Chimp

[1.] God is, by definition, the greatest possible entity, universally distributive, all inclusive; G[x] > x, where "x" is an aspect of existence, and G[x] is "total" existence.

God is that, which nothing greater can be concieved.

[2.] Assume it is possible that God, G[x], does not exist.

[3.] If [2.], then an entity greater than God is possible, because the entity would be greater than the all inclusive entity.

[4.] If [3.], then it is possible for an entity greater than the greatest entity possible.

[5.] But [4] is a contradiction, not logically possible.

[6.] Ergo, the assumption [2.] must be false.

[7.] Hence, the premise that God does not exist is false.

An all inclusive predicate G[x] appears to be quantity that refers TO itself, for example, what is the "meaning" of ... meaning? Ergo, G[x] is self referential, or "self aware".

This appears to be a meta-mathematical entity.

Meaning exists only with respect to axioms, or "rules", i.e. tautologies, which are the starting points in a logical system.

Meaning is subjective and relational and appears to be the product of mathematical truisms built into the very[self referential] fabric OF ...reality?

So meaning, being subjective, has an interpretive dimension, with varying magnitudes of importance, in accordance with the subjective entity/quantity in question.

For entity A, B > C

For entity B, A > C

For entity C, A > B


For meta entity G[x], collective entities A,B, C

A = B = C ?

It appears to be a very tricky question!

Which entity arbitrates the optimal value of individuals in the collective [A,B,C] ?

Does A, or B, or C, know the cognitive "state" of G[x], such that they are qualified to be the arbiter FOR G[x]?

So to say that 1 does not equal 2, is to state that 1 is different from 2. But from a more symmetric perspective 1 and 2 are aspects of a concept called "natural number" and they are equivalent in that respect.

A distinction is a specification, a definition. A "difference" from equilibrium. One side of an equation, which is a balancing effect.

The Bearded One

You've already made a category error. Let me try to expand upon your item [2] for the sake of clarity. Let us suppose that G[x] is incoherant such as "A><A". In this case, the mere fact that I exist has nothing to do with the incoherent concept G[x]. I am not "greater" than G[x], nor is G[x] an all-inclusive entity.

G[x] (and I'll assume that you're talking about some form of God here) has reality only in that real beings can use it as a concept. It is no greater a concept than Robin Hood or Gilgamesh (no insult intended to either of those fine concepts).

Thank you for trying, but this Ontological Argument fails in the same way as all prior ones. Existance of real beings does not spring forth from their conception any more than Yoda can step off of a movie screen.

-- The Bearded One

Chimp

G[x] > x

Let "x" be your existence. "x" is included in G[x].

If G[x] is incoherent, x is an aspect of an incoherent concept, but x exists and is coherent. Therefore the incoherence is an incomplete definition on the part of x, hence G[x] is necessarily and sufficiently coherent for x to exist.

Ergo G[x] is an all inclusive entity, greater than that which can be conceived by x.

The argument stands.

graymouser

You used logical-looking syntax to restate Anselm's ontological proof. How...quaint.

The hypothetical entity "God," in the hypothetical sense, has the quality of "exists." However, the hypothetical entity God, with all the qualities that it would have, is not actually instantiated in the world. In the hypothetical sense, it does not have the property "only hypothetical." However, in reality, it is uninstantiated because reality has precisely zero to do with the hypothetical space. God is unmatched in thought, but thought does not imply fact.

The ontological argument has been a cheat for centuries. It hasn't changed now.

-Wayne

Soralis

G[x] > x

Your argument is unclear though, do you mean that G[x] is an entity which exists that is > x, or that G[x] is the concept of an entity that would be > x? What [2] means depends on this definition, so I'll cover both possibilities.

Do you mean G[x] = nothing (non-existance), or do you mean that there is no entity that exists which is G[x]? If the first, then you've already contradicted yourself, [1] and [2] would be contradictory assumptions, if the second, then you run into problems with your next statement:

In order to clarify this, I'll just insert the two possible definitions I see in for [2.] (and substituting it's result for in place of god as well) in the statement above. The second part of your statement just seems to be redundant, since you defined god to be the all inclusive entity, so it would read "then an entity greater then god is possible, because the entity would be greater then god", so I'll just leave off the last part of it.

If you assume that [2.] means there is no entity that is God, then the first part of your statement becomes "if (there is no entity that is greater then everything), then an entity which is greater then (an entity greater then everything) is possible", which is about as clear a contradiction as you can get.

Assuming that [2.] means God = non-existant, then the first part of the statement would be "if (there is an entity which doesn't exist), then an entity which is greater then (an entity which doesn't exist) is possible". Yes, that would be true for any entity which exists in that case. Although [4.] certainly doesn't follow from this.

Any way you look at it, your argument is flawed and incoherant.

The Bearded One

First, I want to apologize. I was sleep depped when I posted my initial response, and I realized after logging off that G[x] could also refer to the universe as a whole. In that case, G[x] is not incoherent, but it would certainly lack the quality you describe here:
There is no reason to assign the quality of "aware" to the universe as a whole. In this hypothetical the definition of G[x] = "all". There is nothing which encompasses more than "all". "All" even includes minds, but there is no indication that "all" has a mind of its own.

Anyway, on to your newest....

Remember, we're talking about definitions here. So let's us an example that maybe we all remember from our logic classes. You say that an incoherent concept, say G[x] = married bachelors, cannot have coherent aspects; but married people exist (ie my brother) and bachelors exist (ie myself). Therefor, x can be coherent while G[x] is not. Your argument fails, except in the instance I cited at the top of this post.

-- The Bearded One

dshimel

You start with the assumption that God exists, and is greater than the universe. Of course any proof based upon that assumption will prove that God exists. It is, by definition, circular reasoning.

If God exists and is greater than the universe, then God exists and is greater than the universe.

Please try to prove the existance of God without starting with the assumption that God exists.

graymouser

dshmiel -

The Ontological Argument is a little more finely nuanced than that; it argues that the greatest conceivable being must necessarily exist. This is predicated on a few bad assumptions (specifically, that actual existence or nonexistence affects hypothetical perfection in some way, and that a hypothetical can necessitate an actual) but that God exists is not exactly one of them.

Ontological proofs don't work, but assuming the conclusion isn't always the reason.

-Wayne

atechnie

Define [1.] please.

What do you mean by "totality of existence"?

What kind of "God" are you talking about?

If I say the "totality of existence" = "God" = "a non-sentient ball of energy" OR "an ant" OR "a black hole" OR "some combination thereof," is that okay with you?

Or are you arguing that "the totality of existence" = "God" = "Christian God" OR "God of another religion"?

atechnie

dshimel

Yes, I know that, but his particular presentation of it is not so finely nuanced.

"[1.] God is, by definition, the greatest possible entity, universally distributive, all inclusive; G[x] > x, where "x" is an aspect of existence, and G[x] is "total" existence.

God is that, which nothing greater can be concieved.

[2.] Assume it is possible that God, G[x], does not exist. "

In [1] he is assuming G[x] exists, and in [2] he is assuming G[x] is God.

He is clearly assuming that which he is trying to prove.

By definition, the Invisable Pink Unicorn created God. IPU[x] > G[x] > x.

Therefore, existance proves God proves the Invisable Pink Unicorn. All I've shown is that by assuming IPU exists, I can prove IPU exists.