Celsus

Jacob, this is beginning to look like special pleading.

The Noah-Utnapishtim parallel is much better. I can see quite clearly that you are using vague, general words to establish the parallel. A god leaving heaven is a standard motif of plenty of stories about gods, since conflict tends to occur in the realms below. That says nothing of the similarities between the myths. Jesus being killed by archons (note, Doherty is alone in his use of archon as mystical beings alone, it is used normally as earthly "magistrates" in Hellenistic works). Inanna is slain by order of Ereshkigal, the Annunaki are the 7 rulers of the netherworld, so of course they had something to do with it. Note if he is trying to use this to buttress his reading of archon as a mythical being, then, he is arguing in a circle, since the other points are not strong.

The only precise point is (e), and as I have already pointed out several times, 3 days is only when Ninshubur begins to act. After that, he still has to travel to the three gods, and then the two messengers have to descend into the netherworld as Inanna does, and finally bring her back. That would, I suspect, take a great deal more than 3 days in the ancient eyes. Points (d) and (e) are thematic similarities based on the interpretation of the stories (note, Inanna has no desire for soteriology: she's in it for herself, as per most of the other Inanna journey-myths we find), and there is room for that, but it doesn't tell us anything about borrowing or influence, only that the two myths have things in common, dealing as they do with death (and which myth about death doesn't involve tackling the problem of death in some manner?). Inanna's purpose of heading into the netherworld is purely selfish, by the way, as Enlil's speech to Ninshubur reveals.

You are stuck in a contradiction: As I've already said, the more general you make your statements in order to save your parallel, the less it helps Doherty's argument that Inanna's descent is indicative of influence. Conversely, the more details you can draw without paraphrasing into distortive reductios the more powerful would be your argument for a parallel. Secondly, depending on which points you wish to highlight, you can draw out similarities but it leaves the uncompared portions deeply problematic.

Now compare this with the very specific language and emplotment that is used in both Noah and Utnapishtim:

1. Yahweh plans to destroy humankind because they are "wicked";
   The gods plan to destroy humans because they have gone "astray"
2. Yahweh warns Noah in advance, and instructs Noah to build a rectangular ark covered with koper;
   Ea warns Utnapishtim in advance and instructs him to build a cubic-shaped ark covered with kupru
3. Every species of animal is brought on the ark, along with Noah's family;
   Every species of animal and skilled craftsmen are to be brought on the ark, as well as Utnapishtim's family
4. The flood comes and destroys everything;
   ditto
5. The waters subside gradually, and Noah sends out a raven and a dove;
   The waters subside gradually and Utnapishtim sends out a raven, a dove, and a swallow
6. The ark finally comes to a rest on Mt Ararat;
   the ark finally rests atop Mt Nisir
7. Noah builds an altar of sacrifice to Yahweh;
   Utnapishtim builds an altar of sacrifice to the gods
8. Yahweh smells the pleasing odour;
   The gods smell the sweet odour
9. Yahweh removes the curse from earth, promising bounty and no more floods;
   Enlil reconciles with Utnapishtim and repents of his rash decision to destroy the earth
10. Noah is blessed by Yahweh and his sons repopulate the earth;
    Enlil blesses Utnapishtim and his wife with immortality, his sons repopulating the earth

Which part of the myth has been left out? Nothing at all relating to the plot, and only a few details like measurements of the ark, types of animals, etc. don't confuse the entire structure with the individual narrative unit that is up for comparison (e.g., Gilgamesh has nothing to do with the analysis here, and nobody is claiming that he does). Point (8) is probable not integral to the plot, which makes the fact that they are identical even more interesting. Do you really think the parallels are comparable with your Inanna case? They just serve to make it look more and more like special pleading.

Joel

Richard Carrier

Ted Hoffman says he is confused about my supposed equivocations. I'll provide some clarity so the rest of you can continue this discussion and move on.

