diana

Good morning, Chris.

That is what I'm not saying, Chris.

What I said was this:

A = I believe X is wrong.
B = I will not do X.

If A, then B (If I believe X is wrong, then I will not do X). This is my basic premise. By the same token, the inverse is true: If ~B, then ~A (If I will do X, then I do not believe X is wrong).

Now let's put a "I don't want to do X" into the equasion, as you appear to be hung on what you think I want to do. Let's make B = "I don't want to do X."

If A, then B (If I believe X is wrong, then I don't want to do X). If this is true--which it isn't--then only the inverse would be true: If ~B, then ~A (If I want to do X, then I believe X is right). For the record, this is just as untrue as its inverse; math is dependable that way.

However--and I cannot stress this enough--I have made no statement about what I want to do. I have spoken only of what I'm willing to do, and what those actions say about my personal moral code. Please stop conflating the two.

d

Viti

Rather than blanket statements about what is wrong, I try to base my actions on what I think is right, or at least more right in any given circumstance...then everything interplays. For example, I value honesty as well, but I don't say "Lying is wrong" because I can think of dozens of situations where lying might be the most moral choice (as you have already discussed in the OP).

Anyway, what was the question?

Unbeatable

That's the most reliable way for other people to infer your moral beliefs, since they don't have access to your subjective consciousness. But I don't understand why your actions would define your morality to you, as you don't lack that access. What makes a belief which is expressed externally more real than one which isn't?

I doubt that those people who are saying that they believe action X is wrong are actually doing X as they're typing the sentence, so there isn't actually a conflict. When they speak of what they believe, they're speaking of averages. Since people harbor various conflicting beliefs whose relative weights change from moment to moment, it's entirely possible that most of the time, the person's belief that X is wrong is stronger than their belief that it is right. It's only during those specific intervals when they get an urge to do X or they find themselves in a situation wherein X is apparently necessary that the weighting of their beliefs temporarily change to suit their actions. But after the situation's over, the weighting defaults back to what it was before. I guess one would call that compartmentalization.

The AntiChris

Good evening.
Ok, let's try again.

You said:
What you appear to be doing is going a little further than simply expressing your lack of understanding. What in fact you appear to be implying is that such people are actually being dishonest and it's this that I take issue with.

It seems to me, all you can say with any confidence is that anyone who says something is immoral but does it anyway, simply doesn't share your view of morality.

Chris

Jinksy

All that doesn't change the core problem Chris levelled at you. Imagine he'd simply responded to:

with

'The only way this makes sense is if, in your view, "I believe X is wrong" is synonymous with "I will not do X". I don't think most people see it this way.'

The simple reason we don't see it that way it that your usage doesn't correlate with popular usage (most people believe in the possibility of a situation where their selfishness and their morality conflict), or with any broadly accepted ethical theories.

If you say 'all cars are black' (whatever other properties they might also have), then people could spend a lifetime trying to persuade you that a 'car' is (for the sake of simplicity) a metal vehicle with four wheels, and they could never be 'right' according to you, because their definition wouldn't preclude non-black cars. But if no-one ever persuaded you that cars could be other colours, you'd still not have established anything except that according to your chosen definition, only black things could be cars.

You wouldn't be 'wrong', per se, since language has no inherent accuracy. But you'd have chosen a definition with no historical, logical or etymological justification, which no-one else shared with you.

Hence Chris' analogous comment that 'It seems to me, all you can say with any confidence is that anyone who says something is immoral but does it anyway, simply doesn't share your view of morality.'

And you can imagine how it might irk someone if they said they'd just bought a new car and, having seen its redness, you called them a liar. And it wouldn't exactly help matters if you tried to justify the description by saying,

'The irony here is, I'm attempting to apply common sense to the situation, while you're asking me to take on faith that you really do believe you own a car, even though it's not black.'

diana

I like that, Brandi. Succinct and reasonable.



I asked how a person can do something he says he believes is wrong. I suggested that his action indicates that he doesn't truly believe it's wrong.

By extension, this position implies that others could know just as much about our moral codes as we do--if not more. We have a tendency to see ourselves in the rosiest light available, despite evidence to the contrary. (It's a psychological phenomenon that has a name I forget; I just call it "I'm ok, you're an asshole.") All I'm suggesting is that we are not misguided to judge others' beliefs/morals through their actions. I learned long ago to ignore the smoke and mirrors that people will throw up; I will know what sort of person I'm dealing with by watching how he behaves--what he does and doesn't do. That is, I discover his true moral code--not the code he claims to have or thinks he has, but the one he applies...which strikes me as the only one that matters.

d

Excelsior

A = I believe X is wrong.
B = I will not do X.

You can take these two premises, and you can make a conditional. Is it sound?

Why does A imply B? Because you say so? What argument do you have for it?

Why must we never, or can we never, do what we believe is wrong? What is it about wrong actions as such that necessarily preclude us from doing them?

diana

When the belief that is expressed in words is contradicted by the person's actions, the words are the easiest to dismiss as incorrect. But you ask a very good question, Unbeatable: Why would your actions define your morality to you, since you have access to your subjective consciousness?

Because we tend to refuse to see ourselves in the best light possible, and play down or ignore the unseemly bits, we don't see ourselves internally with the full, unfiltered truth in all its messy glory. We all see ourselves as basically good, honorable people, regardless of the things we've done and the things we do now that would suggest otherwise. So how do you know what you really believe? The same way other people can tell: by watching your actions.

What a fascinating idea! 'Tis the curse of my fundamentalist upbringing that I still catch myself seeing things as black and white when I least expect it. But I think you're right. (And yes...I think I would call it compartmentalization. But I quite like the "grey area" notion of morals.)

Thanks much for the thoughts.

d

diana

That is the question, now isn't it? I've been waiting for someone to step forward with that. You win the prize. Good man.

I'm making the argument the best I can. Can you argue against it? I'm quite interested in solid arguments that would make me rethink this premise. So far, I've been told to take it on faith that people do what they honestly believe is wrong.

One must wonder how wrong you believe something is if you do it. To me, this is self-evident. With extreme cases, most people would agree that a person who states a belief that murder is wrong, then commits murder, has demonstrated his true belief. Why does this not hold true for less extreme examples? I think it does.

We do things others believe is wrong all the time. Why would you engage in an act you believe is wrong? Do you not think instead that you believe it's wrong in a general sense, but ok in certain circumstances (such as the ones surrounding your commission of the act just now)?

d

diana

I'm realizing this as we go. Honestly, it didn't occur to me when I began trying to explain this position how potentially offensive its implications were. Apologies.

I think we, as humans generally speaking, have a propensity to lie to ourselves without being aware of it. As I've stated, we tend to see ourselves in a flattering light, particularly when it comes to our moral codes. We like to believe we have very high ideals that are pure and clean and good. We don't like to consider the fact that our selfish needs and wants interfere with those ideals daily. And instead of acknowledging that all our moral decisions are tempered by our selfishness, and working with that as a moral framework, we set up simplistic and unworkable ideals, then make excuses for why we are unable to live up to them.

Yes, I generalize. This is what I see every day, and the impression I've gotten even stronger since starting this thread. Every rule has its exception.

That and he's a hypocrite.

I wasn't aware my posts were exuding confidence, Chris. This is just a thought I wanted to toss around and dissect with some intelligent people. It's a notion I've had for a long time, but I realize it's unprovable, unpopular, and may even be basically flawed. That's the whole point of the discussion.

d