fast

Can we objectively draw any objective conclusions within the same categories of harm, then infer moral conclusions? By categories, I mentioned earlier that we can harm people financially, emotionally, and physically; moreover, there are many more ways to harm people.

If we're not comparing across different categories like safety versus freedom and instead within the same category, can we then come to any objective conclusions concerning harm then infer any moral conclusions?

Example: A doctor needs to cut off a finger from his patient, but he does not like this person and decides that cutting off the patient’s hand would satisfy his need for vengeance. However, he realizes that doing so would be identified as malpractice, but he feels as though he can cut off three fingers without being questioned. He's about to choose the decided option to cut off three fingers instead of the whole hand.

When comparing the future harm of cutting off the fingers versus the hand, we can compare the intentional inflictions of harm and determine that cutting off the hand is more harmful, right? Since this is in the same category, can we then infer that it's more morally wrong to cut off the hand (yet still immoral either way) since the harm of cutting off the hand is more than cutting off the fingers? Let's never mind the immorality of the cover-up present with the fingers that's not present with the hand.

JamesBannon

Fast,
Presented with a scenario like this the answer is obvious: objective harm has been done to the patient since the amount of harm inflicted, whatever the reason, exceeds that which is necessary to solve the problem. Proving that it was an immoral act, however, is much more difficult as in this case it all turns on the doctor's (presumably hidden) motivation - revenge.

fast

I'm not sure how to take this. On the one hand, are you saying that we cannot prove that it's immoral, or are you saying that we cannot prove the harmful intention? I'm not trying to prove harmful intention...I'm assuming harmful intention.

Let's say the doctor tells one hundred people about what he's going to do prior to the act. These one hundred people come from all walks of life. 99 of them agree that it's a harmful act. It matters not what the single one says in his opinion that it's not, for it's not actually an opinion. It's his conclusion about the fact, which can be shown to be wrong due to fallacious reasoning. The single person thinks it's subjective of us to say it's harmful, and assume he truly believes that it's not harmful...that of course does not matter. It's factual and not a matter of opinion.

Regardless, we now know (as you and I are two of the 100); therefore, proof that his action is going to done is proof positive enough to make a judgment in that what he's going to do is harmful, assuming he carries through with it. Hell, we should know (by my use of the term harm) that even if he only cuts off one finger, then it's still harmful--Remember, it's a harmful act regardless of morality--it's harmful despite our subjectivity. We have demonstrated 'excessive' harm.

Now, back to your comment. I have dealt with the possibility that we cannot prove intention. We know his vengeful intentions, and we know what he will do can be considered excessive harm. What moral implications do we have beyond our agreement or disagreement in regards to the moral nature of the act?

Two important paragraphs:

Since I'm still contending with the premise that morality is subjective, I have to consider that our agreement that it's immoral is irrelevant. Yet, at the same time, I'm compelled to note the strong correlation between our subjective conclusions of immorality is tightly tied in with the objectively identified 'excessive harm'.

Homing in a little more: Many subjective opinions in regards to morality are based on objective harm where the harm is sometimes fallaciously misunderstood thereby rendering the objective analyses of harm whereby the subjective basis of morality becomes skewed. In other words, our ability to fully comprehend the objectiveness of the situation may more directly affect our agreement in regards to the morality of the act. I find this to be a fascinating connection bridging the gap (a little closer) between the objectivity of harm and the subjectivity of morality.

JamesBannon

Fast,

I do not see it that way and this situation as you describe it causes no difficulty IMHO. The victim has suffered objective harm and the doctor's intent was malicious, therefore the act is immoral. We are always going to have the problems of object-subject identity, cultural interference and the is-ought gap to deal with no matter what we do. However, this does not of necessity imply that we are stuck and can make no practical judgement on the matter.

Note also that I do not agree that morality is always inherently relative or subjective. It is as objective in the same way that we as sentient creatures are objective but there will always be a subjective component to deal with and we, practically, deal with this through universalising our moral concepts.

fast

:notworthy

I actually agree; however, I do not feel that we are in the majority around here.

