Pixnaps

I recently came across one of the professors at Crooked Timber, explaining his favourite moral theory:

"It�s a form of consequentialism, so in general it says the better actions are those that make for better worlds... What�s distinctive is how we say which worlds are better: w1 is better than w2 iff behind the veil of ignorance we�d prefer to be in w1 to w2."

For those unfamiliar with the Rawlsian "Veil of Ignorance" (VoI), i'll try to explain it briefly (i'm not an expert on it though, so please correct me if i'm wrong):

Basically, someone in the "Original Position" (behind the VoI) doesn't know anything about who they are, their particular skills/abilities/talents, or social class, wealth, race, gender, etc etc.

All that you know about yourself is your personality & character (i.e. purely internal, personal things), you know nothing at all about your social position. You're basically just a disembodied mind.

This "veil of ignorance" is useful because it effectively removes all possible bias, so any decisions made behind the veil (eg to tax the rich and look after the poor & homeless) are made fairly, in everybody's best interest (rather than just the best interest of the rich & powerful / ruling class).

Now that you know what the veil is, hopefully this moral theory makes more sense then... basically, to decide whether an action is moral or not, you simply think of each possible action (in a particular situation) as splitting off into a parallel world, and then ask which world you would prefer to live in, if you were behind the veil of ignorance when making that decision.

this is such a huge improvement on simple utilitarianism and such, I think it would have to be the most convincing moral theory i've ever come across. I can't imagine a better, fairer, way of deducing morality.

What do you think?

nessa20x

Do you think a VoI is possible given human nature?

Alonzo Fyfe

My first question is whether you have read the utilitarianism thread in its relationship to this issue.

I have four problems with veil-of-ignorance moral theories.


The Logical Problem

The first is logical. It does not follow logically, that because I would make a particular decision in a hypothetical world it does not follow that I should make the same decision in this world. I can ask, "What would I choose to do in a hypothetical world in which the fire alarm just went off?" Chances are I would grab my coat and head outside. However, it does not follow from this that I should grab my coat and go outside in the real world where the fire alarm remains silent.

The premise that I am behind a veil of ignorance is a false premise, and one cannot build a sound argument on a false premise.


Of how much are we ignorant?

The second problem has two elements; two sides of the same coin. Behind a veil of ignorance, either the veil is too thin to have any effect on our decisions, or we are too ignorant to make choices. Both options arise from the question: "Of what, exactly, are we supposed to be ignorant?"

If I were a fundamentalist Christian, under a veil of ignorance, I would still want a world that gave Christianity all sorts of advantages. Outside of a veil of ignorance I may discover that I am a Muslim, but behind a veil of ignorance I would select a system that had the best chance possible of convincing this Muslim of the error of his ways and convert him to Christianity.

Or, we could hold that behind the veil of ignorance, I am also supposed to be ignorant of my real-world views regarding religion. Then, are we supposed to also be ignorant of the causes of disease? Many peoples' views on this regard are closely tied to their religion in such a way that it seems contradictory to say that they are to be behind a veil of ignorance regarding religious matters but not with regard to matters regarding the cause of disease. Others hold that the lack of proper faith in a country makes it vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters; God removes his special protection. Is this view allowed behind a veil of ignorance, or blocked?

Even as an atheist, I hold religion to be in error and, as such, a foundation of much mischief and poor choices. Am I to carry these beliefs with me behind the veil of ignorance. If so, then even here I would say, "even if I were a Christian or a Muslim in the real world, my beliefs would be in error, and I would want a system in which they would be corrected?" Or am I to be ignorant of all matters of fact that are relevant to these different world views, and hold the truth of all world views as equally likely? If the former, then I will hold behind a veil of ignorance the same views I hold in life. If the latter, I will be too ignorant to make any decisions at all, let alone wise decisions that I think should carry through to all people in the real world.


Desires

The third problem asks a parallel question about desires. I hold that all meaningful value claims relate objects of evaluation to desires and says of those objects of evaluation, "It is such as to fulfill the desires in question." The only issue remains, what are the desires in question? This question is as valid behind the veil of ignorance as it is in front of the veil. In making a choice behind a veil of ignorance, I am asking to evaluate the truth of the proposition, "Is this option such as to fulfill the desires in question?" And I ask the same question in return; "What are the desires in question?"

