Detached9

Excellent point here. I concede my argument.

Not exactly relevant to what I was discussing, but also a valid point.

Agreed. I'm glad someone finally attacked my argument.

The part that confuses me about objective morality is I don't understand how to make a case for it without using an argument from popularity. Perhaps someone could enlighten me.

JerryM

This is just what I find useful for defining these terms:

Objective: that which can be observed or experienced by others

Subjective: that which is perceived or experienced only by an individual

If I break my arm, an x-ray of the fracture is objective. The pain is subjective. My behavior as a result of being in pain, such as holding my arm immoble, or moaning is objective--but the pain itself is only felt by me. Of course, at a very fundamental level, everything is perceived or experienced by individuals. So it is probably more accurate to say that the sum of many concordant subjective experiences equals an objective experience. And it also is apparent that it is the agreement or consensus of individuals that make something objective. Whether we like to admit it or not, moral systems in any society are ultimately established by convention or consensus. This doesn't mean that these morals are the best, or most correct. Moral systems are always a work in progress. In the modern age, with widespread travel and communication, societies change and evolve. It is inevitable that ideas of right and wrong must also change, at least to some degree. For many people, this is very unsettling, but I don't see any alternative.

kctan

Quote from JerryM,
The pain is as objective as the fracture. It can be measured by using CATs.

When you start describing your pain to another, that's when the subjective part comes into play.

It would be better to say objective experiences give rise to subjective description of such experiences.

All actions are objective, even a choice of non-action is itself an action. It's the interpretation that is subjective.

bd-from-kg

Detached9

Your argument is fallacious. In order for a proposition to be objectively true it is not necessary that it refer to something in the natural world, or even to something that exists or is of such a nature that it might exist. For example, it is arguable (in fact a great many very competent philosophers believe) that the natural numbers don�t �exist� in any meaningful sense, and a great many more believe that if they exist at all, they exist only in minds. The only other alternative, so far as I can see, is that they exist in a mysterious realm of �ideals�. Just the same, regardless of which of these options is correct, it is objectively true that 2 + 2 = 4.

To say that morality is objective means only that some moral statements are objectively true. And it appears that the same alternatives are available to the moral objectivist as to the �arithmetic objectivist�. He can say that morality, as such, doesn�t �exist� in any meaningful sense, but that a moral statement such as �torturing newborn babies just for the fun of it is wrong� is nevertheless objectively true. Or he can say that morality exists only in minds, but that some moral statements are nonetheless objectively true. Or he can say that morality exists in the realm of �ideals�, and that some moral statements are objectively true.

None of this shows that morality is objective. (In fact, I don�t believe that it is.) The point is simply that your argument is fallacious. It�s just not that simple. If it were, intelligent men of good will would not still be arguing about it after thousands of years.

As for subjective moral theories, I agree with Alonzo Fyfe�s comments. No subjective theory is remotely plausible as an interpretation of what almost anyone means when they make moral pronouncements. Thus, practically no one who says �torturing innocent babies just for fun is wrong� means that he personally disapproves of it (or has a certain negative feeling about it, or anything of this sort); or that those who do such things disapprove of it; or that most people in his society disapprove of it; or that most people who have ever lived or will live disapprove of it. Nor does anyone interpret such pronouncements coming from others in any of these ways. Subjectivism is a complete failure as an account of what people mean by moral statements, or of the purpose or function of such statements.

JerryM:

Not so. If a new virus hits a community (or the entire world for that matter) that causes everyone to hallucinate little semitransparent Martians following them around all day for a couple of weeks, this does not equal the objective experience of little semitransparent Martians following everyone around all day for a couple of weeks. If everyone had the subjective experience of conversing with God every day, this would not equate to the objective experience of God conversing with everyone every day. (It�s plausible, of course, that this would be the cause of these experiences, but the universal occurrence of such experiences would not be the same thing as God conversing with everyone every day; it would be meaningful to ask whether this is what�s really happening or whether there�s a naturalistic explanation.)

Again, not so. Aside from the cases mentioned above, let�s suppose that everyone, or practically everyone, agrees that Mozart�s most beautiful music is more beautiful than anything ever written by Salieri. (In point of fact, practically everyone familiar with the music of these composers does agree with this.) Does that make Mozart�s music objectively more beautiful than Salieri�s? I don�t think so.

This commits the very same fallacy that Alonzo refuted earlier. The term �the moral system of society X� is a descriptive term; it denotes certain practices and attitudes of the people in society X. This has nothing to do with the question of whether moral statements such as �torturing babies for the fun of it is wrong� are objectively true in that society. It�s logically possible that this statement (or others of the same form) is objectively true even though almost everyone in society X disagrees with it.

The AntiChris

Are you using the same sense of "objective" in these two statements?

Chris

bd-from-kg

The AntiChris:
Pretty much. (But keep in mind that I didn't make the second statement.) To say that a statement (or proposition) is objectively true means that it's true regardless of whether anyone believes that it's true, and regardless of anyone's attitude or feeling toward it. In the case of moral statements it has become standard usage to say that "'X is wrong' is objectively true" also implies that it's true regardless of anyone's attitude or feeling toward X. (Otherwise theories called "subjective" would qualify as objective since it may be objectively true that the relevant person(s) have the requisite attitude toward X.)

The AntiChris

So, in theory at least, it's possible for activity "X" to be universally considered "right", but, at the same time, it could really be objectively "wrong". How would we know?

Chris

bd-from-kg

The AntiChris:

First off, I did not say that this was possible in theory; I said that objective moral theories generally entail that it is.

Obviously if an action were universally considered right but was really objectively wrong we wouldn�t know. There�s nothing inherently contradictory about the possibility that everyone is wrong regarding some objective fact. So I have to assume that the question you really have in mind is something like, �Even if everyone considered a certain kind of act to be �right�; how would we know that it really was right?�

As I said from the start, I�m not an objective moralist. If I thought there was a really plausible objective moral theory I�d probably subscribe to it. And the answer to the question of how we could tell whether a given act is right or wrong depends strongly on which objective moral theory one is talking about. Theists would say that the way to tell is to check what God has said. Classic utilitarians would say that the way to tell is to calculate the balance of pleasure over pain for each alternative. Intuitionists would say that the way to tell is to consult one�s innate moral sense. Randians would say... but you get the idea.

Anyway, the main point that I�d like to get across is that both objective and subjective moral theories are wrong. Moral statements (IMHO) are neither factual statements about some �external reality�, nor are they simply reports about some actual person or persons� current subjective state(s).

The AntiChris

Thanks. You've made things much clearer now. I think.

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

This is substantially consistent with what I have been claiming. But it requires specifying what moral claims are if not these two things -- because way too many people think of these as being mutually exclusive/jointly exhaustive options. It has to be one or the other.

But this is not the case. There are other subjective state(s) in existence other than those of the person making the moral claim, and reports about these subjective states are reports about some "external reality". So, objectivism and subjectivism are NOT mutually exclusive options -- it is possible for some types of claims to be both.

One alternative here is 'intersubjectivism' -- that if enough people dislike something, then it is wrong. Though intersubjectivism does not work either -- if X% of the people don't like Y, how does this imply that the 1 - X% of the people who have different likes and dislikes ought not to do it?

I propose that moral claims ultimately describe relationships between desires and other desires, regardless of who has them. Rape and murder generally thwart the desires of others, which is what makes them wrong. These relationships describe objective facts about subjective states -- facts that are independent of people's attitudes towards these facts, but fully dependent on people's attitudes towards all other things