Originally Posted by J-D

It is a fact that 'not perfect' is synonymous with 'imperfect' and it is also a fact that neither of them is synonymous with 'having serious problems', and they are still facts, and very simple ones, even if some people should happen to lack the really very basic ability required to grasp them.

In fairness, although the way you express yourself has serious problems (that's another, separate and independent fact), they are nowhere near as serious as the problems with Chili's mode of expression.

Originally Posted by aa5874

I will accept your public self-confession that you do NOT have a perfect record of success in achieving clarity of expression since it is true based on your own posts in this very thread.

What you POSTULATE about others may be illogical and unsubstantiated.

Originally Posted by J-D

In fairness, although the way you express yourself has serious problems (that's another, separate and independent fact), they are nowhere near as serious as the problems with Chili's mode of expression.

Originally Posted by Toto

Pete - you started this thread with some unintelligible stuff about postulates. Now at least you're writing about hypotheses.

Originally Posted by Richard Carrier

Axiom 4: Every logically possible claim has a nonzero epistemic probability of being true or false.


By ‘possible’ here I mean a claim that is possible in any sense at all (as opposed to a claim that is logically impossible), and by ‘probability’ here I mean ‘epistemic probability’, which is the probability that we are correct when affirming a theory or claim is true. For example, if (given all we know) a claim has a 25% probability of being true, then if we say that claim is true, there is a 75% chance we are mistaken, but if we say that claim is false, there is only a 25% chance we are mistaken. Therefore, if we say such a claim is false, we will more likely be correct, and so we say the claim is false. But it still has some probability of being true. Accordingly, when we say something is ‘probable’ we usually mean it has an epistemic probability much greater than 50%, and if we say it’s ‘improbable’ we mean it has an epistemic probability much less than 50%, and everything else we consider more or less uncertain. If a claim is not logically impossible, then it has some probability of being true, however small. This is because we have only finite knowledge and we are not infallible, therefore some probability always remains that we are mistaken or misinformed or misled. Our challenge, then, is to only believe
claims that we are very unlikely to be mistaken or misinformed or misled about. But many things have different levels of certainty and thus different degrees of probability. And although the probability that a given claim is true (or false) may be vanishingly small and thus practically zero, it is never actually zero. It is vital to admit this. For the truth is not always what is most probable, since improbable things happen all the time. If we know nothing else, often we can at least say what’s most likely. But that’s not the same as saying the alternative can’t be true. We may have to admit it could be true, even if we don’t think it is. And we may have to decide just how likely or unlikely either conclusion is.

..... Arriving at a reasonable conclusion as to what is the more likely explanation of any conjunction of facts will require comparing the relative probabilities of all the pertinent evidence on different theories (as I demonstrate in chapter two of On the Historicity of Jesus Christ), which requires admitting that theories you don’t believe in nevertheless have some probability of being true, and theories you’re sure are true nevertheless have some probability of being false. And you have to take seriously the effort to measure those probabilities. For when you do, you may find you can’t sustain the level of certainty you once had.

Hence mythicists must be prepared to admit there might have been a Jesus after all, just as historicists must be prepared to admit there might not have been a Jesus after all, no matter what you end up thinking is more likely, and no matter how much more likely you think it is.

Originally Posted by mountainman

N/A

The schematic I introduced identified two types of hypotheses - those directly associated with each element of the evidence, and a set of general hypotheses. I have since realized that what I have called this set of general hypotheses includes things that Carrier describes as axioms in his recent publication The Twelve Axioms of Historical Method, By Richard Carrier, Ph.D. (March 2010). (I dont have a current URL for this).

These twelve axioms as enumerated by Carrier I see as part of the set of what I have termed general hypotheses.


I want to return to a few disagreements about the role of hypotheses that have emerged in this thread, but before this time I would like to introduce one of these 12 axioms and ask two questions in relation to it.


IMO this comment about Jesus applies to Paul and to every other historical identity since it is presented as an axiom (that I have represented in the schematic as a general hypothesis).

One issue I have developed in this thread is to point out that there are certain class of hypotheses that may be framed for all such historical identities, which are antithetical. For example "Jesus existed" or "Jesus did not exist" - and we are used to seeing such claims (or hypotheses) being accepted as being true (or false) for the purposes of many discussions here.

Both of these hypotheses cannot be assumed to be true at once, since they are antithetical, and therefore only one can be true.

I have two questions ....

Question 1

With reference to Jesus, to what extent are one or other of these hypotheses ("Jesus existed" or "Jesus did not exist") used explicitly in various theories of christian origins, to what extent are one or other used implicitly in the all remaining other theories?


Question 2

With reference to Paul, to what extent are one or other of these hypotheses ("Paul existed" or "Paul did not exist") used explicitly in various theories of christian origins, to what extent are one or other used implicitly in all the remaining other theories?

Originally Posted by Chili

Huh? How can truth be a mode of expression.

Originally Posted by J-D

Your 'acceptance' was not requested or required and has no value.

I notice that you have not publicly denied the statement that you do not have a perfect record.

Originally Posted by aa5874

Please, please, please, I am not really interested in your postulate only in the fact that you have ADMITTED your imperfection.

Your imperfection is a serious problem based on your posts in this thread.

Originally Posted by J-D

Please, please, please. It doesn't make any difference to this thread what you are interested in or what you are not interested in. The only serious problem with this thread is mountainman's inability to respond to requests for greater clarity, although if you continue to insist on injecting irrelevancies that may also become a serious problem...

Originally Posted by mountainman

...

I have two questions ....

Question 1

With reference to Jesus, to what extent are one or other of these hypotheses ("Jesus existed" or "Jesus did not exist") used explicitly in various theories of christian origins, to what extent are one or other used implicitly in the all remaining other theories?