muidiri

On that note... you're asking that we "prove" that god has a moral obligation. Isn't this kind of like asking us to "prove" that the tooth fairy is racketeering? :rolling:

Given the depiction of god in the bible, and working from the assumption that the biblical god exists as portrayed therein... then we have the following argument (mostly by Yahzi - please correct me if my summary is incorrect)

1. If a being has the ability to tell right from wrong... then the being has a sense of morality
2. If a being has a sense of morality, and has the ability to make decisions, then that being has an obligation to act morally
3. According to the biblical depiction, god has the ability to tell right from wrong, and has the ability to make decisions about his actions
4. Thus god has an obligation to act morally

Since god has an obligation to act morally, then when he fails to act morally, he is immoral, and is not amoral.

In what way is this argument incorrect?

Valmont

The argument falls down on a false (or at least ungiven) premise. That is premise 2. If you want to use the fact that If a being has a sense of morality, and has the ability to make decisions, then that being has an obligation to act morally you must first prove it. Now Yahzi or you may have done this. I may have overlooked the proof. If I have, then I apologise.

If you would be kind enough to furnish the proof (again) then that would advance your case considerably.

All Hail Discordia!

There's quite a few remarks I'd like to make here, but I'll have to limit myself to just one for lack of time.

I would like to note a point at which all of Valmont's analogies to explain god's amorality break down. There are to be sure, all sorts of things and events and beings that are exempt from moral evaluation. Tigers and earthquakes are among them. So also are some mentally handicapped persons, infants, inanimate objects, and so on.

The problem is that in all of his analogies, and, indeed, in every case I can think of, the status of amorality is ascribed to things that are not competent in moral discourse. Tigers, infants, etc., are not so much beyond morality as they are excused from it. But Valmont does not maintain that god should be excused from moral evaluation on grounds of incompetence. Rather, god (somehow) transcends morality. It is not that god is not competent to engage in moral discourse with us; it is that we are not competent to morally evaluate god. So there is an obvious asymmetry here. You're going to need a better analogy.

muidiri

Someone lay out the darn rules for me.
I'm not sure this is "provable" but it certanly seems sensible and reasonable. It seems insensible and unreasonable that being can have a sense of morality, have the ability to make decisions about his own actions... but that somehow he is EXCUSED from having to be moral... just because he said so. This may not be within the "formula" of the discussion.. but can you please explain exactly how this seems reasonable to you? Because I'm really not getting it...

muidiri

Very good point - you've stated it very well, I think.

Let me get this straight then...

I say that I have the ability to tell right from wrong, therefore I have the ability to judge that god is immoral.
Valmont says that I have the ability to judge right and wrong, unless we're talking about god - god is so far removed that I am incompetent to judge his actions.

Doesn't this give god a free pass? Isn't this sort of like god saying "because I said so" and expecting that to satisfy?

Yahzi

Of course. One can hardly be required to take others into account if one cannot mentally process the idea of "others."

To be a moral agent is to be a moral agent. I do not understand your confusion. You seem to be saying that just because one has all the attributes of an apple, just because one is round and red and hanging from an apple tree and atomically indistinguishable from an apple, does not entail the obligation to be judged on your appleness.

To be a moral agent is to be bound by moral rules. That's what moral agency means. Being a moral agent is not an optional title; you do not choose it. It is like being a rook in a chess game. That is what you are, and thus by the rules you cannot move diagonally. If you do choose to move diagonally, then you are breaking the rules.

If you are capable of moral agency, then we (the rest of us moral agents) will identify you as a moral agent, and pass moral judgements upon you. This is what it means to be a moral agent; to be subject to moral judgements.

Now, just because you are a moral agent does not mean you must choose to behave morally (if only that were true!). But it does mean that you are inescapably and legitimately a subject of moral evaluation. You are bound by moral rules, in the sense that you can be judged against them, not in the sense that you are physically restrained by them.

Let me turn it around: what do you think a moral agent is, if not "a fit subject for moral evaluation?"

Being labelled immoral is the entire point of moral judgements. That is what moral judgements do: determine the label "moral" or "immoral." Enforcing a consequence of those judgements is an entirely different matter, just as doing the calculations for a bridge is entirely different than building a bridge. The ability to make moral judgements does not necessarily entail the ability to enforce empirical consequences of those judgements (would that it did!). Immorality does not need to be more than a label.

