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Senior Member
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Texas
Posts: 976
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Originally Posted by Dean Anderson
Congratulations. You managed to get through a whole paragraph before you started making errors.
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Thanks.
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Besides, Aristotle was raised in Macedon, in the capital city of Pella (his father, Nicomachus, was the Royal Physician for King Amyntas III of Macedon), and was brought up by his Uncle Proxenus. He only moved to Athens at the age of 18.
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Yes, that's what the current story is. But if this is a "revisionism" issue, then the specific history is automatically presumed to be revised, inaccurate.
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So he wasn't even in the right country to be Socrates's lover.
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You're not paying attention. Try this. The Persians revised their history and when Thucycides wrote his history of the Peloponnesian War, linking events in Persia, it exposed Xerxes as Artaxerxes. So what does a superrich country do about it? They hire a Greek propagandist to revise Greek history. Who would they hire? Xenophon! Thus we find Xenophon the architect of this part of the history and very much into Persian issues. So he's linked to Persia in a big way.
But how could he pull this off with help? His good friends Plato and Aristotle would have to go along with it. Plenty of money to go around and the opportunity of fame if all other histories are suppressed, right? So they move the Peloponnesian War back 28 years from 403 to 431BCE but also the history of Socrates with it. Wow! What is to happen about all those people Socrates knew, including his own lover, Aristotle? Guess what. ALL of his history had to be destroyed! But Plato and Xenophon would not let the greatness of his philsophy die, right? So what do they do? They both make sure they publish his dialogues, written in the first person! what do you know! as if Socrates spoke and wrote these dialogues himself. And with imaginary people who were not alive at the time he was all of a sudden!
And what about poor Phaedo/Aristotle? Suddenly Socrates dies 16 years before Aristotle is born. He doesn't know him. By the time he's 18 and perhaps beginning to write philosophy, Socrates would have been dead 34 years already. Yet Aristotle manages to mention Socrates over 80 times, in the most admirable way as well. So did he really know him? Or didn't he?
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There is no "suspicion" other than your completely baseless speculation.
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It's not baseless. It deals with archaeastronomy, or at least astrohistoricity. There was a critical major eclipse that occurred in the first year of the Peloponnesian War. It was total at Athens. The eclipse now dating that event was only partial and thus quite dismissible as the actual eclipse event.
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Stephenson and Louay, in a brief note (Historia 50 [2001] 245-53), have unwittingly shed new light on our problem. Unaware of the relevance of the eclipse passages to the composition controversy, these astronomers generally confirm Thucydides’ accounts as “reliable” (253). They show, however, that scientific advances now enable us to calculate, far more accurately than hitherto, the time, duration, inclination, and degree of obscuration of ancient eclipses. Thus, in passing, we learn from Stephenson and Louay a few details that Thucydides gets slightly but significantly (and, it is argued here, deliberately) wrong. First, the frequency of solar eclipses during the Peloponnesian war was not “much greater” (1.23.3) than any previous period but roughly equivalent to that of the previous fifty years. Second, the most remarkable solar eclipse Thucydides mentions (2.28.1, 431 B.C.) could not have created sufficient darkness for “stars” to become visible, as the historian says.
http://www.camws.org/meeting/2003/ab...003/flory.html
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So the eclipse doesn't work in 431BCE. That's the first basis of "suspicion." The second is "The Delian Problem" where Plato is consulted in the first year of the war now dated to 430 BCE when he wasn't born until 428BCE. And you're thinking I'm not supposed to be suspicious?
Anyway, an eclipse that was actually total in Athens was located in January of 402 BCE. This eclipse would have produced what they saw. It was total over Athens but the edge of the eclipse track passed over the Athenian Harbor so some in Athens would have seen it go completely dark and the stars come up but still with the crescent edge visible. At any rate, a much better match than 431BCE. If that occurs then the beginning of the war would have begun that summer in 403BCE and at that time Plato would have been 25 years of age, old enough and maybe famous enough by now to have been consulted to help with the Delian Problem. Plato did get into math after all. He wasn't able to solve the problem.
