diana

Uh...he did. I needn't imagine it. I can just scroll up.

I realize it's a fringe idea. I think that's irrellevant, though. I am interested, however, in the idea that "most people believe in the possibility of a situation where their selfishness and their morality conflict." Thanks for bringing it up, because the idea that selfishness and morality need to be in conflict doesn't make sense to me. It seems like a Christian hand-me-down, really. Morality is "concern with the distinction between good and evil or right and wrong; right or good conduct." Why shouldn't it take your selfish needs and wants into account? It strikes me as an oversight if it isn't factored in.

I'm intrigued by your analogy. If I've decided that all cars are black, have you not also decided all cars are white?

d

Excelsior

Let's try an example.

Since there's been mention of "common sense" in this thread, let's assume for the sake of this example that X believes that it is right to sacrifice himself to save his child from a car/bullet/some other dangerous object.

X finds himself in a situation where his child is endangered. X does not sacrifice himself. His child dies.

Well, suppose we don't know what X's belief is. What could we safely infer if we had never known X and all we were given is information about his action?

1. He doesn't believe it is moral to save his kid.
2. He does, but some other circumstance prevented him (Fear paralysis as an example)
3. He considers saving his kid to be an amoral action (This case does not interest us)

Just because X believes that something is right does not mean that he will do so in each and every case that he has the opportunity to do X. We have no way of determining (1) or (2) apart from what he tells us.

If believing that doing something is moral does not necessarily mean that we will do it, why does believing that something is immoral necessarily preclude us from doing it?

If, as you say, morality is "concern with the distinction between good and evil or right and wrong; right or good conduct," it really shouldn't take into account selfish needs/wants unless they are important to the distinction.

viscousmemories

Hey diana.

I think what Excelsior is trying to say is that you haven't actually made an argument. The A and B above aren't really premises, they're just statements. If you were to make a formal argument out of what you've said so far in this thread, I think it would look like:

P1: People will not do that which they truly believe to be wrong.
P2: X truly believes Y is wrong
C: X will not do Y

If P1 is true, the conclusion would seem to follow. What we're missing so far is any good reason to believe P1 is true.

Jinksy

I changed the phrase to incorporate your subsequent comments - it's not a direct quote.

It doesn't prove anything, but unless you think you're one of the smartest people in the world it's not usually a good idea to oppose the consensus of experts in a field unless you're well-enough versed in the field's history to confidently assume you've seen something they haven't.

That does sound like a Christian definition. The field of normative ethics is usually defined as something like the attempt to fill in the blank in 'behaviour is ethical if and only if ...' So in my case (for the simplest answer), I'd fill in the blank with 'it is utilitarian behaviour'. That translates into the conditional 'if I want to behave ethically, I must behave in a utilitarian manner'. Clearly though, that still leaves the possibility of me not wanting to behave ethically. Or wanting to behave slightly ethically.

I don't see how. Your claim amounts to 'all action is considered ethical by the actor'. My claim amounts to 'not all action is...'

The AntiChris

And what you see as "workable" others might see as safe and unchallenging. What purpose does morality serve if it ceases to be a framework for what we believe we should do and simply becomes another word for what we invariably do do?

Chris

diana

Good morning, Excelsior.

Quite true and good point. He does, though (which means he does have more insight into his own morals than we do; thank you for refining this notion).

What I've been arguing is that in the case of number 2, his actions were the final indication to him that his chosen belief was not as pure as he'd originally thought. He believes it is moral to save his child, but hasn't taken into account situations in which his own selfish need for self-preservation might tip the scales. This is why I continue to state that we've overlooked a crucial factor if we haven't taken our selfish needs into account when we make claims about what we believe is right or wrong. In many (most?) cases, we may believe our own self-preservation is more right than the situation we've simplistically stated is "right" (such as saving one's child).

There are many many moral actions I could take that I do not. I simply haven't the time, energy or finances to act on every moral opportunity that trips down my path. If I don't do something you consider moral, that doesn't make my lack of action immoral. It makes it amoral. But if I claim to believe something is immoral and then I do it, how can I continue to claim that I believe that thing to be immoral--particularly if I continue to do that thing?*

I'm taking into account the possibility that someone will believe that X is immoral then, when placed in a situation where X is an option, choose X. At that point, the person has decided that the action is not immoral according to his own code. After the fact, the person decides he was correct to begin with, then refuse to engage in that behavior again. What I cannot understand is how a person can continue to claim X is immoral yet continue to do it. Clearly, there's no learning process going on there: he's lying to someone--probably himself.

I concur.

d

Nexus

I think your correct about people who say one thing and do another. They truely don't believe it's that wrong. For other people perhaps their emotions or animal lusts compel them to do things they don't really want to do. Addictions would fall under this catagory.