Your inabilty to separate the phsyical consequence from the abstract conclusion perhaps explains why you don't seem to object to "might makes right." Except I know for a fact you can make this distinction: again, I cite Hitler. You cannot enforce any physical consequence upon Hitler; yet, if I ask you to morally judge him, you are capable. Do you see? You can morally judge Hitler, even though all you can do is assign a label.

Not in your theology, no: but in every single aspect of the rest of your life, yes. Your theology contradicts the beliefs by which you actually act, the knowledge by which you pursue your life in this empirical world. (For an example, see above, where you assert you cannot judge God because you do not have the power to enforce a judgement, but you have no problem judging Hitler even though you do not have the power to enforce a judgement.) The contradiction is not in your theology, it is that your theology conflicts with all your empirical knowledge.

It is trivial to create a theology that has no internal contradictions. What has yet to be done is to create a theology that does not contradict everything else we know.

You are simply asserting this. You have yet to show how a being could be moral and yet not be a moral agent, just as you have yet to show how a rook can be a chess peice and yet not be bound by the rules of chess.

Then you concede that God is not moral?

Then what was the Resseruction? Wasn't that "intervening" just on our behalf? Many animals have a limited sense of self (dolphins, etc.) And what about all the other hominds (neanderthals, etc.) Did Jesus allow them to live in the spirit? If you answer yes, I don't think anyone can pretend you are a Christian; if you answer no, then clearly God intervened specially for us.

And how do you describe this as love? If your wife loved the rocks in yard and Pepsi cans as much as she loved you, would you feel loved? No, of course not. Once again we see the special exemption. You accept from God behaviour you would not accept from anyone else. You change the definition of words based on the subject of the sentence.

You keep asserting this, but you have not shown it. If God is capable of moral action (both physically and mentally), then what makes him exempt from being evaluated on a moral scale?

But that is not love. Love is inextricably bound up with the notion of human fellowship. You mean something else, something besides love. You are commiting equivocation here; assigning an attribute to God based on our human understanding of it, and then rejecting all human understanding of it; what then is left to your assignation? Only a sound, a few letters, because you've just gutted the concept of all meaning.

If God does not love me in a sense I would call love if a person did it, then God does not love me.

Again with the "might makes right" argument. What good does it do to condemn Hitler? Why does it have to do any good? Why are you unable to separate the knowledge of morality from the ability to act on it?

Whatever you think the key is, I assure you, someone somewhere didn't have a fair chance at it. A child tormented by a priest who grows to adulthood, spits on a cross, and gets hit by a bus before he can change his mind. Etc. Therefore you must either conclude that a) God condemns some you would not, or b) God selects who he will, in which case why didn't he just select everyone?

Why not be a Universalist? Why not let everyone live again in the Spirit? What does God, or anybody, gain from not?

Valmont

Well, argument by analogy is always a dangerous gambit. However, I think that I am able to furnish a better analogy, although as an illustration not as an argument. Joseph Malik is a human being. He certainly exists, therefore, in the sphere of moral discourse and his actions are subject to our moral evaluation. Moreover, we should maintain that other moral agents have a moral obligation to him.

One day, aboard a yellow submarine called the Leif Erikson Joe Malik comes to a profound realisation. He is a character in a book. The authors, Shea and Wilson, have heaped humiliation and tribulation upon him in the name of a good story.

So, my question is, do Shea and Wilson have a moral obligation to Joseph Malik?

The 'darn rules' are simple enough. You are entitled to believe whatever you like. If that doesn't accord with the empirical facts we might consider you mistake or deluded but that's your prerogative. If, however, you want me to change my beliefs then you need to provide me with a good reason for doing so.

God is not excused from moral obligation. No moral obligation lies upon Him in the first place. This is not because He has said so. If you think about it I think you will find that you normally only make moral judgements about other humans. The only other moral agents that anyone has mentioned are hypothetical extra-terrestrials who are like humans in all but physiognomy. So if we would normally only make moral judgement about human beings why do we suddenly make an exception and try and apply moral judgement to God when He is a very different category of being?

...and...

So which is it? To be bound or to be judged? We can judge a wolf or a shark by moral rules. Indeed we do. When we hear that wolves eat their prey alive, we react with a sort of moral repugnance, even though we would not class a wolf as a moral agent in the former sense of being bound by moral rules.

Now that's a good question. Let me attempt an answer...

