John A. Broussard

You've gone way astray.

To begin with, I most certainly tied your omniscient god's foreknowledge to the entire universe, past, present and future as well as to man's actions.

HOWEVER....Nowhere. Nowhere! NOWHERE have I said that god is the cause of anyone's actions. Nowhere have I said that your choices are determined by "some cause." All I've said is that god knows what those actions will be.

Is there a problem with that? You didn't voice it before, but I'm willing to listen to your critque, here.

I've simply described what an omniscience god knows. Since god knows what you are going to do...for absolutely for certain, how can it make any difference whether or not you have free will?

Why do you refuse to deal with that issue? Why do you keep slipping into Libertarian Free Will? It doesn't matter whether man has Libertarian Free Will or Republican Free Will. Or NO free will.

Won't man behave exactly the same regardless of what shape or form you give to his free will or lack of free will?

God knows exactly what you are going to do, period.

Let's move on from there.

If you have no free will, will you do only what your omniscient god has foreseen that you will do? I say yes. Do you say no?

If you have free will, will you do only what your omniscient god has foreseen that you will do? I say yes. Do you say no?


I'm looking forward to your answer.

lynx

I see it this way - god made a movie, starring us. (creation)

This blockbuster (in sense-surround!) has great rewatchability as there are billions upon billions of scenes in a huge number of locations. This god can replay the movie continuously, rewind or fast forward and even zoom in. (omniscience)

We have as much free will here as do Frodo and Sam.

rhutchin

I believe that we actually agree on this issue. We both agree that man does not have “free will� (and if we were in a free will discussion, we could specifically identify this as Libertarian Free Will). We also agree that people choose consistent with their desires (which, if I understand the arguments presented, is the same as compatibilist free will).

Since you are referring to “free will� (without further distinction), I will assume that you have LFW in mind (even if you do not know it and do not mean to get into a technical discussion about "free will"). Consequently, I agree with you that there is no free will.

We both agree that the answer is, yes, to both your questions (even if you do not understand that "Free Will" can be defined in at least two ways and you have used two different definitions in your questions).

Going further, we could also ask your questions in the following manner--

If you have no free will, will you do only what you desire to do? I say yes. Do you say no?

If you have free will, will you do only what you desire to do? I say yes. Do you say no?

Since this discussion seems to be off topic, maybe you should start a new thread if you want to pursue it.

rhutchin

If the choice that humans make is exactly the choice that they desire to make, why does free will matter? The essence of free will is that a person has the option to do that which he DOES NOT desire to do. Absent free will, the person does not have that option (but would never exercise that option anyway, even under free will). So, if a person always chooses to do that which he desires, why does it matter if God knows it beforehand?

rhutchin

Neither God nor a human father needs to inform the child of a natural disaster in order to protect them. The father can merely intervene to protect the child and the child may never know that it was in danger.

The issue seems to be, what is the father's obligation to those who reject their father's help.

Wayne Delia

I say no. What I desire is to do something your God knows I won't do. I can't possibly do that (because that would refute the assumption that God is omniscient), so therefore I don't only do what I desire to do. You're wrong, and this is more than the 50th time it's been pointed out to you. Your rebuttal consists of nothing but crickets chirping.

If I DO have free will, and can / will only do what I desire to do, your God's omniscience is refuted, since I choose to do something He knows I won't do.

As for Broussard's position, you've just conceded it: your conclusions are the same regardless whether a person has free will or not, therefore whether we have free will is irrelevant. Did you notice that?

WMD

Wayne Delia

I've used very much the same analogy, only with the movie Casablanca, and the characters of Louie and Rick on the foggy airport runway at the end of the movie. We've seen the movie, we know how it ends, we know that movies don't magically change plots once filmed, and because of all that, in a very limited sense, we approximate what is known as "pseudo-omniscience." We know what the outcome of the characters in the movie will be, and while it seems as if the characters have free will in their actions when the movie was filmed (in 1941, for Casablanca), in the presence of our "pseudo-omniscience" in the year 2005, the characters cannot logically choose any other actions in the movie (Rick could have chosen to get on the plane with Ilsa Lund, which he should have done in the first place). That's because of the presence of reasonably accurate knowledge of the outcome in 2005 which prevents the characters in 1941 from choosing anything else. Analogously, if God is assumed to be omniscient, then right now in 2005, there is a presence of absolutely certain knowledge of outcome of choice events in 2005 and beyond. Because of that absolutely certain knowledge, people cannot possibly choose any other alternative, and free will is therefore flushed.

WMD

Wayne Delia

You missed the point. The fact that natural disasters do occur and cause pain and suffering is evidence that God does NOT protect His children.

Whether a child knows he's in danger or not is completely irrelevant. The question is why does God not provide the level of protection He is capable of providing - when a much less omnipotent human father would provide any help he could.

That isn't the issue at all. The question is why doesn't God provide even the amount of protection from natural disasters that a regular, normal, non-omnipotent human father would provide (or attempt to provide) for his own children. You cannot explain that, so your typical technique when cornered is to shift the topic to something else significantly different.

WMD

rhutchin

Let’s see, you say, “What I desire is to do something your God knows I won't do.� Basically, you are saying, “What I desire is to do something I won’t do (or have no desire to do).� What God knows is irrelevant to what you desire. Your position sounds goofy to me. How can you desire to do that which you have no desire to do? You are concluding that I am wrong based on your weird thinking (or so it seems to me).

As for Broussard's position, Libertarian Free Will is not relevant because of the deterministic system that exists. Other forms of free will can still be relevant (e.g., compatibilist free will). Also, whether God is omniscient is also irrelevant.

Wayne Delia

Humans DON'T always make exactly the choice that they desire to make. Soldiers in the armed forces, and inmates in prison, often spend most, if not all, of their time doing things they don't want to do. And I, neither an inmate or a soldier, desire to choose something God knows I won't choose - and I can't do that, if God is assumed not to be wrong in what He knows. So your premise is false, and your conclusion only concede's Broussard's argument. While it is interesting that free will is irrelevant, it's not the point - free will is IMPOSSIBLE if God is assumed to be omniscient.

(jaw hits floor) Hey! The light bulb is flickering on! Let's cling to that as a fragment of your operating definition of free will. If God is omniscient, and knows the outcome in advance with perfect accuracy, then the person's option to do anything else is removed completely. The person has zero percent chance of choosing any of those options. That means that free will is refuted when God is assumed to be omniscient.

Soldiers, at certain times in their military career, would prefer to spend the afternoon relaxing rather than going on a five-mile run or a ten-mile march.

Prisoners, at many times while serving their sentence, would prefer to leave their cells and take a long walk outside.

These are two examples of people being compelled to choose things they do not desire to do. You are simply wrong.

I, an atheist and a skeptic, would prefer to choose something among the set of options that God knows I won't choose. Even if those alternatives appear to be logically available, there's no possible way I could choose any of them in order to preserve God's omniscience. So, my free will is removed, and as a result, I cannot do that which I desire to do.

You really need to stop using that as a premise assumed to be fact, because it's been refuted many times.

A person doesn't always choose to do that which he desires. The soldier cannot choose to sleep in until 11:30AM; the prisoner cannot choose to roam free in the community; I cannot choose to select something God knows I won't. Your premise is refuted.

WMD