Alonzo Fyfe

Among the errors contained in Heiro5ant's description of my view in his recent post, I want to make sure that one particularly significant error gets corrected early.


Okay . . .

WRONG

The whole project, from Day 1, has been to argue that statements containing words like "should" and "ought" have a truth value, and that some of them are true. This is wholly inconsistent with making the claim that we should abolish statements containing the words "should" and "ought" -- action-guiding statements.

I deny that "prescriptive" and "descriptive" are mutually exclusive categories. I view "prescriptive" and "descriptive" statements to view the same relationship as squares and rectangles.

All prescriptive statements are also descriptive, but not all descriptive statements are prescriptive.

[Similar to, "All tigers are cats, but not all cats are tigers." Certainly, it is absurd to interpret such a statement as saying that tigers are fictions and people ought to stop using the term. But it does imply that tigers that are not cats are fiction, and people should stop talking about THEM (if they ever did to start with)]

Morality is concerned with prescriptions.

Prescriptions are not fiction.

However, prescriptions that are not also, at the same time, descriptions are fiction in the same way that tigers that are not, at the same time, cats are fiction.

Nor do I "eschew any claims that his theory is an accurate descriptive theory". Desire utilitarianism is both accurately descriptive and prescriptive, at the same time. Though, here, I will deny that there is only one thing in the world worth describing, and that is how certain people have decided to use certain terms.

fast

And it's appreciated too! I read what he said five times verbally uttering, "WHAT?!?!"

Alonzo Fyfe

And another thing....

Hiero5ant, in one of our more recent exchanges, asserted that he considers "metaethics" to be concerned solely with the meaning of moral terms.

I, on the other hand, hold that "metaethics" is concerned primarility with moral ontology (what exists and what does not exist). The meaning of moral terms is subservient.

So, to an extent, what Hiero5ant is so concerned about proving is something I could not care less about. If Hiero5ant is right about the meaning of moral terms, it does not affect me one way or the other -- because what exists and what does not exist (ontology) is independent of what we call them.

If Hiero5ant were to repond to this by saying that it is illegitimate for me to call this "metaethics", I will answer with the same apathy over the meaning of philosophical terms that I recently expressed over the meaning of moral terms.

When I took courses in moral realism and intrinsic value in graduate school, they were offered under the general heading "meataethics". I continue to use these terms as they were taught to me. Since I did not go to school in some intellectual backwater (University of Maryland at College Park) I think that my teachers had an accurate understanding of how philosophers generally would interpret these terms.

Be that as it may, it is a waste of time to write more than a few lines on this specific question.

On the more general question of language, I think that more would be useful.

Language is a tool. As with all tools, we are free to modify it whenever we discover a modification that will allow us to use the tool more efficiently. Of course, 'efficiency' has to include the costs of retraining those who use the old tool how to use the new one. This cost sometimes outweighs the benefit of changing to a more efficient tool.

The people who originally designed our language-tool made some assumptions that were later shown to be in error. For example, they assumed that a group of symptoms common around those who live near swamps and other smelly places were caused by bad air -- so they called this set of symptoms "mal-aeria". When this error was discovered, we needed to make a change in our language-tool to more accurately describe reality (one of the purposes for which our language-tool was designed).

The people who originally designed our language-tool also made the false assumption that the smallest bits of any element could have no further parts, so they called these these "a - tom" (which was Greek for "without - parts"). They were wrong.

So, we made changes to improve our language-tool. Malaria is now only contingently associated with bad air, and atoms can now have parts.

Long philosophical discussions involving hundreds of thousands of words exchanged across several years about the true meaning of the words 'malaria' and 'atom' are, in my mind, have nothing but entertainment value -- and I do not find them entertaining.

So, I have no interest whatsoever in participating in such a debate. I would rather watch paint peel.

I would rather focus on what exists and what does not exist. And where our language is not an efficient tool for describing these things, we change the language.

Hiero5ant appears to be of the opinion that statements containing moral terms are more like groans, grunts, and giggles -- they have no truth value.