You and I have an interest in humans, in general, behaving in a moral way. It is clearly better for us to live in a society governed by moral principle. We benefit from morality and therefore we have a desire that it should hold sway. It is this moral interest that defines a moral agent.

However, we are not able make every moral agent act morally. In order to satisfy the collective moral interest of the plurality of moral agents though, we can act morally ourselves. By acting morally we do not satisfy only our own moral interest but that of every other moral agent. Of course, it is only worth our while to do this if other moral agents act morally. In other words, there is a kind of moral contract in force.

So, if a moral agent upholds his side of this moral contract we define him as moral. If a moral agent does not, then he is immoral. But it his interest in everyone else upholding that contract that defines him as a moral agent, not his own ability to uphold it.

Now, of course, we might wish that God uphold the moral contract but God is not subject to the will of man. Nor has He any interest of His own in the contract. He might wish that we uphold it to each other but for our good and not for His. God Himself is not party to the contract. Of course, the corollary here is that we have no moral obligation to God. That is as you would expect. We are neither able to help or harm Him. But we do have a moral obligation to each other.

But, of course, Hitler is no longer a moral agent. We are not judging Hitler now. We judging him historically, at a time when he was a moral agent, when he did possess a moral interest. Moreover, it is the actions of Hitler that we judge not the man himself. And we do not judge those action specifically but we judge them as represetations of a class of action. Our judgement then is not specifice but categorical. We judge Hitler to be immoral because we would judge any moral agent who did as he did to be immoral whether they exist in the past, present or future.

I do not see this at all. My account of morality, at least, which is the subject of discussion, seems to me to be perfectly reasonable and in accordance with the observable facts. It certainly provides a better explanation of why morality exists than your own rather odd Godless Divine Command Theory. It provides a better reason for following the Golden Rule than simply asserting that it as some abstract, absolute imperative.

I think I did somewhere back in the original post. Goodness! How many more times do I have to?

No. The life, death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ were and are an intrinsic part of the act of creation, a link from this material creation to the next Spiritual creation. But this might be one to leave for the time being. It's wandering off from the central discussion.

I don't think equivocation is a fair charge. I have always been very careful to distinguish between Divine Love and human love. I am prepared to defend my definition of both but, again, can we leave that for a later date?

Most people, you included perhaps, do not even want to live this life in the Spirit. What makes you think you would enjoy an eternity of it any more? Again though, one for another day perhaps?

muidiri

At the point that Shea and Wilson become aware that Leif is a sapient being... yes.

OK, thanks. Is there a type of formula to the exchange? And do you have to give good reasons why our reasons aren't acceptable? Or do you just have to deny them? {I really am asking - never did any debating}

You're assuming that we can only morally judge humans. Partly, you're assuming that since humans are the only sapient beings we have encountered (aside from god in the context of this argument), then only humans can be judged. This doesn't necessarily hold. Although we have not encountered other truly sapient beings, I see no reason to think that moral judgements would not apply to them. I don't believe moral judgements are limited to humans only.

Consider also - it appears that some primates have a rudimentary sense of right and wrong. They exhibit characteristics of shame and embarassment in certain circumstances. On some occassions, they seem to engage in actions which they consider to be wrong. On those occassions, I can say "that chimp is misbehaving" because that chimp really is behaving counter to what he SHOULD do. So in some limited situations, we can morally judge beings that are not human.

You haven't given any good reason why god is above our moral judgement. I am pretty well convinced that a moral obligation does lay upon god - else you're busy serving a being who is either incapable of discerning right from wrong, or is incapable of making a decision about his actions regardless of whether he knows them to be right or wrong.

Maybe you react with moral repugnance, but I don't. This is in the nature of the wolf, and I am not offended by it. I find it icky... but not immoral. The wolf doesn't discern right from wrong... thus the wolf is amoral

I see this as a reason for morality to exist... but I don't see the leap to this being the definition of a moral agent.

Kind of a "mob rule" sort of situation?

So... if a person behaves morally, then we call him moral. And an individual is a moral agent if he is concerned about whether or not other people act morally, regardless of whether or not that individual is capable of morality? Huh? You've just said that the abilility to behave morally is completely independent from moral obligation. You've just defined a psychopath as a moral agent.

