Prof

What are you thanking connick for? If you think somehow he just gave some support for your position then you clearly didn't read or understand what he wrote, especially what followed from the quote you gave. Read it again: The point is this discussion is about justifying...that is arguing for... what position you take on God's morality. Connik merely pointed out that in the context of this discussion if you SIMPLY ASSUME God's goodness you are begging the question; assuming what you are being asked to justify. You are producing a logical fallacy.

You have to JUSTIFY choosing one or the other horn of the Euthyphro dilemma. Which you have not been able to do in any cogent manner.



I know. And I keep pointing out that every time you try to argue or justify that proposition you have appealed to principles that fall apart when examined. They amount to special pleading - another logical fallacy.
I don't care what you believe: I'm just asking to see if it's logical/reasonable or not. So far it fails.


None of which establishes why anyone but you ought to consider that God "good."

If God is not "good," in the moral terms we can understand among ourselves, then please stop using a term that does not communicate what "good" typically means. Make up another word, like "God is BLIKERIX" or some such thing. Using the same word with contradictory denotations is illogical and fails the communication test.

Prof.

Prof

Let me point out yet another issue with the "horn" you wish to jump on - that something is "good" simply because God commands it.

The issue I've focused on is whether there are reasons that make something "good" or whether something is "good" merely because God commands it. The first horn entails that it is the reasons that makes something good, and not simply the fact God commands it, hence God is following an outside standard. The second horn, which you have admitted to jumping on posits Good as being whatever God commands.

I have pointed out the classic problem: that this ends in arbitrariness for what God commands. If God DOESN'T HAVE REASONS (let alone sound reasons) for what he commands then his commands are purely arbitrary. In fact it makes them irrational, or at best A-Rational.

And if God doesn't require reasons for what he commands, that his moral commands are A-Rational, this contradicts other claims that God is All Wise/All Knowing. You can not claim a being making A-Rational commands unsupported by reason to be Intelligent or Wise. That is simply incoherent.

You got quite a few problems to deal with here...

FreedFromOz

Being new here I may be out of line joining in so late in the discussion, but I have been so intrigued by this whole thread for the past few days. I apologize if I am missing the whole point here, but here are my 2 cents.

I understand arguing that god is beyond our realm of existence so he does not fit into our human definition of good. However, the bible seems to contradict that sentiment.

God commanded Adam and Eve not to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. When they did, their eyes were opened and in Gen 3:22 it says-Then the LORD God said, "Behold, the man has become like one of Us, knowing good and evil..." Does that not imply that we have a basis on which to judge good and evil and how to apply it? It appears that god himself is saying that we have the same knowledge as he does. By that reasoning can we not apply our definition of good and evil to god and, if he exists, judge him by his actions?

Prof

Zing! ^^^^

Welcome FreedFromOz.

Once you bring the bible into the equation most of the abstractions used by theists to argue about God are further undermined. In the very bible from which believers get their description of God, the biblical God is anything but Omniscient (or even All Powerful). "Adam, where are you? Yoo-hoo?..."

Prof.

Elfman

No. You seem to think that I have been arguing that God is good based on something. I have not been. I thanked Connick because He seems to get it that if we start with the premise that God is defining good by the nature of the horn we are on, it is pointless to try and examine why He is "good." Because the only answer is: He's good because He is defineing good. That is where the horn places us. You keep saying that we need to come up with justifications as to why we call him good. That is a different thing. That is justifying our subjective opinions....and that is fine to do, but it is a different question. This horn makes it impossible to call God evil in an objective way because "good" is necessarily that "which conforms to the nature and will of God."

ummm....why? What is lacking cogency if I say "Goodness is defined as "that which conforms to the nature and will of God." Then I say "God conforms to His nature (by necessity or He would have a different nature as you so eloquently spoke on earlier) and cannot will things apart from His nature - and thus IS good."

Now if I define "good" as some standard of behavior based on some common conception of how people ought to treat one another, based on reason or cultural norms or some such thing - and then I try and see if God matches that behavior (no special pleading allowed) then you would be right. But that is not the horn we are on.