First I must note that Hoffman is right on the money regarding the methodological issues in this debate. It is not necessary for Doherty to prove Jesus is a carbon copy of some prior deity, or that he was even intended to be such. The use of parallels was not meant by ancient writers as just a rehashing of someone else's religion. It was routinely the case that cultural symbols (literary, visual, conceptual, political, religious, everything) were treated like words, and stories were constructed to convey messages with a juxtaposition of cultural symbols exactly the way we convey messages with a juxtaposition of words. Thus:

(1) Stories were constructed to convey messages--and the message was not always about "this is what actually happened as a matter of historical fact." Indeed, interest in historical fact was a relatively rare commodity in antiquity, a problem those who were interested in it constantly complained of. There were things that mattered more, especially in a world where determining "what actually happened" was often next to impossible, but all the more in a world plagued with deep and serious human problems. Who cares about history when the people are starving and oppressed and the corruption and misery and injustice is only getting worse? Morally passionate persons cared more about solving the latter than about determining the former.

(2) When a symbol is used to convey meaning, the symbol does not necessarily drag with it the entire religion it comes from. Though it does drag with it that one symbol's direct connotations--its "cultural meaning" as employed within that other religion--that is not the same thing. Again, like words: just because one author uses words that another author uses does not mean the second author is "just copying" the ideology of the first. To the contrary, the new author is creating something entirely new, by arranging the words differently, and choosing to include or exclude words. The words still have to share a common meaning for this to work, but they only drag with them their limited sphere of connotations, not the entire ideology of any prior writer. Indeed, the same words can be used to say exactly the opposite, or even to attack the prior ideology, but also to improve upon it. At most, a particular rare or unique word or phrase, when used by a second author, can carry with it (and intentionally) connotations that include particular aspects of the first author's ideology--but again, this can be done to invert or challenge or change that ideology, or to combine it with something new. In every case, to understand what the second author means, you have to look at how he has arranged the same words in a different way--their arrangement, juxtaposition, and context change the message, and that is how words are used. So, too, symbols--biblical verses, culturally significant numbers and time periods, images, concepts, names, puns, etc., even narrative structure.

Therefore, when Christians import pagan motifs into their stories about Jesus, their point is not that Jesus "is" Osiris or anything like that. Their point is exactly the same point intended by Osiris worshippers when they imported that same symbol or motif into the Osiris myth: the motif is a cultural "word" and you will only understand what it means when you understand the word (what the symbol represents or conveys) and its context (the way it is juxtaposed with other "words"). There is absolutely no doubt that the Christian Gospel authors were doing this. This isn't a proposition that can be proved here--to see it (and once you see it you will admit it is undeniable) you have to immerse yourself in the study of these facts--of ancient myths and myth construction, of the way the ancients themselves talk about myth interpretation, of the effect certain myths had on community action, and so on, but above all a good acquaintance with the ancient languages and cultural symbols in widespread use.

For example, much ink has been spilled (mainly by astronomers) on what astronomical event the "Star of Bethlehem" could be, yet in all probability the star was a cultural symbol, not a real event--the use of stars throughout ancient iconography, even coins (the "Star of Julius Caesar" being a particularly relevant example), belies the fact that a star heralding an event is a concept as readily understood to an ancient reader as any word would be. It is thus a cultural word, that conveys meaning, not history. But you will only understand this when you immerse yourself so much in ancient culture that you have images and passages about heraldic stars coming out your ears. By the time you get to that point you say to yourself, "Hold on a minute. There's something going on here." And it isn't history. It's something much more important. However history can still be involved (a point that is central to the present case, as I'll explain below): e.g. there probably was an actual "star" that was seized upon by Caesar's propaganda mill, but this was precisely because the symbol already had meaning.