But if this is the case, and Socrates was 32 when the war began, he would have been born in 435BCE and at 69 died in 366BCE, which means we now look for any evidence that he was still alive during this time and that he actually knew Aristotle. Since Phaedo was 18 when Socrates died and would have been born in 484BCE, the presumption is that in the revision of the history by Plato and Xenophon, Phaedo was invented to be the lover of Socrates in earlier times. Now that the chronologies overlap, Aristotle is the prime candidate as Socrates' lover.
But how can we prove that? How can we prove that he ever knew him? Does he mention him? Does he like Socrates? As I noted, he mentions him over 80 times!
Wanna see? You decide! Is this someone who might have known Socrates, been his lover, or who only heard about him years after his death?
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TOTAL 80 REFERENCES
5 from Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 1, section 1216b
Accordingly Socrates the senior thought that the End is to get to know virtue, and he pursued an inquiry into the nature of justice and courage and each of the divisions of virtue. (1.29)
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 3, section 1229a
Second is military courage; this is due to experience and to knowledge, not of what is formidable, as Socrates said, but of ways of encountering what is formidable. (1.86)
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 3, section 1230a
For the fact is the exact opposite of the view of Socrates, who thought that bravery was knowledge: sailors who know how to go aloft are not daring through knowing what things are formidable, but because they know how to protect themselves against the dangers; also courage is not merely what makes men more daring fighters, for in that case strength and wealth would be courage—as Theognis puts it:
For every man by poverty subdued.
(1.63)
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 7, section 1235a
Others hold that only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that all men actually do pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in their own persons (as the old Socrates used to say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that we throw away even parts of the body that are of no use, and finally the body itself, when it dies, as a corpse is useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt. (2.74)
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics book 8, section 1247b
Therefore this will not be a matter of fortune; but when the same result follows from indeterminate and in definite antecedents, it will be good or bad for somebody, but there will not be the knowledge of it that comes by experience, since, if there were, some fortunate persons would learn it, or indeed all branches of knowledge would, as Socrates said, be forms of good fortune. (1.67)
31 from Aristotle, Metaphysics
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 981a
To have a judgement that when Callias was suffering from this or that disease this or that benefited him, and similarly with Socrates and various other individuals, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who suffer from this or that disease (e.g. the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering from burning fever) is a matter of art. (1.67)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 981a
For it is not man that the physician cures, except incidentally, but Callias or Socrates or some other person similarly named, who is incidentally a man as well. (1.81)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 983b
Similarly we do not say that Socrates comes into being absolutely when he becomes handsome or cultured, nor that he is destroyed when he loses these qualities; because the substrate, Socrates himself, persists. (3.30)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 987b
And when Socrates, disregarding the physical universe and confining his study to moral questions, sought in this sphere for the universal and was the first to concentrate upon definition, Plato followed him and assumed that the problem of definition is concerned not with any sensible thing but with entities of another kind; for the reason that there can be no general definition of sensible things which are always changing. (1.36)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 991a
To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that fashions things on the model of the Ideas Besides, anything may both be and become like something else without being imitated from it; thus a man may become just like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not,and even if Socrates were eternal, clearly the case would be the same. (2.72)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 1, section 991b
Is it because things are other numbers, e.g. such and such a number Man, such and such another Socrates, such and such another Callias? (3.46)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 3, section 1003a
But if the common predicate be hypostatized as an individual thing, Socrates will be several beings: himself, and Man, and Animal—that is, if each predicate denotes one particular thing. (2.96)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1004b
If this is not so, who is it who in will investigate whether "Socrates " and "Socrates seated" are the same thing; or whether one thing has one contrary, or what the contrary is, or how many meanings it has? (7.20)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
But it is not in this sense—that both terms are accidents of something else—that Socrates is cultured. (1.10)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
Therefore since some accidents are predicated in the latter and some in the former sense, such as are predicated in the way that "white" is of Socrates cannot be an infinite series in the upper direction; e.g. there cannot be another accident of "white Socrates," for the sum of these predications does not make a single statement. (1.68)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 4, section 1007b
