Alonzo Fyfe

Well, on an old and outdated version of utilitarianism, it is pleasure and pain. Contemporary theories are a bit more sophisticated, talking about human well-being or using some rather sophisticated concepts of eudaemonism.

Regardless of which alternative one uses, the main point remains the same. Those who argue that happiness, well-being or whatever are not to be maximized can only be understood as promoting suffering and human misery.

The Other Michael

We are quite happy to have links to lengthy articles instead of posting the whole thing. The OP wasn't just a link - there was some additional text asking for comments ( the article detailed the OP's outlook) and offering to answer questions.

cheers,
Michael
MF&P Moderator

Jamie_L

Since having encountered desire untilitarianism 'round these parts, I've more or less become a subscriber to it.

So, in short, "what Alonzo said".

Jamie

Ms. Siv

Thomas
Somehow that doesn't really form a rigorous definition, does it ? Happiness is such an ambiguous term. Is "contentment" happiness ? Is "gloating" happiness ?
Maximising human welfare is again an ambiguous term because welfare is ambiguous. Who determines whats my welfare ? Me ? But I am an irrational human being, who might, sometimes, stupidly want to do something which is not to my long term welfare. Should I be prevented then ? But is forcing me to do something I dont want to (or forcing me not to do something I want to) against my welfare because it makes me unhappy ?

I dont think that its such a simple task to chalk out a goal for all of humanity. Religion tries to do so but we all know religion's credibility.
Hedonism, happiness etc seem to be zero-sum games. Conflict of interest ensures that my happiness is often at the cost of someone else's.

The only objective which has ever made any sense to me, in the sense of being lofty enough (even that you can prick holes in, but less so than than for other objectives, IMO) is the one Jacob Bronowski talked about in Ascent of Man.

Alonzo Fyfe

What you cite are not definitions but slogans. Philosophers who defend utilitarianism typically spend a great deal of time specifying the meaning of their terms.

On a desire utilitarian model, desire fulfillment has a very specific definition. As explained above, a desire is a propositional attitude whereby a person with a desire that P (where P is a proposition that refers to the object of the desire) has a mental attitude that P is to be made or kept true. A desire is fulfilled if P is actually made or kept true. A desire is thwarted if P is made or kept false.

Desires, on this account, are the object of moral evaluation. A desire is good to the degree that it fulfills (other) desires regardless of who has them. A desire is evil to the degree that it thwarts other desires regardless of who has them.


If one wants to defend a proposition such as, "We are a scientific civilization. That means a civilization in which knowledge and its integrity are crucial. Science is only a Latin word for knowledge... Knowledge is our destiny," one encounters a number of ambiguous elements.

First, is the speaker really saying that we are a scientific civilization, or that we ought to be a scientific civilization? The former is not a moral proposition. The latter is lacking any type of defense or foundation.

Is the claim, then, that being a scientific civilization has some sort of intrinsic merit -- a built in property of ought-to-be-ness? If this is the claim, there are a lot of questions to ask about what this property is, how we can sense it, and how it interacts in the universe. It is such a strange property, one is justified in being skeptical about its existence, in which case the claim that we ought to be a scientific civilization is false.

But, then, if we are not talking about a property of intrinsic ought-to-be-ness, when what does it mean to say 'we ought to be a scientific civilization?' Is this, instead, the claim that being a scientific civilization will increase human happiness or well-being? This pretty much concedes the utilitarian point of view, doesn't it?

These questions, mutis mutandis are to be asked of any type of non-utilitarian alternative. Against the challenge of building a theory on the existence of some sort of strange intrinsic value property, the problems that utilitarian theories face are insignificant.

Adrian Selby

Alonzo:

In saying that there cannot be any so called secondary desires, then it is meaningless to say there is only one desire to maximise all desires. Yet it is meaningful to assert that where everyone has at least one other desire, to have sex, then where each wish to maximise all desires, they're maximising sex opportunities. Thus, to attempt to maximise all desires is to attempt to maximise those desires that everyone has. In this sense its more of a directive than a desire, while it is possible to desire that we maximise the fulfilment of desires, I don't see why it can't be posited that act utilitarianism proposes a directive by which we act. As such I'm not sure you can assert that it is possible or right to mix these second order desires with a directive regarding how one should act in relation to them.