The bottom line is, you will never really understand Plato's theory of "truth" or ancient obsessions with symbolic paths to knowledge (astronomy, oneirology, physiognomy, augury, etc.) until you understand the importance and role of cultural symbols as a "language," a language we have largely lost today in an age of literacy, video, and corporate logos. The ancients even found "hidden meanings" in sacred texts--not only the Bible, but the Sibylline Oracles and even Homer were used as cryptic sources of mystical truth, the latter attested by Augustine who sought to debunk the practice. But this still proves it was a fashion--and fashions tell us something about how these people think. And they didn't think like us. The sooner you realize that the better. Because as soon as you understand that they didn't think like us, you will realize that what seems "plausible" or "inconceivable" or "probable" to you is not an accurate guide to how things seemed to them.

You have to give up your ethnocentric assumptions and try to understand these people, how they saw things. Bruce Malina is an excellent guide here--and Holding shamelessly misrepresents him, so don't follow Holding, actually read Malina. In fact, I strongly urge everyone here to read his Social Gospel of Jesus and, for an intro to the present discussion, his commentaries on Revelation (On the Genre and Message of Revelation: Star Visions and Sky Journeys, The New Jerusalem in the Revelation of John: The City As Symbol of Life With God, and Social Science Commentary on the Revelation). Malina makes some errors (when he mistakenly uses obsolete sources in ancient history), but most of the time he is right on the money.

Also important are what I and Evan Fales say in the new book The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave. Fales discusses symbolic language in "Taming the Tehom." I discuss it in "Spiritual Body of Christ," where I demonstrate that Mark's empty tomb narrative is a brilliant juxtaposition of cultural symbols (Jewish and pagan) that conveys meaning about the gospel message, and thus was probably not intended as a historical report. Indeed, Mark never claims to write history, but only "the good news" which was proclaimed by John, which was not a historical empty tomb account but a message about how we can make things right again. The meaning of the empty tomb narrative must be found in that end, not in some other end that Mark never declared to be pursuing. Of the Gospel authors, Luke alone claims to be doing history, yet uses Mark as a "historical" source, which was probably his biggest mistake--assuming Luke really did intend to write history as he claimed.

But regarding Mark, it is pretty clear to me that Mark's empty tomb narrative uses Biblical symbolism to convey a message about death and salvation and the New Covenant. And since the most popularly known cultural complex of symbols about these things outside Judaism was the Orphic, Bacchic, or Eleusinian mysteries (all were related and very similar), Mark consciously employed well-recognized symbols from their salvation narratives (the boy in "white" who stands on the "right," the tomb as "mnemeion," an icon of "memory," the implied connotations of seeking the water of life, which is achieved by allusions to Jacob's Well--all and more I show in that chapter, so buy the book if you want the evidence). But Mark uses these symbols in a way that sells his message as the superior one. Thus, Mark is not saying that Christianity is just an improved pagan mystery religion. He is saying that Christianity actually provides the salvation that these mystery religious claim to provide. That is a message that is uncontroversial today--every Christian would agree this was something all early Christians wanted to argue. Thus, why should it be controversial for Mark to argue this in the language his audience was best equipped and best prepared to understand--the language of cultural symbolism?

So much for that. In this regard, Doherty and Price are correct, and their works on this methodological point are well worth heeding.

But what does this tell us about the historicity of Jesus? Unfortunately, nothing. And that's the problem. Myth and legend, even deep meaningful symbolism like we find in Mark, can and did build up around real people, often burying the "real" person completely. There is some evidence that Hercules was a real person and Troy a real place and the Battle of Troy either a real event or a type of a real recurring event from the time portrayed, yet all were obscured almost completely behind symbolic myth. We see this starting already in the case of Pythagoras and Apollonius. Therefore, that symbolic myth should completely encompass all historical facts about Jesus does not entail there was no Jesus. It does entail that Christianity is a myth (though it could still be a true or meaningful myth--that's a different debate). But Jesus and Christianity are not the same thing.

