Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Alonzo Fyfe · 04-28-2005, 05:09 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Danielboy

If your theory requires the use of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment to cause one to have desires that will fulfil the desires of others, objectivity would then be contingent on the fact that people indeed use those tools to shape ones desires. In a community that does not practice these tools or for a person on a stranded island, morality as conceptualised by oneself will not be objective either (same as another one's). For if you cannot or do not compel me to consider beyond my own desires, I have absolutely no reason to lest I have a predisposition for empathy.

An argument offered by the philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson handles your case.

Let us assume that we come across a society deep in the jungle. They have a tool that they use when they eat, which is long and narrow with one sharpened side that they use to cut their meet. They also use these tools to cut twine and grass and other things. In their language, this tool is called a "glod".

Which is the best translation of their word "glod?"

(a) "Glod" in their language means "knife" in English.

(b) "Glod" in their language means "zipper" in English only, in their culture, zippers are long instruments with a sharpened side used to cut meat.

Thompson argued that (a) would be the better translation.

What this means is that we are not going to translate any word or phrase in another culture, into the English word for "morality", unless they have a word that they use in nearly the same way that we use the word "morality".

There is no sense to be made of the claim that "Their word '??????' means 'moral' in English except in their language 'moral' is a small flightless bird that happens to have very tasty eggs." Their word '???????' will have to have very much in common with 'moral' in English, if their word is going to be translated into the english word 'moral'.

Danielboy · 04-30-2005, 07:53 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Bomb#20

Huh? DCT has the same is-ought structure as other theories like Utilitarianism. If having that structure makes a theory subjective, then DCT is subjective. Ascribing a magical get-out-of-subjectivity property to God isn't a defense. If any such magical property is possible, that is proof that having is-ought structure doesn't imply that a theory is subjective. If that's the case, why would you make an issue of is-ought? If we can make DCT objective by simply defining God's command as objective, then we can make Utilitarianism objective by simply defining happiness maximization as objective. Refusing to apply the laws of reasoning to God because He's God is a special-pleading fallacy.

It's easy to resolve. For morality to be real, it has to be independent of God's will. That's what Euthyphro proves. It's only a dilemma to a theist who has a theological problem with this conclusion. That's no more a real dilemma than a creationist's unwillingness to face the fact of evolution is. Theology is not evidence.

Yes. But "anything" means "any thing". Self-contradictory nonsense doesn't qualify as a "thing".

Yeah, indeed. As an athiest, I think I have not bothered to examine whether DCT is huey or not. I didn't quite see the need to.

I see it now. God prescribes certain actions. If we were to take those actions as what we ought to do, then we will have to insert something like "we ought to do that which is commanded by God" which is as subjective an ought if ever I saw one.

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