gurugeorge

OK, I see the distinction you're making. But I don't think the MJ interpretation in general necessarily requires a sort of genetic link between the real Mystery religions, Egyptian religion, etc., and the origins of Christianity.

Put it this way, it's quite conceivable, in a rationalistic perspective, that (say) people involved in the (real) Mysteries, (real) Egyptian religion, (real) Merkabah mysticism, etc., etc., had somewhat analogous experiences, and in places like Alexandria where they were rubbing shoulders with each other, could see that essentially they were all talking about similar (or very closely related) experiences (perhaps mystical experiences, or lucid dreaming experiences, or "astral" visions - all in-principle-explainable in contemporary Western biological or psychological terms). An Egyptian priest might chat with a Jewish mystic and say "ah yes, that thing you're talking about there, that experience, or that "angel" X, sounds pretty much like our "deity" Y."

There need be no actual historical influence, just a mutual recognition of similarity or analogy by "professionals", so to speak, in a "melting pot" situation, and a loose, easy swapping of terms.

Of course, this doesn't make life easy for us now, trying to understand what went on then, but them's the breaks!

Celsus

It's possible, but the level of contact and deep understanding is just speculation. Penglase identifies the Homeric Hymn to Demeter as the key influence on Plutarch's On Isis and Osiris, and if he is correct, we can forget about Plutarch altogether (he also argues for a thematic continuity between the Demeter and Inanna myths via oral tradition--this is where the parallel's at. It is standardly accepted that the Isis-Demeter conflation arrives early on (by Herodotus among others, who believed Greek gods came from Egypt, as I mentioned earlier), for whatever reasons. Obviously, the original Egyptian myth of Osiris' death and journey to the underworld is nothing like the Greek version. However, the cult of Demeter arrives in Egypt after Alexander the Great, and its influence on Egyptian practice (imagine if you were a conquered Egyptian and realised that the fool Greeks believed Isis and their supreme mother goddess were the same--the leverage from playing along would be too good to pass up) is very likely.

Now I'm sounding like a conspiracy theorist. How cool.

Joel

gurugeorge

Heh. That's the trouble, with a lot of this stuff. In lieu of "smoking guns" (e.g. a note from Eusebius saying he forged the Testimonium Flavium) you're just matching plausibility against plausibility, and my plausibilities are always more plausible than yours

But you can see contemporary mystics from different living traditions getting on with each other, and seeing commonalities in their stuff (I'm thinking of a recent dialogue I saw between a Tibetan Buddhist and a Hindu Advaitin), so I think it's extremely likely in places like Alexandria in them thar days. Practitioners of these things are always much less doctrinaire than ideologues.

Anyway, I just wanted to flag the idea that genetic or historical connections aren't absolutely necessary to support the MJ thesis, and while I agree that getting clear on what, exactly, the separate religions were really about in those days is an important part of these investigations (especially before positing influences), it's not such a great disproof if such "hard" connections can't be found. There's plenty of wiggle room.

badger3k

I can't find what I was looking for online, so I have to refer to an older book, "History Begins at Sumer: Thirty-Nine Firstts in Recorded History" by Samuel Noah Kramer, pub 1956, rev 1981, University of Pennsylvania Press. This link should lead to it here. It has an overview and translation of some fragments of the story. Pages 154-167 have the tale. The relevant parts (after Innanna is raised) start on pg 163 :

"Inanna is about to ascend from the nether world,
The Anunnaki seized her (saying):
"Who of those who have descended to the nether world ever
ascends unharmed from the nether world!
If Inanna would ascend from the nether world,
Let her give someone as her substitute."

Inanna ascends from the nether world,
The small demons like shukur-reeds,
The large demons like dubban-reeds,
Held on to her side.

