blt to go

RobertLW - what exactly are the "rules of canon?"I found it interesting you cited 1 Thess. 2:13. Paul is talking about the "gospel" of Christ there (gospels were not yet written). jbernier's point earlier.

But even more interesting (read the WHOLE chapter) is that Paul is saying that the words he SPOKE to the Thessolonica people were the words of God, NOT the words he was writing!!! So unless someone was recording at the time, I am afraid the words of God are forever lost.....

(In case you think I am being misleading):

For this reason we also thank God without ceasing, because when you received the word of God which you heard from us, you welcomed it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the word of God, which also effectively works in you who believe. [emphasis added] 1 Thess 2:13

Thank you, for clarifying (slightly) your position on circular reasoning. If I have it correctly, there were certain (dare I say "intuitive?" ) elements you felt could only be explained by an entity such as "god." And the example you give was "morality."

As you know, I LOVE application. So we shall try "morality" asIs it moral, amoral or immoral to get a divorce?

jdlongmire

from: here which was linked from Bibliology: The Doctrine of the Written Word

jdlongmire

Depending on circumstances, maybe all 3...

Cross Examiner

1. I say here and elsewhere that men know intuitively that baby-torture is wrong. Do you wish to say and argue otherwise or not? Anything else (e.g. your first two sentences in the above) is irrelevant to this particular point of mine.
2. Non sequitur, again. It is an invalid inference from the premise that the term 'torture' is 'historically conditioned' (whatever that means) that our knowledge of baby-torture as wrong is therefore not intuitive, innate or synthetic a priori.
3. This is not my burden to meet. Originally, Sven positively asserted here that the sensus divinatus I expound upon is identical to that which the Moslems and Mormons claim justifies their beliefs in the inerrancy of their holy books, respectively, and so either you or he needs to put some dirt beneath said assertion.

Now, jbernier, you've made a few truth-claims in this thread and so I echo RobertLW in challenging you to ground knowledge; show that your worldview (whatever it is) actually provides for your appeals to the truth. Since you and I have been talking about morality, let's start with moral knowledge. Is it absolutely true that baby-torture is wrong? Its not a trick-question. But in the meantime, I note that you wrote the following bit to RobertLW:
And I agree that so long as the ontological materialist does not appeal to his presuppositions as support for his position he does not chase his own tail. But since the ontological materialist's position itself cannot be 'studied by empirical methodology' said position therefore cannot be 'said to be real', as you say. And one might reasonably consider this sort of self-refutation a serious problem for any ontological position.

Regards,
BGic

blt to go

jdlongmire - thank you for the link. I particularily found it interesting that itsupports my previous statement to RobertLW about the Apocrypha being in the LXX, and arguably included in Paul's statement of "all scripture is inspired." I notice the link merely makes the assertion that the Apocrypha was not inspired, with no support, proof or evidence for the assertion.

(In fact, the link makes ALOT of leaps of conclusions without proof, but still was a better response than any given so far.)

As to your statement that divorce, depending on the circumstances, can be immoral, amoral or moral, I would (respectfully) disagree that the Bible asserts the same. The bible is clear that it is always immoral. Always. (I would LOVE to see the apologetic that allows divorce that would not violate Ephesians 5 and 1 Peter 1 and 2.)

But even given your "all three" scenario, this simply proves my point. Morals are not that easy to state that we can "define it" and "act upon it."

Morals change. Even "christian" morals.

jbernier

You stated that "you somehow know that baby-torture is wrong and ought not be done even though you cannot exhaustively and definitively explain why it is wrong and ought not be done." This was given as an example of intuition. However I demonstrated elsewhere that I can offer an explanation for why I feel this way.

No, it is certainly not a non sequiter given your original example. You supported your original assertion that this knowledge is intuitive with the evidence that we cannot explain why we have this knowledge. Thus if I can show that we can explain why we have this knowledge then the evidence you have provided for this knowledge being intuitive is not valid.

Actually, I have not been talking about morality at all.

That notwithstanding the first thing that I must say is that I have stated how I ground knowledge several times. I have stated the following, although not systematically at any one point: That an examination of all argumentation reveals that all people work from first principles; that such first principles cannot be supported by their own principles as this would be circular; that first principles cannot be supported by other principles as this would mean that they are actually not first principles; thus one's first principles are chosen prior to any reasoning, empirical observation, etc.; therefore one's first principles are selected arbitrarily (although not randomly as our choice of first principles is a result of a choice personal history).

Thus one should be clear what one's first principles are, knowing that these cannot be proven to be correct but that this fact is not a liability but rather part and parcel of what the species "first principle" entails. Thus one can say "The Christian scriptures are inherent" and then proceed to interpret all scriptural texts in light of that first principle. However one must recognize that this inerrantist assumption is not derived from the scripture but rather from an epistemological first principle adopted prior to exegesis. Moreover, the first principle itself is exposed to critique insofar as it may result in interpretations which conflict with interpretations derived from other first principles; in such conflicts one must consider which interpretation makes most sense given the available data and which set of first principles is most likely.

