Freethought & Rationalism Archive

fishbulb · 01-09-2006, 03:14 PM

While I think anticipation of and reduction of harm is a good foundation for a set of laws or ethical guidelines, I think that the link between harm and morality is a lot more tenuous.

It seems to me that, fundamentally, moral outrage, indignation, or disapproval (however you want to term it) is an emotion and, like other emotions, its manifestation is the product of evolution. Most of the time, we feel moral indignation in response to actions which are, in fact, detrimental to our well-being. We disapprove morally of killing people we like and care about because those people are our genetic relatives or people we depend on for one reason or another. When a stranger or an enemy is faced with a similar threat, we tend to feel less moral indignation, or even approval. (But some people are more sympathetic than others.) I suspect that we spend a lot of effort trying to come up with post hoc rationalizations for why this is right, but I think it is ultimately because that is how we are programmed and conditioned.

In many cases, our moral indignation is entirely an accident: if a wild animal attacks and kills someone close to us, we tend to feel morally outraged, sometimes to the point of feeling that the animal should be killed as punishment for its actions, despite the fact that it is irrational. When a ten year old kills someone, the first reaction of a great many people is, "try him as an adult," not because there is any reason to believe that the ten year old has the same level of maturity and ability to take responsibility for his actions as a mature adult, but because of a gut reaction of moral outrage. When tragedy arises as a result of accident, we are often motivated to find fault with someone, forgetting that there are such things as a reasonable standard of care and honset mistakes. We even get angry when disease takes someone close to us because they were "too young to die" or "didn't deserve to go so soon." Even though we know (well, many of us know) that disease, lightning, earthquakes, and similar hazards are impersonal forces of an unconscious Universe that is unaware that we have wants, needs and fears, we still feel as though an injustice has been done.

Much of the time, our moral reactions are tied to the perceived harm to us or to those we care about that is caused by other human beings, but sometimes our reactions are triggered by other, unrelated stimuli. I would say that there are no meaningful underlying moral principles, because our feelings are based mostly on instinct and genetic programming, not rational ideas. The best we can do is to acknowledge that we have these feelings, try to understand why, and then decide how we will deal with them in the context of trying to survive and prosper on a planet full of other people who share the same kind of programming.

fast · 01-10-2006, 07:00 AM

fishbulb,

We have biologically evolved, and currently as a consequence, we have and continue to emotionally harbor within us certain moral inclinations and indignations that deviate to varying degrees from others both within and among other cultures -- a varying degree to which can be more understood by examining both actual and perceived: identified associations with others.

I would submit that many, perhaps myself included at times, would be morally outraged in times in which the only harm is perceived yet not actual. If this is the case, which seems to be at least one point you make and to which I have agreed, and if the emotionally stemmed, biologically driven, moral conclusions are infused with or tempered with a more objective basis for our moral cries of “that’s wrong,�? then I’m not so sure that lends itself to a nonexistent connection between harm and morality.

If I base my moral condemnation towards another on a type of harm that is perceived yet devoid of actual existence, then I have made an emotional and subjective espousal without reasoned merit. If the morals embodied within us are indeed emotions capable of being sparked by either actual or perceived harm, then I would imagine that a rational, reasoned exploration into distinguishing actual harm from perceived harm would go a long way in minimizing the gap.

If a man thinks an act is bad, and if a prominent basis for that subjective, moral, biological, moral conclusion is imagined harm, then the objectively identified fallaciousness of obfuscating reality with imagination being brought to light ought to offset much disparity between the camps of those who thinks the act is bad.

fishbulb · 01-10-2006, 03:46 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by fast

I would submit that many, perhaps myself included at times, would be morally outraged in times in which the only harm is perceived yet not actual.

