the fonz

jbc,

You are confusing two different concepts. That between meaning and reference. The meaning of a statement is subjective. The meaning of words is decided by us, the language-speakers. Our choice to use "ball" to refer to "a spherical object or entity" is completely arbitrary. Definitions, aka meaning, is arbitrary and subjective. Reference, OTOH, is not necessarily subjective. Regardless of the fact that our definitions are arbitrary, the statement: "The earth is flat" is objectively false. (Given the definition of "flat" in our english language). Sure, one may want to define "flat" as something else to make it a true statement. That does not however prove that the earth is subjective or that flatness is subjective, etc.

No one is arguing that people must refer to DU when speaking of moral terms. You can refer to whatever you like. The only way to speak the current language you are speaking now (and to not refer to fantasy) is to refer to DU. That is what we are saying.

His Noodly Appendage

Then why are you posting in a thread concerning the objectivity/subjectivity of morality in general, when in fact you're posting on the objectivity of DU principles?

I fail to see the connection.

Jinto

You don't have a point. The criteria for determining what "moral" means may be individually defined (actually it's intersubjective, but whatever), but the criteria for determining the morality of an act follow strictly from the definition and are in no way subjective.

Only in the same sense that the criteria for determining whether 1+1=2 are subjective (namely, on what grounds to we suppose that = should imply that the thing on the left side of the equation and the right side of the equation are the same). Let me repeat this, and maybe after enough repititions you'll finally get it: If morality is subjective merely because the definition of the terms involved is subjective, then 1+1=2 is only a subjective fact.

Do you or do you not believe that 1+1=2 is subjective?

It should apply because we presumably wish to communicate, which requires that we come to some agreement, even if temporary, as to what it is we are talking about.

What is the "it" you are talking about? It surely cannot be morality, because morality refers to something that is most assuredly objective.

That is not the premise. The premise used is "the definition of morality is X." Period. We are not making a moral claim here, we are making a semantic claim, and failing to acknowledge the difference only detracts from your argument.

Alright, let us presume that the definition of morality is "bible." Then morality is a long annoying compilition of mythology from bronze-age goat herders. Last time I checked, no one ever used the term moral to refer to a physical object. On what rationale do you suggest that we adopt this definition?

Whatever.

The AntiChris

What's the argument that supports this assertion? (Just point me in the right direction if you don't want go over old ground)

Chris

Janus

Hmmm. Most of this stuff is going waaaaay over my head. Jinto, the fonz, is there a website that explains this stance of yours in a more, ah, structured way?

I just don't understand what DU has to do with this discussion. It seems to me that it's like a discussion about how many times a dropped tennis ball will touch the ground before staying there, with one person clamoring "But the ball acts this way because it's made of ATOMS! In fact, everything's made of ATOMS!" It's definitely true, but practically speaking it's just not relevant.


Anyway, this quote attracted my attention:

The reason moral debates are possible is because the debaters already have a moral point of view in common. In a way, moral debates aren't about morals per se, they're about the best way to attain a moral end which is implicitly agreed upon by both debaters. Evidence is relevant to that, not to the common moral viewpoint.

For example, imagine a debate about the legalization of marijuana between two secular humanists. It's likely (or at least possible) the debate will one day be concluded, because the debaters both agree that things like the individual's physical well-being and freedom, and the possible effect on society as a whole are "good". Evidence can be brought to support either viewpoint, and if they're honest the debaters' opinions will change accordingly.
But the same debate between a secular humanist and a Christian fundamentalist is utterly pointless, no matter how much evidence there is to show that (for instance) marijuana is completely harmless, because to the fundy "good" has nothing to do with "harmless" or "freedom". "Good" is what God wants. There's no common ground, so the debate will never reach a conclusion.

Jinto

Well, the best way to learn about it would be to read Fyfe's Ethics Without God series. Although, strictly speaking, I don't accept desire utilitarianism, it's just that I get extremely annoyed when people try to dismiss morality as subjective simply because they don't agree with the definition. Not once have I heard someone simply say that we do not use the word moral to refer to things that result from desires that tend to fulfill other desires - that being the ONLY proper objection to the theory. Rather, it's always some variant of "why should this apply to me" or "how do you know that things that result from desires... are moral?" (note: it would be appropriate to ask why he thinks that's what moral means, it is not appropriate to ask why these things are moral. It's like asking why squares have four sides). I swear to IPU, I even heard someone say that morality cannot be objective simply because we disagree on what things are moral. There are a lot of things that we canot agree on - like whether or not god exists. Does that mean that the theists are just as right in asserting that God exists as we are in asserting he doesn't? Such factual relativism ought to be reserved for fundies. So I defend the theory, if for no other reason than to promote understanding of the difference between semantic and moral propositions.