But have you considered a third group who believe their actions are immoral but do them any way because they acknowledge they are immoral themselves?

diana

Hi, Tom. Always a pleasure.

"People will not do that which they truly believe to be wrong" is indeed a premise--an assumption. What I'm looking for is a good reason to believe that it isn't true. As I've stated, it seems self-evident to me. Its opposite, as it turns out, seems equally self-evident to everyone else: People will do that which they truly believe to be wrong. It's a bit like arguing if God exists; what it comes down to is "You can't prove he does and I can't prove he doesn't."

While discussions like this quickly devolve into extreme examples to make a point, I think we tend to think this way on a smaller scale about other people. Let's say you have a neighbor who cheats on his wife. You know he cheats on his wife. He tells you he believes it's wrong but he continues to cheat on his wife. At some point, you'll probably question just how "wrong" he really believes it is. You might eventually decide he’s probably telling you he believes it's wrong because he doesn't want you to judge him harshly, and he’s hoping you'll judge him for his stated beliefs/intentions and not his actions.

I'm merely taking this idea back one step and saying that our own actions belie our own moral stance in any given instance. Back to the "I'm ok, you're an asshole" phenomenon. It's based on our egocentricity and our desire to see ourselves in the best light available. We can cut someone off in traffic, but we're having a bad day, running behind, and wouldn't normally; thus, we compartmentalize our own actions and refuse to judge ourselves based on them. Let someone cut us off in traffic, though, and it's a direct negative reflection in his character in general: he's just an asshole.

I don't understand how you can believe something is wrong while you're doing it but continue to do it. You may believe it's a bad idea because you might get caught, but your reasons for doing it outweigh any belief you may have that it's wrong. That is, you consider the action to be right for you in the moment, based on circumstances.

Perhaps the biggest disconnect between all of you and me is the view we take of our personal moral codes and what purpose they serve--or should serve.

I think most people see a personal set of morals as a set of ideal guidelines they cannot live up to; the idea is to make them attempt it, to reach for higher goals, I think; to hold themselves to a higher standard. Think of it as the Jesus Model. It's very admirable to try to live as best one can, but this model--despite my name for it--it pretty unforgiving. It results in people continuing to say they believe X is wrong while they continue to do X, so they're either hypocrites or living in a state of guilt (mental self-flagellation)--and what possible purpose does that serve? It tends to promote a vague sense of superiority because one is trying to live up to an unattainable ideal. It also seems to promote more unforgiving judgment of others, because those who adhere to this model tend to see themselves in light of their ideal and not in light of how well they themselves live up to it (not all people do this, but many do)--then they judge others by their actions (of course).

My moral code is a set of guidelines in which the ideal does not exist. My code is more forgiving and reasonable; it provides for introspection in lieu of self-punishment. Have I done something I regret? Acknowledge first that I chose to do it and there was a reason. Look at what I did and why I did it. Find the reason I did it. Weigh that reason against the outcome. Change the code to reflect the lesson learned or cease the behavior, then drive on. It cuts out the worthless self-punishment phase and provides a tool with which to judge myself as others do, and as I do others; as such, it seems fairer than the Jesus Model. Plus, I don't find myself trying to defend the idea that I believe something I'm doing is wrong, which is a good thing, because it isn't a position I envy.

d

diana

Good afternoon, Jinsky.

Apologies. I read it several times last night but didn't see what you'd changed. I was quite tired.

I did a quick search at onelook.com and snatched up the quick definition, so perhaps it is. If you can provide a more secular definition, I'd be pleased to use it. (Usually, the "onelook" quick look uses the concensus definition, so I didn't spend a great deal of time looking farther into it.)

I understand your position. It is more or less the usual one: you set up an ideal to aspire to, knowing you will often fail to meet your own standards. How do you feel when you do not, though? And what do you do about it? Do you forgive yourself for falling short or do you feel guilty--which is a way to punish yourself for your failure? If you forgive yourself for falling short and the situation comes around again, do you behave ethically this time? Or have you decided it's okay, really, if you continue to not live up to the strict standards you have set for yourself?

...Do you see what I'm getting at?

I see. I was looking at the analogy from a definition perspective, in the sense that I think actions reflect the personal morals of the actor while you believe there's no necessary connection. You won't convince me through assertion that there's no necessary connection between actions and personal beliefs and won't accept my assertion that there is a direct connection, so all your cars are white and no amount of my pointing out the black cars will sway you. And vice versa.

d

diana

What a most excellent question, Chris.

I'm equally interested in what purpose morality serves if it is only a framework for what we believe we should do but has no necessary connection to what we do do.

When someone asks you about your morals, do you assume they mean the code you aspire to, or the one you live? I assume they mean the latter, personally. Who cares what sort of person I think I should be? What matters is the person I am.

d