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Veteran Member
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: Orlando
Posts: 2,014
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Hi andrewcriddle,
There does seem to be a debate over the exact year that William of Occam was excommunicated for heresy (from wikipedia):
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His work in this period became the subject of controversy, and many scholars have thought that Ockham was summoned before the Papal court of Avignon in 1324 under charges of heresy. During the Middle Ages of Europe, theologian Peter Lombard’s Sentences (1150) had become a standard work of theology, and many ambitious theological scholars wrote commentaries on it.[5] William of Ockham was among these scholarly commentators. However, Ockham’s commentary was not well received by his colleagues, or by the church authorities. In 1324, his commentary was condemned as unorthodox by a synod of bishops, and he was ordered to Avignon, France, to defend himself before a papal court.[5] For two years, he was confined to a Franciscan house, until he was condemned as a heretic in 1326.
An alternative theory, recently proposed by George Knysh, suggests that he was initially appointed in Avignon as a professor of philosophy in the Franciscan school, and that his disciplinary difficulties did not begin until 1327.[6] It is generally believed that these charges were levied by Oxford chancellor John Lutterell.[7] It was in this year that the Franciscan Minister General, Michael of Cesena, had been summoned to Avignon, to answer charges of heresy. A theological commission had been asked to review his Commentary on the Sentences, and it was during this that Ockham found himself involved in a different debate. Michael of Cesena had asked Ockham to review arguments surrounding Apostolic poverty. (The most uncompromising Franciscans, known as spirituals, believed that Jesus and his apostles owned no personal property, and survived by begging and accepting the gifts of others[8]). This brought them into conflict with Pope John XXII.
Eventually, fearing imprisonment and possible execution, Ockham, Michael of Cesena and other Franciscan sympathizers fled Avignon on 26 May 1328, and eventually took refuge in the court of the Holy Roman Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria - who was also engaged in dispute with the papacy, and became Ockham's patron.[5] After studying the works of John XXII and previous papal statements, Ockham agreed with the Minister General. In return for protection and patronage Ockham wrote treaties that argued for King Louis to have supreme control over church and state in the Holy Roman Empire.[5] For doing this Ockham was solemnly excommunicated by Pope John XXII, while Ockham believed that John XXII was himself guilty of heresy for refusing to accept the Franciscan claim.[3] However, though Ockham was excommunicated, his philosophy was never officially condemned.
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While a theologian, it should be noted that theology was only a part of William's interests and work. This can be seen in this summary from an article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
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2. Writings
Ockham's writings are conventionally divided into two groups: the so called “academic” writings and the “political” ones. By and large, the former were written or at least begun while Ockham was still in England, while the latter were written toward the end of Ockham's Avignon period and later, in exile.[9] With the exception of his Dialogue, a huge political work, all are now available in modern critical editions, and many are now translated into English, in whole or in part.[10] The academic writings are in turn divided into two groups: the “theological” works and the “philosophical” ones, although both groups are essential for any study of Ockham's philosophy.
Among Ockham's most important writings are:
Academic Writings
Theological Works
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1317–18). Book I survives in an ordinatio or scriptum—a revised and corrected version, approved by the author himself for distribution. Books II-IV survive only as a reportatio—a transcript of the actually delivered lectures, taken down by a “reporter,” without benefit of later revisions or corrections by the author.
Seven Quodlibets (based on London disputations held in 1322–24, but revised and edited in Avignon 1324–25).
Philosophical Works
Logical Writings
Expositions of Porphyry's Isagoge and of Aristotle's Categories, On Interpretation, and Sophistic Refutations (1321–24).
Summa of Logic (c. 1323–25). A large, independent and systematic treatment of logic and semantics.
Treatise on Predestination and God's Foreknowledge with Respect to Future Contingents (1321–24).
Writings on Natural Philosophy
Exposition of Aristotle's Physics (1322–24). A detailed, close commentary. Incomplete.
Questions on Aristotle's Books of the Physics (before 1324). Not strictly a commentary, this work nevertheless discusses a long series of questions arising out of Aristotle's Physics.
Political Writings
Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope (1340–41).
The Work of Ninety Days (1332–34).
Letter to the Friars Minor (1334).
Short Discourse (1341–42).
Dialogue (c. 1334–46).
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When examining the theological works, it would be more appropriate, I think, to describe them as highly unusual and unorthodox, rather than more-or-less orthodox. This excerpt from the International Encyclopedia of Philosophy indicates this:
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Theology
a. Fideism
Despite his departures from orthodoxy and his conflict with the papacy, Ockham never renounced Catholicism. He steadfastly embraced fideism, the view that belief in God is a matter of faith alone. Although fideism was soon to become common among Protestant thinkers, it was not so common among medieval Catholics. At the beginning of the Middle Ages, Augustine proposed a proof of the existence of God and promoted the view that reason is faith seeking understanding. While the standard approach for any medieval philosopher would be to recognize a role for both faith and reason in religion, Ockham makes an uncompromising case for faith alone.