First, I disagree, for reasons that I stated elsewhere. Whenever people use moral statements they treat them in all regards as truth-bearing propositions. However, I think that this debate is a side-show; a largely insignificant diversion.

Second, and more importantly, it does not matter. I have defined my terms, and anybody who reads those definitions knows that I am talking about a broad based general theory containing truth-bearing propositions.

(1) If Hieor5ant is of the opinion that I am talking about these grunts, groans, and giggles when I use moral terms, he needs to read more carefully. I have defined my terms, and they do not include such things.

(2) If Hiero5ant is of the opinion that my use of moral terms without referring to these grunts, groans, and giggles is illegitimate, he is incorrect. There is no "legitimate" way to design a tool, except according to whether it does the job it is designed for efficiently. Even if Hiero5ant is right about the above statement, my use of moral terms is no more "illegitimate" than that of the computer industry using the term "virus". Nobody even thinks to raise the objection, "You cannot use that term because nobody up until now has ever used the term 'virus' to refer to malicious code. A 'virus' is a living entity, and your malicious computer code is not a living entity, so it cannot be called a virus."

(3) If Hiero5ant is of the opinion that I use my terms inconsistently -- that I equivocate between "truth-bearing proposition" definitions and "non-truth-bearing grunts, groans, and giggles" definitions, then I invite him to identify specifically where I have been inconsistent. Show me the quote, and then show me how the quote requires a shift in meaning from the first type to the second type.

(4) If Hiero5ant is of the opinion that, even though I do not equivocate myself in how I use the terms, that I invite others to equivocate and confuse the two meanings, I answer that this is no objection to the theory. This objection could be used to argue that I am a poor writer, but it cannot be used to argue that my propositons are false or that my arguments are invalid. This is the strongest criticism that his particular line of argument can make against me -- that I could have expressed myself better if I used different terms.

(5) If Hiero5ant is of the opinion that I log into this web site and post my articles because I get some sort of thrill in intentionally causing others to equivocate between definitions, I can offer some non-printable suggestions as to what he can do with those accusations.

Of these five options, only the third would count as a valid criticism of my theory.

Concering item (4), I do not wish to be a poor writer. So, yes, I am interested in what comes to peoples' minds as I use certain terms. But it is a side topic -- something that has interest in the same way that I would want to use an easily readable font.

But, still, my primary concern remains the truth of the propositions I defend here and the validity of my arguments. Only objections fitting category (3) have any relevance here.

I can illustrate this point with a claim that Hiero5ant made about metaethics. He reports being surprised that after several exchanges in several threads and a formal debate on metaethical issues, that I would say that metaethics is a waste of time.

A more accurate description of events is that Heiro5ant considers metaethics to concern only questions about the meaning of words. I, on the other hand, consider metaethics to be concerned primarily with moral ontology and epistemology with a corresponding (but secondary) conern with the meaning of moral terms.

I can only assume that, in our debates, Hiero5ant has been discussing what Hiero5antian metaethics, I have been discussing Fyfian metaethics. The two subjects overlap to a degree that we did not realize we were talking about different things, until lrecently.

Hiero5ant will claim that he knows the one true definition of 'metaethics' and that I used the term inappropriately. I believe that he is mistaken. I would be surprised that after 12 years of college (6 years of graduate school) specializing in the subject of moral philosophy, that I am mistaken on what will come into the average philosophy professors' mind when I use the term metaethics.

However, is the issue of what 'metaethics' means worthy of a formal debate and a set of exchanges spanning several threads? It seems to me to be a huge waste of time. Even if Hiero5ant is right, the worst charge that can be leveled at me as a result is that I am a poor writer who has not used a particular word "correctly". Ultimately, it makes little difference. The unfortunate reader simply has to think to himself whenever he reads the word "metaethics" as a part of one of my posts, "Oh, yeah, when Alonzo uses the word 'metaethics', he includes moral ontology and epistemology in the theory. It isn't just about the meaning of words."

Once the knows my error (if there is an error), he can continue reading -- mentally translating the near-English language that I am writing in into English.

This is the worst that can be said against me if Hiero5ant is right.

