Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Thomas Metcalf · 02-04-2003, 12:52 PM

Originally posted by mattbballman :

"Depends on their view of indiviual responsibility. Mine's rather high. Society's as a whole is rather low. I think in many dimensions; most people think in only one at a time."

I can't think of any remotely promising way to argue that secret free willed people chose for every one of those beams to fall down, those pipes to burst, those electrical outlets to shock the children, and for those deadly and painful diseases to afflict them.

Thomas Metcalf · 02-04-2003, 01:11 PM

Originally posted by luvluv :

"Well, is anything other than the UPD really necessary?"

It shouldn't be. But I don't think it really helps much in the case of the orphans; all it seems to do is remind us of the possibility that the security guards are present. But if it really removes our ability to make any such judgment, it seems that we could make the situation as bad as conceivable without allowing us to make such a decision. Suppose it was an infinite number of orphans, and they were all infinitely painfully tortured for all eternity. According to UPD (as construed to apply to the non-deductive arguments), you still wouldn't be able to infer that the security guards probably weren't there that time.

"Further, I think if your example is to be honest, that some of the children should fall out of the window and die, others go on to have fruitful and meaningful relationships with the guards (at a distance, somehow) and eventually go on to live fulfilling lives."

I don't think that's necessary. God is everywhere, so even if such horrible instances are only locally rather than globally analogous, any local analogue could be said to "become" global. That is, the orphanage case is applicable to any major disaster, or even just the cross-section of the population who suffer horrible pain.

"It's just a blatant appeal to emotion, in my book."

That's what's necessary to illuminate the jump from (1) and (2) to (3). We make similar leaps all the time, as in the moths case.

"Why not use full blown Christian theology as the thought experiment?"

The theist is perfectly capable of applying it to the orphanage example. Maybe the security guards were there, but it was really better for the orphans that they all die that way. Maybe there was a really powerful evil guy hanging around who made all that happen, and the security guards decided to let him run amok for some inscrutable reason. You can append "maybes" all you want, but look for yourself, honestly, at whether you think they make it seem any more likely that the security guards were around instead of on vacation.

No matter how many possible mitigating circumstances you add, they seem to produce the same increase in probability to either side, if you take my meaning. That is, the security guards' presence is consistent with the situation no matter how many of these additions you make. And you have to grant that the horrible events are more likely on the hypothesis that the security guards were on vacation -- aren't they? Or does the security guards' presence produce absolutely no guarantee that the children will be protected, in which case, what's the point of having them around at all?

"I would say that there are probably no moths in your closet, or that they are dead or molting or something. But I couldn't say that there definitely were no moths in the closet with objective certainty."

Of course you can't; I'm not asking for you to do the same with God either. I'm just saying it's more likely than not that the moths weren't in that particular closet, it's more likely than not that the security guards were on vacation at the time, and it's more likely than not that God doesn't exist.

luvluv · 02-04-2003, 01:36 PM

Couldn't the same "more likely than not" argument be made for realities that support the existence of God? Couldn't it apply to the cosmological or the teleological arguments as well? Or to the argument from religious belief? If the absence or presence of evil were the only evidence available for us to discern the existence of God, then these "more likely than not" examples could be profitable. But it isn't, so they are not. The problem of evil would only be sufficient to eliminate belief in God if it functioned as a sound disproof. But the fact that it only yields (to some people, in a totally subjective fashion) a "probably not" does not mean that "God probably does not exist". There is more evidence for and against God's existence than the existence of evil in the world, and if all the P.O.E. can do (for some people in a totally subjective way) is produce a "probably not", then this "probably not" gathered together with all the other "probably not's" must be weighed against the "probably so's" before anyone can come to any such far reaching conclusion as "God probably doesn't exist."

And even then you could very easily be wrong.

I'm sorry, in the end I just don't see the point of this exercise. Is this a typical exercise in philosophy? Is this kind of thing encouraged?

Thomas Metcalf · 02-04-2003, 02:14 PM

Originally posted by luvluv :

"Couldn't the same 'more likely than not' argument be made for realities that support the existence of God?"

I hope not.

