Bold

No, I suppose I am saying that if, morally, (1) should live, then it is a moral tragedy that (2) has died. This is given the moral significance of beta-sameness in making judgements about transporter operations.

Perhaps I should say ... a tragedy that (2) has "beta-died".

Let me put it another way. Your position seems to be that the survival of an alpha-same but not beta-same individual is not good enough. You would not use a transporter that offered only alpha-sameness, by scanning 5 minutes before destruction. (I wonder: what if the transporter simulated the evolution of the pattern for 5 minutes in software before reconstruction?)

My point is that beta-same survival is not possible anyway. There is only alpha-same survival. This seems to undermine your objection to the delayed destruction of the body in the transporter.

Chrysanfori

If the process of teleportation was to map my atomic structure, then break it down and transport the atoms for reassembly via some sort of frequency, then yes... I would be okay with that.

If the process was to actually destroy my original body and then have a clone of it assembled within the new location, then no. It is hard to explain why I am against this happening to me, though it would seem like my conscienceness is being destroyed and cloned -- spawning somebody who isn't actually me within the new location.

By the way, this topic reminds me of an acticle I read about biotechnology, where a man theorized that people will begin converting themselves into androids through a similar system -- the brain of the human person is mapped, with each brain cell being killed-off as it is copied into the android brain.

The AntiChris

Ok, I see where you're coming from and it seems I've not explained myself clearly.
I don't agree - at least not "died" in any standard sense of the word. See my post #83 where I explain that in one, important sense, we continue to exist (persist) as accumulated memories. On the other hand, when death occurs, memories are irretrievably lost.
That's right.
And as I have pointed out, I believe we do survive in the only relevant sense of the word.

I hope now you see that it clearly doesn't.

The fundamental difference here is that the delayed destruction of the body in the transporter inevitably results in the the irretrievable loss of all memories accumulated since the scan. This is a 'true' death.

I don't want to misrepresent your views, but I get the distinct impression that you see personal identity as somehow irrevocably tied to the actual atoms and molecules that we consist of, whereas I believe the actual atoms and molecules are irrelevant and that personal identity arises purely from specific patterns of atoms and molecules. This results in your view that personal identity is indivisible whilst I take the view that a specific personal identity will exist for every instantiation of a particular pattern (in theory, limitless).

Have I got this about right?

Chris

Juma

Why do you go to the movies? - To view a movie.
Why would you use a teleporter? - To be moved a different location: To experience the new location.

Do you believe that you are moved to a different location using the teleportation process as mentioned in the first post?

I dont, since the mind in the body that enters the teleportation boot will not experience a move to a new location.

The AntiChris

So what did you mean when you said in the OP that:

Chris

steamer

This topic is close to the digital immortality idea. Even if this other entity which is copied elsewhere thinks it is me, I will still be killed. I'm opposed to being killed.

35Kas

Points of argument:

1: For a timespan t>0 there was no phsysical nor psychological (consciousness and memories) existance in this universe, only a stream of energy containing the original's information and/or the latter and data with the original's information stored in a databank.

2: The original never experienced an actual move to the second location.

3: The copied pattern(s) is(are) the same of the original when it was scanned.

4: For two entities to be the same, they must be of exactly the same build, incluing all the information stored in it (atoms' spins, orbits, masses, positions relative to each other, etc.) and (4b) have exactly the same point of references in the universe at the same coordinate in space-time.

5: If #4 were to be true, it would be pointless to argue that two things are the same because they are the same single thing.

6: An entity exists if it is able to continually maintain its integrity (Either physical or psychological) as time moves forward and entropy increases.

7: #6 maintains for all of us because even though atoms are interchanged all the time and cells die and are born continuously, we are able to preserve our overall integrity, even if with increasing entropy, as old information is transfered to new material.