Alonzo Fyfe

The main problem with such an account is that 'directives' are not a part of the causal mechanisms of action.

Recall:

(Beliefs + Desires) -> intentions -> intentional actions.

'Directives' do not have any place in the equation, and there is no reason (no set of observations that cannot be adequately explained with the above formula) to introduce a third entity -- or to complicate the issue with 'first order' and 'second order' desires.

Adding these complexities because one's favorite ethical theory would be possible in such a universe does not argue that such a universe actually exists. One has to argue that these complexities are required in order to better predict and explain human actions -- in the same way that physical forces are postulated according to their ability to explain and predict the motion of bodies in the universe.

Note: BDI theory, though it does not have different 'orders' of desires, does recognize a distinction between desires and metadesires -- as well as beliefs and metabeliefs. A metadesire is a desire that takes a desire as an object (Jim desires that Susan love him), just as a metabelief is a belief about beliefs (BDI theorists believe that beliefs are propositional attitudes). But this is different from postulating first-order and second-order dsires and directives.

If all people had only one desire -- a desire to have sex, for example, then their entire intentional life will be devoted to realizing sexual events. They would not eat (except insofar as eating is a useful tool for having sex), they would not drink, they would resist pain. Such creatures would be the paradigm of single-mindedness.

If we postulate creatures with two desires -- a desire for sex and a desire to act so as to maximize all desires regardless of who had them, then, agents would compromise between the two desires -- often times sacrificing the quest to fulfill all desires in order to obtain sex.

The only type of creature that will always act to fulfill all desires regardless of who has them is a creature that has only one desire, to fulfill all desires regardless of who has them.

Adrian Selby

Well, whether or not I'm correct in using the term directive, perhaps meta-desire is more appropriate, I still think its wrong to equate a meta desire (maximise all desires) with the desires themselves (sex, eating, whatnot), at least, I don't see why it can't be the case that there are desires, and act utilitarianism is positing an 'ought' in relation to them, namely, one ought to maximise this set of desires. I don't see that act utilitarianism is part of the set of desires, as it is descriptive of action in relation to those desires, not itself one of those desires.

I think you're taking the terms too literally if I'm falling foul only through using a term that is not specifically in your preferred equation, though I'm not denigrating the possibility that such terms have precise meanings and therefore utility. You'll have to forgive my lack of specific reading of BDI proponents and their texts, but I don't think I'm adding complexity to suit a particular theory, rather, it seems to me a better understanding of this topic in relation to human action that act utilitarian directives are not equated with the desires that they refer to. I'm no expert in moral philosophy however, so I'll be keen to see how your view differs.

Would I be wrong on your view to posit that it is a belief of mine that I maximise all my desires, or, that my attitude to my desires, my meta-desire, is that I fulfil all my desires, if 'belief' and 'meta-desire' are more appropriate phrases?

Ed

Given that the hardship is unintentional by the child, that is not grounds for his death, especially since he has extreme intrinsic value.

Quote:

wip: As a utilitarian, I would protest that people won't be happy if they are subject to elimination because somebody doesn't think they make people happy. I think people will generally be happier if we have a rule against eliminating people. crc

So you are antiabortion?

Ms. Siv

I cited what Thomas used for defining/explaining Utilitarianism. Ok, lets see the rigorous definitions.

And what if this P varies from person to person, and even for the same person, varies with time ?
Thats how it is, you know. Often there is a direct conflict in satisfying everyone's Ps. There's also usually some conflict in satisfying a peson's long term and short term Ps.

I'm sure one will encounter many ambiguities. I even said as much. But at least, with such a definition, there is not much inherent conflict of interest. We both can acquire knowledge and it need not come at the cost of the other at all.