Sure, maybe it could. I encourage anyone to try for it. But in my experience, it hasn't happened. No one could say that the best explanation for the world's existence is that God exists, I don't think, and defend it cogently. Or that more likely than not, God exists. I mean, these are the force of most of the contemporary arguments for God's existence.

I agree totally that we have to sum up the probablies and the probably nots and in the end figure out which side has more probabilistic support. Arguments from evil, unless they're deductive (and these have largely been abandoned), won't be able to answer a deductive argument for God's existence. Deductive arguments trump everything. But here, as is the case with most things, there just isn't one available for either side. (At least, not one based on the Problem of Evil.)

In fact, positive probabilistic evidence for God's existence will provide reason to doubt the evidential arguments from evil. Evidence that God exists is evidence that all the suffering we observe is not in fact gratuitous. My default position for this post has been that there is no sound deductive or evidential argument for the conclusion that God exists, and therefore, the scales are even -- until I provide the probabilistic weight of the argument from evil to tip the scales in the "atheism" direction. And it's incumbent on the theist to answer that argument or to provide positive argumentation for her own side that will tip the scales back in the other direction.

So. If the theist can't provide any positive evidence for God's existence, the scales remain tipped in the "probably, no God" direction (if the argument from evil is sound or strong).

"I'm sorry, in the end I just don't see the point of this exercise. Is this a typical exercise in philosophy? Is this kind of thing encouraged?"

It's nice when one has a deductive argument to employ for some conclusion, but it's rare. More often, it's a matter of probabilistic arguments versus other probabilistic arguments. As for these thought experiments, they're intended to make the best explanation really clearly seem to be the best.

Here's a post I made elsewhere recently on the subject...

Quote:

In this post I will present and evaluate three arguments based on the Problem of Evil. I conclude that each has some use for the atheologian's position, but the second and third are far more effective.

I. The Deductive Argument from Evil

(1) If God exists, intense suffering does not exist.
(2) Intense suffering exists.
(3) Therefore, God does not exist.

The only reasonably disputable premise is (1). To avoid the force of (1), the theist must limit God's omnipotence such that God is incapable of maximizing good in the universe without the existence of some intense suffering. Further, the theist must accept that none of the intense suffering in the universe is such that it's (a) preventable and (b) unabsorbed (not required for a greater good). This second consequence has implications for ethics; if God ought not prevent some of this evil, it's not clear why we humans should be trying to prevent it either. After all, every time we try to allow some evil to happen, if it successfully happens, then it's better for the world that it happen -- otherwise, God would have prevented it.

The first of these consequences requires a story about how all of this intense suffering is unpreventable or absorbed. Such stories usually take the form of theodicies, explanations for why intense suffering exist. Yet it's a fairly well accepted position on both sides that none of these theodicies succeeds; a God whose abilities range over the space of the logically possible is certainly able to give humans good souls, knowledge of good and evil, an appreciation of good, and the like, without intense suffering. And to preserve our freedom of action (rather than just our freedom of choice) does not seem to provide a justification for all the intense suffering in the world, especially because so much of it does not seem to be the result of humans' free will decisions. The only recourse for the apologist seems to be the claim that it's still possible that God has a reason for all this suffering, and it's just better that we don't know about it. While this functions to remove the deductive force of this particular argument, it will prove much less effective for the following two.

In addition, to limit God's omnipotence to the logically possible may produce some further conflicts with God's other attributes. But that's a topic for another post.

II. The Evidential Argument from Evil

(4) If God exists, then probably, there won't be as much intense suffering and premature death than there is now.
(5) But there is as much intense suffering and premature death as there is now.
(6) Therefore, probably, God does not exist.

Again, only the first premise is disputable; the second is true analytically. Support for (4) comes from the fact that God, as morally perfect, wouldn't want all this suffering to exist, and as omnipotent, wouldn't have a goal that conflicts with this desire prohibitively. In other words, there is probably some intense suffering and premature death that isn't strictly necessary for a greater good; the world wouldn't be a worse place if, say, 9,999 people died in an earthquake instead of 10,000, or one's grandmother experienced 99 units of suffering before she died of a terminal illness instead of 100 units.