{there is more description here, but irrelevant to the matter at hand. The author then gives a short description of what happened next:}

Inanna proceeds to the two Sumerian cities Umma and Badtibira, whose two deities prostrate themselves before her and are thus saved from the clutches of the demons. Then she arrives at the city Kullab, whose titulary deity is Dumuzi. The poem continues:

Dumuzi put on a noble robe, he sat high on (his) seat.
The demons seized him by his thighs....,
The seven (demons) rush at him as at the side of a sick man,
The shepherds play not the flute or pipe before him.

She (Inanna) fastened the eye upon him, the eye of death,
Spoke the word against him, the word of wrath,
Uttered the cry against him, the cry of guilt:
"As for him, carry him off."
The pure Inanna gave the shepherd Dumuzi into their hands.

{more description of the "demons"}

Dumuzi wept, his face turned green,
Toward heaven to (the sun-god) Utu he lifted his hand:
{more minor details on how he tries to escape, then the tablet ends}

The translation is probably not as good as more current and knowledgeable translations, since the author describes the dificulty that producing this translation went through (the original idea was that Dumuzi went to the underworld first, not that he was sent there by Inanna). He also uses "hung on a nail" as the method of death, and that the two servants give "water of life" and "food of life" (his quotes).

I can't see how going to cities can be anything but going to them on earth. I wasn't aware that the Sumerians had any concept like future cultures, that earthly things were replicated in some other realm. Everything I read seems to imply that what is on earth is on earth, and only there. If anyone has any opposing information, I'd appreciate it.

Richard Carrier

I am not following the whole thread, someone just called my attention to one point: that the text suggests Inanna did spend some time on earth, and was not incarnated "in" hell but travelled there.

Re-examining the texts, I have to agree. So I stand corrected on that point. The parallel between the Inanna tale we have and Doherty's theory consists solely of the death and resurrection not taking place on earth.

In fact, on reflection I think it is anachronistic for me even to put a Platonic interpretation on Sumerian texts--the Sumerians almost certainly believed that hell was literally under the ground and therefore a part of the earth. The Platonic notion of heaven and hell arises, of course, only after 400 BC. Thus, we would need to know how the Inanna cycle was interpreted in the 1st century BC/AD, which would certainly have been different than in the tablets, but in what respects can't be known. We don't have any texts from the Tanit cult or any of the cults that derived from the Inanna tradition.

This is another example of my chief complaints against Doherty: though his theory is plausible, it is not proven. He lacks the kind of evidence he needs to secure his case as probable. All he has accomplished is to develop a theory that is consistent with all the evidence. His theory does have other merits besides that, and he does have the Platonic interpretation of the Osiris cycle as a precedent (so he doesn't need Inanna), but his theory does not have the kind of direct evidence I (and other professional historians) would need to be convinced. He also lacks precedent, I think, for "born of the seed of David" or "born of a woman" as a spiritual metaphor, which I think is the largest problem he faces. But maybe he has said more on that than is in his book. I confess I don't follow his work online.

Celsus

Thanks for your input, Richard. I wonder what either yourself or Doherty have to say about parallelism in general?

Joel

Ted Hoffman

Joel,
I have to thank you for your fine criticism. The landscape is shifting. I am having fun 'moderating' this whole 'debate' and may now bring in Robert Price. That would make it very colourful.

But first, you have brought out fine details of the Inanna myth that are interesting. And you have correctly faulted Carrier on missing some of these fine points, or for "glossing" over them as you put it.

But these details that you are hammering on may make us lose sight of the big picture, and I do not find them necessary because what we are interested in is the forest. I will come back to this shortly.

I take issue with your over-literalization of the points Carrier and Doherty have made, and your fixation with clear proofs of genetic origin - or of plagiarization of Egyptian mythology into Christian theology.

Plutarch's very loose borrowing of certain elements of the Egyptian Osiris and using them to craft his own, totally different one, shows that your rigour and level of proof is misplaced and is not cognizant of the loose and arbitrary structure of the borrowing we are looking at. The comparison between Roman Mithraism and Persian Mithraism comes to mind with the former being almost totally different and independent from the latter, its antecedent.

