Prof,
Thanks. I want to follow this up with a question based on your comments....
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Originally Posted by Prof
Remember that here we have been discussing the nature of morality not necessarily the nature of God. The euthyphro dilemma only points out
that deriving morality from the commands of God possess dilemmas for the nature of morality.
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I understand this. What I am trying to do is ground "what God Commands" not in ""what is good to do" but instead in "What God's ultimate desire is." I am trying to explore the possibility that a non-moral reason can be given as to why God does as He does (including the making of moral laws for humans). So rather than saying that God does things because those things are inherently worthy of being done in any way (becasue that would be giving reasons as to why that thing is good apart from God's decree), that instead, God does those things because they are the best way for Him to accomplish what He is trying to accomplish. This converts the idea of what is "moral" or "right" (in terms of God's actions) to what is useful. For example, when I say that I use a hammer to hit a nail instead of a sponge because the hammer is the "right" (or even "good") tool for the job. I am not saying that a hammer has any moral goodness, I am simply saying that it is the best tool for a task. It has utilitarian value that is seperate from moral value.
I know its a task....but roll with me here for a moment.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Prof
Actually it IS a reason. The proposition "Desires are the only reasons for actions that exist" is one that I find compelling. If there were no desire for X, what possible reason could there be for any action regarding X? (Reason - the faculty - helps us decide what actions will fulfill desires). That happens to be a specific tenet of Desire Utilitarianism that I'm pointing out...but for the moment that's simply a point of interest: I don't need to defend it...I'm just going to watch your argument for consistency.
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Good. I think I am trying to say something similar to this. I am trying to say that God makes commands based on a desire (to have relationship with a free willled people) that have no moral reasons necessarily. I am not saying that God thinks that relationships are good things in a moral sense, and therefore He wants more of them. I am just starting with the desire.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Prof
Now, as I read your response I see that, I suspect unnoticed by you, it is rife through with implicit judgements about what is "good."
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This is exactly what I need pointed out to me. Can you be more specific. If I say that God desires relationship with a free willed people, and so then has a reason to make a free willed person, an earth for them to live on, makes evil so there is a choice to reject God, etc... none of these "reasons" for actions are morally based...they are strictly utilitarian towards the end goal of relationship with a free willed people. So God does not command "I am the Lord your God, have none other" because it is morally wrong to worship other God's (apart from His command as defined by this horn), but because it defines an action that leads us away from why we are here - which is to be in relationship with God. So God declares moral rules that need no intrinsic MORAL reasons for being, but may have utilitarian reasons that drive men towards the goal of relationship with him.
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Originally Posted by Prof
You have therefore rejected that what is good depends on the REASONS for it being good (this would restrict what God could morally command, from an outside standard of "reason").].
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Correct. There are no moral reasons for defining good. That is not my assertion.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Prof
Therefore, attempting to even find reasons for God's commands is a non-sequitur, or useless to the dilemma you face. What is the use of finding reasons, good or bad, for what God commands IF WHAT IS GOOD IS NOT DERIVED FROM THE REASONS IT IS COMMANDED?].
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I am not so sure about this. If I contextualize why God does something in a non-moral foundation, then God can have reasons for his actions that are non-moral. And then God can use morality (as defined by the second horn)as a tool for an end. I struggle with this idea that because God doesn't have a moral reason for doing a thing, that He therefore has NO reason for doing it. Can there be a non-moral reason for actions?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Prof
You are trying to have it both ways: God doesn't need reasons to make his commands good..."oh, but by the way, God is also rational and here are some reasons why He would make the commands he does..."].
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Right...I am not trying to say that God does X (action such as declaring a moral law) because X is good. I am saying that God does X because X is the best way to get Y (desire fulfilled). Am I explaining the difference? As we agree, on this horn there is no point in trying to defend why God does anything. I am just attempting to make His actions then not necessarily random by providing a non-moral context (the fulfilling of a beginning desire)that is coherent.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Prof
There's also some special pleading waiting in your argument about trying to justify what God chooses to do via appealing to God's desires. Taking that route implies a moral theory that what one "ought" to do - morality being what we ought to do - derives from desires.
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I see this issue. I am not trying to justify God's actions - merely trying to describe how an intital desire can lead to a set of actions that would logically follow. The morality of those actions is not the issue (again - using a hammer isn't good - but the hammer is the best tool to drive the nail). On this horn, the morality of anything is purely a function derived from God's commands. On this horn, murder is wrong for people to do only because God says so. And God's reason for declaring murder wrong has nothing to do with the nature of what murder entails, instead, it is about whether murder accomplishes God's goals or not.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Prof
Better, in my view, to choose the other one: What is good is established by the reasons for it being good.
Then you can at least say "God being All Knowing would know the reasons for why any X is good, hence, lacking God's omniscient knowledge, we ought to defer to God on moral questions."  |
Sounds like the mysterioous ways defense to me. ;-) HA. I just want to make sure I have chased down every rabbit hole on this path first. OR is it a squirrel hole?
09-30-2008, 07:49 AM
a follow up