Now, I am going to continue to use the term 'metaethics' as I have been using it, because I believe that Hiero5ant is not correct. I think that my use of the term "metaethics" will not generally cause people to think that I am talking only about the meaning of moral terms, and that switching to Hiero5ant's definitions will make my writing more confusing to most people, rather than less confusing.

As I said above, even if Hiero5ant is right about the meaning of moral terms or the meaning of the word "metaethics", the worst that this implies against me is that I am a poor writer. It does not imply -- it does not even take a step towards implying, that the propositions that I write are false.

Alonzo Fyfe

could you explain to me how this proposition that nonfalsifiability is a fatal flaw is falsifiable?

If I were to offer you a counter-example, my guess is that you would reject it. And you would do so on the basis that "unfalsifiability is a fatal flaw". However, this makes "falsifiability is a fatal flaw" itself unfalsifiable.

It appears that one would be advised to say of this unfalsifiability criterion, "They're not rules, exactly. They're more like guidelines."

Now, let us look at the principle, "The acceleration of an object through space is equal to the vector sum of all of the forces acting upon it."

Now, we find an example of an object moving through space whose movement is not equal to the vector sum of the forces acting upon it.

Do we hold the principle to be falsified?

No. We say, "Hey, there is a previously unknown force out there," and physicists immediately start the hunt. The proposition about the relationship between acceleration and force is unfalsifiable.

Isn't this what we do with dark matter? We hold that a certain relationship between mass and acceleration exists. We look out into the universe and collect observations that the acceleration we see is not consistent with the mass that we are aware of. We do not say that this falsifies our hypothesis. We say that there is "dark matter" out there that we can't see.

Maybe this is the will of God holding the universe together?

The debate between evolution and intelligent design hinges around the same issue. We have a theory of evolution that explains and predicts the changes in species over time. Yet, there are some things it has difficulty explaining. Do we use this to falsify the theory of evolution? Or do we instead say, "Here is a feature of evolution that we do not understand yet?" Scientists pick the latter. Intelligent design picks the former. Which is correct?

Indeed, this identifies the core objection to intelligent design as a scientific theory. The biologist looks at it and asks, "What do I do if I come up with a question I can't answer, throw my hands up and say, 'God did it?'". Intelligent design offers no way to generate falsifiable propositions.

At the core of every discipline there is a set of principles that are not falsifiable. They can still be tested. However, their test is not a test of falsifiability. Their test is in their usefulness.

Ptolomy's theory about the earth being the center of the universe was never falsified. Adherents to the theory had the option of adding epicycles upon epicycles to account for any set of observations. The reason that the geocentric theory of the solar system was abandoned was not because it was falsified, but because astronomers did not want to do as much math.

It is simpler.

Consider, then, the idea that "All things being equal, the simplest explanation is the best." Or the principle, "Never add entities beyond those strictly needed to explain the phenomena in question."

How do you falsify these principles?

Evolution does not defeat intelligent design because the theory of evolution itself is falsifiable but has not yet been falsified. It defeats intelligent design because it is a first-level (unfalsifiable) theory that is nonetheless extremely useful in generating second-level falsifiable propositions.

The same is true of the proposition, "The acceleration of an object through space is equal to the vector sum of the forces acting upon it." This gives us a way of verifying or falsifying the statement, "The forces acting on O are F1, F2, F3, F4." The principle tells us that we can verify or falsify this statement by seeing if the acceleration of O is equal to the vector sum of F1, F2, F3, F4. If this does not add up, we have not "falsified" the principle about the vector sum of forces and acceleration. We have, however, falsified the thesis about which forces are acting on this object.

Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) theory functions at the same level. Like the theory of evolution, it is not itself falsifiable. However, it is an extremely useful framework for generating second-order propositions that ARE falsifiable.

We take a person's actions and we explain them in terms of beliefs and desires. We use a principle like, "A person acts to fulfill the more and the stronger of his desires, given his beliefs." (This is analogous to "the acceleration of an object through space is equal to the vector sum of the forces acting upon it.")