Doherty will not join the discussion but had occasion to share some of his thoughts on the ongoing discussion via private correspondence with me. I have taken the liberty to share some of it here.

I admit error on my part about Inanna looking for Dumuzi in the netherworld and not on earth and for combining AoI and Inanna to demonstrate the same point. It also appears that Carrier did make the claims you accused him of making.
He has admitted fault and has moved closer to the position that "Doherty should indeed provide more proof" although its clear that there is still plenty of room for manoeuvre - you have suggested they stick to Platonism. Carrier has also indicated that Inanna is not necessary for Doherty.

That ("I have always told Doherty he needs...") leaves the ball in Doherty's court since Carrier has made no clear commitment to Doherty's thesis. His ambivalence, is what, Doherty has characterized facetiously as "a failure of nerve" as per Gilbert Murray's Five Stages of Greek Religion .

I do not know if the rest of you have noticed that Carrier has stated that Doherty's theory makes the most sense (ABE), and yet Carrier has consistently stated it doesn't meet this and that proof requirement.

I am sure Carrier will soon explain his position because it seems, at least to me, that he cannot have it both ways. I have analyzed Carrier's nuanceology [for lack of a better word] with great interest and wanted to write a paper on his several nuances - like "this is correct, but doesn't prove that..." "this fits very well with the evidence, but doesn't prove that..." "this proves that, but it doesnt rule out..." "this means Doherty's interpretation is correct, but his theory is not thereby secured".

Severally. Maybe it is because I haven't read so many books, but I have never seen any writing with so many dimensions and angles like when Carrier reviews Doherty.

As Doherty writes in his response to Muller, "The paradigm is whole. It spells, I maintain, the failure and invalidity of agnosticism on the question of Jesus' existence. If we can't make a choice based on balance of probability in a case like this, we will never commit ourselves to anything."

But I digress...Joel asked "So what?" That was a very important question because it questioned the purpose of showing Inanna's example and its relevance to the arguments being made. He also wanted Doherty's thoughts on the parallels. To these, the response is below.

Holding's criticism ("Copycat saviour Figure") is that the dying and rising godmen have fundamental differences. Of course they do.

The argument is not that Jesus was a xerox copy of the other dying and rising saviour figures. And I will not argue that Christians made up the Jesus figure by necessarily copying from them.

I will repeat here what I posted recently. If we take as an example, Asclepius was son of a God and mortal woman. He lived as a demigod (son of Apollo), healed many and raised people from death. We was killed by Zeus for blasphemy (raising the dead) but was resurrected and made immortal. From heaven, he would appear to his believers on earth.

Robert Price says, "Ideal types, as Bryan Wilson observes, are not Procrustean boxes into which phenomena must fit or be forced to fit. Rather they are yardsticks distilled from common features, yardsticks employed in turn to measure and make sense of the features the phenomena do not have in common. The differences are just as important as the similarities, which is why it is needful to study the various phenomena (in this case, ancient miracle-workers and inspired sages) each in its own right. Each is unique, but what they have in common with the other recognizable members of the same class will help us understand where they differ and why. Thus it is not helpful in studying the gospels to cross "Divine Men" off the list for gospel study either because the proposed members of the class are not all alike (as Jack Dean Kingsbury wants to do in The Christology of Mark's Gospel) or because there are also other elements besides that of the Divine Man in the gospels. Theodore J. Weeden (Mark: Traditions in Conflict) shows how Mark both presupposes and critiques the Christology of Jesus as a theios aner."

And before you launch to apples and oranges, Price adds: "...genres evolve precisely by means of "transgression" of genre conventions. What we are seeing in the Christian rewriting of Septuagint stories as Jesus stories is something like a mutant strain of what was happening over in the cousin religion of Rabbinic Judaism. An apple is not an orange. Neither is a tangerine, but it is helpful to compare a tangerine to an orange if you are trying to describe a tangerine. More helpful than comparing it to an apple or to saying it is like nothing else."

