Alonzo Fyfe

Corona688

The question was not strictly concerned with how you would answer, but with whether that would be a reasonable interpretation of what was asked. I can, of course, presume whether an interpretation is reasonable or not independent of what you would answer.

There are a long list of examples I could add to these.

"Do you believe in evolution" seems nothing more than a way of asking, "Do you believe that the theory of evolution is true," and "Do you believe in the aliens" is the same as "Do you believe that extraterrestrial civilizations exist." "Do you believe in the Loch Ness Monsters" means "Do you believe that there is such a creature in Loch Ness."

For all of these "Do you believe in . . ." questions, people have no trouble giving a range of answers such as:

Yes
Probably
I don't know
Probably not
No

I can suggest yet another experiment to confirm my theory. (This is what I like about theories -- the good ones generate testable hypothesii.)

Create a survey that asks, "Do you believe in . . .", and for each question identify some object, event, theory, entity.

Your theory predicts that people will not write "I don't know" or "I'm not sure" or "I haven't made up my mind yet" or give any similar answer to a question that takes the form "Do you believe in . . . ?"

My theory predicts that you will see these types of answers. This is because people interpret the question, "Do you believe in P" to be the same as "Do you believe that the propositions that make up 'P' are true?" for which "I don't know" (and similar types of statements) are perfectly comprehensible answers.

Furthermore, if you passed the surveys with these answers around, virtually nobody will express any surprise at seeing answers such as "I don't know" or "I'm not sure".

From this I would conclude that any theory that claims that "Do you believe in P" has a meaning that renders "I don't know" and similar claims to be incomprehensible is not talking about how the phrase is actually used by English speakers.

JGL53

Well, AF, this is just a friendly little disagreement between you vs. Corona688 and myself.

Let us just agree to disagree. I can't see you changing our minds about the importance of language in arguing with literalist religionists. You are not going to ever bring us around to dropping our distinction between "know" and "belief". And apparently visa versa.

So, you just go on with your approach, and we will with ours, and maybe together we can out-flank the superstitious.

Fair enough?