Johnny Skeptic

Message to bfniii: Even if intelligent design is a given, and even if the uncaused first cause is good, there is no evidence that the God of the Bible is the uncaused first cause.

Boro Nut

<edit>. I arranged to meet him at the Berlin Wall. Have you any idea how many walls there are in Berlin? The whole place is made out of them. Hopefully he'll turn up next time. We're meeting under the tree in Brazil.

Boro Nut

Doug Shaver

What do you mean "we"? To many of us who are not wedded to certain dogmas, the God of the Bible looks like the epitome of evil.

Jack the Bodiless

Oops, missed something:
More evidence of your confusion. Nebby did indeed defeat Necho at the Battle of Carcemish (on the Turkish/Syrian border) and subsequently drove the Egyptians out of Palestine. However, he did this BEFORE the siege of Tyre. His battle against the Egyptians AFTER Tyre was against the pharaoh Amasis II, and doesn't appear to have achieved very much (it was near the beginning of the pharaoh's reign, Egypt certainly wasn't "conquered", let alone "devastated"). The actual conquest of Egypt was by the PERSIANS, the same folks who had by then put an end to Nebby's Babylonian Empire.

I'd also like to revisit this:
Why the insistence on pointless qualifiers from ME in the first case, followed by blanket assertions from YOU in the second?

Have you forgotten where you are? This isn't some Christian apologetics forum, where baseless assertions such as "incorrect, 7 and 8 are messianic prophecy" will be accepted without challenge. The FACTS in this case are clear, from the Bible itself: these are NOT messianic prophecies, regardless of what Christian apologists would prefer to believe.

...which leads on to a question I've tried to ask you several times: what are you doing here? What do you hope to achieve? Why do you imagine that WE will simply accept the opinions of Christian apologists as authoritative?

You seem to be amazed by the notion that we would regard ourselves as being more authoritative on the Bible than the christian apologists YOU regard as authoritative. You need to get used to the fact that we DO so regard ourselves. There isn't much point in getting all huffy about our "smuggled-in authority" and our chutzpah in challenging your cherished assumptions. And, no, it doesn't really matter HOW many people have shared similar assumptions over the centuries: they were ALL mistaken.

And, yes, my authority is superior to that of the Apostle Matthew too (or, rather, the author of the book traditionally attributed to him). If that causes you an apopleptic fit: sorry, not my problem. Get used to it.

bfniii

exodus 23:9, lev 19:33, 34

john 3:16

leviticus and deuteronomy are examples of God caring enough about people to provide moral standards.

joshua through nehemiah show God's mercy despite the recipients being undeserved. even when God punishes them, it's not permanent although it could be.

the prophets are examples of God warning people before they are judged.

the messiah is evidence that God wants to provide grace for anyone who comes in contact with the gospel.

i realize you might try to counter with different examples of what you perceive to be God acting unjustly. that would be a logical fallacy and is a different topic altogether. providing different instances of God's behavior does not refute the above citations. furthermore, if you would like to discuss any different examples you might have, we can. i hope they are not the same ones i have already addressed in the other thread; suffering, etc.



the argument's popularity is not a good indicator of it's veracity



why not? on what basis do you make this statement?



i understand the argument.



as i said when you threatened to contact scholars regarding other issues, you can do as you like. i will respond as best i can.

why do you have to contact someone else? are you unable to discuss the issue yourself?



"Although McHugh's version may avoid some standard objections, it seems subject to at least some familiar problems as well as bringing with it problems of its own." i'm not interested in krueger's analysis of mchugh's argument. however, krueger does nothing to obviate the argument:



purtill's comment, "It seems to be contrary to our idea of logical necessity that whether or not a statement is logically necessary should be determined by the existence or nonexistence of something", refers to "our". who is "our"? purtill doesn't bother to qualify that and it certainly does not include me. part of the logical necessity is existence. without it, we would be having an absurd conversation about something that can't possibly exist.



purtill continues, "If by "logically necessary statement" we mean "theorem of a logical system" or "tautology" or "analytic statement," no, i don't mean "logically necessary statement" or "theorem of a logical system". i mean logical necessity. there is a difference.



"it seems quite clear that the existence or nonexistence of something is irrelevant to the question of whether or not a statement is a theorem, or a tautology, or is analytic." i guess i don't really care one way or the other about this statement. it has little to do with the argument. i am not really referring to a statement or theorem. i am referring to a truth about which statements are formed. there is a difference.



"Even if our idea of logical necessity is claimed to be wider than any of these notions, it seems unlikely that any plausible account of logical necessity would allow it to be dependent on existence." it might seem that way to purtill, but not to me. the argument itself is the reason why i disagree. his statement does not really object to the argument other than in a vague way.



krueger states, "In other words, Hartshorne's first premise, that if god exists, then god exists necessarily, seems implausible." this may be hartshorne's first premise, but it is not exactly the first premise of the argument.



"McHugh is removing lesser-making properties in the hopes of constructing an objection-proof concept of god." that's the whole point of the argument.



"The common definition of God assumes omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence. However, not all systems hold that God is necessarily morally good (see summum bonum). Some hold that God is the very definition of moral goodness and that God is equivalent to love. Others maintain that God is beyond morality. any system that doesn't maintain God as being good is not referring to the same God. God, as expressed in the bible and the ontological argument, is not limited by lacking goodness.