Doherty writes:This topic is huge and I am away from my desk. Lets see your take on this Joel.

Celsus

Well this amount of attention is flattering to say the least...

Jacob, it will take me a while to reply to all this, as there is a lot there. I'd just like a quick word on Lévi-Strauss' structuralism, but I fear that I won't have many good things to say about it. Doherty's influence is clear when he writes:
This of course is the same as Lévi-Strauss' concern to expand from the "scientific" study of myth to reach for "universals" of the human mind. That is why he wasn't bothered by the details of the myth, but the structure. The level at which he studied them was also influenced by Drumézil and Malinowski, which is at a functionalist level: what do the myths do? And he worked this out by analysing a "deep structure" of mythemes (discreet units within a myth) that allowed for comparison. This co-opted the Saussurean insight that signs and signifiers were distinct from the signified, and he attempted to reach for the latter level. In demonstrating the latter, he believed he could find this binary opposition within myths that makes them work.

The influence of J.G. Frazer was obvious as well, hence seasonal cycles, dying-and-rising gods and the whole gamut were thrown in. But we've left this behind somewhat, not least because of deconstruction and poststructuralist critiques. More important (to me) is the failure at the level of the details--both Wittgenstein and Leach pointed out that these "mythemes" are often as much a part of the mythologist's mind as it is "objectively" deduced. The "signified"--mythemes--of Lévi-Strauss are theoretical constructs not available for proof or disproof. It is the same when (sorry) Carrier's original post characterised "hung" as "crucified" (why must we accept that "crucified" is what is signified?). There is a deep, intrinsic relativism at this level that isn't solved by the structuralist impulse to "deduce" mythemes from the text.

So it's very strange that we should be invoking Lévi-Strauss at this juncture. Details do matter, because we are (I am) looking at the myth from an evolutionary point of view (as I believe those attempting to establish context for Christian origins are as well), not trying to replicate the failed project of searching for universals in the human mind. Girard, whom I'm sure Price can tell us all about, has his own alternative to structuralism, but while structuralism has failed, not much else has taken its place, hence the difficulties in putting in a decisive rebuttal.

Secondly, a quick glance at Thompson's interpretation of the Inanna myth presupposes much of the seasonal cycle motifs that Frazer came up with, but is now universally discredited (it is not at all clear that Inanna's descent is in winter, for instance). The ritual aspect of the myth is very well attested through comparison with other texts, where Inanna's journey is physically replicated by travel (metaphorical or real) between Sumerian cities. Was this also interpreted seasonally? Probably, but it can't be assumed. I've warned you about this before Jacob: there is no automatic connection between ritual and myth (this is a fundamental assumption of Frazer, Gaster, Cumont, et al), and I see no indication that Inanna descends in "winter", nor that ancient Sumer experienced dry winters (typically Mediterranean climates have rainy winters, though I'm aware of the dangers of extrapolating this too far in the past). The post-Saussurean (Derrida et al) critique that separates signs and signifiers from the signified (indeed destroying any attempts at a reconnection) makes Lévi-Strauss et al's work obsolete.

I hope this makes it clear that the structuralist approach to mythology is difficult to support. Well I guess that wasn't a quick word after all, but myth is a very complicated subject, depending on the level you want to take it to. My apologies for losing the forest from the trees, but we need to ascertain whether or not this really is a tree before we decide we're in a forest.

Joel

zaitzeff

I haven't read Doherty's book. However, this is my reply to what I understand of it, or, at least, to the MJ theory:

Paul tells us but little of the actual Jesus of history, but the little he tells establishes that Jesus existed as an actual person.

The reason is that Paul speaks of Jacob as the brother of the Lord
and he speaks of the Lord's brothers in I Cor 9. Paul does not speak of himself, of Peter or Apollos or anyone else in this fashion. Modern Christians do not speak of "John the brother of the Lord," or "Peter the brother of God,"
or "David Zaitzeff the brother of God" ha, ha, and the whole phrase would sound blasphemous to Christian ears. The phrase sounds blasphemous to 1st century Jewish ears, too! So, there was something special and unique about Jacob and a few others, something that made them "the Lord's brother." Was is that if not that they were physical kin to Jesus, born to Mary? And, the one person who uses the phrase uses it in the very context that makes us sure he did not regard being "the Lord's brother" as an infallibly wise or righteous person or source!

