Alonzo Fyfe

Copiai:

Your statements about being able to predict the computer's decision, and the fact that initial starting conditions will lead to no change in the decision, do nothing to change the fact that it is a decision that we are predicting in the first instance and replaying in the second.

copiae

i guess this could be an argument on semantics, but i propose that because there is never any chance of any other "choice" being taken in that decision - or any other, in a deterministic universe, and that to call it a choice at all would be incorrect: it is merely the progression of inevitability.


As an example: Lets say i am walking down the street, and the street ends in a T-junction. I have three choices - walk left, walk right, or turn around. I decide to walk left. In a non-deterministic universe, if i was at that T junction, and walking with no other motivation (i.e. not going somewhere in particular), if we could "rewind" the universe, there is a chance for me to not walk left, but to turn around, or walk right.


Not so in a deterministic universe. I have been fated to turn left there all of my life - indeed, someone who knew all the rules could have accurately predicted that i would have walked left on that T thousands, or even millions of years before i even existed.

Robert Anthony

It doesn't matter if you self-pretentiously doubt "morality" was hardwired into us. Overcivilized humans usually forget that their glorious Platonic wisdom is inconveniently bound up with the gooey juices and tissues of animal flesh. Morality is simply the codification of certain biological imperatives essential for individual and group health and survival. (looking towards Alonzo's way)Secularism has largely inherited the Judeo-Christian theology-derived transcendentalist doctrine that humans are rational-moral agents magically capable of a-causal self-determination. I can never laugh enough at secular moralists who think they are on to something when they blabber about "the naturalistic fallacy", and how one can't go from "is" to "ought". This "naturalistic fallacy" is itself a fallacy; for if "ought" is not "is", what is? I wonder if believers in the "naturalistic fallacy" will regard the digestive system as some sort of "fallacy". While at breakfast tomorrow, I imagine, like every other organism, these people seem to have no problem with committing the "naturalistic fallacy"! Only devitalized pseudo-intellects could pose the insanely meaningless question, "Is it fallacious to obey my innate insincts?"

"If morality WAS hardwired into us, surely there would be some grain of similarity displayed through the cultures?"

Cultural phenomena are merely the expressions of the biophysiological life-plan given to all humans. If you fail to see the essential unity of the human races, and the tedious sameness of human history throughout the ages, you have your own corrupt imagination to blame.

"But, alas, no. Throughout history, there have been times (often, eras) where that which is morally abhorrent to us now - slavery, torture, rape, murder, have been viewed as morally permissible by various cultures."

So what? Behavioral codes differ according to the idiosyncrasies of certain peoples and nations, and specific circumstances of history, but the same biological substratum has been at work all the time. There is a certain limited range of moral possibilities open to the human beast; collective predispositions are ever-ready to spring into action when necessary for the life of the individual person and his biocultural community. Are you going to follow the fraudster Boas, and his modern heirs and co-racials Lewontin and Gould, and nihilistically claim there is no such thing as human nature?

"Although, and actually, come to think of it, the one thing that has almost never been seen as morally permissible is theft (unless you count killing someone and taking his possessions as theft), but i suspect that this is due to other reasons... After all, surely evolution would favour intelligent theft? (Increasing your resources, and thus your likelyhood to survive & prosper, with no fear of retribution?) [/QUOTE]

Ah, now you sober up a bit. I attach resources for the fatuously beriddled secular moral transcendentalists still clinging to moralist illusionism, as if "morality" resulted from individualistic "choice":

http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~owenj/UsefulSources.htm

http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/mor.htm

http://www.msubillings.edu/modlang/b...n51_60.html#56

Alonzo Fyfe

Robert Anthony:

First a question. Is it lonely up there on your mountain of wisdom, from which you look down and sneer upon us mere mortals who struggle with concepts that come so easily to your infinite mind?

I beg your indulgence in this humble bit of pathetic and finite mortality to suggest the possibility that you may contemplate the following:

You will find no 'transcendentalist doctrine' in my writings except that which you put there yourself. My writings are fully consistent with the concepts of evolution. There is a reason for evolution to favor a soft-wired (programmable) system over a hard-wired system.

Plop a rover on Mars with a course hard-wired into it, whereby it will travel a particular distance in a particular direction no matter what, and you have a machine that can survive in only a limited number of locations. A cliff or even a large rock in the wrong place, and the rover is doomed. About the only way to make sure at least some rovers complete their mission is to land huge numbers in the hopes that the hardwired course will work for some.