8: A copy with the exactly the same information as the original as established in #4 starting to exist in another coordinate in space-time with elapsed time t>0 after original's destruction without experiencing some sort of movement and stoping to exist with integrity as a person physically and psychologically leads to to the conclusion that the copy is not the same person because it does not satisfy #4b and #7.

I don't think it can be made any more clear than this.

Bold

OK that is a little clearer. Moral significance is attached to the survival of memories.

Suppose a drug is administered to a person that causes memories not to be stored for 5 minutes. Is that a similar crime to the destruction of (1)?

Or suppose (1) has that drug administered so that no memories are stored after the scan. Is it then OK to delay his destruction?

No, in fact I would be much happier using a machine that replaced all my molecules, 1 by 1, in situ, using some sort of molecule transporter. I expect there is probably sufficient redundancy in my makeup that I would survive such a procedure even if the process were a little less than perfect. And indeed molecules are replaced naturally anyway. What about larger chunks at a time? Without solving the problem of consciousness, I can't say.

Let me put it this way. 'I' am not just a particular pattern, I am a particular instance of a particular pattern. It is physically possible for other instances of the same pattern to exist elsewhere in the universe, nearby due to technology (supposing the OP), or remotely, naturally. Whether or not other instances of the same pattern exist does not affect me at all. (Spooky action at a distance!?)

Your are associating identity with the pattern, not the instance. For you, statements beginning 'I...' would refer to all the instances that might exist, many, possibly, that you are unaware of.

To me, your usage seems absurd - it refers to possibly multiple entities. It confuses a type with an instance of that type.

...

I take Searle's view that consciousness is a natural biological process. And that semantics is not an emergent property of syntax. My matter is not merely information, it is important that it remains matter.

If you take a different view, say functionalism, then I dare say you would have to conclude that transporters were safe. I consider that a problem with functionalism.

The AntiChris

Yes.
I'm not sure I understand the question. Do you mean we'd never remember the last 5 minutes of our lives?

If so, then it's not something I'd approve of but it's certainly not, in my view, equivalent to the irretrivable loss of memory that occurs when (1) is killed.
Of course not. You shouldn't assume that when I say memories accumulated post-scan are "morally significant" that they must be the only moral factors to be taken into consideration.

Clearly, if teleporter travel ever became a reality, the precise timing of the destruction of the original will be a hot ethical issue. Ideally, the original will be destroyed as soon after scanning as is practical.

So to answer your question, in my view, it is not "ok to delay his destruction" any longer than is absolutely necessary. If it were 'necessary' to delay destruction beyond, say, a few milliseconds, then the administration of a drug to maintain deep unconsciousness would be essential. Precisely how long we could acceptably delay would be a matter of balancing risk and moral discomfort against benefit.

I suspect that the level of moral discomfort would diminish proportionate to the increase in awareness of the benefits of teleportation.
Nothing I disagree with here. The only thing I'd add is that each and every instantiation of 'your' pattern would have the exact same sensation of "I".
Yes.
No. This is a basic misunderstanding.

This is an absurd strawman. The problem is that you're superimposing your concept of the indivisibility of personal identity over my pattern-based view and produced this ridiculous mischaracterisation.

For me statements beginning 'I....' refer only to the particular instance making the statement. In other word such statements refer to me and to no-one else.

In any event, you need to keep in mind that multiple instances of patterns will only remain identical (be the same person) at the instant of materialisation. From that point, as they experiece differing sensory input, they all develop divergent identities, although they'll all remain the same person that was scanned!
I'm not sure I understand.

Assume we scan and produce a copy which has, to all intents and purposes, maintained continuity of consciousness throughout the process. We allow the original to live.

I claim that, apart from their recollection of events post-scan, they have identical subjective experiences of personal identity and must be accorded equal status.

How do you view these two individuals in terms of 'type'/'instance of type' and how do I confuse these concepts?

Chris

kciredor reprah

I wonder would the old body feel the pain of being desentigated. Even if there is no pain involved, would the new body have any memories of going the the process of desentigration.

Peace