Paul tells us almost nothing about the life of Jesus. Wow! But Julian of Norwich tells us about as much about herself as Paul tells us about Jesus. And, Julian does this in a autobiographical book of 86 chapters! The first woman to write a book in the English language, so far as we know, and what do we know about Julian herself from her book? That she had a mom, that she got sick at age 30, that she saw Jesus who told her various and sundry things, including, "I love you, really, lots," that her mom and a priest visited her when she was sick and about to die. You know, some people believe that we don't even know Julian's actual first name! We could use the method of Doherty to establish the hypothesis of the Mythic Julian of Norwich. All we would need to do is to ascribe the book to someone named something other than Julian . . . who has chosen to write a fictious account of Jesus saying and doing some things the church says were false and heretical:
1) God would save all people (see the short text, this is obscured in the long text);
2) God would reward people for their sins;
3) God has no anger or blame toward us sinners;
4) God does all things we do (this would include acts of killing and sex outside of marriage and everything else we do contrary to the Ten Biggies.)
5) Implying in a vision supposedly from God that Christ fell with Adam.

Well, are we sure that Julian was not a Cathar or some other heretic? Was she really an anchoress in England?

A revisionist like Doherty could examine this and say, "Of course, Julian never existed. We don't even know her name. And, if she had existed, she would have been burned as a heretic. Since she wasn't, Julian never existed."

Doherty says,
If Jesus said and did what the synoptics say he said and did, why did Paul not quote Jesus to establish his points? Well, Paul does quote Jesus to establish his points: 3 times. And, it increasingly appears that a lot of what
"Jesus said and did as reported by the synoptics" is not in fact what Jesus said and did. If the synoptic writers made up a bunch of their Jesus, then, naturally, Paul could not quote Jesus as depicted by them to establish his points. Consider, unclean foods. Is it more likely both that Jesus had explicitly repealed kosher food law and that Paul knew Jesus had repealed the kosher food law (something of which Jacob seems very ignorant), or that Mark puts in the mouth of Jesus words that are very convenient for the reader of Paul? If Jesus had repealed the kosher food law while he was alive, why is there no controversy story about that between him and some Pharisees, or him and the disciples? Instead of reading in Mark, "They grumbled at him because the disciples ate food with unwashed hands . . ." how about, "They were very upset at him because and he and the disciples were eating pork and shellfish!" If Mark and Mt made up stuff, how could Paul, who wrote earlier than they did, have known what Mark and Matthew would later make up? How can Paul be held accountable for not quoting it? And, would Paul even have wished to quote Mark or Matthew or anyone else (say, some person like Jacob or Peter), even if he had an inkling that the people telling him Jesus stories were making things up and adding to them things that they themselves believed?

Remember, it was common among the Jews to make up stuff and attribute it to the beloved founder of one's group or some other supposed wise person. Is it possible Paul knew this? And, if so, is it possible that the Greek-thinking Paul used a degree of Greek skepticism on everything Jacob or Peter said to him? Suppose Jacob (or Peter) has been telling Paul stories about Jesus, and also that Jacob has also caused Peter and Barnabas and other Jewish Christians to abandon fellowship at dinner with Gentile Christians. Does anyone believe that Paul is going to give a lot of credence to all Jacob's "Jesus stories," (including "Jesus always ate kosher!!") even if he is willing to believe and repeat some? After the incident of Galatians 2, is it not possible that Paul says to himself, "I am not quite sure I believe anything Jacob has been saying about Jesus; I am not sure Peter remembers or understands things right either."?