This means that we can now take a hypothesis such as "Agent A desires D1, D2, D3, and D4, and believes B1, B2, B3, and B4" and use it to make a prediction of how that agent will act. (This is analogous to "The forces acting on O are F1, F2, F3, and F4).

If our observations do not match our predictions, the first-order principle tells us that we were mistaken about the beliefs and the desires acting on the agent. (This is analogous to discovering that our observations of an object moving through space does not match the vector sum of the known forces acting upon it telling us to look for another force.)

This is not to say that BDI Theory (like evolution or the basic principles of physics) can't be defeated. At this level, the basic test is not one of falsifiability. At this level, the basic tests are those of parsimony, simplicity, robustness, and fecundity.

On these measure, nobody here has offered a better theory.

Alonzo Fyfe

I do not understand how your example is supposed to prove your thesis.

Every one of your possible interpretations identifies a set of beliefs and desires that explain a particular action.

The first is a desire to drink.

The second is a desire to prove a rhetorical point and a belief that uttering the statement "I want a drink" will be useful in making that point.

The third is a desire that I express a particular attitude towards you and a belief that supplying you with a drink expresses that attitude.

In all three cases, "I want (desire) a drink" is still a statement about the mental states (the beliefs and desires) of the agent. So, how is this example supposed to demonstrate that such statements do not refer to the mental states of beliefs and desires?

This is what I meant when I said that BDI Theory is the theory of everyday language. It is that common speach -- what you hear people do every day (and what you do as well) is explain intentional action in terms of beliefs and desires. These terms are used as a part of a theory that, in turn, is used to explain and predict behavior. It generates propositions that produce counterfactuals capable of verification or falsification. That is how the concepts of "belief" and "desire" work in everyday language.

Now, I will grant that people may not know that they are referring to mental states (or, more precisely, brain states). They may think that they are referring instead to soul-states or some component of a "free will" (whatever that is). However, that is not the question. The question is whether the statement refers, in fact, to brain states.

Bringing what the agent thinks he is referring to into the discussion is to commit the 'masked man' fallacy. It is to argue that "the masked man cannot be the mayor's brother, because the sheriff did not know that the masked man is the mayor's brother." Whether the masked man is the mayor's brother is true or false independent of what the sheriff believes to be the case. Whether beliefs and desires refer to brain states is true or false independent of what speakers believe to be the case.

When you identify the masked man as the mayor's brother, it does not matter that the people you tell your theory to say, "That can't be true! None of us here who have been talking about the masked man had the slightest inkling that we were talking about the Mayor's brother. In fact, we all know and like the mayor's brother and would have immediately and could not even imagine that the masked man was the mayor's brother. On this evidence alone, we can dismiss your claim that the masked man is the mayor's brother."

This is NOT a valid counter to the thesis that the masked man is the mayor's brother.

Another relevant counter-example to the claim that what people think they are doing is relevant evidence against a theory about what they are doing in fact is a bicycle analogy that I have frequently used. Ask most people how they keep their balance on a bike, and they report that they do so by shifting their weight from side to side. You would think they know how they keep their balance, but they do not. In fact, they keep their balance by turning the front wheel and using inertia to carry them back and forth over the center of gravity. They do not know this. They cannot report correctly what they are doing when they ride a bike.

They cannot report correctly what they are doing when they employ the concepts of beliefs and desires. But we can look at what they are doing and find out. The fact that they report something else is irrelevant.

If we look at what they are actually doing, they are using the concepts of belief and desire to generate falsifiable propositions that can be used to explain and predict the behavior of other people. These propositions, in turn, produce counterfactuals which can be tested to determine if the original propositions are true or false.

One relevant point to make here is that there are two different senses of the word 'desire': desires-as-means and desires-as-ends. Whether we desire something as a means or an end, we use the same term, leaving the statement somewhat ambiguous.

The statement, "I want a hammer" almost always expresses a desire-as-means. The speaker has some other desires-as-end in mind and believes that if he had a hammer he would be able to better obtain what he desires as an end. He may want the hammer in order to club his annoying business partner over the head. His "desires-as-end" is an end to whatever unpleasantness his business partner is causing him. His desire for a hammer is a "desires-as-means".