The apologist's only response seems again to be the claim that maybe that extra person and that extra unit of suffering were indeed necessary for a greater good, as is God's refusal to inform us of this fact and the way by which this suffering is necessary. Yet I do not see any obvious way to make such a possibility seem intuitively likely. Sure, it's a possibility, but a simple possibility does not a compelling response make. If there were good reasons to believe that God existed, these would function as good reasons to believe all this suffering is indeed necessary -- but these good reasons have not been forthcoming and I doubt that they will in the near future.

Suppose, however, that one were to accept that this simple possibility is enough to throw away all of our intuitions about how much intense suffering is indeed necessary. Why should we not extend this skeptical defeater to other cases? It seems as if we know that there are nine planets in our solar system. Yet maybe there is actually a tenth planet we just don't know about, and maybe there is a really good reason for God not allowing us to know about this tenth planet. On the other hand, maybe there are no planets at all other than earth, but God is currently allowing us to have the minimum amount of false information about the solar system that we could have. It seems like God could let us know a little bit more without harm to the total goodness in the universe, but according to a close relative of this skeptical defeater, we are in no position to conclude such. Even though there's no plausible story about how letting us know that the other eight planets are illusions would reduce the total goodness in the world, some might say the mere possibility is enough to prevent us from taking our alleged knowledge about the solar system seriously.

I conclude that the only ways to avoid the evidential argument are (a) to provide a plausible positive explanation for the intense suffering in the world, and (b) to assert that we must adopt skepticism with respect to whether, if God exists, we are in a position to know about the way things really are. Choice (a) seems to fail consistently, and choice (b) seems to commit us to extremely damaging skepticism about the world around us. Why ought we not conclude that we have no knowledge whatsoever, because of the mere possibility that God exists and is hiding things from us because that's in our best interests?

III. The Abductive Argument from Evil

(7) There exist widespread intense inscrutable suffering and premature death.
(8) The best explanation for (7) is that God does not exist.
(9) Therefore, probably, God does not exist.

In this argument, only the second premise is disputable. The argument asks the reader to conclude that "there is no God" is a better explanation for (7) than anything the apologist can offer. To bring in the Unknown Purpose Defense to which I alluded in the discussion of the previous two arguments, the apologist's explanation might be "God exists but (i) has hidden reasons for not telling us why suffering is necessary, (ii) hidden reasons for not telling us why (i), (iii) hidden reasons for not telling us why (ii), ..." etc. So the argument asks us to estimate which explanation has the greater probability. What's more likely -- that an omnipotent being has good reasons to allow all this intense suffering and premature death, but just can't tell us about them and can't prevent any of it without subtracting from the greater good, or that this being simply does not exist?

I will provide a thought experiment to try to make the choice clearer. Suppose there is an orphanage in town, and you are told that ten omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect persons work there as security guards and caretakers. These persons only want the best for their young charges and want to protect them from any harm they can. And because they're omnipotent, they have extremely powerful means at their disposal to protect these children. Unfortunately, the entire group seems to take rather unpredictable vacations from their jobs, and during these vacations they do not attempt to protect the orphanage. The contingent of "super security guards" always returns eventually, but it's no simple matter to figure out when they're about to take such a leave of absence.

Now suppose that over the course of a week, every child in the orphanage dies painfully in various preventable accidents and as a result of various curable diseases; that is, these deaths could have been prevented given the knowledge humans have now, but for some reason, the deaths weren't prevented. In addition, most of the children kept a pet bunny or kitten, and all of these animals died painfully as well because of preventable and curable illnesses.

Take stock of your intuitions. What do you think the probability is that these security guards actually were present, versus the probability that they were all on vacation at the time? If you believe you're in a position to estimate such a probability, I think you have no choice but to conclude that the latter seems much more likely. Finally, I believe the analogue with the case of the Problem of Evil is strong; while God never takes vacations, we can simply view this component as an analogue to God's nonexistence. If you think it's more likely that the security guards were on vacation when all this horror went down, I believe you must think it's more likely than not that God does not exist.