Nor can "white " have a further accident, such as "cultured"; for the former is no more an accident of the latter than vice versa; and besides we have distinguished that although some predicates are accidental in this sense, others are accidental in the sense that "cultured" is to Socrates; and whereas in the former case the accident is an accident of an accident, it is not so in the latter; and thus not all predications will be of accidents. (2.96)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1017a
Similarly too in affirmation and negation; e.g., in "Socrates is cultured" "is" means that this is true; or in "Socrates is not-white" that this is true; but in "the diagonal is not commensurable""is not" means that the statement is false. (3.86)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1018a
"Socrates" and "cultured Socrates" seem to be the same; but "Socrates" is not a class-name, and hence we do not say "every Socrates" as we say "every man. (5.20)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, section 1024b
Now in one sense there is only one definition of each thing, namely that of its essence; but in another sense there are many definitions, since the thing itself, and the thing itself qualified (e.g. "Socrates" and "cultured Socrates") are in a sense the same. (4.75)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1032a
It is obvious that the sophistical objections to this thesis are met in the same way as the question whether Socrates is the same as the essence of Socrates; for there is no difference either in the grounds for asking the question or in the means of meeting it successfully. (4.51)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1033b
The whole individual, Callias or Socrates, corresponds to "this bronze sphere," but "man" and "animal" correspond to bronze sphere in general. (1.33)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1034a
The completed whole, such-and-such a form induced in this flesh and these bones, is Callias or Socrates. (1.91)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1035b
But individually Socrates is already composed of ultimate matter; and similarly in all other cases. (1.81)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1036b
And the analogy in the case of the living thing which the younger Socrates used to state is not a good one; for it leads one away from the truth, and makes one suppose that it is possible for a man to exist without his parts, as a circle does without the bronze. (1.43)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1037a
And "Socrates" or "Coriscus" has a double sense, that is if the soul too can be called Socrates (for by Socrates some mean the soul and some the concrete person); but if Socrates means simply this soul and this body, the individual is composed similarly to the universal. (6.91)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1037b
But such things as are material or are compounded with matter are not the same as their essence; not even if they are accidentally one, e.g. Socrates and "cultured"; for these are only accidentally the same. (1.76)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1038b
Again, a substance will be present in "Socrates," who is a substance; so that it will be the substance of two things. (1.10)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 7, section 1040a
The formula, then, is general; but the sun was supposed to be an individual, like Cleon or Socrates. (2.41)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 10, section 1055b
For if we always use the word "whether" in an antithesis—e.g., "whether it is white or black," or "whether it is white or not" (but we do not ask "whether it is a man or white," unless we are proceeding upon some assumption, and asking, for instance, whether it was Cleon who came or Socrates. (1.51)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 12, section 1070a
There are three kinds of substance: (1.) matter, which exists individually in virtue of being apparent(for everything which is characterized by contact and so not by coalescence is matter and substrate; e.g. fire, flesh and head;these are all matter, and the last is the matter of a substance in the strictest sense); (2.) the "nature"(existing individually)—i.e. a kind of positive state which is the terminus of motion; and (3.) the particular combination of these, e.g. Socrates or Callias. (1.02)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 12, section 1074a
But all things which are many in number have matter (for one and the same definition applies to many individuals, e.g. that of "man"; but Socrates is one), but the primary essence has no matter, because it is complete reality. (1.76)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
Now Socrates devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was the first to seek a general definition of these(for of the Physicists Democritus gained only a superficial grasp of the subject and defined, after a fashion, "the hot" and "the cold"; while the Pythagoreans at an earlier date had arrived at definitions of some few things—whose formulae they connected with numbers—e.g., what "opportunity" is, or "justice" or "marriage"); and he naturally inquired into the essence of things;for he was trying to reason logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning is the essence. (1.51)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
There are two innovations which, may fairly be ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and general definition. (2.74)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1078b
But whereas Socrates regarded neither universals nor definitions as existing in separation, the Idealists gave them a separate existence, and to these universals and definitions of existing things they gave the name of Ideas. (1.29)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1079b
Besides, anything may both be and come to be without being imitated from something else; thus a man may become like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not,and even if Socrates were eternal, clearly the case would be the same. (4.56)