JamesBannon

Fast,

I don't feel we're in the majority either and that's a bit sad! I think people sometimes lose sight of what it's like to actually live in our world when they go on to the philosophical astral plane: most people simply don't live there. They're too worried about starving, being brutalised, tortured, raped, infected, working 16 hours for $2 / day and such to be worried, or even care, about we amateur & professional "intellectuals" have to say about objectivity, relativity and all the rest of our bloody bullshit!

GoodLittleAtheist

I think maybe people deny the harm (on either side) because it makes the dilemma go away. If there is only harm on one side of the equation, then the moral question is pretty straightforward.

This is where you lose me if you want to talk about objective harm. If we open it up to emotional harm, doesn't that open the door to the situation you were trying to avoid before: a homophobe that is 'distressed' by 'immoral' lifestyles? Isn't he emotionally harmed? Maybe you could get around it by saying that homosexuals aren't attempting to harm him, but if the homophobe makes his harm known, then aren't homosexuals deciding that the emotional harm to themselves (not being able to live freely) outweighs any emotional harm to the homophobe? [seinfeld]Not that there's anything wrong with that! [/seinfeld]

Honestly? I would say they are about equal. That is, if I was on a jury trying two different doctors for hand versus multiple fingers, I'd probably give them an equal sentence. Chopping off three fingers certainly isn't sufficiently better morally to warrant less punishment IMO. (Interesting that when I read 'chopping off a hand is morally worse', it sounds correct, but when I switch it around to its implication 'cutting off three fingers is morally better' I balk....) I would, however, award a larger sum to the person who lost the entire hand as it would have a larger negative impact upon their life.

fast

One is either harmed or they are not, objectively so. How one can be harmed is in any number of ways. One can be emotionally harmed, objectively so.

This is tricky. It's not so much difficult as it can be an emotionally charged subject for many.

If we follow the construct that many acts bring with it at least some form of elemental harm, then even the distress of a homophobe can be considered as a potential factor. However, I do not want to use this as an example because a better example is needed, for when the harm by the homophobe is self inflicted, then the source of the harm ought not be attributed to the purportedly immoral homosexual.

We have to move away from an idea that something is wrong just because we sense within us that something is wrong." If we can objectively show and make a person understand that an individual is fallacious in the espousal of their subjective opinion in regards to harm, then the deviation of the alternative camps who espouse their subjective opinions of morality will lessen. Morality may be subjective, but an objective understanding of harm may just change how we view morality...just a tad.

Eight bounced checks is financially better than fifteen bounced checks. One can be in financially better situation by losing only eight times the NSF fees than fifteen times the NSF fees. It may very well still be bad that we lose only one person in a war, but bad as it may be, it's still better (by count) than many fold that many. It's better to cut our losses than not. It may be bad for the father to break a child's arm out of neglect, but it's a far cry better for that than to have a father to kill by shaking the child to death. Objectively, a negative number on a number line is higher or lower than another negative number on that same number line.

GoodLittleAtheist

Right. So obviously cutting off three fingers is worse than cutting off a hand. That's three separate cuts.

:devil1:

I need to think more about the self-inflicted harm...

fast

, good one!

I suppose we could differentiate between the various characteristics within the same category of physical harm and make notations to each in those regards. We could then objectively examine the merits or physical harm of each characteristic and in the case of the "actual number of cuts", we could conclude that on the basis of actual cut count, three fingers being cut would indeed be more harmful (on that basis). We could then move onto functionality, loss of body tissue, etc.

If I do not like blacks, and if I'm irritated when I see them, then the irritation stems from my own mind and thus the irritation is not a causal effect from the presence of blacks. Yes, one that is irritated by blacks would not be irritated if blacks were not around, but that is not to say that the true source of the irritation (though many speak like that's the case) is from the presence of blacks. Instead, the harmful irritation (harmful in that it's something that eats away inside the prejudice mind) is stemmed from and promulgated by his/her and other prejudice minds.