In your example, we cannot tell on the surface whether the person stating, "I want a drink" is talking about a desires-as-ends or a desires-as-means. However, the ambiguity of the statement does not change the fact that both options lead, ultimately, to it being a statement about a set of beliefs and desires.

Hiero5ant

Absolutely no worries whatsoever. If you think your responses have been "slow" relative to the demands of some ideal posting interval, my responses in this thread are shaping up to be truly glacial in pace. Just as an FYI, my schedule this summer is beyond bizarre, so responses might be weeks apart. This will have to be a slow and leisurely thread as opposed to the good ole days of the fast and furious "post-response-post-response-post-response" era. But points will almost certainly go unadressed, and prioritization will be haphazard, so it's fair to consider any point I leave unanswered to be provisionally conceded (except, of course, for the ones upon which I am so obviously and scintillatingly brilliantly correct...)

Alonzo Fyfe

Well, no such assumption will be drawn.

I, personally, dislike the habit of attempting to refute every statement in a posting with which I disagree. To kill somebody else's post, one good sharp blow through the heart should do it. You don't need to go through and stab every single organ to get the job done.

So, any point that goes unanswered will be considered unimportant, while you focus on the kill shots instead.

BillyTheKat

No, but since it's not my claim, I don't feel any obligation to do so. I am not saying that unfalsifiability is a fatal flaw in every circumstance; I am saying that it is a fatal flaw for BDI as a descriptive theory of human action.
We assume that people act in a manner which is consistent with their internal states, and although we have no way to examine those internal states, the general predictability of behaviour suggests that this is the case; or rather, the utility of acting as if this is the case is greater than the utility of acting on the basis that behaviour is unpredictable (we focus on the predctability of behaviour and ignore the instances of unpredictability).

The study of the naive (in the natural and unaffected sense of the word) assumptions and attributions that people make about the world around them is known as folk psychology; BDI originates out of this discipline, and is but one taxonomy of these internal states that we attribute physical behaviour to. So if we define internal states as beliefs and desires, then of course people act in terms of beliefs and desires. If we define these states as beliefs and information—people act in a manner which is consistent with their beliefs and the information is available to them— then people act in terms of beliefs and information.

We might agree a good theory of human action should seek to correlate internal factors with external actions. That human action results from internal factors is our meta-theory, if you like. However, this doesn't mean that any theory which correlates internal factors with external actions is a good theory. Whilst BDI is as good as any other taxonomy of internal states, it fails, as do all theories of rational action, because it doesn't account for other components of action such as emotion, or unintended/non-conscious action, or the effects of group action and membership. In fact, the assumptions that BDI requires us to make—ie. the specific role of beliefs, desires and intentions—precludes the possibility of unintended/non-conscious action, or the effects of emotion &c &c. This is why I claim that claim that BDI is fatally flawed as a descriptive theory. The flaw is not simply that we carnt establish the existence of the entities that are alleged to be responsible for behaviour, but also because these claims are insufficient to account for all of human action, and, in fact, deny the possibility of any form of human action other than what is accounted for in the explanation.

This is probably a result of the screaming error I make when I say, 'but what it doesn't mean is "My current mental state disposes me to find and consume a drink."' Given that stating a belief or desire is a mental state is exactly the same as stating that one has a belief or desire, then of course stating, "I want a drink" is exactly the same as stating "My current mental state is...".

This is not the nature of my objection. My objection is to your claim that; I have no objection to claiming that desires are mental states, because to say that one has a mental state of [a] desire is simply another way of saying one has a desire. However, it is confusing to compare mental states with physical states such as solids, liquids, gas or air. There are physical states which are involved in behaviour, but these are not like mental states (and it is certainly not a masked man fallacy to differentiate between the two). As a (possibly over-simplistic) example, we might describe someone's mental state as delusional. We might attribute that mental state to the physical state of a surfeit of a particular neurochemical. We might also treat the mental state by the use of a drug which prevents production of the particular neurochemical. But we would not assume that the two states are the same, because we know that similar physical states in other individuals produce different mental states.