Aristotle, Metaphysics book 13, section 1086b
This theory, as we have said in an earlier passage, was initiated by Socrates as a result of his definitions, but he did not separate universals from particulars; and he was right in not separating them. (1.67)
7 from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1116b, bekker line 1
(2) Again, experience of some particular form of danger is taken for a sort of Courage; hence arose Socrates' notion that Courage is Knowledge. (2.41)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1127b, bekker line 20
These also mostly disown qualities held in high esteem, as Socrates used to do. (1.16)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1144b, bekker line 1
Hence some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of Prudence; and Socrates' line of enquiry was right in one way though wrong in another; he was mistaken in thinking thatall the virtues are forms of Prudence, but right in saying that they cannot exist without Prudence. (1.19)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1144b, bekker line 20
Socrates then thought that the virtues are principles, for he said that they are all of them forms of knowledge. (2.81)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1145b, bekker line 20
Some people say that he cannot do so when he knows the act to be wrong; since, as Socrates held, it would be strange if, when a man possessed Knowledge, some other thing should overpower it, and ‘drag it about like a slave. (1.51)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1145b, bekker line 20
In fact Socrates used to combat the view altogether, implying that there is no such thing as Unrestraint, since no one, he held, acts contrary to what is best, believing what he does to be bad, but only through ignorance. (2.06)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) bekker page 1147b, bekker line 1
But inasmuch as the last premise, which originates action, is an opinion as to some object of sense, and it is this opinion which the unrestrained man when under the influence of passion either does not possess, or only possesses in a way which as we saw does not amount to knowing it but only makes him repeat it as the drunken man repeats the maxims of Empedocles, and since the ultimate term is not a universal, and is not deemed to be an object of Scientific Knowledge in the same way as a universal term is, we do seem to be led to the conclusion which Socrates sought to establish. (1.36)
25 from Aristotle, Politics
Aristotle, Politics book 1, section 1260a
Hence it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a moral virtue of their own, and that the temperance of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor their courage and justice, as Socrates thought, but the one is the courage of command, and the other that of subordination, and the case is similar with the other virtues. (1.08)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
For example, it is possible for the citizens to have children, wives and possessions in common with each other, as in Plato's Republic, in which Socrates says that there must be community of children, women and possessions. (2.06)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
Now for all the citizens to have their wives in common involves a variety of difficulties; in particular, (1) the object which Socrates advances as the reason why this enactment should be made clearly does not follow from his arguments; also (2) as a means to the end which he asserts should be the fundamental object of the city, the scheme as actually set forth in the dialogue is not practicable; yet (3) how it is to be further worked out has been nowhere definitely stated. (1.96)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261a
I refer to the ideal of the fullest possible unity of the entire state, which Socrates takes as his fundamental principle. (0.85)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261b
Again, even granting that it is best for the community to be as complete a unity as possible, complete unity does not seem to be proved by the formula ‘if all the citizens say “Mine” and “Not mine” at the same time,’ which Socrates thinks to be a sign of thecity's being completely one. (3.46)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1261b
If it means ‘each severally,’ very likely this would more fully realize the state of things which Socrates wishes to produce (for in that case every citizen will call the same boy his son and also the same woman his wife, and will speak in the same way of property and indeed of each of the accessories of life) but ex hypothesi the citizens, having community of women and children, will not call them ‘theirs’ in this sense, but will mean theirs collectively and not severally, and similarly they will call property ‘theirs’ meaning the property of them all, not of each of them severally. (1.19)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1262b
But speaking generally such a law is bound to bring about the opposite state of things to that which rightly enacted laws ought properly to cause, and because of which Socrates thinks it necessary to make these regulations about the children and women. (1.10)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1262b
For we think that friendship is the greatest of blessings for the state, since it is the best safeguard against revolution, and the unity of the state, which Socrates praises most highly, both appears to be and is said by him to be the effect of friendship, just as we know that Aristophanes in the discourses on love describes how the lovers owing to their extreme affection desire to grow together and both become one instead of being two. (1.51)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1263b
The cause of Socrates' error must be deemed to be that his fundamental assumption was incorrect. (2.29)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