I would perhaps go even farther and suggest that moral outrage is instinctive: we make our initial moral judgements without first asking, "what's the harm?" It is, I suspect, a simple case of pattern matching: when we perceive certain criteria, we instinctively react with moral outrage. Most of the time, or at least enough of the time to make it a useful survival trait, the thing that triggered our feelings would be what, upon rational examination, we would judge to be harmful, but often enough, it is a "false positive." Once we make our initial instinctive judgement, we need not and often do not take a second look. Sometimes we do, but other times we devote our efforts towards rationalizing and justifying our initial feelings rather than asking if, perhaps, there is a better way to react.

Quote:

If this is the case, which seems to be at least one point you make and to which I have agreed, and if the emotionally stemmed, biologically driven, moral conclusions are infused with or tempered with a more objective basis for our moral cries of “that’s wrong,�? then I’m not so sure that lends itself to a nonexistent connection between harm and morality.

Taking the time to think about why we feel the way we do will certainly change our perceptions, but we are first and foremost creatures of instinct. Rational second-guessing of our instincts is a skill that must be learned, and it is not an easy skill to acquire. I would hazard to guess that there are very few people--and I am not one of them, though I strive to be--whose feelings are influenced more by their rational thoughts than by their instincts. It must require incredible discipline and practice to make one's instincts subservient to one's higher cognitive functions.

Rational analysis affects the way that we interpret and act upon our feelings. They can even change how we feel, but our instinct is pretty strong. Often, the decision we regard as most rational and ethically correct still feels wrong, and we will sometimes go to great lengths to justify acting against the facts and our rational analysis and to go instead with our gut feeling, even though we intellectually realize that decision will have strong negative consequences. Often, when we do go with what rational reflection tells us is the right thing to do, we feel bad about it, as though we are somehow betraying or denying something deep within ourselves, at least for a short while.

This doesn't just apply to moral judgements. I'm sure most of us have, for example, let our sex drive get the better of our common sense and done something we knew well in advance that we would probably regret, or at least that was probably not in our best interests. We have all probably said things in anger that we knew, even as we said them, were not helpful to anyone, least of all ourselves. It is well-understood that people exercise poorer judgement in matters that are intimatele important to them than they do when they are emotionally detached from the issue at hand.

arkirk · 01-16-2006, 08:53 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by The AntiChris

Probabaly because you appear to be mistakenly equating objectivity with consensus agreement.

You seem to be suggesting that when the majority agrees that harm is done, then it's reasonable to say morality is objective?

Does that mean that when there isn't majority agreement about the harm done, then morality isn't objective?

Chris

Objectivity is not necessarily consensus agreement. Moving this issue to another level. Gallileo looked through his telescope and saw moons circling Jupiter. Nobody wanted this to happen. They made him recant and all. His observation was objective and it just goes to show you objectivity itself can be harmful...to rickety old ideas. It can also be harmful to the the objective interpreter (in this case, Gallileo) as well.

We only interpret our experience to others. We do not convey all of our experience to others . If Gallileo had the option of actually getting everybody to the lens of his telescope and seeking concensus on the interpretation, his conflict might not have been so severe. The truth is the truth, at least in the closer reaches of the universe. The moons do circle jupiter. No interpretation that left that factor out would be accepted by a group seeking an honest interpretation of the facts.

What comes to us with moral foundations, and ethical judgements and definition of just what HARM might be is a measurement of how much something brings human discomfort (be it emotional or actual physical discomfort). If it makes us feel bad, I suppose we will say it is harmful and if a majority are discomforted by it, then that will also be a consensus agreement.

Earlier in this tread, the idea that our emotions arrived via natural selection, and were somehow not to be trusted because of that factor seemed to beg the question. This suggestion is actually begging us to not investigate our feelings. Our eyes and ears and taste buds and cerebral ganglia and other tools of objectivity arrived via evolution as well.

The problem I see is that some want ABSOLUTE DEFINITIONS before we start the discussions to arrive at consensus agreement on the definitions. In other words something from god to help us?:rolling:

MattBeckwith · 01-17-2006, 12:48 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by fast

Abstract goals are much different than clearly defined objectives. Upper management envisions or sets goals then outlines objectives in line with those goals for lower management to follow.