I conclude that these arguments indicate that traditional apologetic monotheism is probably false.

Thread Tools	Search this Thread
Show Printable Version	Search this Thread: Advanced Search

02-04-2003, 12:52 PM	#31
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by mattbballman : "Depends on their view of indiviual responsibility. Mine's rather high. Society's as a whole is rather low. I think in many dimensions; most people think in only one at a time." I can't think of any remotely promising way to argue that secret free willed people chose for every one of those beams to fall down, those pipes to burst, those electrical outlets to shock the children, and for those deadly and painful diseases to afflict them.

02-04-2003, 01:11 PM	#32
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by luvluv : "Well, is anything other than the UPD really necessary?" It shouldn't be. But I don't think it really helps much in the case of the orphans; all it seems to do is remind us of the possibility that the security guards are present. But if it really removes our ability to make any such judgment, it seems that we could make the situation as bad as conceivable without allowing us to make such a decision. Suppose it was an infinite number of orphans, and they were all infinitely painfully tortured for all eternity. According to UPD (as construed to apply to the non-deductive arguments), you still wouldn't be able to infer that the security guards probably weren't there that time. "Further, I think if your example is to be honest, that some of the children should fall out of the window and die, others go on to have fruitful and meaningful relationships with the guards (at a distance, somehow) and eventually go on to live fulfilling lives." I don't think that's necessary. God is everywhere, so even if such horrible instances are only locally rather than globally analogous, any local analogue could be said to "become" global. That is, the orphanage case is applicable to any major disaster, or even just the cross-section of the population who suffer horrible pain. "It's just a blatant appeal to emotion, in my book." That's what's necessary to illuminate the jump from (1) and (2) to (3). We make similar leaps all the time, as in the moths case. "Why not use full blown Christian theology as the thought experiment?" The theist is perfectly capable of applying it to the orphanage example. Maybe the security guards were there, but it was really better for the orphans that they all die that way. Maybe there was a really powerful evil guy hanging around who made all that happen, and the security guards decided to let him run amok for some inscrutable reason. You can append "maybes" all you want, but look for yourself, honestly, at whether you think they make it seem any more likely that the security guards were around instead of on vacation. No matter how many possible mitigating circumstances you add, they seem to produce the same increase in probability to either side, if you take my meaning. That is, the security guards' presence is consistent with the situation no matter how many of these additions you make. And you have to grant that the horrible events are more likely on the hypothesis that the security guards were on vacation -- aren't they? Or does the security guards' presence produce absolutely no guarantee that the children will be protected, in which case, what's the point of having them around at all? "I would say that there are probably no moths in your closet, or that they are dead or molting or something. But I couldn't say that there definitely were no moths in the closet with objective certainty." Of course you can't; I'm not asking for you to do the same with God either. I'm just saying it's more likely than not that the moths weren't in that particular closet, it's more likely than not that the security guards were on vacation at the time, and it's more likely than not that God doesn't exist.

02-04-2003, 01:36 PM	#33
luvluv Veteran Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: Planet Lovetron Posts: 3,919	Couldn't the same "more likely than not" argument be made for realities that support the existence of God? Couldn't it apply to the cosmological or the teleological arguments as well? Or to the argument from religious belief? If the absence or presence of evil were the only evidence available for us to discern the existence of God, then these "more likely than not" examples could be profitable. But it isn't, so they are not. The problem of evil would only be sufficient to eliminate belief in God if it functioned as a sound disproof. But the fact that it only yields (to some people, in a totally subjective fashion) a "probably not" does not mean that "God probably does not exist". There is more evidence for and against God's existence than the existence of evil in the world, and if all the P.O.E. can do (for some people in a totally subjective way) is produce a "probably not", then this "probably not" gathered together with all the other "probably not's" must be weighed against the "probably so's" before anyone can come to any such far reaching conclusion as "God probably doesn't exist." And even then you could very easily be wrong. I'm sorry, in the end I just don't see the point of this exercise. Is this a typical exercise in philosophy? Is this kind of thing encouraged?

Freethought & Rationalism Archive

The archives are read only.