Besides that I think God deserves some special pleading based on how much greater He is than us - I have not spent much time here trying to justify God's behavior. I have made some comments about His motives being different because He can see bigger consequences and outcomes (a justification for special pleading because you assume you know His motives such as when you say "He murders people" - you assume they were not wicked and that it isn't a greater good that they be destroyed.), I have made a few comments that I see His actions in a different light than you because of presuppositions, so I interpret the same actions in a far more charitable way - but I need do none of this if the horn I am on defines goodness as that which conforms to the nature and will of God.


Again - different discussion. You have to prove to me that God must necessarily treat man as man ought to treat man, and that no greater good could come from us knowing evil (which legitimizes our choice for God because we know the alternative).


I would argue that God is "good" in moral terms we can understand as long as we begin with the premise that God is not a man, does not work under the limits of man, is in a position of authority over man, and can have things in th eplan that we cannot know or understand. All of these would be normal items when talking about God. I understand that you might feel hamstrung too much by these and not want to go there since you seem only comfortable treating God as if He were a man and judging Him based on that. I do not think that is judging God very accurately or fairly.

Elfman

Welcome OZ -
I think we can judge God's actions as "good or evil" to a point. We can compare them to His stated (or declared will). The problem in doing this is that there is no reason that God cannot make a rule that says "People should not murder, but God can." Remember - goodness isnt a standard outside God so He can arbitraily make what is good. You ask "then how could we ever judge God?" And I would simply say that we pretty much cannot, unless we can know what God knows. I do not think the intent of our gaining knowledge of good and evil was ever to judge God, but instead for us to examine ourselves in light of that knowledge - hopefully become aware of our need of cleansing - and turn towards God. Maybe there are some secondary reasons such as "so that we can recognize evil" to turn from it.

Prof

Elfman,

We are having trouble in this conversation mostly, I'm sorry to say, because you don't seem to apprehend some basic principles of logic/argument. You think I don't understand what you are trying to say. I do - even though you are stumbling trying to say it. The problem isn't what I understand; it's that because of some ignorance on your part you don't seem to understand my responses. The very fact that after all our conversation you would say this:

Highlights this problem.

You DON'T want to say you are Special Pleading on behalf of God because, as I explained several times (look at the last page in the thread),

Special Pleading is a logical fallacy. It's making an exception WITHOUT SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION. It violates (among other things) the Principle Of Relevant Difference. So special pleading undermines an argument. It's a fallacy when you engage in it. What you just wrote equates to "When it comes to God I think it's fine that I have no justification for my position."

If you understood these things you wouldn't be admitting to engaging in special pleading. You don't want to say "I have no sufficient justification for holding God to be the Ultimate Good." You DO believe you have justifications.

What you WANT or MEAN to say is that there are RELEVANT DIFFERENCES between God and humans that JUSTIFY your holding God to be the ultimate Good and not a human.

Right?

Further, you want to say you aren't holding it as a matter of your human judgment that "God is good." Rather, you are holding it as AXIOMATIC.
As an ASSUMPTION. God = Good is your moral axiom.

That's fine! I understand that.

But...you have to understand something about axioms. Axioms are not proven; they are the assumptions from which you go on to prove other things. If God=good is your axiom, you are saying "I'm not out to prove God is good, that's my axiomatic assumption."

HOWEVER, axioms must be JUSTIFIED (if you wish to be considered a rational being). You have to JUSTIFY why you choose X as your axiom.
There are various ways of doing so. Descartes had as an axiom "I think therefore I am."

But he didn't just throw that axiom out and ask anyone to accept it. He JUSTIFIED why he held it to be an axiom, via a long argument that ended positing the necessity of I think therefore I am as a foundational axiom, from which other things can be understood.

Often one justifies an axiom by pointing out the benefits of adopting that axiom, insofar as what can be explained by it, or what other propositions can be arrived at by that axiom. And for the same reasons, the justification for an axiom can be CRITIQUED on the same grounds.

