Amaleq13

Actually, "God" is only involved in my argument if it is asserted or assumed that God has perfect foreknowledge.

Given an opening assertion of perfect foreknowledge of the outcome, there is no possibility you could do otherwise for any apparent choice. Where is your freedom if you could never have chosen other than what was perfectly foreseen?

An appeal to the possibility of the "many universes" theory inspired by quantum physics doesn't really threaten my original statement. If perfect foreknowledge exists within any given universe, no choice made in that universe can be considered free if the outcome was known with certainty beforehand.

That an Amaleq13 in a parallel universe did not post a reply to your post does not make this Amaleq13 free to do the same. Both would be unable to choose otherwise if the outcome was known with certainty beforehand.

The universe was not free to do otherwise if it was to reach its present size.

If God knew with certainty that you would re-post this thread, there is no possibility that you could have done otherwise. Therefore, your "choice" to re-post cannot be considered free.

If God knew with certainty that you would not re-post, there is no possibility you could have done otherwise. Therefore, your "choice" to not re-post cannot be considered free.

Free will is only possible in a universe with uncertain outcomes. The asserted existence of perfect foreknowledge logically precludes uncertain outcomes. Therefore, a universe with perfect foreknowledge cannot also include free will.

ReasonableDoubt

"If God knew with certainty that you would not re-post, there is no possibility you could have done otherwise. Therefore, your "choice" to not re-post cannot be considered free."

Exactly right. There is no free will, only the illusion of it - compatibilism, instead, exists. We, as non-omniscient humans, are not aware of the fact that we could not have done otherwise- so to us, our choices seem free unless we feel coerced. Since most of our choices and actions do not seem coerced to us, we think we are freely choosing them, when in fact, we cannot do otherwise than what we do.

Amlodhi

Hello CJD,

This statement appears to be diametrically opposed to your previous argument but, perhaps I am simply misunderstanding your choice of terminology. As it stands, it reflects pure Calvinistic predestination in that as Calvin himself states:

I cannot, at this point, disagree that simple foreknowledge must necessarily preclude individual choice or "free will". However, if it is asserted that this foreknowledge is a subsequent artifact of God's fore-ordaining of these events, then it would seem, by definition, that any possiblility of personal choice would indeed be precluded.

Namaste'

Amlodhi

Vinnie

How does God exhaustively know something that hasn't happened in time yet? Its not something to be known.

It may be contended that God can know that the earth will still be revolving around the sun tomorrow. So he can know stuff that has not occured in time.

I reject this.

1) We know the same things. There is no special knowledge here. Rather than "knowing the earth will still be revolving around the sun tomorrow" we are "accurately prediction something with virtually 100% accuracy (as evidenced by the constancy of the laws of physics for billions of years).

2) The earth does not have free will to choose to revolve or not revolve around the sun tomorrow. Ergo, its path or behaviour, by definition, can be determined in advance by the equations of classical physics. It can be calculated.

The analogy is false. Something (especially a free choice) that hasn't happened in time yet is not something that can be known. God of course could still predict bahvior to a certain extent, even more so than humans can!

This of course is why I am an open view theist

Vinnie

CJD

In God's sovereignty and foreknowledge, I have freely chosen to re-post to this thread.

How could this be? Firstly, God has ordained whatsoever; he is not ordaining whatsoever. God is not "continually creating." We misunderstand Calvin if we take him to mean that God is a puppeteer. Don't underestimate the doctrine of Natural Law in Calvin (or me, for that matter). God does not "stir up the waters" with his giant finger (save for those rare occurrences described in Scripture).

He providentially, via Natural Law, predetermines the "system" in which free actions are made (these are those states of affairs that are logically necessary). His foreknowledge comes as a result of that predetermination. Thus one aspect of God's knowledge consists of both what I may or may not do—in every conceivable circumstance (i.e., counter-factual states of affairs). When God finally gets around to actually setting such things into motion (i.e., "creating"), he then has all future-tense states of affairs filling-up his knowledge. This is logically so because, quite simply, God was not bound to create a temporal world. And without a temporal world, there would be no foreknowledge of the kind you speak.