Similarly, I would offer that harm/benefit is to morality as objectives are to goals--at least in one sense. I'm saying that the key to determining the degree to which an act is moral/immoral could, in one sense, be tied to the degree to which harm/benefit is present.

Many acts or lifestyles that society at large consider wrong are indeed harmful (or at least that’s what we say), yet there are also a number of acts that society at large 'consider' to be wrong that are not "objectively" harmful. In the latter, those 'considerations' are generally regarded as being born (especially by IIDB goers) of fallacious reasoning.

I've been looking for that connection (and hopefully not looking for something that does not exist—like a ghost) that I've noticed (or at least think I’ve noticed) that draws a good many IIDB members together to congregate, other than the God issue. Yes, rationale, logic, and reason may be the backing or cornerstone that keeps us intellectually honest and focused, or perhaps a drawing card in its own right, but I feel that there's a deeper element in our midst, and I'm thinking that the secret or rather illusive component or connection that I strive and seek to understand somehow relates to the concept of harm.

But, not just any harm, but rather a harm of a very particular variety. Remember, as I’ve already mentioned, there’s a distinction between a harmful act and an act that’s considered harmful—and they don’t always mesh. In other words, there is actual harm and there is perceived harm. Moreover, sometimes perceived harm is actual harm and sometimes it’s not.

When I first came to IIDB, I was amazed by the shear number of people that would take-up for and side with others on a great number of non-god related issues. Obviously (to me at least), ‘typical’ members of society ordinarily wouldn’t, but that wasn’t the case here. You guys/gals for the most part were different. But, it seems after all, a common bond beyond the God and reasoning issue that distinguishes many IIDB members and the remaining is a propensity to acknowledge and accept people who act in non-harmful manners, yet differently than the remaining.

It’s also amazing to the degree to which I have allowed myself to change in my attitude in many respects. I used to be locked on the despise mode, but now I seem to have made my way to the admire mode.

To what degree does harm relate to morality/immorality? If we can objectively show that an act is harmful and regard that act as immoral, and likewise if we objectively show that an act lacks harm and regard that act as moral (disregarding the amoral references), then morality sure seems to take on an objective appearance when looking at morality through the lens or perspective of harm and how it relates to issues. But, if morality is subjective, then my question has to be, what difference does the harm of an act make in terms of morality and whether of course it’s wrong?

I’ve touched on a number of subjects, so this thread may be a little too broad and go in any number of directions, and I’m sure I’ve got some flaws in there, but it’s a new year, I feel more understanding than usual, so what the heck. Any comments.

A better 2006 fast,

<at least today :devil3: >,

fast

A few reactions:

1. If you're looking for an objective measure of morality by using objective harm as a measuring stick, then doesn't this just shift the subjectivity from morality to harm? Because how could harm be objective? For example, physical harm is not as important to some people as harm to social standing.

2. You talk about the people on IIDB as if they represented the alternative viewpoints to theism. However, I've noticed that there is a preponderance of nihilism on this forum. When looking for a non-theistic morality yardstick, I would not use this forum.

3. You seem to be referring to some sort of absolute morality. But can morality be absolute? Isn't morality always entified in relation to a value system?

The AntiChris · 01-17-2006, 04:57 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by arkirk

Objectivity is not necessarily consensus agreement.

Here's a pretty standard definition of moral objectivism from wiki:

Quote:

Moral objectivism is the position that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinion.

So it's clear that if moral worth is determined solely by consensus opinion, then it's not an objective morality according to the 'standard' definition.

Of course, anyone's free to define objective morality in any way they want, but if it's in such a way that moral value is determined by opinion, why bother?

Chris

fast · 01-17-2006, 07:45 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by arkirk

His observation was objective and it just goes to show you objectivity itself can be harmful...to rickety old ideas.