Again, you've reverted to the argument that because we can't FORCE god to behave himself, he is excused from any questions of morality. Again you have demonstrated a "might-makes-right" viewpoint. You say that we have no moral obligation to god because we can neither help nor harm him. God CAN help or harm us... but still he has no obligation to be moral? Let's look at this in another way: The people of Trinidad can neither help nor harm the US government. So is it OK for us to blow them off the face of the earth, since by your definition we have no moral obligation to them?

Moral obligation lies in the one with the ability:

BOB can either feed JOHN or let him starve.
BOB has the ability to give food to JOHN, and also has the ability to withhold food.
BOB has the mental ability to make this decision without interference from any other agency.
BOB understands the consequences of his actions, and understands the repercussions to JOHN.
JOHN can do nothing to BOB, and is powerless to affect BOB's decision.
BOB will neither suffer nor benefit from JOHN starving, and will he will not suffer nor benefit from JOHN living.
JOHN doesn't want to starve.
BOB is aware that JOHN doesn't want to starve.
BOB is a three-legged kurquet from Rigel 7
JOHN is a flying gerheetshumpter from the Andromeda system.

Does BOB have an "obligation" to act morally toward JOHN? If BOB let's JOHN starve, can you say that he is acting immorally?

True - you said that god is not moral. But you say that god's status of "not-morality" is actualy amorality as opposed to immorality. I think we are all arguing that because god understands the consequences of his actions, and can decide on a different set of actoins, then god understands morals... and is thus immoral - he is not above moral obligations.

The rest of your comments reflect your belief set and have nothing to do with this discussion... so I'll simply ignore them and let you save them for another day, as requested.

Valmont

Yes, I do have to explain why I think your reasons are unacceptable. And I hope that I try to. If you don't think I have please do say which of your arguments I haven't addressed satisfactorily.

Well I agree, moral judgement do not apply only to humans. I am well aware that many more intelligent social animals have a rudimentary sense of morality - even if it operates only on a tribal rather than a universal level. But certainly chimpanzees, and I think just about any other moral agent you might cite, have a clear moral interest, as I defined before.

I still insist that moral interest rather than sapience is the basis of a proper definition of 'moral agent'.

Well I have given a reason why God is above our moral judgement. Because He has no moral interest. Because He is not part of the moral contract. Now I know you don't accept my premises about the nature of morality. I hope that I will be able to persuade you however that my premises are at least defensible, if not persuasive.

For the time being, let me ask whether you accept that if moral interest is the basis of moral agency then God is beyond moral evaluation? Note that I am not asking you to accept that God is beyond moral evaluation. I am simply trying to home in on the source of the controversy.

Assuming you do accept my statement above, the debate then becomes What is the basis of moral agency? Do you think this is fair?

Well I would argue that if it is the reason for morality to exist then it makes a much better starting point for defining what we mean by a moral agent than sapience or empathy which seem far more loosely related to the notion.

But, of course, this is just as much of a problem for you. Of course, a sociopath is sapient. A sociopath is physically capable of acting morally. He even can understand, in intellectual terms, the difference between right and wrong and the consequences of his actions. In fact, very few courts define antisocial personality disorder as a mitigating factor in their judgements. Sociopaths are, and should be, treated as moral agents.

If BOB has an interest in morality holding sway then, yes, he has a moral obligation to JOHN. It does not matter that he does not have a specific interest in JOHN acting morally. That is not the nature of a moral contract. The moral contract requires individual moral agents to take specific actions to contribute to a general state of affairs.

Yes but mere understanding is not enough to create a moral obligation. We are under a moral obligation only when we are part of a contract. God is not part of the moral contract. God is above moral obligations.

Now we can assert at each other until we are blue in the face. It isn't going to get us anywhere. I feel I have outlined some very good reasons as to why and how moral obligations exist. Those reasons depend on moral interest. If you want to press your case that moral obligations exist because of moral understanding then you need to do one (or both) of two things...

Show that moral understanding accounts for the existence of moral obligations.

Show that moral interest does not account for the existence of moral obligations.

So far, you have not done the former at all and I hope I have been able to answer your arguments (sociopaths and JOHN and BOB) for the latter.

This takes us back to question highlighted earlier, What is the basis of moral agency?

muidiri

In what ways does BOB differ from GOD?
Does god have no interest in morality holding sway in our world? If so he has no interest, wouldn't this mean he really doesn't care about the welfare of any human on this planet? If god directs us to act morally (the ten commandments)... doesn't that show that he has an interest in morality holding sway? How then can he not have a moral obligation to humans?