By now one should notice that this is much more hermeneutic than scientific. However, as of yet it is a hermeneutical view without an understanding of power. I think that a study of the history of knowledge indicates that knowledge is never produced or generated in a vacuum - it comes ouf of and is located within discourse, within debates, discussions, , etc., which all involve negotiations of power and position. Thus any epistemology must start with this recognition - that no "science", no philosophy, no theology is free from human relations and that, indeed, human relations are immanent in all of these. Yes, there is a strong Foucauldian influence to my thoughts here (as well as a degree of Kuhnian influence as well). This, however, does not mean that the ideas that are produced are never accurate; there is a real world out there and some ideas are right and some are wrong. What it does mean is that the straightforward application of scientific method, etc., is insufficient without a recognition of the dialogical aspects of knowledge production. It is certainly to say that no epistemology - be it the scientific method, sola scriptura, etc. - should be accepted simply because those who advocate and practice it happen to be in a position of ideological, cultural and social dominance.

That last paragraph was a bit of an excursus. Now to my own first principles, at least in terms of theology: "The divine has been and continues to be revealed within the communities of Israel and Christianity and that the communal memories of this revelation are contained within Biblical, Talmudic, Midrashic, Patristic and other theological texts as well as liturgy and practice; these memories of divine revelation constitute the record of a dialogue within historical time and it is that dialogue with which the contemporary Christian community (the ekklesia) must critically engage."

Cross Examiner

1. You seem to be trying to argue modus ponens that:
P1. If the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is known (synthetically) a posteriori then it is not known (synthetically) a priori.
P2. The truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is known (synthetically) a posteriori.
C3. Thus, the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is not known (synthetically) a priori.
Is this your major, minor and conclusion? If not then please amend.
2. Let's line up your premise and inference formally:
P1. The term 'torture' is 'historically conditioned'.
I2. The knowledge of baby-torture as wrong is therefore not innate.
But it is self-evident that I2 does not follow from P1 and so it is an invalid inference -- which is what non sequitur means. If you have your heart set on arguing this issue rationally then you'll need to add some more dots and then connect them in plain view.

Regards,
BGic

jbernier

yes, only insofar as it is a critique of your argument that intuitive knowledge is knowledge which cannot be exhaustively explained, defined or justified. Thus your P1 appears to have been "If the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is not known due to reasoning or experience then it must be known intuitively" and your P2 appears to have been "The truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is not known due to reasoning or experience." Therefore C3, "Thus, the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is known intuitively." This is what you appear to have said in your initial presentation of the baby-torture example.

Cross Examiner

1. You continue to mistake me for arguing for this example of moral knowledge as exclusively intuitional, rather than explaining from this example of moral knowledge what innate ideas are like and how the sensus divinatus might operate, but I can take up the position you seem to want me to take.
2. My formal position on the issue would look more like this:

P1. If the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is known (synthetically) a priori then it is not known (synthetically) a posteriori.
P2. The truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is known (synthetically) a priori.
C3. Thus, the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is not known (synthetically) a posteriori.

To which you counter-assert:

P1. If the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is known (synthetically) a posteriori then it is not known (synthetically) a priori.
P2. The truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is known (synthetically) a posteriori.
C3. Thus, the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is not known (synthetically) a priori.

But since the origin of the knowledge of the verity of the aforementioned proposition, hereafter, P, is either a priori or a posteriori, and not the knowledge of the verity of P itself, we inappropriately apply the law of excluded middle (i.e. false dichotomoy) in the above scenario. That said, I am, more acurately, asserting that:

P1. If the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is originally known (synthetically) a priori then it is not known (synthetically) a posteriori.
P2. The truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is originally known (synthetically) a priori.
C3. Thus, the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is not originally known (synthetically) a posteriori.

to which you counter-assert that:

P1. If the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is originally known (synthetically) a posteriori then it is not known (synthetically) a priori.
P2. The truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is originally known (synthetically) a posteriori.
C3. Thus, the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is not originally known (synthetically) a priori.

and try to support P2 with the following:

P1. The term 'torture' is 'historically conditioned'.
I2. The knowledge of baby-torture as wrong is therefore not innate.

But, as we've seen here, this is a non sequitur; which now takes us to the present state of our disagreement.

Regards,
BGic

jbernier

Exactly! I am arguing that C3 is incorrect - that one can support the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' a posteriori. I would further argue that P1 is incorrect - that a priori knowledge does not exclude a posteriori knowledge.




Which is simply a rephrasing of your P1.

Quote:

P2. The truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is known (synthetically) a posteriori.

Which is simply a counter to your P2.

Quote:

C3. Thus, the truth of the proposition 'baby-torture is wrong' is not known (synthetically) a priori.

Which displays the same reasoning as that which results in your C3.

The law of the excluded middle is introduced in your P1 - and is precisely what I am arguing against here.