Obviously, of course, a verified letter by Paul articulating Doherty's thesis would definitively prove Doherty's thesis, and we do need something like this or at least hinting at something like this to close the doors on this debate, so-to-speak. Otherwise, the possibility always remains that there was a guy named Jesus who started the whole thing, and this guy might really have been executed by the Sanhedrin when Pilate was governor of Judaea, exactly as the Jewish Talmud claims--and their account of the trial is more credible in the sense that it conforms to what the law would prescribe for Jesus, rather than the complex extralegal mess that the Gospels try to force on us for symbolic and doctrinal reasons. My point is not that the Jewish record is more reliable (it faces a number of problems and questions, not the least of which being how late it is), though it is more believable. My point is that everything Doherty demonstrates only tells us something about Christianity. It tells us very little about who started it.

Now, this is actually where Doherty and Price (and I) probably part company, since Doherty actually contends that Christianity is an amalgamation of numerous movements that all had separate origins (from many came one), which is certainly possible, but he is far from proving it. At best all he has are hints that could indicate such a fact, but could also have come about in other ways and so do not entail his conclusion. But if Doherty could prove his many-to-one thesis then that would complicate the question of the historicity of Jesus, though it still would not solve it, since there may have been a real man who shocked the system into overdrive in one of these groups, he may have been named Jesus, and he may have been executed by the Sanhedrin under Pilate, and so on. I am skeptical of Doherty's many-to-one thesis since I see the evidence strongly suggests a one-to-many thesis (though there may have been outside groups absorbed into the Christian movement after this). But I do not see his many-to-one thesis as essential to the mythicist thesis--a one-to-many theory is still compatible, IMO, with Doherty's entire case for a mythic Jesus. And a letter from Paul saying he made Jesus up himself would be an example of iron-clad proof of such a thesis (and I can imagine plenty of less impressive evidence we could have that would tend toward the same conclusion).

But the point is: a mythic Jesus could still also be a historic Jesus, i.e. the myth would be layered on top, possibly obscuring most of the truth, just as most scholars today believe to be the case (and a consensus of objective experts is still a required standard for a secure historical truth--sometimes I think Doherty slights that methodological point too much, as he pretends to have won the battle rather than trying to actually win it, i.e. persuade the scholarly community). Thus, the issue is not black-and-white, "historical Jesus" or "mythical Jesus," but a complex mess of possibilities, and barely any evidence at all to figure out which theory is correct. That last point is absolutely crucial: because it is typical in antiquity for us to not know the truth, precisely because the evidence is so scarce. And this is one of those cases. I'll explain this point further again when I conclude below.

First a final point about method: what I am often accused of (by Doherty and others) is not accepting the obvious. For example, it is fairly clear that pre-Christian Jewish texts were seen as "predicting" a man named Jesus would be the messiah (Christ) and deliver the gospel, that he would be despised, executed, then exalted, and that this would even provide absolution for Israel's sins (e.g. Is. 52-53). Many other details are there, too (that this man would be buried by a rich man, etc.). I grant all of this. But this still does not prove that Jesus was nothing but a fiction discovered in a mystical reading of ancient texts. These things could have caused a real man named Jesus to believe he was "the" Jesus or to sell himself as such, or for his followers to sell him as such, and (for example) his execution would then be seen as a fulfillment, sparking a sect to explode onto the scene asserting a distinct identity as those who recognize the messiah was really here as predicted. Or these things could have been found or drawn upon after the fact to revitalize a movement that a real Jesus started but that, once executed, his followers wanted to continue (because of the merits of his moral-political message, for example), and thus the fact that he was really named Jesus and some things that happened to him could be lined up with predictions would have bolstered the movement. Thus, there are at least two other theories that are completely consistent with all of Doherty's evidence. Therefore, since Doherty cannot rule out these alternatives, he cannot assert his theory is true--for to do that would be to assert that these alternatives are false, which he does not have sufficient evidence to justify asserting.