A point to which I agree. However, some, if not many, others would counter argue that it's not harmful and in fact beneficial if indeed the old ideas are rickety. They would continue and argue that the 'harm' to the old ideas is being conflated with 'change'. I would submit that their failure is in not recognizing the harm it took to produce the beneficial change.

I liked the old dirt road to town, but it's been paved now. Most would say that if an overall change is for the better (subjective), then it's beneficial (subjective). I say making the old dirt road no more was an objectively real act. It matters not that I liked the old road...what's important is that the old road is no more.

So, if we're going to change our worldly ideas for the better, let's not kid ourselves into thinking that no harm is present in the destruction of old rickety ideas.

GoodLittleAtheist · 01-17-2006, 08:28 AM

Sorry, RL detained me for a bit. But since this tread is still kicking...

Quote:

Originally Posted by fast

, good one!

I suppose we could differentiate between the various characteristics within the same category of physical harm and make notations to each in those regards. We could then objectively examine the merits or physical harm of each characteristic and in the case of the "actual number of cuts", we could conclude that on the basis of actual cut count, three fingers being cut would indeed be more harmful (on that basis). We could then move onto functionality, loss of body tissue, etc.

And have a whole bunch of different categories of harm with no way to objectively compare categories.

Quote:

Originally Posted by fast

If I do not like blacks, and if I'm irritated when I see them, then the irritation stems from my own mind and thus the irritation is not a causal effect from the presence of blacks. Yes, one that is irritated by blacks would not be irritated if blacks were not around, but that is not to say that the true source of the irritation (though many speak like that's the case) is from the presence of blacks. Instead, the harmful irritation (harmful in that it's something that eats away inside the prejudice mind) is stemmed from and promulgated by his/her and other prejudice minds.

How do you know when the cause of emotional harm is not internal? Your two examples work very nicely because you and I agree that in those cases a person shouldn't be harmed by the stimulus (the other example was a homophobe being 'harmed' by seeing homosexuals). How do you decide? Intent?

fast · 01-17-2006, 11:04 AM

I've drafted some responses to a few of you and keep deleting them because as soon as I make an attempt at a sound argument, I find holes in it; then, I explain. I keep going in circles with myself.

It's like I don't want to (and is not my intent to) justify immoral actions, but it seems like following the concept of subjective morality allows me to do just that when I don't want to.

Example:

All moral conclusions are subjective opinions
All acts of rape can be judged as morally good conclusions.
Therefore, All acts of rape can be judged good as it's a subjective opinion

arkirk · 01-18-2006, 01:18 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by The AntiChris

Here's a pretty standard definition of moral objectivism from wiki:

So it's clear that if moral worth is determined solely by consensus opinion, then it's not an objective morality according to the 'standard' definition.

Of course, anyone's free to define objective morality in any way they want, but if it's in such a way that moral value is determined by opinion, why bother?

Chris

There's very little doubt in my mind that we have any disagreement at all. It is clear my post dealt with objective observation not morality. I agree we cannot say there is such a thing as the standard defininition of "moral objectivism". This leaves us still with the matter what is right and wrong for us as human beings? We get slapped all the time for "situational ethics."
Yet I notice that there is a kind of consistency in our responses that seems to bridge all sorts of differences in opinion regarding religion, and political organization etc.

My post was just an example to show that the moralists of the times in the tale given were very positive. They said, "How can you say these things Gallileo, where the reality of God's plan is so clearly set down in the Bible. You better start praying, Boy." It pains me to see a man of such great and obvious intellect humiliated through social pressure... humiliated and made to grovel.

I only hope these forums would not likewise make a modern day Gallileo grovel if he came here. That is my concern. We need to bring objective observation to bear on our problems. We also need to know what FAIR is. We need to be sensitive to human need without trampling on our science.

