Clutch

So it's "Cluth", now, is it?

Naw, just kidding. I was totally wrong on the name thing, and withdraw my point (4) to Robert unreservedly. But I want you to know that I had a BLT for lunch for that very reason.

In any case, "slimy little fuck" is an utterly unacceptable form of address. I would never say such a thing -- having no evidence as to your size.

blt to go

ClutCh - Sorry Must have been a freudian slip

Cross Examiner

I'll rephrase my main question. Does some proponent p for the inerrancy of some text t assume the burden of proving the inerrancy of t given the presence of 'surface anomalies' in t? If so, why? Surely someone here is informed on the matter. Then again ...

<cue cricket noise>

Regards,
BGic

Clutch

What do you suppose has gone unanswered, at this point?

RobertLW

Blt to go,

I am disappointed that you feel that way, I was hoping for a very good discussion with you.

Gentleman,

Please allow me to strip this down to the very basic parts.

The definition of inerrancy that Vinnie elected to use during our debate was the Chicago Statement. In it's most simplistic terms, that statement says that the Bible is true. Therefore, this is the question that we are asking:

Is the Bible true or is the Bible not true? (Hang on to this question for a second)

If we ask ourselves if there is a God, there are only three options available by way of an answer.

A. There is no God.
B. There is a God but he has not revealed himself to us.
C. There is a God and he has revealed himself to us.

Now, we have all already picked one. All three are presumptions. They are presumptions because there is no empirical data to prove ANY of them. Therefore, we must use reason to justify why we picked the option we picked. When we pick one, this becomes our ultimate presupposition. The ultimate answer to the ultimate question; is there a God?

Now, let's ask ourselves the question. Is the Bible true or is the Bible not true? There are only three possible answers based on our selection above:

A. There is no God, therefore the Bible cannot be true.
B. There is a God but he has not revealed himself to us, therefore the Bible cannot be true.
C. There is a God and he has revealed himself to us, therefore the Bible can only be true.

The only way to validate the answer to the question of whether or not the Bible is true is to validate our ultimate presupposition. Which presupposition justifies all that we find and use in this world? (i.e. universals, empirical data....etc...)

I have chosen option C. Since I have chosen option C, I MUST presume the verity of the Biblical authors. If someone chooses options A or B they CANNOT presume the verity of the Biblical authors. Thus, I will treat the text differently than someone who has chosen options A or B and debating specific text is useless. Therefore, when we get into a discussion on whether or not the Bible is true, we MUST FIRST validate our ultimate presumptions.

When I said that "my presumption is my argument", the simplified version is, "if you start with my ultimate presupposition you will come to this conclusion".

I cannot strip this down any more than I just have.

At this point, I would like to invite anyone to e-mail me if they wish to discuss. All I ask is for you to be honest and open to cross-examination.

Thank you to all for discussing this with me and I apologize if I have offended anyone.

Robert

Cross Examiner

I asked why is it presumed that the inerrantist has the burden of proving inerrancy given 'surface anomalies'? You seem to believe that it is because the existence of 'surface anomalies', whatever those are, in the text are somehow tantamount to a 'defeasible appearance of flaws', which, if given for argument's sake, amounts to a prima facie case against inerrancy which, somehow, obliges one to take the default stance of errancy, over neutrality, such that the inerrantist position assumes the burden of proving the verity of inerrancy. Where does this criterion for determining the burden come from? What is the precedent for using this criterion? Why is neutrality not addressed? Who does Number Two work for?

RobertLW, for what it is worth, I agree with you that the divide between theist and atheist here is not so much hermeneutical/exegetical as it is philosophical.

Regards,
BGic

Clutch

No. If you are going to mix metaphysical and epistemic possibilities, there are four outcomes: (A) should read, "There is no god and the evidence suggests this", and (A`) should be added as well, reading, "There is no god, but the evidence suggests otherwise." And for parity, your remarks in (B) and (C) about revelation should be replaced with the more inclusive notion of there being evidence.


This is by turns false and even incoherent. Unless by "picked" you mean, "arrived at a conclusion by considering the evidence", it is false that "we all" have picked a position on this question. The various options are not presumptions, therefore -- or need not be -- since they issue, or can issue, from reasoning on the evidence. What standard of proof is needed for (A)? Nothing more exotic than the standard by which I believe (justifiedly, in my view, but feel free to disagree!) that there exist no backwards-flying horses who solve calculus puzzles while delivering pizza to the President of Ecuador.

Your idea of reasoning as a matter of post hoc rationalization of a "pick" may be autobiographically accurate, but is just plain silly as a generalization over everyone else. And your claim that taking a view on theism becomes an "ultimate presupposition" is left gloriously innocent of any justification whatever. Indeed, what this notion of ultimate presupposition could even mean is opaque -- for reasons that I broached some posts back, and which were presented with rather greater clarity by blt to go, as well.


Huh?

How about, There is a god (or several, or several thousand), but the bible's purported depictions of him/her/it/them/newt are wholly or partly false?

This is crux of the whole matter, after all. The question of a god's existence is entirely orthogonal to the question of whether any particular text is wholly correct. You can be a devout theist all day long while finding powerful reason to reject any purportedly holy text as flawed; the belief that there is a god, and that the evidence supports this, simply fails to imply that "the bible can only be true".

So the bible's truth cannot be levered out of your commitment to theism; it has to be assessed on its merits as a text, in accordance with the standards for belief that we deploy when considering any text -- or indeed, things more generally. Of course, as soon as we do that, the wheels fall off the wagon. We're left with just one more assemblage of theologically-inflected stories known to be largely false: Norse, Greek, Abrahamic, Mayan...

Clutch

Yet again, I don't see what has been left unsaid. I think that if the prima facie evidence is that P, then it is rational to believe that P unless countervailing evidence appears. The appearance of flaws warrants the defeasible judgement that there are flaws; the inerrantist then inherits the obligation to defeat that appearance. This all seems pretty obvious, doesn't it?

Sven

What? I also answered your questions. You didn't like the answers, but this does not change the fact that I answered them.

Vinnie

This is correct. The default, prima facie or natural (however you want to term it) is also that "books were authored by men" (and women). Its a property of the very identity of "books". I brought this up as well. I then moved to "books (or more accurately anthologies) written under the same circumstances" are CERTAIN to have errors unless it can be shown to have been verbal plenary inspired by God.

Robert's verity argument isn't even coherent. Aside from being built on one or more factually incorrect presuppositions the conclusion built off of them is also a non-sequitur fallacy (I demonstrated both of these problems already).

Vinnie