Moreover, the working of the constitution as a whole in regard to the members of the state has also not been described by Socrates, nor is it easy to say what it will be. (1.36)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
For Socrates makes the Guardians a sort of garrison, while the Farmers, Artisans and other classes are the citizens. (1.91)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264a
But quarrels and lawsuits and all the other evils which according to Socrates exist in actual states will all be found among his citizens too. (1.55)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
But again, if Socrates intends to make the Farmers have their wives in common but their property private, who is to manage the household in the way in which the women's husbands will carry on the work of the farms? (2.96)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
It is also strange that Socrates employs the comparison of the lower animals to show that the women are to have the same occupations as the men, considering that animals have no households to manage. (2.47)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
Also Socrates' method of appointing the magistrates is not a safe one. (1.81)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
But it is clear that he is compelled to make the same persons govern always, for the god-given admixture of gold in the soul is not bestowed on some at one time and others at another time, but is always in the same men, and Socrates says that at the moment of birth some men receive an admixture of gold and others of silver and those who are to be the Artisans and Farmers an admixture of copper and iron. (1.96)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
The Republic discussed by Socrates therefore possesses these difficulties and also others not smaller than these. (1.96)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1264b
For in the Republic Socrates has laid down details about very few matters—regulations about community of wives and children and about property, and the structure of the constitution (for the mass of the population is divided into two parts, one forming the Farmer class and the other the class that defends the state in war, and there is a third class drawn from these latter that forms the council and governs the state), but about the Farmers and the Artisans, whether they are excluded from government or have some part in it, and whether these classes also are to possess arms and to serve in war with the others or not, on these points Socrates has made no decision, but though he thinks that the women ought to serve in war with the Guardians and share the same education, the rest of the discourse he has filled up with external topics, and about the sort of education which it is proper for the Guardians to have. (2.98)
Aristotle, Politics book 2, section 1265a
Now it is true that all the discourses of Socrates possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness of inquiry, but it is no doubt difficult to be right about everything: for instance with regard to the size of population just mentioned it must not be over-looked that a territory as large as that of Babylon will be needed for so many inhabitants, or some other country of unlimited extent, to support five thousand men in idleness and another swarm of women and servants around them many times as numerous. (2.29)
Aristotle, Politics book 4, section 1291a
For Socrates says that the most necessary elements of which a state is composed are four, and he specifies these as a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker and a builder; and then again he adds, on the ground that these are not self-sufficient, a copper-smith and the people to look after the necessary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a retail trader. (1.10)
Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316a
The subject of revolutions is discussed by Socrates in the Republic, but is not discussed well. (2.54)
Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316a
He says that the cause is that nothing is permanent but everything changes in a certain cycle, and that change has its origin in those numbers ‘whose basic ratio 4 : 3 linked with the number 5 gives two harmonies,’—meaning whenever the number of this figure becomes cubed,—in the belief that nature sometimes engenders men that are evil, and too strong for education to influence—speaking perhaps not ill as far as this particular dictum goes (for it is possible that there are some persons incapable of being educated and becoming men of noble character), but why should this process of revolution belong to the constitution which Socrates speaks of as the best, more than to all the other forms of constitution, and to all men that come into existence? (1.70)
Aristotle, Politics book 5, section 1316b
And although there are several forms of oligarchy and of democracy, Socrates speaks of the revolutions that occur in them as though there were only one form of each. (1.29)
Aristotle, Politics book 8, section 1342a
Socrates in the Republic does not do well in allowing only the Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and that when he has rejected the flute among instruments; for the Phrygian mode has the same effect among harmonies as the flute among instruments—both are violently exciting and emotional. (0.75)
Aristotle, Politics
Therefore some musical experts also rightly criticize Socrates because he disapproved of the relaxed harmonies for amusement, taking them to have the character of intoxication, not in the sense of the effect of strong drink, for that clearly has more the result of making men frenzied revellers, but as failing in power. (1.10)
12 from Aristotle, Rhetoric
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1356b
Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to some one, and is persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because it appears to be proved by propositions that are convincing; further, no art has the particular in view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art, whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons. (2.55)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1357b