For instance, if I take as an axiom "All birds are green" you don't have to critique it on the grounds that "Hey, but all birds aren't green!" You critique the axiom by the havoc it presents to much of our experience and how it breaks down the coherence of many propositions we use.

Likewise with your axiom "God = Good." That axiom IS what the Euthryphro dilemma is about. It says IF we affirm the proposition that:

1. X is commanded by God because it is moral.

THEN X, Y, Z problems seem to arise for other theistic propositions.

And IF you take the other horn and affirm (as you have):

2. X is moral because it is commanded by God.

THEN from that assumption we get X, Y, Z problems arising.

You have to rebut these problems; show that your ASSUMPTION of What God Commands = Good is not problematic, as the Euthyphro dilemma says it is.

As it stands you've jumped on horn #2. And one of the main problems that arises is that it makes morality and goodness arbitrary.

This is what I have continually tried to get across to you by re-phrasing the dilemma so you can see this:

1. "Does God have/need reasons for why his commands are good?"

Or:

2. "Does God not have/require any reasons for why his commands are good?"

You've jumped on horn #2, which denies #1.

And WHEN YOU ASSUME horn #2, one of the consequences is that it makes the nature of morality arbitrary. Essentially it says "There are no reasons that make God's commands good." Because it's good simply because God commands it.

(If you say there ARE or ought to be good reasons for God's commands...then you've jumped off horn #2 back to horn #1, in which case it isn't God commanding something that makes it good; it's the REASONS themselves that make something good, an outside standard).

This makes morality essentially irrational, or a-rational. You really remove your very justification for moral commands.

And note what I pointed out earlier: You can not simultaneously portray God as All Wise, All Knowing because part of what it means to be those things is to be RATIONAL and not merely ARBITRARY to have GOOD REASONS for what you do. Yet your hopping onto horn #2 denies God as a rational being - it says God does not command things on good reasons.

But if you are still going to try and say "But I ALSO hold God to be a rational, wise being" I'll ask "Ok, what are God's reasons for X moral command?"

If you stay on the euthyphro horn #2, you ain't got an answer. You have to admit that God doesn't have, doesn't require, reasons for what He commands. Nothing like reasons or rationality CONSTRAINS what God does. But then, you have no basis for claiming God is rational or wise; you've just contradicted the claim. Are you really sure you want to sit on horn #2????

Am I getting through yet? Do you understand what I'm saying?

If not, I'll have to throw in the towel because this is the best I can do to be clear on this subject.

Cheers,

Prof.

Elfman

Prof,
I am not sure I am entirely grasping this problem as you have explained it. I read your next post, which further attempts it, but let me ask a couple questions so that I can better flesh out what it is that you are saying. Thanks for indulging me - I know that you have thought about this a lot more than myself and I am sure that you are feeling like you are hitting your head against a wall. But I really want to know why most theists avoid this horn as well.

I am declaring that God's commands are good by virtue of the fact that He defines what is good. You seem to be saying that if there are not reasons for His actions being good, then God must be a-rational. So this is a side consequence that affects another attribute of God that you think I would support....His Intelligence and/or wisdom (which I do). I think you are saying that if God doesn't have reasons for doing what He is doing than HE is essentially doing things for no reason at all. Correct?

It seems to me that God can have desires to act that are grounded in who He is that might alleviate the issue. I will give an example so that we can talk more about what this process might look like rather than using the a-rational or a-moral languauge because I think that might be confusing me.

Let's start with a desire: God wants to be in relationship with a free willed people who freely choose Him over something that is not Him. Such a desire does not require that there be some great moral reason, does there? It is simply a desire. It's like saying that "I desire ice cream." Now you could say that there are reasons I like ice cream - such as the flavor tastes good which make me want it, and I so I will give you a reason God could want this (not sure if I need to - sorry if it is irrelevant). God, being triune in nature, experiences the joy of relationship among His various expressions of self and so desires more of that. OK?