God may be beyond morality, but that doesn't mean that morality isn't one of His characteristics. this is the same for time or space. "But why is something that is spatiotemporal lesser than something that is not? How is that not a deficiency "in any sense"? Furthermore, to say that a being is not spatiotemporal is to say that the being is unable to engage in activities that require a spatiotemporal context, such as walking around and juggling. Those activities cannot be performed except in a spatiotemporal environment. So if the Godlike being is not spatiotemporal, the being cannot juggle, ride a bicycle, speak, and engage in other common activities. How is that not being deficient 'in any sense'?" krueger is misunderstanding the argument. it's not that God lacks or possesses spatiotemporality. God created what we understand to be spatiotemporality. to try to assign a finite quality to a supposedly infinite God is absurd, such as trying to assign value to God's juggling ability. this can be expressed in a mathematical sense in that the equation would have an infinite value and a finite value in the same equation which is, of course, nonsensical. whether or not God has spatiotemporality in an infinite sense is mere speculation and not germane to the ontological argument.

once more for clarity "It would seem that a Godlike being that has most of the attributes of McHugh's being but which could also exist in the spatiotemporal realm would be superior to McHugh's Godlike being, so how is the lack of spatiotemporality not a deficiency?" God not only exists in and beyond what we consider to be space and time, God created what we know to be space and time.



"If this were to happen, the problem would be that McHugh's proof would have as its conclusion something that most people would reject as god," krueger still doesn't get it. if the idea is rejected, it is because the idea is less than the perfect standard which is God. if the idea is rejected, then a better idea can be formed which would indeed match the standard. the standard is perfection. you might counter with the idea that no two people are going to agree on every single aspect of God's existence. this can be refuted by the fact that a perfect God would encompass everyone's ideas about God (as long as they pertained to a perfect, good God). that is part of the perfection.



"it looks like an ad hoc method of limiting the definition of Godlike to the sort of being McHugh has in mind." i am responding as if this were posed to me; you can call it ad hoc if you want, but it is a definition that anyone could possibly conceive about God. it is the best possible definition. if there is any limitation, then that is not the best possible definition.

the statement "One long-standing problem with the ontological argument has been that it can be parodied." is quite incorrect. there is no long-standing problem with this argument. some people, such as kant, may perceive that there is, but there isn't. furthermore, krueger's misperception that using parody undermines the argument qualifies as neither a long-standing problem nor a problem at all.

theorizing objects such as the perfect island, special fairies or the like does not equate to God. there is no perfect island, or any other object in existence, because those objects are finite. God is beyond the finite. the very idea of island is finite. therefore, it can never reach perfection of any kind. it is negated before it can even be applied to the argument. an island is not sentient. if a person started to add those types of qualities, such as sentience, then we would be just describing God but substituting the word "island" which is ridiculous. any such parodies are neither analogous nor equitable.



this is true, unless God reveals things about Himself to us in a way we can understand.



prescience and determinism are two different things. i agree that there might be some semantics involved, but determinism does not necessarily imply that causality is thoroughly intrinsic, assiduous and ineluctable. it can be a matter of degree in which case there can be freewill within the boundaries of compulsion.



and you find these statements helpful in what way? in what way does this paragraph help us regarding the tyre issue or biblical inerrancy? it what way are these comments even necessary? how do you know what i have "bargained for"? how do you know what experience i have in discussing the ontological argument?



we're not talking about a "possible" creator. we're talking about the God of the bible.



but that's not what we're talking about. we're talking about creatio ex nihilo. we're talking about morality. we're talking about the ontological argument.



yes we can, especially if He reveals Himself to us.



1. do you have any reason to believe this is the case?
2. even if that is the case, that still doesn't prove:

a. the God of the bible doesn't exist and isn't in control of things
b. the God of the bible is less than perfectly good.

divine revelation and inspiration



of course we can prove that. if the being you are talking about is evil, then you aren't talking about God in the ontological sense nor in the biblical sense.



yes necessarily the earth since the earth is part of the universe. the idea pertains to every object in the universe.



yes there is evidence of it and yes we can prove it and it has nothing to do with ID or evolution.

bfniii

you've got to be kidding, right? bare means not like it used to be, whatever you used to have, you don't now. bare means uncovered or unsupported. being made bare means a higher authority is going to reduce the extent or influence of the rock (tyre). let's not forget occam's razor here, you are unnecessarily complicating a simple issue.



he's referring metaphorically to the city-state, not entirely to the physical city. this is not uncommon in biblical prophecies.



where buildings used to be? yes, that would be remarkable.



yes there is.



not permanently



of if they are resisting the knowledge that God exists.....



rom 2: 14-16



not necessarily



if that helps you sleep better at night....

bfniii

unfulfilled prophecies would immediately exclude that person from being considered a prophet since that would obviously undermine the authority of the office. among the jews, prophetic accuracy is one of the factors that determines whether or not a person is a prophet.

bfniii

yes. what part are you confused about?



which prophecies in the bible are you having trouble verifying?



i don't recall that being the case with any biblical prophecies i have examined.



expected behavior if they misunderstand the text.



that's not the case with biblical predictions.



even if he did, you would claim it was later revised.



yes, the ontological argument or the bible. i guess you could even throw in the anthropological argument as well.

bfniii

in the context of my discussion with jack regarding the date listed in 26:1. ezekiel's reputation is not critical to that issue, but it can be helpful.



really? what source are you getting this info from?



some people still believe the world is flat. how do you account for that?

bfniii

i did see that post. and i also saw that what jack said didn't match the definition, regardless of what source he cited. i addressed his sources specifically, and cited several of my own. if some people would actually read what others say.....