Well, it's relevant if people are saying that how many times the ball bounces cannot be objectively determined because the ball has no physical properties and is just a manifestation of our opinion.

Generally speaking, that's true. People tend to mean similar enough things by morality that they can agree on what they are talking about and proceed to have a meaningful discussion. But note that that requires them to mean something other than "people's opinions about the act" or else they would not be having debates, they would be conducting a Gallup poll.

I also disagee that a debate between a humanist and a fundamentalist is pointless - fundies believe their assertions that "God is good" have semantic content, whereas if good was defined solely in terms of what God wants, the statement would be only "God is God," a useless tautology. Moreover, they are usually quick to express a belief that God would not, say, murder a thousand innocent children, despite that being unwarranted by the bible, which suggests that their definition of good includes at least some respect for human life, even if they are not quick to say so, and so discussion is at least possible, if difficult.

But then there's Fred Phelps...

fast

Hello shorty. :wave:

Okay, Okay, you've earned one free attack towards me; My free gift to you as I welcome you to the forums.

PS, the remainder of your post doesn't indicate that it was in fact "waaaaay" over your head. :thumbs:

Adrian Selby

Fonz,

What evidence do you have for asserting that there is an objective fact of the matter. How are you measuring the strength of desires? Why also is it relevant to measure the strength of desires and not merely their number? I'd like to know what 'maximal fulfilment of desires' (which you equate with what 'good' things are) means if we're accounting for strength and not mere number.

Killing is indeed desire thwarting, but could prove so effective a deterrent that nobody commits any more crime, and thus could lead to a net maximal fulfilment of desires. When it comes to desires, are the desires of criminals to do crime to be considered where their desires lead to actions that are by that society's definition desire thwarting?

Not strictly relevant as a counter example since if we'd been brought up in a society where committers of crime were killed I daresay we may not have broken the law so freely.

Your third point presumes that the act of taking the car is intrinsically criminal, or assumed that's what I meant. If the person taking the car was found guilty because the owner pressed the charge, then insofar as they were found guilty then they would be considered a criminal, and thus killed. This depends on the owner of the car.

This analysis aside, you still haven't provided evidence that even in that society where the father did steal the car was killed for stealing, there would overall be a net thwarting of desires in virtue of the promotion of desires that tend not to break the law. One example of a rare situation where there are moral problems doesn't mean that for the full spread of humanity there isn't a net gain in desire fulfilment, the trouble is, as I originally asked, how do we determine this, because as it stands, I don't believe it is a logistical problem only, I think it's an insurmountable problem to theories that have an abacus.

Also, because of the fact that it is to my mind nearly impossible to ascertain whether a set of desires promoted lead to a net fulfilment of desires, it makes more sense to describe how people actually do morality in terms of actions, and no, I'm not convinced Alonzo ever successfully deflected or defeated my position which was a variant of act utilitiarianism that utilised Alonzo's DU. We argued it of course, but the outcome wasn't conclusive.

Alonzo Fyfe

I just got back from a trip to Kansas, and I am preparing for to be in the Infidel Guy show in about 4.5 hours to discuss this very topic, so I only have time for a brief response.

The whole question of whether morality is objective or subjective is problematic because, when people discuss morality, they use some really bizarre definitions of "objective" and "subjective".

Subjectivists, when they criticize "objective" morality, use a definition of "objective" that not even the hardest sciences of physics and chemistry, and even many claims in math and logic, could not pass.

And, if subjectivism is true, then moral claims are claims that are completely separate from reality, allow absolutely no evidence for or against, and are true only for the people who believe them. However, delusions also are completely separate from reality, allow absolutely no evidence for or against, and are true only for the people who suffer from them.

So, I don't accept either option.

Jinto

That's certainly true. It all goes back to the fact that they don't distinguish betwen semantic and moral claims. Personally, I think they do themselves a disservice, as it is actually possible to support a positive argument for moral subjectivism, but what most of them end up doing is just equivocating.

I know you didn't actually say "therefore, if subjectivism is true, then moral claims are delusions," but you should know better than to even imply "All A are C, all B are C, therefore all A are B."