Fundamentally speaking, it should be obvious that such foreknowledge is an accidental byproduct of God's "pre-volitional" knowledge (that which he knew "before" his deciding to create). It plays no role in determining what the future will be like, for it (foreknowledge) "happens" too late in the logical equation to be of any use to God. Thus God's foreknowledge is neither the effect nor the cause of our future free actions. Rather, it is God's exhaustive knowledge of all counter-factual states of affairs that furnishes his ability to pre-determine all. Do you see how this creates at least a bit of potentiality or indeterminism?

I might add that "compatibilism" is not the same as "fatalism," and is thus not antithetical to "free will." Such betrays a misunderstanding of the relationship between volition and desire (i.e., agent causation).

p.s. Open Theists are closet Olympian-worshippers!

Regards,

CJD

Amlodhi

Hello Amaleq13,

I'm not sure if this must necessarily be the case even when restricted to a single manifest (uni)verse.

David Duetsch presents some interesting theories regarding this concept in his book "The Fabric of Reality". If I understand his position correctly, it is not the possiblility of different outcomes that would require a multiversal framework, but only a multiplicity of outcomes.

Say, for instance, that I were to devise a mechanism by which I could travel backwards two weeks in time. If I were then to interact with anyone, thereby changing the course of events from what they originally were, then rather than creating a paradox, I would simply be observing an alternate reality in an alternate multiversal plane than the one in which I originally inhabited.

If, however, I did not interact in any way with anyone, the sequence of events would remain the same and I would be observing myself and everyone else within the same original universe which led to my developing the time travel device.

In the two weeks prior to my developing the time travel device, everyone was acting according to their own free-will. Thus, I would be observing people acting of their own will while at the same time having perfect fore-knowledge of "future" events within a uni-versal framework.

Of course, since it is alleged that God does indeed interact, the problem remains how God can interact before he interacts. However, the above considerations do, at least, demonstrate that simple fore-knowledge (as opposed to fore-ordination) does not necessarily preclude freedom of choice in all cases.

Namaste'

Amlodhi

Amlodhi

A distinction needs to be made here between freedom to choose God's salvation and freedom of choice regarding the myriad details of everyday actions.

Calvin is speaking strictly within the context of any individual's ability to make a free-will choice regarding their salvational status. In this, he makes it very clear that man simply has no choice whatsoever in the matter.

While Calvin nowhere states that God has pre-ordained whether I will choose to fill up my automobile with regular or premium, on the matter of election he can scarcely be misunderstood.

Namaste'

Amlodhi

Amaleq13

Exactly!

This is also true if it the "ultimate reality" is one of complete physical determinism (contrary to the implications of quantum physics). It would still seem our choices are free but, for any entity capable of obtaining and understanding all the relevant information, they could be predicted with perfect certainty.

Amaleq13

As I understand the concept, multiple universes are suggested by quantum uncertainty. Quantum uncertainty suggests that all possible outcomes exist simultaneously which would seem to require multiple universes. I'm not clear how Duetsch's view changes the apparent contradiction between free will and certain foreknowledge.

This is why I stated earlier that "God" is not necessarily part of my argument. It doesn't matter who has the perfect foreknowledge (e.g. time traveller, alien, God), it is the simple fact of its existence that precludes free will. In your example above, you are violating the perfection part of the foreknowledge because, if the foreknowledge had been perfect, you would be incapable of enacting any change.

I'm not sure what you mean by "simple" but the foreknowledge that logically precludes free will is perfect in the sense that it cannot possibly be wrong.

If a time traveller comes back and states with total certainty that I will post to this thread, there is no possibility that I can do otherwise and, thus, my posting cannot be considered free.

It is the perfection more than the foreknowledge that creates the problem for free will.

Vinnie

It is my understanding of current scientific research that travelling backwards into time is in fact an impossibility. In that light, I do not see how an impossible thought experiemtn can serve as a valid apologetic that God can exhaustively know the future of ofe free-willed beings before they actually choose to do x, y or z.

i am not sure exactly what DD is trying to say. Can you provide another thought experiment (one that is actually possible) which demonstrates this.

Vinnie