01-10-2006, 07:00 AM	#52
fast Contributor Join Date: Nov 2004 Location: South Carolina, USA Posts: 14,025	Well-written and insightful! fishbulb, We have biologically evolved, and currently as a consequence, we have and continue to emotionally harbor within us certain moral inclinations and indignations that deviate to varying degrees from others both within and among other cultures -- a varying degree to which can be more understood by examining both actual and perceived: identified associations with others. I would submit that many, perhaps myself included at times, would be morally outraged in times in which the only harm is perceived yet not actual. If this is the case, which seems to be at least one point you make and to which I have agreed, and if the emotionally stemmed, biologically driven, moral conclusions are infused with or tempered with a more objective basis for our moral cries of “that’s wrong,�? then I’m not so sure that lends itself to a nonexistent connection between harm and morality. If I base my moral condemnation towards another on a type of harm that is perceived yet devoid of actual existence, then I have made an emotional and subjective espousal without reasoned merit. If the morals embodied within us are indeed emotions capable of being sparked by either actual or perceived harm, then I would imagine that a rational, reasoned exploration into distinguishing actual harm from perceived harm would go a long way in minimizing the gap. If a man thinks an act is bad, and if a prominent basis for that subjective, moral, biological, moral conclusion is imagined harm, then the objectively identified fallaciousness of obfuscating reality with imagination being brought to light ought to offset much disparity between the camps of those who thinks the act is bad.

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01-09-2006, 03:14 PM	#51
fishbulb Senior Member Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Canada Posts: 792	While I think anticipation of and reduction of harm is a good foundation for a set of laws or ethical guidelines, I think that the link between harm and morality is a lot more tenuous. It seems to me that, fundamentally, moral outrage, indignation, or disapproval (however you want to term it) is an emotion and, like other emotions, its manifestation is the product of evolution. Most of the time, we feel moral indignation in response to actions which are, in fact, detrimental to our well-being. We disapprove morally of killing people we like and care about because those people are our genetic relatives or people we depend on for one reason or another. When a stranger or an enemy is faced with a similar threat, we tend to feel less moral indignation, or even approval. (But some people are more sympathetic than others.) I suspect that we spend a lot of effort trying to come up with post hoc rationalizations for why this is right, but I think it is ultimately because that is how we are programmed and conditioned. In many cases, our moral indignation is entirely an accident: if a wild animal attacks and kills someone close to us, we tend to feel morally outraged, sometimes to the point of feeling that the animal should be killed as punishment for its actions, despite the fact that it is irrational. When a ten year old kills someone, the first reaction of a great many people is, "try him as an adult," not because there is any reason to believe that the ten year old has the same level of maturity and ability to take responsibility for his actions as a mature adult, but because of a gut reaction of moral outrage. When tragedy arises as a result of accident, we are often motivated to find fault with someone, forgetting that there are such things as a reasonable standard of care and honset mistakes. We even get angry when disease takes someone close to us because they were "too young to die" or "didn't deserve to go so soon." Even though we know (well, many of us know) that disease, lightning, earthquakes, and similar hazards are impersonal forces of an unconscious Universe that is unaware that we have wants, needs and fears, we still feel as though an injustice has been done. Much of the time, our moral reactions are tied to the perceived harm to us or to those we care about that is caused by other human beings, but sometimes our reactions are triggered by other, unrelated stimuli. I would say that there are no meaningful underlying moral principles, because our feelings are based mostly on instinct and genetic programming, not rational ideas. The best we can do is to acknowledge that we have these feelings, try to understand why, and then decide how we will deal with them in the context of trying to survive and prosper on a planet full of other people who share the same kind of programming.

01-17-2006, 11:04 AM	#59
fast Contributor Join Date: Nov 2004 Location: South Carolina, USA Posts: 14,025	I've drafted some responses to a few of you and keep deleting them because as soon as I make an attempt at a sound argument, I find holes in it; then, I explain. I keep going in circles with myself. It's like I don't want to (and is not my intent to) justify immoral actions, but it seems like following the concept of subjective morality allows me to do just that when I don't want to. Example: All moral conclusions are subjective opinions All acts of rape can be judged as morally good conclusions. Therefore, All acts of rape can be judged good as it's a subjective opinion

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