fast

Now, this is what I thought too. But, doesn't Mr. Alonzo's position state differently,? or have I got it confused yet again?

Danielboy

I think it would be easier to understand subjectivity and objectivity in relation to morals than not.

Try this site too
Lower down the page with respect to Hume

99Percent

You are correct.

It would be more precise to say "Subjective truth is true for the subject but not necessarily true for others"

fast

Yea, me too. I had a thread awhile back 250+ or so responses engaging the issue with results that ultimately had me second guessing myself. Now I’m guessing myself guessing myself. There just seems to be no consensus on ANYTHING, leaving me ridiculously uncertain about even the seemingly obvious.

I will shortly. Thanks.

fast

And another thing too:

I just can't compete with intelligently structured opposing opinions. I first professed to believe in subjective morality, but proponents of objective morality have demonstrated a level of understanding beyond what I seem to be capable. Granted, others stepped in to aid in my defense, but that only left me to gauge between two different camps with more knowledge about the issue than myself.

How can I in good conscious side with one over the other without some sound methodology to .... this is sounding pitiful -- let me stop.

Soundsurfr

Why must you?

fast

I asked myself that -- I don't know

It just seems like differentiating between the following is somehow important:

P1: Committing some [seemingly] 'wrong' act is wrong to me, but in reality there is no 'real' wrong.

P2: Committing some [seemingly] 'wrong' act is wrong to me, and in reality there is a 'real' wrong.

When I say 'wrong', I mean it in opposition to being 'non-beneficial to society'.

In other words, 'stealing' may not be beneficial in facilitating a well ordered society, and stealing may be objectively shown how it's not beneficial, but when I refer to wrong, I am necessarily not referring to the act in which is deemed wrong, and I am instead referring to the 'consciousness' of the individual that deems it to be wrong. It's the 'thinking' it's wrong without reference to the object in question. It's the 'thinking' in what makes wrong in fact wrong.

This is where I move into the arena of belief. What is it about the individual that is capable of deriving a sense of wrongness from consciousness? It's the belief of the individual. Within the confines of consciousness, it is here desires are either supported or thwarted (OBJECTIVELY SO-in that it is a real life truth value that we do in fact have a conscious), but any talk of consciousness clouded in these terms seems counter productive because subjective to me necessarily refers to these intern processes.

It seems to me, morality is objective in that narrow sense, but it's that same sense that draws me to the conclusion that morality is therefore subjective.

Now, I've showed you how I've traced conscious thought to subjectivity, so now it's time to show why I think morality itself can be as well. To me, this is actually easier. Morality isn't about intentions, desires, and acts. It's about our attitudes towards those intentions, desires, and acts. Our attitudes are incumbent upon our beliefs.

AND TO THINK, I am the one who didn’t want to bring up morality. Geez

Worldtraveller

Well, the subject (pu intended) of subjectivity and objectivity is fuzzy, at best. When it comes to morals/ethics/beliefs as far as I'm concerned if you can make a counterexample to any moral statement, it is, by definition, subjective. Meaning it may be true most of the time, but not all the time.

"Thou shalt not kill." Seems objective, but there are so many reasonable exceptions that it quickly becomes apparent that it is subjective. And in order to make a statement like that true, you would have to narrow it down to such specific instances as to render it meaningless.

You can say you love ice cream. Fine. Technically, that's an almost objective statement. But not quite.

Why? Well, do you like squid ice cream (it exists, I had some when I lived in Japan.)? No, howabout pina colada (yummm)?

You like chocolate ice cream? How about when it's melted? Howabout when it's been left out for three days and smells funny? So again, to really be objective, statements like that have to defined in such narrow terms as to be practically and semantically useless.

Hopefully that's clear. There was another thread in E/C about how science was 'wrong' about such and such and religion is right. Well, you start really delving into the meaning of the statement, and theists make the claim that sience was 'wrong' because Newton was 'disproved' by Einstein's relativity.

But we all know that's not true. Newton's physics are simply an approximation (good to lots of decimal places) when speeds aren't anywhere near the speed of light.

The earth is flat...to a reasonable approximation, for civil engineers using typical building scales, for instance, but if you are laying transatlantic cable, you'd better take the curature into account, or you'll wind up a few hndred miles short, and in deep water (pun intended again!). So is there anything truly objective? Probably. but most objective things are relatively meaningless, IMO. Trivially insignificant. It's the subjective things in life that keep things interesting, and make us better people.

Cheers,
Lane

fast

Hello Lane. I appreciate your response.

Does "I [enjoy] ice cream" necessarily mean that I enjoy ice cream no matter what? I mean: does just the saying it mean that I mean that.

I see your point, but let me give you an example that i think counter argues your point.

P: I like trees

Just because you can show me a tree that I don't like, or just because you can show me a time in which I do not like them, or just because we can manage to find an exception, it does not [or does it?] negate the real fact that I like trees.

Saying: I like trees does not mean "I always like all trees no matter what and without exception", for I still do in fact like trees.

P: trees are green
Question for the day. Does this truly and properly interpreted to mean: All trees are green?

uncertain


hmmm: default in vernacular would seem to include: with exception (not without exception).

I ain't know

knowitall

Lane,

I believe you are being dogmaticly subjectivist with your interpretation of value.

You say that tweaking a statement to be objective renders it meaningless but that stands in opposition to what subjective and objective means. Why must a statement be ambiguous to be meaningful?

'Icecream tastes good to me' is an objective fact.

But, 'Icecream tastes good' is also an objective fact because it implies 'to me' in real world conversation. Subjectivists force us to explicitly objectify these statements in the type of dialogue we are now in, but in real world conversation, the 'to me' implication is understood. Perhaps because it sounds different than real world conversation, this is why you feel that objective talk is meaningless, but, in real world speak, the objective conditions are implied but just too redundant to say explicitly. They're unnecessary.

That morality has no meaning is counter-intuitive. When morality is spoken about in the real world, it seems to imply that it has real meaning, IOW, that it also implies some objective conditions. This whole debate pivots on what those objective conditions are.

Now, I've explained that 'icecream is good' can be objective, depending on it's context and, as such, moral statements can also be objective. But moral statements and statements of personal preference imply two completely different objective conditions. When people say, "murder is wrong," they don't mean "murder is wrong to me." They imply, "murder is wrong to everybody." When people say that statement, are they trying to project the wrongness of murder on everyone's personal preferences? No, they mean "murder is a wrong action for the individuals of a group." Now, why do people say that? Do they mean, "murder is a wrong action for the individuals of the group because the group wants to die." ??? No, not at all. That is not what is intuitively implied by a moral statement. Rather, what is implied is that, "Murder is a wrong action for the individuals of a group because the group wants to live." The objective condition implied by moral statements is the survival of the group.

So why are we have such a hard time labelling that condition as such even though it is what we are implying? Because we aren't born with complex knowledge for why we are the way we are. These things have to be figured out. We didn't know why mankind existed until evolution was discovered and people still argue over whether it's real or not. Religion played a role in that confusion. Complex group evolution provides the objective conditions that give real value to morality, but people will definately argue over that for a long time to come. Religion has also played a role in that confusion, IMO. But that we lack concensus doesn't take from it's truth value. That's what makes it objective.