As a point of clarification, please note that the previous section concerned which beliefs we are allowed to carry with us behind the veil of ignorance. This question asks about which of our desires we are allowed to bring. Beliefs and desires are not the same thing, so this issue is not to be interpreted as simply expressing the previous issue in different words.

Yet, the question here is parallel. Which desires are relevant behind the veil of ignorance? Am I to fulfill only my own desires? This seems to be what is implied by saying that the answer is what I would choose behind a veil of ignorance. My choice is based on my desires; and if I am ignorant of those desires than I have nothing upon which I can base any type of choice.

Or am I to base the decision on how the object of evaluation would fulfill all desires, as if I am aware of all of the desires that exist but not aware of which are mine and which belong to others? If this is the model that we are being asked, then we really do not have a "veil of ignorance" theory at all. Rather, this would fall into a class of theories known as "benevolent impartial observer" theories. Moral value would depend on the option that a benevolent impartial observer would choose. The theory really makes no use of a 'veil of ignorance', though the 'benevolent impartial observer' is just as fictitious as the 'veil of ignorance.'

There is one final important point to make about both options presented here. The relationship between objects of evaluation and a particular set of desires -- the answer to the question of whether an object is "such as to fulfill the desires in question, or not" -- is a question that we can answer without postulating any fictitious entities such as veils of ignorance or impartial observers. In fact, it is a question most easily answered in the absence of any ignorance whatsoever; ignorance simply hides the relevant facts that allow us to determine the truth of the matter. The veil of ignorance, on this model, does not reveal the best answer, but hides it.


The Purpose of the Veil

The fourth problem, and last, addresses a comment by some that the 'veil of ignorance' is to ethics what massless strings and frictionless pullies are to physics. Ignoring the mass of the string and the coefficient of friction for the pully puts the physicst behind her own 'veil of ignorance'. It is a useful trick, because it simplifies the problems that the physicist is addressing, and makes it easier to evaluate the answer. Of course, the answer is not accurate, but sometimes it is useful to exchange a bit of accuracy to obtain some simplicity.

However, the physicist is not likely to suggest that the massless string and frictionless pully theory stands on its own in competition with other theories in the field of physics. She will not likely argue that the answer that comes from some assumptions is better than and should replace the answer that would be given by theories that assume strings have mass and pullies have friction. She is not at all likely to do what the veil of ignorance ethicists do and suggest that the assumptions lead to answers that are MORE accurate than those of the theories they approximate.

Or, perhaps, we should view the veil of ignorance the way that scientists view the double-blind experiment. Scientists are well aware of the ways in which an individual can 'see' what they want to see when conducting an experiment. To get around this problem, scientists put their researchers behind a veil of ignorance. The research physician does not know if this patient is getting the drug being tested or the placebo, so he cannot have his desire to see the drug succeed cloud his observations concerning the effects on the patients. Observers are not told which child suffered a trauma and which did not, so she cannot 'see' problems with the abused child that would confirm her prejudices.

The ethical veil of ignorance may play this type of role in ethics. Ethicists are no less likely than research scientists to see their favorite theory confirmed in their observations. So, a veil of ignorance may be useful in removing those prejudices.

However, when the research doctor is asked for an explanation of how the drug works to cure the disease, or how childhood trauma affects behavior, she is not likely to incorporate any mention of the double-blind experiment as part of the explanation of cause and affect. These elements are a part of the testing procedure, but they are not a part of the theory being tested.

Similarly, if we conceive of the ethical veil of ignorance in this way, the veil, properly conceived, may become a useful tool for getting around certain biases in our testing of different ethical theories. But it does not become an ethical theory in its own right. The best it can hope for is to remain outside of ethics looking in.

Yet, even as a heuristic for removing our prejudices, the veil of ignorance fails. Its advocates boast how it circumvents utilitarian issues. Yet, how does it do so? It says to the person who employs the veil of ignorance, "if you do not like that answer, toss it out." And it is tossed out for no other reason than the person using the veil of ignorance does not like it. The rejection is not grounded in any way on reason or principle. It is grounded solely upon the decision-maker's tastes, his prejudices.


Conclusion

The veil of ignorance suffers from a number of problems.

(1) It invites us to base moral conclusions on false premise, because in truth there is no veil of ignorance, and what a person may decide in a hypothetical fantasy situation is not relevant to the decisions he should make in the real world where those fictions and lies do not exist.

(2) The veil of ignorance either leaves us too ignorant to make decisions, or allows us to carry so much information with us that our decisions will do nothing but conform the prejudices we carry with ourselves in life.