So my objection is as follows: if you want to describe the physical states involved in action as desires and beliefs, then fine, but then you cannot claim that BDI is the everyday language of beliefs and desires. The everyday language of beliefs and desires refers to mental states, not physical states.

Brain states are something else entirely; they are neither mental states, nor physical states. The best description would be that they are the sensation of certain properties of physical states. Being relaxed is a brain state; feeling sleepy is a brain state; feeling full of energy is also a brain state. Desires and beliefs are not brain states.

Alonzo Fyfe

Nothing in the theory requires that a person is conscious of a belief or a desire. A desire is a disposition to act so as to make true a proposition. A person can act so as to make true a proposition without being conscious of the fact that he is doing so.

[In fact, I believe that there is reason to doubt that 'consciousness' exists at all.]

Psychological research has provided convincing evidence that, even when we seek to explain and predict our own behavior, we form a theory (in terms of beliefs and desires), and that theory may or may not be correct. We have no special knowledge or direct access as to what our own beliefs and desires are. Instead, we form a theory based even on our own behavior, as we form a theory about the beliefs and desires of others based on their behavior.

All of this is perfectly compatible with BDI Theory.

As for emotions, I do not see these as being anything more than physical symptoms associated with patricular combinations of beliefs and desires. Fear of X is an aversion to X (a desire that not-X) associated with higher pulse, adrenaline secretions, and the like. Whereas disgust at X is a desire that not-X associated with a different set of physical symptoms.

Now, if you want to argue that this is not a perfect theory that fully accounts for all observed behavior, I will agree with you. Yet, Newton's theories were not able to fully account for all astronomical observations either.

I fully expect that a better theory will come along some day -- an 'einsteinian' counterpart to our current 'newtonian' theory. When it does, any theory attached to this model will also have to change.

However, the existence of problems is only a reason to throw out a theory if another theory that has fewer problems is available. As far as I can tell, no 'einsteinian' counterpart to this theory yet exists. Therefore, we are stuck with using this 'newtonian' model, in spite of its flaws, until then.

And it does a good enough job, in our day-to-day lives. It has served us quite well in explaining and predicting the behavior of those we share our community with. It does what it needs to do.

One final point. If we are going to under stand "common-sense" morality, it makes sense that this is going to be compatible with "common-sense" psychology. Desire utilitarianism, I would argue, draws a very tight connection between the two. Furthermore, it does not require strange entities such as free will, intrinsic value, or the like. It explains the role of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment in ethics (as instruments to be used to alter maleable desires -- promoting those desires that fulfill the desires of others, and inhibiting those desires that thwart the desires of others). It explains the concepts of moral responsibility (or culpibility). It explains "ought' implies "can", justification, and the types of arguments that people tend to draw upon in defending moral claims.

As I said, the thesis, "It is flawed, therefore it is to be abandoned," is a weak argument. As soon as a better theory exists, I will be all for abandoning this one. Until that better theory exists, the claim that we abandon this one is as flawed as the claim that people in the 1800s should have abandoned Newtonian physics.


The purpose of my comparison was simply to illustrate the difference between an object, an event, and a state.

Hiero5ant interpreted me as saying that the terms 'belief' and 'desire' referred to objects -- which he found objectionable. He suggested that the terms refer to events.

My response was that his interpretation of my view, and his alternative, were both flawed -- that the terms 'belief' and 'desire' referred to states. I then felt that I needed to explain what a 'state' was -- to illustrate how a term can refer to something real, but which is neither an object or an event. I felt that a reference to the concepts of solid, liquid, and gas would best illustrate the concept of a state.

That is all the reference was meant to do -- to help define the concept of a 'state' as something that is not an 'object' or an 'event'.


If you are claiming that I cannot truthfully say that people, when they use the terms 'belief' and 'desire', consciously acknowledge that they are referring to a physical state of the brain, then, of course this is true. I would be foolish to deny it.

However, my claim is that these physical states do all of the things that 'beliefs' and 'desires' do. So, when people use these terms 'belief' and 'desire', they are referring to physical states, whether they are consciously aware of the fact or not.