From a basic desire (which I suppose has the moral status of "good" because He wants it given this horn) God then goes about working His will out....so He makes a place for a free will people to live, makes free willed people, gives them a legit alternative to Himself so that man can choose to not be in relationship with Him (evil), etc....) All these actions would require a great deal of wisdom and logic to work out - all directed at fulfilling an end desire. So God has reasons for doing what He does...all aimed at fulfilling a desire.

Then God could make commands about certain things that are conducive to our making a good decision. For example, so that people can be alive long enough to make a decision to desire God, they must not run around killing each other all the time. So God commands murder is wrong...not because in some global sense it is, but because it works against God's desire.

I do not see how this scenario requires God to be non-rational. He desires something based on self experience, and then rationally goes about making it happen. Can you point out where I am not thinking about it correctly? The concept of non-rational thought seems so foreign to me that I am having trouble grasping it's ramifications.

To wrap up: God has reasons for doing things, but those reasons are wrapped up in His desire for a particular thing in the first place. I suppose you could say that God just as easily could have wanted to destroy a free willed people as love them and then where would we be? Is that your contention? So the best I could say is that we either got lucky He wanted something that is positive for us (desiring relationship) rather than wanting something we would see as negative (our destruction for the fun of it)? Right?

I think that brings us back to why does God want a particular thing - which seems to be inseparable from the question of who He is. After all, we all have desires and dislikes based on what we think is important/pleasurable or necessary. Am I crazy or are we back at the same answer...God's actions are grounded in who He is, not an outside standard.

Thanks again for your time. Connick...got a link for you:
http://www.natureartists.com/squirrels-marmots.asp :devil3:

Elfman

Yes...I get it. Special pleading is an illogical thing. Relevant differences to justify that God has a broader scope of what can be good for Him. Yes. That sounds like a better expression of my view. Thanks. Sorry for the confusion on my part. As you can tell, I have no training in philosophy, but find it very fun. I love studying theology, and see that the two have some common points even if some of the language is very different.

Yes...that is the horn.


It seems illogical to try and justify why God's commands as "good", given this horn, because then we would be assuming the other horn (that there are reasons/standards outside God that His decision correspond to). that seems self defeating.
So we move on to the other problems that arbitrariness gives rise to....I think my previous post heads in that direction, or at least starts in that direction.
If you think it helpful for me to give my subjective opinions on why God's actions seem good to me, I'd be glad to, but I do not think it moves us anywhere does it, given the horn we are discussing?

connick

Well, I think that's part of Prof's point to you. If everything God does is good then you have no basis for calling anything good or bad outside of that single criterion. On the other hand, if God's actions can be judged by our subjective criteria then he's at odds with what most consider "good".

But do they really? Or are you just saying so? Even if you credited someone with all of creation, how does that make it right, in your eyes, for them to wantonly destroy it?

I personally agree that there is nothing which compells a mighty being to act according to the whims of weaker beings, but is that the kind of god you are espousing? Do you submit to God because you believe he is powerful, despite the fact that his supposed powers remain unproven?

I was thinking along the lines of squirrel nests. They are about as artful and meaningful to us as a Picasso would be to the squirrel.

You missed the point I was trying to make though. If we define good as God's nature then it is pointless to try and examine why anything is good! On the other hand, if you have other criteria on which to judge goodness, then God is not good in any way that you would normally use the term.

Cogency goes out the window when you start with this definition and try to evaluate something other than God. Consider the implications of defining good this way.

Not being a man does not make one good by default, nor does exemption from limiting factors, nor does authority, nor does the posession of clandestine, indecipherable plans. None of those qualities would exempt any other entity from being judged as evil.

I think, to judge God accurately and fairly we would put him on equal ground with man. You seem to think that it's fair to judge God versus man only when God gets a leg up on the competition.

If what is good is based on God's arbitrary choices, then you must abandon any subjective concept of good. How could we ever judge anything? You would say that we pretty much cannot unless we can know what God knows.

This is just speculative and based more in your hopes than anything else.

Here's the thing: If God is good by definition then all of your subjective reasons get thrown out the window. If good is based on your subjective reasons then God is not good. Unless of course you'd like to take up the challenge of justifying all rapes, murders, stillbirths, diseases, etc. as good.