Now, instead, you plop down a rover with sensors and a computer program that allows it to evaluate options and to choose a course. You now have a machine that is far more adapable -- that can work in a significantly larger number of environments than the earlier hard-wired version.

There is nothing in this distinction that suggests any type of 'transcendentalist doctrine'. Clearly, I would not be suggesting that the robot with sensors and a program that evaluates possible courses somehow possesses some sort of theology-derived a-causal self-determination. Its mechanisms are just as determined as they are for the hard-wired machine, but this determined system INCLUDES soft-wiring (a computer program with a decision-making procedure that evaluates options and picks the one with the greatest value) in place of hard-wiring.

The variety that we see around us with regard to human behavior suggests that there is a great deal about us that is 'soft-wired'. Indeed, the very existence of sense organs (e.g., eyes, ears) suggests a programmable brain -- because a fully hard-wired machine has no need of sensors.

Yes, genetics plays a role in how those sensors are structured and with how the human machine writes new code and erases old code. Yet, all of this is compatible with the thesis that the brain functions by means of a code that functions, in part, by examining and evaluating options and selecting the option determined (this word intentionally used) to have the highest value.

Morality is not a hardware problem, it is, by definition, a software problem. Morality has to do with decision-making, and decision-making procedures by definition fall in the realm of software, not hardware.

cheetah

This is a fascinating topic in which condescencion and rude remarks are unnecessary and have no place. Please remember (one of) our rules in MF&P: that we discuss provocative topics without provoking each other. Please play nice.

cheetah
MF&P mod

Silent Acorns

Alonzo,

To use your chess decision analogy, it's obvious that the decision is determined by how the computer measures the value of each position. Could we then say that evolution has "designed" us in such a fashion that we have a "moral instinct", at least for moral issues that have consequences for the survival of our genes in future generations, that the way we "measure the value" of a certain state of affairs is at least in part a function of evolved moral instincts?

Personally, I think "evolved moral instinct" can explain much of what C.S. Lewis assumed was a God given universal sense of morality.

Hooboy !!

Robert Anthony makes a very good point though...

The human mind is not completely absent of hard-wired functionality. I think many people forget this, or they fail to take into consideration just how powerful those hard-wired functions influence our soft-wired programming. All you have to do is look at the chaos that errupted in Iraq and Haiti after the governments collapsed to see how quickly the human animal reverts to it's most primitive inclinations.

Biff the unclean

Konrad Lorenz (remember his geese?) and Niko Tinbergen were the founders of the science of ethology in the first part of last century. There's no need for idle speculation on this already well researched subject. You are quite correct.

Alonzo Fyfe

Silent Acorns:

You are correct to report that our desires are heavily influenced by evolutionary forces. However, this does not imply any sort of 'moral instinct."


Personal History

Please indulge me with the opportunity to tell a little bit of personal history. When I was in graduate school, I suggested that evolution may have something to say about ethics.

The ethicists immediately dismissed this. "You idiot, Hume's 'is/ought' argument ruled out any possibility of that 250 years ago. It simply makes no logical sense. This is basic undergraduate-level philosophy. Surely, you must already understand something as basic as this."

To which the biologists answered, "Sure, it's obvious. Obviously we are the product of our evolution. Everything about us is shaped by these forces. Yes, I know that the philosophers say that this is illogical, but since when did philosophy ever have anything worthwhile to say about the real world?"

My view was that both sides are right. Evolution has a great deal to say about ethics. But, what most bioethicists think it says is illogical. Logic matters. As soon as somebody starts to throw away logic so that he can hold onto his favorite theories he has left the realm of science and entered the realm of religion.

We need to account for both the science and the logic. I think it can be done as follows:


The Evolution of Desire

It is obvious that our desires are strongly influenced by evolutionary forces. Our aversion to pain, our hunger, our thirst, even (at least on a macro level) what tastes good to us and what does not, all have been strongly influenced by evolution. This goes for a great many of the things that we value.

Any theory that is not consistent with this fact has serious problems.

However, none of these are moral issues. The concept of value is not limited to morality. Rather, moral value makes up a small subset of all value. So, we need to look at what distinguishes moral value from other sorts of value.

