this thread, you will find that I did mention, cite, and discuss most of this, if in a more-abbreviated form (because most of the regular inhabitants of this forum are quite familiar with most of these arguments). I hope you now find my rebuttal of your James A. Sadowsky to be sufficient.

== Bill

[ August 23, 2002: Message edited by: Bill ]</p>

Bill

<a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/jeff_lowder/index.shtml" target="_blank">Jeff Lowder</a> has suggested a series of more formal philosophical essays by Christian philosopher <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/Home.html" target="_blank">Wes Morriston</a> of the University of Colorado, Boulder. In <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/wespapers.html" target="_blank">these essays</a>, Dr. Morriston dissects (among other things) various aspects of Craig's Kalam argument, many of which bear upon matters that we are discussing within this thread. Let me reference a few that I find to be pertinant:

• <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/actual-infinite.html" target="_blank">Craig on the Actual Infinite</a>, which discusses whether it is possible to have an actual infinite within reality, and in particular, an actual infinite number of past moments.
• <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/infpast.html" target="_blank">Must the Past Have a Beginning?</a>, which discusses whether or not there necessarily must be a "first moment" of time.
• <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/ExNihilo.html" target="_blank">Creation ex Nihilo and the Big Bang</a>, where he concludes that "In the last analysis, we simply do not have enough to go on to say what the causes (efficient or material) of the beginning of the universe are likely to be. Certainly, the big bang theory does not settle the issue in favor of creation ex nihilo. Even if time and the universe began together, they may, for all we can tell, have been created by an unknown efficient cause out of an equally unknown material 'stuff.' The best course may well be to suspend judgment about all of these bizarre possibilities."
• <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/HilbertsHotel.html" target="_blank">Could the Past Be Infinite?</a>, in which Professor Morriston critiques Craig's argument concerning "Hilbert's Hotel."
• <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/kalam2.html" target="_blank">Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?</a>, subtitled A Critical Examination of the kalam Cosmological Argument, and followed up by:
• <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/wes2craig.html" target="_blank">Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument</a>, subtitled Reply to Craig, wherein Professor Morriston replies to a series of rebuttals by Craig to the above paper.
• <a href="http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/kalam-not.html" target="_blank">A Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument</a>, wherein Morriston ultimately concludes: "I have tried to show that the kalam argument is not a successful argument for the existence of God or for creation ex nihilo. This does not mean, of course, that I have a better theory of the origin of the universe on offer. My own view is that we simply don’t know enough to draw firm conclusions about such matters. It is fun to speculate, but we cannot hope to come up with answers that any honest, reasonable, and well-informed person would be bound to accept. Most of us have different and somewhat conflicting intuitions about time and eternity, causation and agency, about the nature of personhood, and about many other matters. It is an illusion to suppose that there is a single obviously correct way of sorting it all out. That is why the history of philosophy is, and will continue to be, a history of contest and controversy… and fun."

I would agree with that final summing-up by Professor Morriston.

== Bill

Hans

Bill,

Thanks for the additional links.

Plump-DJ

Tron..

Ok let's disect this.

1) What does it mean for something to come into existence without a cause, from complete non-existence or nothing? What are we really saying? Firstly to me Nothing is an absence of all predictaes, of all potential. This to me is complete non-existence. If nothing has any properties or any potential, it is not nothing or non-existence. So obviously in that case it would be absurd to claim that something can come from nothing if nothing is an absence of all properties or potential.

2) How would you draw the line on something like this? If something can come from complete non-existence without a reason or become actual without any prior potentiality then it could happen every single minute of every single day of every single week. We would be simply assuming ignorantly that things which exist have a reason for their existence, when really they do not and our rational inquiries into the nature of reality are a sham.

3) If you say "Well some things can exist for a reason and some cannot" who's to say what's what? Who's to say that something happened for a reason and who's to say it didn't? There's no holding this thing back and you simply open the flood gates. If the universe can come from absolute nothingness, then we can have no rational inquiry into the situation. We could say that the universe simply popped into exsitence 5 minutes ago, from nothing. I mean how do you draw the line on what can come from nothing? How do you draw the line on what nothing can do or create? All rational inquiry into the nature of exsitence assumes that things which exist have a reason for their existence.

The Principle of Sufficent Reason is assumed by us on a daily basis and if one claims it is false, then where do you draw the line? What non-question begging criteria would you use for saying "No this doesn't need a reason and came from absolutely nothing however this did come from something else and does need a reason"?

4) And what non question begging criteria could we use to say that our experiences are not simply generated by nothing rather then something (the world around us) along with the universe? If a universe, then anything. You open the gates to the complete uselessnes of rational thought as a guide into the nature of reality.


So i think this shows quite clearly that it is a completely irational road to take since it undermines rational thought itself (ratioanl inquiry into the nature of reality) and also because one cannot set a non-question begging criteria as to why our experiences aren't also simply generated by nothing. (along with the universe) As such it undermines any knowledge claims about anything and thus we can know nothing about anything if things can come from non-things. How's that for yeah??

1) I'm going to be blunt here. I think anyone who seriously entertains this idea is simply endorsing what one philosopher has labeled "The Philosophy of Ooops". We can have no rational thought about things which come from nothing, since there is no reason for their existence.
As alluded to above i think it can be shown to be quite irational, since it undermines rational thought itself. It also means we can know nothing about anything.

2) I'd also say it all depends on what you mean by nothing, as to it's rationality. If nothing is an absence of any properties then it would be absurd to suggest that something could come from an absence of such things.

I would argue that this is just pure semantics. It is not a problem of conception. It relies on your binding of the word 'before' to our temporal priority.