These are the same claims that I have made with respect to the "masked man fallacy". People who have been talking about the masked man may have had no conscious awareness of the fact that they were referring to the mayor's brother. They may have even emphatically denied the connection -- as in, "No, the mayor's brother could not possibly be the masked man.". Yet, as a point of fact, it may turn out to be the case that the masked man really is the mayor's brother.

The statement, "Mental states are brain states" is true in the same manner as the statement "The masked man is the mayor's brother" is true.

This referrs, I think, to the distinction between type-type identity theory and token-token identity theory. Type-type identity theory does not require that a mental state refer to exactly the same physical state. It is confortable with the possibility that a desire, for example, can refer to a type of state that has many different tokens. What qualifies a state for a type are certain elements (not all elements, but a subset of elements) in how it functions.

A desire that 'P' in one instance may be altered through drugs. A different desire that 'P' in a different agent may not be susceptible. Yet, they both still qualify as a "desire that 'P'" because they dispose the agent to make or keep 'P' true.


It appears here that you are relating the concept of "brain states" to qualia -- a feeling, experience, or sensation.

I have actually found no use for 'qualia' and, like 'consciousness', I am sympathetic to the idea that these entities do not exist.

I am also sympathetic to the objection that, "If you deny qualia and consciousness, you are denying what is right there for everybody to see. You experience qualia and consciousness directly, yet you deny their existence."

Yet, I am also aware of the fact that people say the same thing about God, that they can sense God directly and that anybody who denies His existence is like the person whose eyes are open but who refuses to acknowledge what he sees.

These are questions that an 'einsteinian' alternative to our 'newtonian' BDI Theory will have answers to, but which do not yet have answers. I am willing to leave them alone, and continue to work with our 'newtonian' BDI Theory until some breakthrough occurs.

But . . . even with Einstein's theory fully supported, we still use Newtonian physics in our day-to-day life. This is because so few people can understand Einsteinian theory, and Newton's theories give us answers that are good enough for all practical purposes.

Morality is, necessarily, an everyday practice. So, I have a feeling that, even if an Einsteinian theory of the mind comes along, the practice of morality will still be tied to the practice of BDI Theory, because it will continue to yield answers that are close enough to the truth for all practical purposes.


Author's Note: Whew! You know, it has been years since I have been required to discuss such issues as qualia and type-type vs. token-token identity theory. I'm a bit rusty.

Adrian Selby

I'd just like to butt in and concur with Hiero5ant regarding my own problems with Alonzo's DU. As went unaddressed in the thread about evaluating desires linked to above in one of Alonzo's posts, it appears to me that if we accept that it is tough to get an objective view on what a good desire is, what we actually have is a subjectively determined judgement on how the calculus operates. What I determine as a good desire is thus subjectively determined.

Ultimately, if the goal is to find out which desire will net fulfil more desires than it thwarts, it is more effective to acknowledge the impossibility of the general and review what desires are good on an act by act basis, i.e. assess the likely implications of a given act in determining whether it will accrue a greater fulfilment of desires, and thus determine the desire to do that act as good on that basis.

Alonzo acknowledges the huge difficulty in determining whether abortion is generally right or wrong, I'm suggesting that his theory isn't of much utility in helping us determine what we ought to do, and furthermore, isn't really how we go about determining what we ought to do. In other words, when I consider what desires are worth promoting, I find it inappropriate to find a general rule, and instead would focus on what will in my judgement be most likely to yield a net positive outcome and go with that. Thus, if I am to ascribe 'goodness' to an act or desire, I don't try to figure out the 'sum of all desires fulfilled or thwarted' as this is beyond the scope of my mind, rather, I figure out in concentric circles the 'wins' of a given desire being enacted, and even those concentric circles are subjectively decided.

Of course, we have at some point to determine generalities for the sake of law and rules that a society lives by, but this isn't the same as identifying these such that the promotion of them does anymore than ensure adherence to any given moral code. After all, it isn't clear that in following any given law we can be sure that it will lead to a net increase in desires fulfilled.