This is a crucial logical point and it seems to be lost on many here, including Hoffman. Every single piece of evidence Doherty presents is equally consistent with all three theories and therefore Doherty is logically incapable of establishing his theory over those others at the present time (beyond a small margin--see below). Besides the Doherty thesis, the other two theories that could be articulated are the pre-hoc historicity theory and the post-hoc historicity theory, i.e. Jesus may have been a complete fiction, or he may have been a man inspired to be or to be sold as this fiction, or he may have been a man later re-cast as this fiction. Thus, proving there is myth and fiction here does not prove there was no man named Jesus behind the origin of Christianity as a distinct and organized movement. It does prove that most of what Christians now believe about Jesus wasn't historical, but that is not the same thing.

How much is history, and how much is fiction? We will probably never know, because we simply don't have the information we need to know. And that is the brick wall Doherty's theory cannot push through. Any correspondence between fact and expectation could be something added on, or it could be a genuine coincidence that was exploited, or it could even be a coincidence that was arranged. For example, that the messiah would be named Jesus would be useful to any real man named Jesus who wanted to sell himself or whose followers wanted to sell as the messiah, it could even contribute to leading him or his followers to believe he was the messiah--the messenger of God delivering God's "good news" as Isaiah predicted. Likewise, if the Bible predicted that the messiah would be executed by the Jewish elite in Jerusalem, anyone who thought he was or wanted others to believe he was the messiah would have reason to confront the Jewish elite until it irked them into executing him--or conversely, anyone who just happened to have done so, could be seen or portrayed as the messiah after the fact precisely because this was or could be expected to happen to him.

We can't rule these things out. And that's the problem.

Hoffman seems to think I waffle on the issue of whether Doherty's theory is true, but Hoffman has a bizarre idea of what historians do, and doesn't accurately represent what I have said on this issue. It is often the case that we don't know. Historical questions are often not resolved into a "yes" or "no" conclusion, but very often--especially in antiquity--they remain at a "maybe" or "don't know." Historical theories can be and usually are established to different levels of probability, and rarely can we say "definitely this is the case" or "definitely not." Very often we are left with conclusions like "its truth is somewhat probable, but there is still a significant chance it is false." This is a degree of uncertainty that annoys Christians, even though we historians are used to it--it irks them because they need their history to be certain. But you don't always get what you want--and you can't decide your history is certain simply because you need it to be. The fact of the matter is, it is not certain. Not by a long shot. But this uncertainty also seems to annoy Doherty and his defenders, who also seem to think there can't be any uncertainty or middle ground, that it is all or nothing, you are either with them or against them. That's bull.

So what have I actually said? Here are the exact quotes from my article critiquing Doherty's book (Did Jesus Exist?), now with emphasis added:

Could I possibly have been any clearer? I don't think so.

I do go on to say that historicists might yet be able to articulate a competing theory and the debate is not over until someone tries. But only a myth-historical theory has any chance of even rivaling Doherty's theory--the Christian literalist or triumphalist theory is dead, IMO. The two theories I suggest above (pre-hoc and post-hoc mythic-historicity) might be refutable--I just haven't seen Doherty refute them. He challenges them, but his evidence is too ambiguous, IMO, to decide the matter. The vote is not in.

Again, I said:

In other words, I think there is still a significant chance Jesus really existed in some sense--it is only by a small margin of greater probability that I conclude, at present, that he didn't. But the margin is so small I call myself an agnostic. There is too much wiggle room for historicists to justify asserting that they are wrong. All we are justified in asserting is that they cannot assert that they are right. And that is an important logical difference--for not knowing who is right does not allow either side to claim victory. That is itself victory enough for Doherty in my opinion. But he seems to disagree.

Again, I said:

Is this not clear? Doherty's case is not strong enough to justify telling the historicists that their claim is incredible or refuted. That is a logical and empirical fact. Those who deny it are not being reasonable. But Doherty's case is strong enough to justify telling the historicists that their claim is not proved or certain, i.e. that they cannot tell ahistoricists that their claim is incredible or refuted. In other words, we are at an impasse, with a slight favor going to the ahistoricists but not enough to justify ridiculing or dismissing the historicists. We are in that vexing middle ground, not knowing for sure who is right. Anyone who is uncomfortable with the existence of such middle grounds is living a dangerous epistemology. All reasonable people accept that there is unresolvable uncertainty about many things, and thus they understand when people like me say there is unresolvable uncertainty about this one.