Three assertions reveal Ockham to be a fideist.
i. Theology is Not a Science
The word “science” comes from the Latin word “scientia,” meaning knowledge. In the first book of his Sentences, Peter Lombard raises the issue of whether and in what sense theology is a science. Most philosophers commenting on the Sentences found a way to cast faith as a way of knowing. Ockham, however, makes no such effort. As a staunch empiricist, Ockham is committed to the thesis that all knowledge comes from experience. Yet we have no experience of God. It follows inescapably that we have no knowledge of God, as Ockham affirms in the following passage:
In order to demonstrate the statement of faith that we formulate about God, what we would need for the central concept is a simple cognition of the divine nature in itself—what someone who sees God has. Nevertheless, we cannot have this kind of cognition in our present state. [Quodlibetal Questions, pp. 103-4]
By “present state” Ockham is referring to life on earth as a human being. Just as we now have knowledge of others through intuitive cognitions of their individual essences, those who go to heaven (if there ever are any such) will have knowledge of God through intuitive cognitions of his essence. Until then we can only hope.
ii. The Trinity is a Logical Contradiction
The Trinity is the core Christian doctrine according to which God is three persons in one. Christians traditionally consider the Trinity a mystery, meaning that it is beyond the comprehension of the human mind. Ockham goes so far as to admit that it is a blatant contradiction. He displays the problem through the following syllogism:
According to the doctrine of the Trinity:
(1) God is the Father,
and,
(2) Jesus is God.
Therefore, by transitivity, according to the doctrine of the Trinity:
(3) Jesus is the Father.
Yet, according to the doctrine of the Trinity, Jesus is not the Father.
So, according to the doctrine of the Trinity, Jesus both is and is not the Father.
Providing precedent for a recent presidential defense, many medieval philosophers suggested that the transitive inference to the conclusion is broken by different senses of the word “is.” Scotus creatively argues that the logic of the Trinity is an opaque context that does not obey the usual rules. For Ockham, however, this syllogism establishes that theology is not logical and must never be mixed with philosophy.
iii. There Is No Evidence of Purpose in the Natural World
Living prior to the advent of Christianity, Aristotle never believed in the Trinity. He does, however, seem to believe in a supernatural force that lends purpose to all of nature. This is evident in his doctrine of the Four Causes, according to which every existing thing requires a fourfold explanation. Ockham would cast these four causes in terms of the following four questions:
First Cause: What is it made of?
Second Cause: What does it do?
Third Cause: What brought it about?
Fourth Cause: Why does it do what it does?
Most medieval philosophers found Aristotle’s four causes conducive to the Christian worldview, assimilating the fourth cause to the doctrine of divine providence, according to which everything that happens is ultimately part of God’s plan.
Though Ockham was reluctant to disagree with Aristotle, he was so determined to keep theology separate from science and philosophy, that he felt compelled to criticize the fourth (which he calls “final”) cause. Ockham writes,
If I accepted no authority, I would claim that it cannot be proved either from statements known in themselves or from experience that every effect has a final cause…. Someone who is just following natural reason would claim that the question “why?” is inappropriate in the case of natural actions. For he would maintain that it is no real question to ask something like, “For what reason is fire generated?” [Quodlibetal Questions, pp. 246-9]
No doubt Ockham put his criticism in hypothetical, third-person terms because he knew that openly asserting that the universe itself may be entirely purposeless would never pass muster with the powers that be.
b. Against the Proofs of God’s Existence
Needless to say, Ockham rejects all of the alleged proofs of the existence of God.
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Thus, he holds the positions that theology is not a science, we have no knowledge of God, the Trinity is a logical contradiction, there may be no purpose in the universe, and the existence of God cannot be proved. He does not sound like a more-or-less orthodox Christian to me, but a most unorthodox one.
He lays the foundations for the Humanism and Renaissance of the 15th Century, the Protestantism of the 16th Century, the Deism and Enlightenment of the 18th Century, the Liberalism and Atheism of the 19th Century and the Socialism and Communism of the 20th century, and the Postmodernism of the 21st Century.
Warmly,
Jay Raskin
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Originally Posted by andrewcriddle
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Originally Posted by PhilosopherJay
As for the others you listed, the four philosophers should not be on the list, if we are looking for smart people who endorse the the inerrancy or supernatural nature of the Bible.
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William of Occam was condemned as a heretic in 1326. He was considered a nominalist or conceptualist when it came to Plato's universals. This was in direct opposition to Christians like Saint Augustine who regarded them as real. His denial of supernatural explanations as the best explanations helped to lead to empiricism and modern science.
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William_of_Ockham held a strong view of the authority of the Bible. His disbelief in the possibilty of discovering spiritual truth by the unaided human intellect combined with his more-or-less orthodox Christianity required him to place a strong emphasis on divine revelation.
The criticisms of some of Ockham's philosophical positions in 1326 or 1327 apparently did not lead to his condemnation as a heretic. However he was later excommunicated for denouncing John XXII as a false pope.
Andrew Criddle |
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01-08-2012, 01:15 PM
