PoodleLovinPessimist

It's been argued here that strong "atheism", like "theism" requires "faith".

To make this an interesting resolution, we need to use definitions of the words that make the argument controversial.

If we use "faith" in the sense of "confidence without absolute proof", then it is uncontroversial that atheists have faith. The real question is not the definition of faith, but a rational examination of the various epistemological methodologies used to conclude truth or falsity of the existence of God.

It's pointless to try to talk about "atheism" or "theism" abstractly; there's just too many people who self-identify on either side, for too many reasons. Regardless of philosophical definition, usage drives language, and enough people use the terms in so many different ways that the terms are robbed of specific meaning. That's not too much of a problem, we just need to use more specific language to discuss the underlying philosophy.

It's probably also useful to restrict the discussion to strong atheism, the presence of the cognitive (true/false) belief that the proposition "God exists" is false. I'm a strong atheist, so I have no problem defending this belief.

There are two main types of epistemological methodologies: empirical and non-empirical. Empirical epistemological methodologies say that we have knowledge of the world based on or related to only the evidence of our senses. Non-empirical epistemological methodologies deny at least the "only", and some deny that we can have any knowledge of the world at all based on the evidence of our senses.

Furthermore, there is the issue of the logical connection between evidence and propositions believed on the basis of evidence. An important distinction is between verificationism and falsificationism. I hold to the stronger falsificationist connection between evidence and belief: A belief is rationally based on the evidence if and only if the contrary of the belief implies the contrary of the evidence. If some belief is compatible with both the evidence and its opposite, the belief is not based on the evidence; the evidence does not justify the belief.

So, I have two strong contentions:

1. All my cognitive beliefs, including my cognitive belief that God does not exist, are either beliefs about the evidence of my senses directly, or falsifiably justified by the evidence.
2. It is not the case that one can falsifiably justify the existence of any God on the basis of shared evidence of the senses. The existence of a god is in fact evidentially justified only on personal revelation.

If some theist has had a personal revelation, I obviously can't argue against that. I can say only that no god has revealed itself to me personally, and I find the idea of a god which reveals itself to only some people to be so exceedingly counterintuitive that I myself, lacking my own revelation, consider the alternative of pure delusion to be the simpler explanation that accounts for your report of revelation and my own experience of no revelation.

The argument that any epistemological methodology shares some common features with another methodology is insufficient to prove they are identical. To prove identity, you must prove that all features are the same. And I'm going to try to keep the discussion focused on what I see is the key differentiators: The reliance on falsifiability on shared sense-evidence.

Wiploc

With regard to other gods, this might be true, but the problem of evil proves that the tri-omni god doesn't exist, so there is no faith involved there.

crc

PoodleLovinPessimist

I don't think that even there we have absolute proof or certainty. At the very least, we might be making a mistake in our deduction. It's highly improbable, of course, but it's not absolutely certain our deduction is correct.

Generally, I consider the notion of absolute certainty to be very difficult to defend, and even if it were defensible, of limited applicability.

Wiploc

Are you certain that you generally consider the notion of absolute certainty to be difficult to defend? (Note: I'm not being snide; I'm testing the limits of uncertainty.) If not, then aren't you certain that if you aren't mistaken you probably generally consider the notion of absolute certainty to be difficult to defend?

I'm hoping that by now you used to consider it to be difficult to defend.

crc

PoodleLovinPessimist

Well, if you put it that way, then I'm certainly uncertain what you mean by "certain". If I'm not uncertainly uncertain. Or something like that.

Do I know that I don't know what I know I don't know? Or do I not know that I know what I don't know I know?

You can tangle any concept you like up in self-referential paradoxes. It's a useful skill if you want to get a Ph.D. in philosophy.

Mountain Man

That argument is based on an equivocation.I disagree. The equivocation comes in with the various definitions of "faith" or "belief" being used here. The strawman "absolute" also comes into play.

It requires no "absolute" proof to be aware that gods do not exist. "Absolute" is not something that is available in this area. The 'faith' that I have that no gods exist is based on a rational induction from the facts. The 'faith' that a theist has is based on indoctrination, dogma, and everything BUT the facts and often held on to inspite of the facts. Comparing the two faiths is like comparing melons to grapes. "They are both fruits, they both grow on a vine, so therefore they are the same."

PoodleLovinPessimist

Indeed. Or it's based on a trivial definition of "faith".

It should be noted that all of these equivocations and straw men fundamentally address epistemological methodology. I think we're pretty much in agreement on everything except the fine details of the terminology of sucky arguments.

PoodleLovinPessimist

But that's what athiesm is! Absolute proof that it's logically impossible for anyone to use the word "God" without his head exploding! Didn't you know?

Wiploc

Perhaps I was unclear. I'll try again. I think certainty is possible. Let me give an example:

Statement 1: I am certain that there are some things I don't know.

That's certainly a true statement. But if I wasn't sure, I could add a hedge word that would make it certain:

Statement 2: I believe I am certain that there are some things I don't know.

Now that's just a fact. There's no way I could be mistaken. But, suppose, that I was somehow, still in doubt. I could hedge again:

Statement 3: Unless I am mistaken, I believe I am certain that there are some things I don't know.

Only a radical skeptic could doubt such a claim. Am I confronted with a radical skeptic? The solution is simple:

Statement 4: Unless the radical skeptics are right, then, unless I am mistaken, I believe I am certain that there are some things I don't know.

That's an unabiguously true statement. There's no way it can be wrong. Therefore, certainty is attainable. There are things we can be certain about.

crc

llamaluvr

What about a person who decides that the evidence that significant, meaningful prophecies with respect to a faith were fulfilled is sufficient and decides to believe based on that? If further prophecies upon which such a faith hinges are later proved to be impossible to be fulfilled (i.e., some plague of fireflies is supposed to hit earth, but fireflies become extinct, or the earth is destroyed before it could happen), then was that prior justification not obtained on the basis of the shared evidence of the senses, and was it not falsifiable?