I go on:

That's simply the way it is. Bitch all you want to. It won't change the fact that this is as far as Doherty has really gotten, and no farther. Hence I disagree with anyone claims he has gotten farther than this. But I also disagree with anyone who claims he hasn't gotten this far--which is far enough, IMO, to destroy any reasonable hope that Christian belief rests securely on historical facts.

freigeister

Mr. Carrier has shown some courage in commenting on the limitations of the mythicist case. He also claims to be a historian. I wonder if he would have the grace to read a document that opposes the mythicist case, claiming that there is indeed sufficient evidence to believe in the historicity of Christ. The document I refer to is the appendix to Constantin Brunner's book Our Christ. I have placed it on the web in its entirety.

Toto

If you want Carrier (aiming for a PhD in history, Columbia) to comment, you will need to email him, as he does not usually browse these threads.

freigeister

So, what, he sends his comments in by telepathy?

Toto

When someone notifies him by email of a topic that he is interested in, he will respond here. But he does not lurk here.

You can find his email address here: Richard Carrier bio

Amaleq13

This seems to be an example of a ritual that is derived from a myth but not practiced consistently by all members of a given religion. Do you have examples of rituals that do not appear to have been derived from myth? It is my understanding that ritual is understood as an enactment of myth.

Is that true of the use of the entire phrase, though? It is my understanding that including "of the age" is what suggests to several scholars that mystical beings are the primary intended reference because that is why is meant in the majority of uses of the full phrase elsewhere.

Richard Carrier

This was written before WWII and is therefore hopelessly obsolete. It is completely incognizant of all the advances made in the sociology of religion and in ancient social history (two areas of inquiry that barely existed before the effect of the GI Bill on sociology and history). Indeed, it responds mostly to opponents whose own arguments are obsolete. It thus bears little relevance as a rebuttal to Doherty's thesis, which is rooted in contemporary historical research and method, which have both substantially if not radically changed things from where they stood in Brunner's day.

Not only is Brunner working with outdated scholarship, he is himself not a historian, but a philosopher. That in itself is not a problem if he takes historical method seriously and works as hard as a historian must, but it does not appear that he did. Indeed, his entire chapter is a sour rant that is shamelessly uncivil and bears all the marks of dogmatic blustering, rather than careful, sober scholarship. So not only was his material outdated, his work didn't even rise to the standards of his own day, much less those of the post-war generation who vastly improved both historical methods and facts.

Christians need to stop doing this. Every time we cite contemporary scholarship, they cite some near hundred year old work as a response. That's backwards. The old stuff has been refuted and superceded by the new stuff. So you can't cite the old stuff and pretend it is a rebuttal to the new stuff. It's the other way around. A more recent Christian writer, Blaikloch, is perniciously guilty of this tactic--indeed, he often doesn't even acknowledge the existence of any work done since the 19th century. It's as if Christians' only last hope is to pine for the good old days of sloppy methods and insecure facts (and uncivil rants!), as the only way to respond to the current state of things, which rests on perfected methods and secured facts and sober scholarship. I've seen this so often now, I just had to comment on the phenomenon in general.

You've got to do better than this, if you want anyone to take you seriously.

andrewcriddle

There are obvious problems with using older material. However, one early 20th century treatment that remains valuable IMHO is that of Schweitzer in chapters 22 and 23 of the 2nd (1913) edition of 'The Quest for the Historical Jesus'.

It is of course in some ways dated but is IMHO surprisingly relevant. Unfortunately it was never available in English until 2000 and is not widely known. (The standard Montgomery English translation of Schweitzer is based on the 1st (1906) edition which lacks these and other chapters.)

Andrew Criddle

Peter Kirby

That sounds interesting, Andrew. What exactly is given treatment in those chapters by Schweitzer?

best,
Peter Kirby