(3) In considering which desires are relevant in evaluating moral claims, the veil of ignorance is worthless. Relationships between states of affairs and desires are things that can be known, and probably best known, without any veil whatsoever.

(4) As a heuristic for removing prejudice, the veil of ignorance would not be a competing theory to hold up in competition to other theories. It is merely a way of getting inaccurate but, perhaps, simplified answers divorced from certain prejudices. Yet, even in this respect, it would fail, because it invites us to carry our prejudices with us, rather than leave them behind.

I believe that this feature of veil-of-ignorance theories is what makes them appealing. In effect, these theories tell each person, 'You know all those prejudices and concerns you have that you think have moral significance. Well, you're right. They do. Whatever you believe you will discover that those are the choices you will support behind a veil of ignorance. And, furthermore, using this theory you can delude yourself into thinking that everybody else in this fictitious world agrees with you?"

It is a theory that holds before its user a fantasy world where their own prejudices reign supreme and all other citizens worship those prejudices as the user does. What's not to like?

Pixnaps

thanks for your reply.
i believe your "logical problem" is mistaken, however:

That's not how anyone uses the veil, though. There is no premise that you are in fact behind the veil, so your objection (that the situation is counterfactual) is... well... pointless.

Note that morality is normative, not descriptive... we are asking what people should do, not what they in fact do. To object to the veil because it isn't real, is about as logical as objecting to utilitarianism because in the real world happiness is not "in fact" maximised :P

To demonstrate, here is a simple moral argument:
------------------
1. An action is moral iff the alternative world it creates is the one i would rather live in, when judging from behind the veil of ignorance.

2. Going on a killing spree would create w1, whereas sitting at home reading a book would create w2.

3. if i were behind the veil, i would rather live in w2 than w1

Therefore: it is more moral to read books than to go on killing sprees.
------------------

okay, i just made that up then, so obviously it's pretty lame. But you get the idea. None of those premises are necessarily false...
Premise 1 give us the basic normative assumption of Veil consequentialism.
Premise 2 is the tedious practical details

Premise 3 is the critical one... the judgement from behind the veil... of course if you dissected it (which is totally inappropriate when dealing with counterfactuals like this), then you could find a false atom ("if i were behind the veil"). But for the argument i've spelled out here, what matters is not the atoms, but how they join together to form the full premise... and that premise as a whole, is true, not false.

So i think it is quite possible to have sound moral arguments based on Veil consequentialism.

Your other points are well taken though, i'll respond to them some other time

P.S. no, i haven't had time to read the utilitarianism thread yet (i'm new here, you might have noticed ), but i certainly plan to at some stage.

Pixnaps

hmm, i was hoping that with a bit of thought i'd be able to come up with some witty refutation of your other points, but alas, i simply don't think i'm capable of such a thing... your arguments are too convincing! :notworthy

so instead i'll just discuss a couple of related issues i find interesting:

First of all, the question of how much personal 'baggage' we carry with us behind the veil, is (i think) an intriguing one... Since if we retain any personal characteristics (differentiating us from other people), then it means that different people will make different judgements from behind the veil. And that would imply a form of moral relativism, whereby different things truly are "moral" for different people.

But that isn't how I envisaged the veil. Rather, I thought you would become just some generic proto-human, making rational decisions in order to maximise the chances of you "inheriting" a good life once the veil has lifted.

Do you think the theory would simply collapse into Utilitarianism if carried out in such a way? Though i guess that depends on how we suppose a generic proto-human judges the "good life" - which brings us to the problems you outline in your "desires" section. hmmm...

Oh well, i guess i'm going to have to abandon Veil Consequentialism as being less than the bullet-proof "moral theory" i had hoped for :boohoo:

Still, i think it is USEFUL, in a rule-of-thumb sort of sense, rather like the Golden Rule is. It's aims are noble, at least, and i think that to bear in mind the sort of impartiality that it aspires to, would be generally beneficial when considering moral questions.

Bellarmino

Based on this description of veil consequentialism, it seems just like theistic morality -- what would an omniscient being want me to do?

Pixnaps

"theistic morality"?
*shudder*

But so long as the omniscient being in question is purely hypothetical, that's not really "theistic morality" at all, but rather a form of "Ideal Observer" theory.

but that's not really what it's asking at all... more like "what would i do if i didn't know who i was?".
which just sounds nonsensical now, hehe. oh well. hopefully you get what i mean :banghead: