Phixphi

(1) Every logically possible universe exists.
(2) Every logically possible being exists.
(3) God is a logically possible being
(4) Therefore, God exists in at least one universe.
(5) By definition, God is a omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent being.
(6a) an all-powerful being can effect events in any universe
(6b) an all-knowing being can have knowledge of any universe
(6c) an all-present being can be present in any universe
(7) Therefore, God exists in all universes.

This argument's a little messy with loose premises. However, it will interesting to hear what others think.

AV-98 Ingram

Old argument. Been refuted before. Next.

bkawcazn

You really need to defend the first premise, to keep the entire thing from becoming worthless.

Quetzalcoatl

Welcome :wave:

You will have to show this. I don’t buy this.

Again please show this. Does Santa exists?

Depends on your definition now doesn’t it.

You need to establish your three previous premises. So far they are just assertions. Let’s run with it for now.

You have some problems here which I am sure others will point out.

All you have done is basically presented a definition of god.

I am god actually.


(1) Every logically possible universe exists.
(2) Every logically possible being exists.
(3) Quetzalcoatl is a logically possible being
(4) Therefore, Quetzalcoatl exists in at least one universe.
(5) By definition, Quetzalcoatl is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, internet poster being.
(6a) an all-powerful being can effect events in any universe
(6b) an all-knowing being can have knowledge of any universe
(6c) an all-present being can be present in any universe
(7) Therefore, Quetzalcoatl exists in all universes.

EnterTheBowser

Is it just me, or is that the ontological argument? Let me try to show why it is not the greatest argument ever.

(1) Every logically possible universe exists.
(2) Every logically possible being exists.
(3) A perfect island is logically possible
(4) Therefore, a perfect island exists in at least one universe.
(5a) By definition, a perfect island is an island that exists in all universes (since an island that exists in more universes is more perfect than one that does not; but this reasoning is just superfluous - I'm just defining the island this way)
(5b) By definition, if a perfect island exists, I am on it (again, just by definition)
(7) Therefore, I am on a perfect island
(8) But I am not on a perfect island
(C) Therefore the above argument is unsound

One of the many problems with all ontological arguments is that they attempt to prove things by definition. And I can probably conjure up some wacky definition that fits the argument, yet is obviously false.

Another way to attack the argument is to show that it proves contradictory things - for example, that there is God whose name is Bob (and only Bob) and is indestructible and can destroy anything, as well as a God whose name is Alice (and only Alice) and is indestructible and can destroy anything. Just add those two things into the definition of God, and they pop out of the end of the argument. But they're contradictory. So there's something wrong with the argument.

Incidentally, what is wrong with this argument (I think you've tried to avoid it, though I think the flaw is just disguised in this version, but it's late and I don't have time to work it out) is the step that goes from "statement A is necessarily true in some universe" to "statement A is necessarily true in all universes" (going from possibly necessary to necessary). It doesn't make sense to say that a statement is possibly necessary. For a statement to be possibly true, it means that there is some possible world where it is true. But a necessary statement is one which is true in all possible worlds - it nonsense to talk of a world where a necessary statement might be true. They're not true "in" a world.

Alf

For one thing. I don't think this is suitable for kids - I doubt kids think about other universes etc.

Secondly, your premise (3) is wrong in lieu of your definition of God. You really should have stated that definition BEFORE you claimed that he is a logically possible being. The point is that God might be a logically possible being for some definitions of God but that does not mean he is logically possible for every possible deifnition of "God" and specifically I believe your definition - which includes an omnipotent etc being is not "logically possible".

An omnipotent being is not logically possible.

Of course, this is true for some definitions of "omnipotent" and false for others. However, your definition of "omnipotent" which you also really SHOULD have included before you started with your arguments appear to be one that is not logically possible.

For example the way we often define a universe is that if there are two universes X and Y then by definition nothing in X can affect Y and nothing in Y can affect X in any way. Thus, to assume that a being can affect any universe other than the one he is in appears to be non-sensical.

There may be other definitions of "universe" but that is also a definition you really should define before making your argument.

So I would say (3) is most likely false and (6) is false (all of them) so your conclusion do not follow.

Premise (1) is of course also not substantiated and is mere speculation on your part.

Alf

Dean Anderson

This axiom is unsupported and not trivial. Since your argument relies on it being true, you must demonstrate its truth value before it can be accepted.

This axiom is unsupported and not trivial. Since your argument relies on it being true, you must demonstrate its truth value before it can be accepted.

This axiom is unsupported, and is meaningless without a definition of what "God" is. Without such a definition, we cannot say whether God is logically possible or not.

This is a logically sound conclusion from 1-3, but since I accept none of those axioms to be true without evidence, then mere logical soundness does not make this conclusion true.

This axiom is mutually exclusive with axiom 3. An omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent being is not logically possible.

This is merely the definition of all-powerful.

This is merely the definition of all-knowing.

This is merely the definition of all-present.

Firstly, this is not logically sound. You have equivocated in your transition from 6 to 7 from "can be present in any universe" to "is present in all universes".

Secondly, even if we ignore the equivocation and assume that it is valid, it would only be true if both 3 and 5 were true. Since 3 and 5 are contradictory, then it cannot be true.

Thirdly, even if we ignore the contradiction, and allow 3 and 5 to both be possibly true: this statement would be true if and only if axioms 1, 2 and 3 are all actually true - and there is no reason to believe your assertion that they are.

Wayne Delia

Bob and Alice are not contradictory, just on opposite ends of the spectrum, as illustrated in the late 1960's movie "Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice." Ba-doom ching.

WMD

PoodleLovinPessimist

This is Plantinga's modal ontological argument. Regardless of the plausibility of the other premises, premises (3) and (4) are fallacious. By definition, modal statements are always true or always false in all modes; it is a fallacy to say that a modal statement is true in only some modes.

In "possible universe" semantics, a possible world is a world where some set of non modal statements are true. We then use modal logic to make statements about all of these universes.

To say that "It is possible that p" translates to "there exists at least one universe where p is true". These statements are, by definition, true in all universes. Even if p is not true in some particular universe, it is still true in that universe that there's another universe where p is true.

By definition, if both p and ~p are logically possible, then by definition there exists one universe where p is true, and one universe where p is false. However, if we try to do this with modal statements, then if p-modal and ~p-modal are both logically possible, then there exists one universe where p-modal is true and another where p-modal is false.

But this contradicts the definition of modal logic: that all modal statements are always true or always false in all possible universes.

PoodleLovinPessimist

We can talk about meta-modality, where we talk about suites of possible universes where first-level modal statements are true for the universes in that suite. But then Plantinga's modal ontological argument entails only that some suites have a god in all universes in that suite, some have no god in all universe, and none have a god in some and no god in others. It does not, however, entail that the suite containing our own universe has a god.