dongiovanni1976x

We must assume that we can only perceive things empirically unless proven otherwise. And if we can only perceive things empirically then those things that are non-empirical will be unknown to us.

So what then, would constitute an empirically observable supernatural phenomena?

Amaleq13

Of course it does. It was an accurate description of the known evidence and that changed subsequent to the new evidence. It became wrong.

If only one corresponds to the observed evidence there can be no case made for retaining the one that no longer does.

Could you provide an example of this, please? It does not appear to describe how science is actually conducted on this planet.

Here is how I'm using the terms:

god: A being of supernatural powers or attributes, believed in and worshiped by a people, especially a male deity thought to control some part of nature or reality.

supernatural: Of or relating to existence outside the natural world.

One that could be confirmed to exist by observation.

Number two, I think.

An empirically verifiable god would require a redefinition of what is and is not "supernatural".

dongiovanni1976x

I think you are equivocating the peripheral interpretation of the law (that being whether it is right or wrong) with the law itself.

If a law said X + Y = Z, but then someone observed that in one case X + Y equaled Q, then the new law is X + Y = Z or Q. Whether you or your neighbor believe that this is the case is when we apply some form of adjectivial veracity to the new observation. It does nothing to change the old law. there are plenty of old laws that hardly anyone believes in anymore.

dongiovanni1976x

Just look at the split in the Middle Ages over Ptolemaic CIRCLES, or the Earth being the center of the universe, or interpretations of light or quantum mechanics etc etc etc
Two laws can be in competition simultaneously.

dongiovanni1976x

As scientists we would then adjust the law accordingly to fit the apparent contradiction. This is my point. If we observe any phenomena that CONTRADICTS a law we already assume as true, we change the law to fit the phenomena. We cannot investigate supernatural causes unless they are empirical in origin, but by definition, supernatural is above nature and thus has no empirical residue for us to trace, or test, its origins.

Amaleq13

And the old law is now factually incorrect which constitutes a rather dramatic change in its essential features.

It clearly renders it inaccurate and, therefore, no longer a "natural law" and, therefore, changed.

Yes and that is because no longer accurately describe the known evidence.

Natural "law" is contingent upon the known evidence and, as a result, are clearly subject to change. Thus, they are not "immutable".

Notions of "immutability" are as foreign to science as notions of "certainty". Both require faith.

I think you are confusing competing theories with a "natural law". It makes no sense that competing theories should be called laws because the definition of the latter is that it has shown itself to be the most accurate description of the available evidence. When scientists don't know which theory best describes the evidence, they don't refer to any of them as "law".

And that is why it is incorrect to refer to "natural laws" as immutable.

Merzbow42

I still hold that it is possible to empirically deduce the existence of a supernatural God. Let's assume we observe a blatant violation of physical laws. There are two possible explanations for this violation:

1. Our understanding of the physical laws violated is incorrect, and so we have to come up with a set of new laws.
2. The laws violated still hold, and were temporarily suspended by a supernatural being who is unconstrained by the laws of our universe.

I would say that in many cases we can imagine, explanation 2 is MORE likely than explanation 1. For example, let us assume that tomorrow, scientists across the world observe that copper weighs more than lead. But only for tomorrow.

What is the more PROBABLE explanation - that the simple, elegant physical laws that describe the mass and density of physical elements are in fact so grossly more complex than we imagined?

Or does it make more sense that a God who is unconstrained by these laws simply lifted them for a day?

I would find the latter explanation far more convincing. It is beyond credulity to believe that among all these elegant physical laws we must now introduce a hideously complex piece of mathematics that only has an effect on that particular day in the history of the universe. In fact, I would argue that introducing such an out-of-place deus ex machina into our physical laws is qualitatively no different than assuming a supernatural God.

jjramsey

What the alternate universe demonstrates is that miracles aren't inherently improbrable simply because they are miracles, but rather because of particulars external to the concept of "miracle" that happen to be true within the world we live. In that particular hypothetical alternate universe, there was still natural law, but trying to track down evidence of a miracle was a trivial affair, rather than the wild goose chase that it is in the real world.

No, it is because alleged miracles consistently lack supporting evidence that miracles are improbable in practice.

ETA: I think we need to clarify just what we mean by "improbable." There are events that are not that frequent, but they aren't considered improbable in ordinary parlance. I haven't gone to McDonalds all that recently, but that doesn't make it improbable that I will go to one in the near future. Furthermore, the fact that I don't go to McDonalds regularly does not make me going to McDonalds improbable. Miracles, by their nature, have to be infrequent enough such that there is a natural law against which a miracle can be contrasted. However, it is not incoherent to conceive of miracles happening at a regular rate, as in the hypothetical alternate universe that I described above. It is also not incoherent to conceive of miracles as happening as sporadically as I visit McDonalds.

Amaleq13

All words are defined by the particulars of the world within which we live and miracles are improbable because they are not expected to happen often and that is what the word "improbable" means.

The absence of supporting evidence for an event says nothing about how often one would expect it to occur and "improbable" only refers to the latter.

It is because, as you have already acknowledged, miracles are not expected to occur often that they are improbable and that is simply because that is what "improbable" means.

Ben C Smith

I am not very philosophically inclined, and I am certain there will be no shortage of qualified personnel eager to correct me here if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that the following statement by Craig is a non sequitur (from page 17 of the transcript):

In order to show that that hypothesis is improbable, you'd have to show that God's existence is improbable.

I do not see how granting the existence of God raises the likelihood of a miracle from either impossible or barely possible to probable. (IOW, I think we can call a miracle improbable even if we do not deny the existence of God.)

Ehrman expressed inductive science with his example of throwing bars of soap and bars of iron into tubs of water a few thousand times. After a while almost any observer will grant that iron sinks and soap floats, and will be able to predict the next few thousand results, as well. Ehrman then extends this principle to the notion of resurrection; billions of people die without being resurrected to eternal life. Most observers will be able to extrapolate for the next few billion deaths, as well.

But what Ehrman states naturalistically I could easily rephrase theologically. I could observe that, granting the existence of God, this God that exists must have no detectable interest in making soap sink or iron float (since thousands of experiments all lead to the same result). I can also observe that God must have no detectable interest in raising up corpses to eternal life (since billions of deaths, with no proven counterexamples, have all led to corpses that stay put). Why, then, would God have shown an interest in raising one particular corpse in history?

There may be a good answer to that last question, but my point is that this argument that Craig produces, that to call the resurrection improbable necessarily entails calling the existence of God improbable, does not follow. Even if God exists (and I am indeed a theist) and is able to raise corpses from the dead, he does not necessarily do so all the time, or even occasionally; in fact, it is quite possible that God has never raised one.

To put it another way, if doubting a miracle entails doubting the existence of God, then those who believe that God exists can never doubt any miracle. All miracles suddenly become not only possible but indeed probable.

But again, I am no philosopher.

Ben.

ETA: It also appears to me that, when (on page 17 again) Craig accuses Ehrman of not dealing with the second term of the denominator of the probability formula, he has actually ignored a few statements by Ehrman, who on pages 12 and 13 expressly says that his made-up nonresurrection scenario is more probable than a miracle.

Craig reduces the formula to X / X + Y, and seems to think that Ehrman has ignored Y, but he has not. He has told us that any nonmiraculous version Y is more probable than a miraculous version Y. Craig may disagree, but I do not think he can accuse Ehrman of ignoring the Y term.