And, given the Jewish ability to make up stories, and the controversy we know to have actually existed (see Galatians 2 and II Cor 10-13) isn't it reasonable that "Yes, Virginia, some people made up Jesus stories and told them," but that the Jesus stories being made up were not pro/con his existing on earth, but
1) whether or not he made all foods clean;
2) what he thought of his brothers and the disciples (unbelievers and clods!);
3) whether he walked on water;
4) whether he cleansed the temple;
5) etc!

Now, let us consider
8 None of the rulers of this age understood it, for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.

But crucifixion was specifically a Roman punishment at this time. Crucifixion was not a Jewish punishment or a Greek punishment. Doherty would have us suppose that Paul (or some anonymous person or persons of great religious genius) goes to the trouble to invent an imaginary spirit world where a mythic Jesus (a mythic Jew, who is servant to mythic other Jews!!) lives and dies. And, how does he die? In the good old Roman way: crucifixion! Hum! Some lack of imagination on Paul's part, we see! For although Paul (or someone or someones) has invented this new spiritual realm, and imagined a Jewish "son of David" to die in it, their very Jewish "son of David" doesn't manage to die in any of the normal Jewish ways! After all, if this is some Jewish myth, why not have Jesus stoned to death, since that, and not crucifixion, is a prescribed form of Jewish execution? Or, why not just pass away peacefully, and then rise from the dead? No, Paul insists and insists, Jesus was CRUCIFIED.

So, Paul says that Jesus was crucified. Is that because, perhaps, actual Romans were involved? And, perhaps because, actual Romans actually crucified people? Paul or some anonymous persons made up an imaginary spiritual realm where imaginary people live and die, and how unfortunate, but the method of death they use is crucifixion?

If Jesus dies only in someone's imagination, why is CRUCIFIXION writ large in every letter of Paul?

Paul tells us but little about the actual life of Jesus. Well, Rumi the Persian poet tells us but little about the actual life of Mohammed! Why is that? For, Rumi believed in the prophet Mohammed! Well, he lived later than Mohammed and what is more important, Rumi believed he was experiencing God directly! So, rather than to tell us about Mohammed, Rumi tells us about God!

Josephus: Antiquites 20.9.1

Festus was now dead, and Albinus was but upon the road; so he assembled the sanhedrim of judges, and brought before them the brother of Jesus, who was called Christ, whose name was James, and some others; and when he had formed an accusation against them as breakers of the law, he delivered them to be stoned:

Amaleq13

That Paul apparently feels compelled to assert that Jesus was born of a woman and was of Jewish descent suggests that these were not obvious facts which is odd, to say the least, if we also assume he was the brother of a Jew of "high reputation".

Paul speaks of many Christians as "brother" or "brethren" so it is not clear whether adding "of the Lord" signifies a reference to literal siblingship or if the former is simply a shorter version of a general reference to certain fellow Christians. Given that Paul wishes to establish himself as having equal authority to James and the other apostles, why would he feel compelled to choose to offer this singularly special identification when it does not appear required by the context and utterly defeats this purpose if intended literally?

If that were the case, we would expect Paul to avoid any such reference to them just as he, presumably, carefully avoids any reference to the fact certain of the disciples were former followers of the living Jesus.

That, alone, should suggest that it either isn't original or doesn't mean what you think it does.

At least one of those "quotes" is explicitly from the risen Christ rather than a living Jesus and the same is arguably true of the others.

It had been a specifically Roman punishment for at least a couple centuries prior to Paul's letters. Paul's theology emphasizes the horrible nature of the sacrifice and there was probably no other method of execution that had a more horrible nature than crucifixion.

This is an inaccurate characterization of Doherty's thesis. Paul is not thought to have invented the spiritual realm in which Jesus was executed. He is clearly described as having learned this concept from earlier beliefs.

This phrase ("who was called Christ") has been argued, in several other threads and on independent grounds, to be an interpolation. It seems more likely that the Jesus mentioned here is actually the same Jesus mentioned in subsequent paragraphs rather than the guy in the Gospel story.