Among signs, some are related as the particular to the universal; for instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, because Socrates was both wise and just. (1.96)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1367b
We ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, for, as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among Athenians. (2.06)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1382a
Anger has always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas hatred applies to classes; for instance, every one hates a thief or informer. (1.51)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1390b
Highly gifted families often degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable into fools and dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates. (3.04)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1393b
Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of Socrates; for instance, if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for this would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those competent to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot, not by a man's knowledge. (1.91)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1398a
Also, the reason why Socrates refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favor as well as an injury. (2.23)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1398b
Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too presumptuously, said, “Our friend at any rate never spoke like that,” referring to Socrates. (1.47)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1399a
There is an instance of this in the Socrates of Theodectes: “What holy place has he profaned? (2.89)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1415b
For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that “it is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of Lacedaemonians. (1.91)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1419a
For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in the gods, asked whether he did not say that there was a divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. (3.14)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (ed. J. H. Freese) bekker page 1419a
When Meletus again said yes, Socrates rejoined, “Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without at the same time admitting that the gods exist? (2.01)
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However, other than the fact that you need to do it to make your numbers fit, even if (and that is a ridiculously huge "if") Aristotle and Phaedo were the same person, what reason do you have to move Socrates's birth and death forward, rather than moving Aristotle's birth and death backward?
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Xenophon and Plato did it, not me. They kept the history of Socrates in line with the Peloponnesian War, maybe because too many people knew he fought in the war. The war was moved back in line with an eclipse that occurs in the first year of the Olympic cycle, but isn't the precise eclipse match as would a total eclipse in Athens that occurs in January 402 BCE.
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Why is "if Phaedo and Aristotle were really the same historical reference, then Socrates would have died in 366BCE when Aristotle/Phaedo was 18 years of age" any more likely than "if Phaedo and Aristotle were really the same historical reference, then Aristotle/Phaedo would have been born in 417BCE, 18 years before Socrates's death (in 399BCE)."?
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Good question. Phaedo is historically 18 when Socrates dies. Socrates is 32 years old when the PPW starts, which starts in 403 BCE, meaning he was born in 435BCE. If Phaedo was Aristotle and Socrates died when he was 18, then he would have died in 366BCE. Socrates is generally aged at 70 when he died.
Plus, you have another problem. Socrates was the same age two of Plato's older brothers who were still at home when Socrates came around and knew Plato as a young boy. In the present scenario with Socrates born in 359BCE and Plato in 324BCE Socrates and Plato's brothers were c. 45 years older than Plato. If Plato was around 10 years of age, old enough to have a relationship with Socrates and be remembered by him as a young boy, then his brothers would have both been together and still at home at 55. (BWAHHH! oops! sorry. I couldn't help laughing!) Anyway, with the redating and Socrates being born in 435BCE, he is still older than Plato, but only by 7 years. So if Plato was 10 years old, his brothers and Socrates would have been only around 17 or 18, likely still home. Perfect.
But, by all means, just ignore all this. I'm way to "suspicious"!
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The rest of your post simply assumes your modified date for Socrates, so can be ignored until you have established why this date should be granted.
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Yes. The chronology is contingent upon the redating of Socrates. But this was just the Greek historical side of it. The true redating of the Peloponnesian War to which Socrates is inexorably linked is the redating of the eclipse that begins during the first year of the Peloponnesian War, allegedly a total eclipse over Athens. That does not fit the 431BCE eclipse as noted above.
BUT you're in the crux now! If I'm successful in confirming Xenophon changed this chronology and paid off Aristotle and Plato to help him, and can recalculate the original chronology by astronomical reference, then 56 years will be extractable from Greek history and all the dating back to the Shishak's invasion will fall by 56 years as well, 54 years adjusted by the Assyrian eponym eclipse.
Here are some rough graphics of the comparison of the 431 vs 402 BCE eclipses as far as their intensity and locations in relation to Athens.
Larsguy47
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03-27-2007, 07:56 PM