One of the things that distinguishes moral value is the concept of 'ought' implies 'can' or 'cannot' implies 'it is not the case that one ought'. If there is no choice in the matter, moral concepts simply do not apply.

Imagine a moral prohibition that says, "You ought not to close your eyes when you sneeze." It would make as much sense as saying "you ought to negate gravity and float across the canyon." If something cannot be done, then it is simply senseless to use the concepts of 'ought' and 'ought not'.

Similarly, the moral principle, "You ought to close your eyes when you sneeze," is just as senseless. It is like saying, "If you fall from the top of a vaccuum chamber, you are morally obligated to accelerate at a rate of 32 feet per second squared." Again, the concept of 'ought' is inapplicable under these circumstances.

If you read the article mentioned in the original post carefully, very little of what the original authors said is inconsistent with this fact. That which is hardwired is outside of the realm of morality. The authors argue that certain types of behavior seems to be hardwired. And, as if shocked by the discovery, they also point out that these aspects of our live are outside the realm of morality.

For example, they note that we do not condemn the parent who favors the welfare of their child over that of a stranger. As if surprised, they suggest that this type of favoratism may be hard-wired.

This is fully consistent with "ought implies can" and "cannot implies it is not the case that one ought." This is fully consistent with the idea that "if the laws of nature are such that you cannot help but do X, then it is senseless for any system of morality to require that you do something else." Whether it is floating across a canyon or valuing a stranger on the other side of the planet as much as you value your own child, "cannot" implies "it is not the case that you ought."


The Breakdown

So, where does this view break down?

If what is hardwired is outside of the realm of morality, then morality is limited to what is softwired (or softwared). It is concerned exclusively with those desires that can be changed by experience, and only insofar as they can be changed by experience.

Our desire for sex may be hardwired (and, thus, outside of the realm of morality). However, your desire for consentual sex may be softwired. By condemning and punishing those who seek nonconsentual sex, and praising those who forego nonconsentual sex, we promote a stronger aversion to nonconsentual sex in society as a whole.

If these desires are hard-wired, then praise, blame, reward, and punishment are senseless. This is where "ought' implies 'can' gets its meaning. It says that we are only going to use the techniques of praise, blame, reward, and punishment to influence the desires of others where those techniques actually have an effect of influencing desires. Where they can have no effect, we will not waste the energy.

In short, moral concepts are only applicable for desires that are not hard wired (that can be influenced by experience), and only insofar as they are not hardwired. As soon as evidence can be provided that a desire is hardwired, evidence is simultaneously provided that the desire is outside the realm of morality.

None of this requires free will or any type of transcendental mysticism. All it requires is what is a readily known fact -- brain structure is determined partially by environmental factors. Given that each of us is a part of each other's environment, I have the power to manipulate the enviornment so that it alters the structure of your brain. I can cause modifications in what you believe, and I can cause modifications in what you desire. The process is no more transcendentally mysical than programming a computer.


Another link between evolution and ethics

There is a second way for evolution to influence ethics other than to place certain aspects of behavior outside of the realm of ethics.

Ethics is concerned with molding desires through the imposition of praise, blame, reward, and punishment. "Molding" implies "not hardwired." But the ends towards which we mold these desires are hardwired. We have a hardwired aversion to pain. Because we have this aversion to pain, we have a reason to mold desires so as to inhibit the pain-causing desires.

The bioethicist actually makes the case far more complicated than it needs to be. The bioethicist says that we evolved some sort of hardwiring against pain-causing behavior and as a result of this hardwiring we call this behavior 'wrong'.

No. What we have is an aversion to pain, and because we have this aversion to pain we use the tools at our disposal to create a world where others are less likely to cause us pain. Some of those tools are praise, blame, reward, and punishment. We use these to inhibit the formation of pain-causing desires in others.

We do not need any type of moral instict. The only thing we need is an aversion to pain and a recognition that we can use these tools to prevent pain.

The 'moral instinct' is one of those concepts that Occam's Razor can easily cut out of our ontology.

Of course, it still makes no sense to try to use these tools on desires that cannot be molded. It still makes no sense to apply moral concepts to traits that are 'hard wired'. The concept of a 'hard wired' ethics is still a contradiction in terms.

Hooboy !!

I agree, and I understand your argument. But, I do not think an aversion to pain is enough of an explanation for our desire to participate in a group. I think we are equally motivated by a desire for pleasure.